"Skirmish fire........how effective was it?" Topic

I have been looking at various rulesets treatment of skirmishers on Napoleonic battlefields and am wondering about its real effectiveness.

Has anyone found good accounts from troops under sustained skirmish fire? I am of the opinion that such fire should have a morale/disorganisation rather than casualty rate impact. Also that it would be more serious at company/battalion level than brigade or division.

So in game terms, a unit under skirmish fire and unable to respond in kind would become disorganised (loss of officers) and/or demoralised…but to what extent?

Skirmish fire could be very effective. Close order units could certainly be demoralised and disorganised by skirmish fire.

Actual effectiveness would depend on a variety of factors such as number, terrain, time available, nationality of firers and their targets.

That it could be very damaging is shown by the fact that it was frequently considered necessary to drive them off, either by deploying their own light troops or light cavalry.

Skirmishers had two functions though, of which causing casualties was only one. The other was the gathering of information, and preventing the enemy from getting close enough to do the same.

Rob,
Some of the references made recently to the Jena-Auerstadt video have related to this subject.
Seems as though we have in the various accounts by Marwitz some very good indication as to the overall effectiveness of skirmisher fire and supporting divisional artillery at Jena. The French skirmishers took particular aim the officers in Grawert`s division but the end result and effects seem to have felt by the whole Prussian command. Although I suspect the less controllable canister fire was probably more generally directed at each battalion, or even particular companies, it would have made for more casualties than the musketry.
In game terms, it depends on the detail of the system being used; a morale-based rule set would somehow have those two arms having different effects on the same enemy target, or different rules to give the same effect.
I`m guessing a bit, but rather than being concetrated at single points, the French artillery involved at Jena may have been used in sections across the front of the first line of skirmishers and in an organisation integrated with them. So their combined effects on the units concerned; loss of casualties and the loss too of the steadying influence of officers amounted to the same result – a deteriorating state of order and morale.

Skirmish fire discourages the receiver from doing nothing. You can't rest when under skirmish fire or rally. You can't hold your position indefinitely. The unit will eventually have to deal with the skirmishers and that can mean either sending out a small force that can be overwhelmed, committing the entire force in a risky manner, or withdrawing.

If I wanted a portion of my opponent to sit tight and defend useless ground, I would not move skirmishers against them. If my opponent had everything in his favour and I needed him to make some mistakes, I would send in skirmishers to get him to make decisions and thereby mistakes. The skirmishers don't need to be decisive but they need to be annoying enough that the status quo is not an option.

You can't rest when under skirmish fire or rally

Troops have held position under artillery fire so why would
they be so concerned with skirmishers?

Ok, they may deploy their own light company but that does not force them to change position.

Why should the defender's force be overwhelmed and not your own light troops?

I cannot see a skirmishers alone stopping troops from rallying, cavalry may keep them moving but skirmishers in open order and having to stop to reload?

I would be very concerned if a set of rules worked in the way you suggest.

The main purposes for skirmishers are to screen your own force from the enemy's scouts, and, more importantly, to force the enemy to deploy, rather than remain in maneuver columns. The skirmishers should be though of more as a mobile, heavy piquet line, a trip wire, if you will. Causing casualties is a side benefit of them, not the primary function. Causing your enemy to commit forces, to deploy before he was ready, to change/alter his plans, etc, and also to slow down the enemy advance are all part and parcel of the skirmisher's duties.

Skirmishers are a nuisance, but they are not a deadly threat. If I were designing a set of rules, I would handicap them from causing casualties and instead use them to force movement reductions and formation changes on troops within their range.

respects,

Here are some direct Website quotes from history :

A Prussian officer described the French tirailleurs and their methods of skirmish combat (1806):
"However, from a great distance, the bullets of French skirmishers already reached us; they were placed formidably in the front of us laying in the field and bushes; we were unacquainted with such tactics; the bullets appeared to come from the air. To be under such fire without seeing the enemy made a bad impression of our soldiers. Then, because of the unfamiliarity with this sort of fighting, they lost confidence in their muskets and immediately felt the superiority of the adversary. They therefore suffered, already being in a critical position, very quickly in bravery, endurance and calmness and could not wait for the time to fire themselves which soon proved to be to our disadvantage."
Several other examples below:

- In 1806 at Jena, French skirmishers took on enemy's line infantry deployed in open field. Maude described this action: "Now followed one of the most extraordinary and pitiful incidents in military history. This line of magnificent infantry, some 20,000 strong, stood out in the open for 2 hours whilst exposed to the merciless case and skirmishing fire of the French, who behind garden walls offered no mark at all for their return fire. In places the fronts of the companies were only marked by individual files still loading and firing, whilst their comrades lay dead and dying around them." (Maude – "The Jena Campaign, 1806" p 156)

- Petre described on p 137 in "Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia" another action of French tirailleurs at Jena: "Harassed by a galling fire from the swarms of skirmishers in and on either side of Vierzehnheilegen and unable to return it, the Prussian infantry was already shaken and demoralised before it was ready to begin volley firing. Even when it did begin, the fire had little effect on the French skirmishers, adepts as they were in finding cover in the gardens and potato fields or behind the walls of the village." and on p 178: "The Prussian attacks on Vierzehnheilegen were a good example of the impossibility of succeeding with the parade-ground tactics of the Seven Years War. The unhappy Prussians, attempting solemnly to form line before opening fire, were decimated by the fire of the French, ensconced behind the walls of the village and the gardens, or hidden in the furrows of the potato fields."

- Englishman Sir F. Ponsonby was an involuntary witness to French skirmishing at Waterloo.
He found himself wounded and immobilized in a sector of battlefield occupied by French skirmishers. One of these threatened to kill him and demanded his money; Ponsonby let himself be searched …. A second skirmisher with the same intentions arrived but left disappointed after an even more meticulous search of colonel's person. Stll later, another skirmisher came by and decided to use the immobile Ponsonby as a screen ! He stayed for a long time, reloading and firing over Ponsonby's body again and again, and conversing with great gaiety all the while.

- At Waterloo after one of the attacks on Hougoumont, many French skirmishers instead of withdrawing to their own lines, climbed the slope in the direction of the British and German positions, concealing themselves amid the high-standing grain. British battery of 6 9pdrs under Lt.-Col. Webber-Smith suffered casualties when the French tirailleurs opened fire. In the course of a few minutes, many gunners and horses were hit, and Webber-Smith had to give orders to limber up the guns and very quickly abandon the position.

- At Waterloo the enormous number of French skirmishers in action, together with the intensity of an artillery fire, had caused an unusual pessimism to spread among the British officers. Col. Gould confessed that he found this situation desperate. Not the least of his reasons was his belief that the only road through the forest would be bottled up in an instant. Captain Mercer: "It does indeed look very bad… Meantime gloomy reflections arose in my mind, for though I did not choose to betray myself (as we spoke before the men), yet I could not help thinking that our affairs were rather desperate, and that some catastrophe was at hand. In this case I made up my mind to spike my guns and retreat over the fields …"

- In April 1813 at Halle, General Maison detached a battalion of French 153rd Line to the Giermeritz farm, on an island formed by two branches of the Saal River. The battalion's voltigeurs took up a position where their fire began picking off the Prussian gunners serving the guns in the earthwork on the far side of the river. The 2 6pdr cannons and 1 howitzer were hurriedly withdrawn due the voltigeurs' fire.

- In 1813 at Dennewitz, French tirailleurs came out of the village and drove back Prussian Horse Battery Nr. 6. They also attacked Prussian Foot Battery Nr. 16 and took 4 guns.

- In 1805 at Austerlitz "The Hussars, excellent ones of Hessen-Homburg, had many men and horses killed by the French skirmishers …" (Amon von Treuenfest – "Geschichte des k.k. 11 Huszaren-Regimentes" p 233)

- In 1813 at Kulm, the Prussian 9th Silesian Landwehr Infantry found itself under heavy skirmish fire. The Landwehr "turned heel and broke."

- In 1815 at Ligny the French skirmishers fought really well. The battle on the right flank, between Thielemann and Grouchy, began late. It was getting dark and the French skirmishers were taking advantage of this situation. They sneaked around the Prussians and fired on their battalion columns from the flank and rear. The angered Prussians charged with bayonets but the skirmishers simply withdrew. They came back and kept popping up and firing into the Prussians.

In the system I developed I rate skirmish fire as much more dangerous for Morale and cohesion effects against enemy troop formations which are not used to such tactics. These formations include Raw or Conscript troops but more importantly, Troops trained in the Traditional way of Linear tactics. It seems that they were much less able to cope with this threat due to the inability to counter it. The Psychological effect of losses etc was too much strain.

Incodentally, the corelation of skirmish fire against line volley fire is interesting. The incomming fire from a skirmish line would be very thin simply because the men are very spread out but these men were usually better trained to aim and shoot at individuals so although the incoming fire volume is low the accuracy is high.

On the other hand, an enemy line would be able to fire off a huge volume of return fire (if ordered) but this would be poorly aimed and because the enemy are so spread out the number of hits would be low. Due to this fact enemy commanders would be inclined not to allow return fire against skirmish lines at distance. If the enemy skirmishers got close or there was little cover this might be different.

My conclusion is that in open field situations these two opposing forces might cancel each other out with roughly equal effectiveness but if the terrain was rough and offered good cover the skirmishers would rein supreme over an enemy line. A column would be sitting ducks as would a square.

Incidentally in the system I developed I have included the ability for Skirmish fire to knock out enemy officers and NCO's which is the ability to take out "CV's". This ability to kill these men in charge of units quickly brings about a reduced morale of the enemy formation over time and its inevitable collapse if not relieved of the situation. This is very obvious when fighting against enemy Traditional (Linear) formations which cannot adequately protect themselves.

Regards,
Shane

p.s. I have put a great deal of research into this very topic in question…

Is it worth allowing formed infantry to fire at skirmishers who were trained to look for any cover, even folds in the ground, and i would assume to fire from a kneeling or prone position once their weapon was loaded? The chances of inflicting casualties would be low and alternative methods of dealing with them would be required, either cavalry or deploying friendly skirmishers. This would be more realistic than allowing formed infantry to pop away at a target they are unlikely to hit.

Basically, the loss of ammunition for little effect is the quantifying factor here. The line would not be ordered to fire back unless the chance of causing damage is high. The Skirmishers therefore would make sure they would use any and all cover at their disposal to protect themselves to reduce the chance of being hit which in itself reduces the possibility of return fire in the first place.

As you wrote, "alternative methods of dealing with them would be required"…

Shane

The best way to deal with skirmishers is with other skirmishers, or light cavalry and/or lancers. I would note, too, that the examples listed above of artillery suffering at the hands of skirmishers and being driven off, are all cases of batteries unsupported by infantry. Where infantry is directly supporting a battery (as they should be, batteries deployed without support is a foolish thing) then they (the infantry support) can deal with skirmishers and protect the battery.

Respects,

Well, as with everything in History there is not a simple answer. The effectivity of the skirmishers depended of a lot of factors -terrain, weather, training, ammunition available, presence of cavalry nearby, ecc- For each example of very effective skirmishing, you can also find another of uneffective skirmishing. In closed terrain, they could be enough to deny the position to the enemy, or to force them to mount a major push just to get rid of the annoyance. However, even those armies -Wellington's comes to mind- that relied in heavy skirmishes screens, the actual function was to disrupt the enemy advance and to conceal for as much time and space as possible, their own lines from the enemy units. Just to have skirmishers in front would have impaired the ability of the enemy officers to check the dispossition of your own lines, forcing them to move out of range to make their observations. Also, forced the opponent to protect their batteries, probably disturbing their deployment as close support of your line.

As for casualties, it is unprobable -due the characteristics of the weaponry used, and the nature of the skirmish battle, with non controlled volleys but individual shooting- that they caused a lot of injuries; or even they could affect seriously -although with some exceptions- the morale of formed units.

I have the strong suspicion that many historians had put too much stress on the skirmish battle, due the importance of the skirmishers in their own time more than in the Napoleonic Wars. But once taken in account the actual physical and technical limitations of the Napoleonic battle, the function of the skirmishers can be better understood.

So, in conclusion, the main function of the skirmishers were, usually, to disrupt the enemy and to avoid disruption from the enemy skirmishers, with the eventual defence (by themselves or in support of formed troops) of closed terrain (woods, orchards, built-up areas, ecc) to deny the enemy the use of the position.

Regards

Very interesting comments. Cohesion and morale seem to be the areas where skirmish fire has the greatest effect, question arises about how thi sis reflected in the rule mechanisms of our games?
I can see a clear distinction in skirmisher effectiveness depending upon the level of combat being gamed (one to one, tactical and grand tactical).

I am looking at amending the V&B 1st ed "skirmish" rules (hence my raising the question initially)

I am thinking along the lines of a unit (brigade or division in V&B) being rated as effective or ineffective at skirmish, I do not want the skirmishers represented by lots of little bases, counters or markers, hence a unit rating. An equal rating will off set so neither side gets an advantage. An effective confronting an ineffective will however result in some degree of impact on the lower rated.

Shane; your degree of research is evident, what is the system you developed used with?

Shane's research and conclusions are spot on with what I have found. There is one more "objective" to add to what Shane has said: Skirmishing is an example of "economy of force". In essence, fewer troops are applying the "force of destruction" than the number they are tying up. (Example, the Voltiguer company of a French Line Battalion (1/6th of the battalion's effectives) deployed as skirmishers, can effectively engege an entire enemy battalion, leaving 5/6ths of the French battalion remaining unengaged and fresh! Conversely, the entire enemy formation remains under stress and eventually will have to deal with the skirmishers. This was not in the plan of the attacked battalion's chain of command had intended as "tasks" for those men!

Tom Dye
GFI

based on my research back in the 1980s, one of the principle tasks of skirikishers were to fire at enemy officers and NCOs which would be demoraling. Other target priorities seem to have been artillery gun crews and enemy skirmishers.

Other tasks would have been to gain intel as to enemy positions and prevent the enemy to determing the exact location of friendly formations.

In regards to ammunition, I read a translation of Prussian skirmish operations in 1813-14. They operated in three man teams with one taked to obtain more ammo if the section ran low.

RobH,

You know, a simple solution to the V&B skirmisher system might be to simply rate each unit with a "skirmish factor". You wouldn't need to have skirmisher stands.

What could happen is that, depending upon the effectiveness of the skirmishers, a unit facing them would be forced to either reduce it's movement, or become disrupted. Evenly matched skirmishers would simply counter-balance each other, and result in no effect to either unit. The movement penalty or disruption, or whatever, would remain in effect while the enemy unit was within a set distance of the unit with the higher rated skirmishing ability.

At the level of V&B, or GA, I wouldn't impose casualties, because each base is an entire brigade. However some sort of penalty/adjustment for moving within the "skirmish range" of an opponent seems like a simple and workable representation.

Respects,

The book "Napoleon's Finest" has some very detailed accounts of how the French skirmishers at Auerstadt worked their way around the flanks of the Prussians and kept up a deadly fire that contributed to the Prussians having to fall back. It is a good read with plenty of helpful diagrams depicting how the voltigeurs worked.

Skirmishers need to be countered with other skirmishers. The Russian army usually had two brigades of line and one of jagers. Thr jagers deployed in open or skirmish order. Most armies would take a portion of the third rank and employ them as skirmishers. Most of the Prussian examples above refer to a time when they did not have a policy or routine to deploy skirmishers- and they got shot up pretty well. Everybody eventually figured it out and things evened out. I believe that light calvary was used to sweep skirmishers from one's front (there's considerable regulations about how skirishers should defend themself when attacked by horse), but right now I can't recall any battle accounts as examples.

In terms of casulties, skirmishers/formed troops, I recall some rule sets where unequal sized units in a firing exchange each lost the same proportion of their men in an exchange. The rational was that the bigger target was easier to hit. Perhaps this factor might be added to the factor of the number of skirmishers engaged to model the casulties.

Actually, the early Prussian battalions (up to 1807) had 50-60 scheutzen per battalion and the doctrine of the day called for reinforcing the skirmishers with men from the third rank. It is a Napoleonic myth that only France used skirmish tactics. I think that this has been dispelled numerous times over the years here on TMP.

That is very true Alte, no one is dismissing this. However, even Prussian officer testimonials refer to their inability to counter the masses of French skirmishers and their reluctance to actually deploy those they had. From my own research many of the Prussian officers of that army did not understand the tactic of deploying skirmishers and thus many were never deployed or if deployed were woefully inadequate to deal with the numbers against them.

Here are some good threads also :

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These are good past discussions regarding skirmishers just here alone on TMP.

Shane

A couple of points.

1 – there is a lot of writing about 1806 skirmishing. I don't think this can be considered "typical" though. It is probably an extreme me example of skirmishers at their most effective.

2 – I read quite a lot about late Prussians. The typical CORPS attack would involve a "feint" with one brigade, while two launched the main attack, onein reserve. Interestingly the feint brigade would deploy a disproportional large amount of skirmishers. This would seemingly make the engagement slower and less decisive. Presumingly the main attack would involve more formal, shock style tactics.

jon

The "eye for terrain" is something that changed with the beginning of the effective use of skirmishers. Imagine.. At an earlier time a good defensive position would be to be on a slight rise, 75 yards above a broken up area- maybe a vineyard or trees, bushes and some broken down walls. Any formed unit marching up on you would have their formation disrupted and would be reforming on the edge of the cleared area when you fired a murderous volley at their confused, forming ranks. …. At a later era, you would find a swarm of hidden light troops, unhittable, killing your line in this shrubry. Horrible place to be and your ability to form a line on that slight rise would depend upon your ability to feed enough lights into the bushes so as to keep the enemy from making your line a shooting gallery.

RobH

''I am of the opinion that such fire should have a morale/disorganisation rather than casualty rate''

Re: Lethal skirmishers

British skirmishers could destroy French battalions.

There is good evidence of this, espscially in the latter stages of the Peninsula campaign: at Tarbes for example. The reason is live fire and modern shoot and movement training (partially derived from the Americans and trained at Shorncliffe), together with the basic philosphy of independant targeting – something not a major linchpin of the French skirmisher ethos. British rifles could be used to take out officers because both officers and men were given shot for target practice; something French muskets couldn't match.

Also, the rifle troops were developing advanced tactics such as independant volley fire in line or extended line, things their French counterparts never considered. Even at an early battle, like Vimiero, the greatest number of French casualties (and the most relics) were (and are) found in the valley before the town, which supports the theory that skirmishers from the town inflicted considerable damage.

There were also heavy casualties in the town which allow direct comparisons to be made between formally trained guard units and light infantry trained skirmishers, with the skirmishers easily being the most lethal.

RobH
''Has anyone found good accounts from troops under sustained skirmish fire? I am of the opinion that such fire should have a morale/disorganisation rather than casualty rate impact. Also that it would be more serious at company/battalion level than brigade or division.''

Bear in mind it depends upon the number of skirmishers firing back. Normally, skirmishers meet in the middle of the battlefield, something less often seen on the gaming table.

There are also interesting statistics about the relative expenditure of ball between British and French light infantry.

…….so the upshot is, skirmishers could be deadly, but it depends on their training, the only question is if your rules differentiate, or if they're just the boring catch-all rules which most of us end up playing!

Playing an ACW game, it was discovered that in those rules, a skirmish line of 3 or 4 stands of dismounted union cavalry would consistently outshoot masses of confederate infantry. It entirely broke the game for us.

See, we didn't care if someone could point to historical moments where this kind of complete dominance happened. It told us that there was no point in fielding anything on the table besides union cavalry. It had mobility, morale, firepower, and could win melees when it chose to mount up and charge.

I get the same reaction when I'm told repeatedly how British riflemen destroyed everything that they fought every time they fought. It seems to me that if the battlefield commanders saw how trivially easy it was to equip troops with rifles and give them a couple weeks of training and then entirely dominate the battlefield against any number of enemies then they'd never trained a single another soldier to form ranks or make another musket.

Something is not corelating.

If we are talking about super elite troops under ideal circumstances with brilliant commanders up against mediocre troops then, well, let's stop talking about it in the same way that we shouldn't talk about the French Imperial Guard low march attrition rates in order to set a baseline or how some officer single-handedly tricked an enemy brigade into surrendering.

When asking if skirmishers were effective, it is more helpful to talk about average skirmishers under normal circumstances. Avergae skirmishers were not more effective in breaking enemy infantry formations than average formed infantry.

Shane wrote:

From my own research many of the Prussian officers of that army did not understand the tactic of deploying skirmishers and thus many were never deployed or if deployed were woefully inadequate to deal with the numbers against them.

Or, maybe, they were fighting against the best trained French army ever fielded by Napoleon. Another question: could be a way to put the blame in the men, instead in the unimaginative management of the battlefield by the Prussian high command? Or a combination of the three? i.e: unproper understanding of the skirmishers role by the mid-level command, exceptionally good training by the French voltigeurs, and a short of cover-up by the Prussian oligarchy to shift the guilt for the defeat from them to the rank and file.

There is another problem in your samples: they are about batteries unsupported being driven back by skirmishers or come from memoires written after the wars, which, as you know, have a trend to embellishment the actual circumstances. May be you have researched on post battle reports and dispatchs that confirm your findings. Would you mind to tell us if that's the case? No that I am doubting your scholarship! Way from that; I just would like to know the basis of your research.

Thanks in advance!
A.

When asking if skirmishers were effective, it is more helpful to talk about average skirmishers under normal circumstances. Avergae skirmishers were not more effective in breaking enemy infantry formations than average formed infantry

I believe that you hit the nail in the head!

Though, at least in the Peninsula, British and Portuguese skirmishers excelled in disrupting the French advances, thus when the French came on range of British main battle line they were half-defeated even before the British actually opened fire.

Also, again in the Peninsula -which is what I have information, I can't say if it's true in other theaters- some scores of skimirshers in closed terrain were enough to stop or to force a major attack, just to be expelled from it.

A lot of talk on spain here and as I said earlier, 1806.

Both were the highlights of skirmish warfare for different reasons.

I think in the 1809 or 1813 campaigns (which are the most "napoleonic" in my view) skirmishing was less of a big deal.

thats the way I see it anyway ..

As for my research it was directly taken from quotes translated into English from Officers and men who either were involved in the conflicts or were eyewitnesses to them. As for when they wrote their reports or memoirs I cannot tell you, I am not going to delve that deeply. But what I will say is this, "they" were there….if they cannot tell us what happened so that we get some idea then who can? I say you can draw your own conclusions.

And yes, the Peninsula and 1806 is not the be all, end all of the way skirmishers fought and their skill levels determined for the rest who fought in all other regions and time spans.

It is very clear that taking normal trained skirmishers as a basis or starting point is where we should aim for, that goes without saying. Once you have a base point of starting point you can build on it and spread or grow your knowledge and application of the facts into a working model for gaming, but using well trained units and designing a working model and working down or backwards from there is also a starting point. Which ever way you go is up to you.

Me, I like to work with the average or mean of everything and build up and down from that mean line. The time line I feel is where both side or most armies were at an equal to each other was probably 1812. By then most of the veteran or elite units of the French "Line" army were thinned out. The Prussians were completely reorganized and re-trained. The Russians were also in a similar situation and the British army was also at a level where they could fight with equal or superior numbers and quality. Most other countries if you study them had vastly increased and expanded the numbers of Light troops of every description and employed them as such.

The whole question of skirmisher effectiveness is about, "balance" you need to set a proper level of game balance for the use of skirmishers that does not create abnormal or unhistorical, inaccurate situations. Also, when adding in eliteness levels upwards or downwards of the base line you have to avoid huge differences but enough to make a difference from the top to the bottom. Once you have all of this in your system working well and in proportionate balance you will be able to play interesting and fun games using skirmishers or any other troop type for that matter.

Reading eyewitness accounts and memoirs is probably the best way to understand what happened and how it happened and more importantly what effects occured. Once you gain all of this you can feed it into your system to modify or re-align your game balance to match what you have read. The examples given above from others about how they, as a group did not like a particular system and how it portrayed certain aspects of a situation shows that there is possibly something inherently wrong in the design and mechanics of the system or that collectively they did not agree with the rules writer's interpretation of history.

Simply put, if you don't like something as a group or do not agree then change it, no-one is going to shoot you if you collectively modify or put in house rules regarding some aspect of a game system. I have a friend who plays Empire for many years. Over time and exposure to other playing groups and reading he has changed the rules significantly and adapted his and his own group's understanding to change many aspects of the system. For example, he now uses 4 equal Impulses per Hour for both sides instead of the rolled impulses as in the system. This gives his group, especially those playing Spanish or armies with poor command control the ability to fight on equal terms with regards to how much they can do in an hour compared to the French. Countless other modifications has been placed into their house system that greatly improved their games and experiences.

Regards,
Shane

As for my research it was directly taken from quotes translated into English from Officers and men who either were involved in the conflicts or were eyewitnesses to them. As for when they wrote their reports or memoirs I cannot tell you, I am not going to delve that deeply. But what I will say is this, "they" were there….if they cannot tell us what happened so that we get some idea then who can? I say you can draw your own conclusions.

Memoires of witnesses, written several years after the facts, should be treated with a lot of caution by the researcher. Mind that I am not saying they are lying, but they did gloss their narratives to make them palatable for their intended audience; sometimes, you can read a particular memory like if the writer was a witness, however when you delve deeper in the account you realize he wasn't a witness but he is narrating a story that was told to him for another person (Sebastian Blaze and Von Brandt, for example, were very prone to relate things that they didn't witness as if they were there!).

The best sources, although not without problems themselves, are the reports written just after the action, or a few days later. Cross-referencing different reports and dispatches you can get a good picture of the reality. Of course, those reports and dispatches should be checked also against the memoires, to check the inconsistences and/or coincidences between them.

A third step would be comparing the information from these sources with the known facts about the technological limitations of the weaponry used, plus the training, supply situation, exhaustion, weather, terrain, ecc.

Of course, the picture you will get from this research would be correct just for the war theatre you are investigating, the particular campaign or even a particular combat.

Your particular approach to represent skirmishers in a wargaming table is sensible, and I agree with you that it is one of the best ways to represent them in tactical games with a certain amount of detail.

basileus66,

yeah ok, people relating their experiences might get it wrong or be hazy about things but this is pretty straight forward stuff. I have no idea why you are singling out what I have related here? the information above taken from writings from these people is pretty relevant to the overall picture of skirmish combat.

I do not have the time nor the inclination to do indepth thorough research here that meets the standard you might define and set. I have other more pressing issues to deal with in life. I hope you do also? If you feel you can find much more accurate information that is well sourced and correct in every way then please, by all means show us….instead of singling my efforts out as fake, incorrect, ill researched inaccurate or not relevant.

please show us some "real" research…

Shane

In our 1984 Guard du Corps rules we had 'hits' by skirishers cause a morale check rather than a casualty. the only exception was if the firing range was less than 50 yards in which both a casualty and a morale check resulted from a skirmish firing hit.

there ya go…well said Rudy

Instead of being lectured on how to define great research how bout listening and taking on board what Rudy has just explained, this is a very simply and easy way to mechanic the effect of skirmish fire into a game system and the outcomes are fairly accurate even if played in a simple way.

It is the more complex rules which need more clarification and mechanics put in place to define the true effects of skirmish fire and the results of such fire. But we do not need to be so dramatic as to demand that unless you use proper research techniques etc that your mechanics are implausible or inaccurate…its only a game after all.

Shane

Like Shane I have done a lot of research into skirmishing. It is a fascinating subject, particularly when you ask questions "about its real effectiveness."

From the accounts I have read, I have to agree with Colin:

"To study the procedures of combat with only the official documents or the combined accounts of battles, one risks falsifying their character. It is a general fact in history of wars, for example, that the skirmishers [tirailleurs] have played an often essential role, always/still important, and however one, in fact, little mentioned."
--J. Colin, L'Infanterie au XVIIIe siècle: la tactiques [16:1]

I have been putting together a series of articles on Prussian skirmishers at Jena. It has been difficult. Historians rarely mention skirmish actions and often ignore light infantry units. You have to really pay attention to primary sources. For instance, few studies actually list as present all the fusilier battalions engaged at Jena.

The three major issues that are overlooked in the accounts of Garwart's action at Jena are:

1. The Prussians were out-numbered two to one or more at every point in the battle, from 6 am to the end.

2. Garwert's division was about 7,000 men, not 20,000, and only one of four divisions engaged [not counting Ruchel]

3. The French had a gunline of more than 36 pieces from two corps reserves and the Guard artillery that stretched almost the entire distance of open ground from Isserstadt to the woods west of V-H. Artillery is mentioned first in all but one Prussian account describing French skirmishers and Prussian casualties. It was this gun line that French skirmishers hid behind when Prussian cavalry attempted to disperse them.

Overall, the Prussians deployed 25% of all their infantry as skirmishers. For instance, Stanitz deployed his entire third line, better than 30% of his line infantry brigade. Another example is the Hohenlohe regiment. It deployed its Schutzen, 100 men from two battalions, and then reinforced them with volunteers 'several' times, which means at least three times, or better than three hundred men total. Then later, the right hand battalion deployed two flank companies. This comes to better than 600 men of a 14-1600 man regiment--and the Hohenlohe regiment was in the middle of Garwart's line.

All this from Prussians that supposedly didn't skirmish in 1806. They may not have been any good at it, and constantly outnumbered 2-1, but they did commit one out of every four infantrymen to skirmishing. That is about what the French deployed percentage wise, which means they fielded twice the skirmishers the Prussians/Saxons did.

Anyone who reads Marwitz's report of Garwert's actions would see that Garwert didn't simply stand in front of V-H and volley. His first action? [or Hohenlohe, depending on who was actually in command.] He sent out skirmishers. They were badly outnumbered, so he recalled them and then
volleyed? No, he called up the artillery, howitzers and bombarded the town, starting fires which did drive the French away. The line infantry, taking casualties was simply support for those two actions.

My point being, skirmish actions tend to be downplayed and misunderstood in most all military studies of the period, even though the military men of the time considered skirmishing very important.

So, to get some tactical comparisons here with skirmish formation: what was 'the real effectiveness' of infantry columns? Infantry line formations? And if we could come to some agreement, how would such generalized/one-size-fits-all conclusions be useful in a game design?

As none of the formations, skirmish, line and column, were used in isolation and effectiveness often revolved around how they were used and when, it is tough to make a meaningful generalization about "the real effectiveness". I don't think there is any doubt that they could be and often were effective in a number of situations.

Rory Muir gives an account in his "Tactical Experiences of the Napoleonic War" book at the end of the chapter on light infantry actions that is interesting.

It is Kempt's Brigade at Quartre Bras facing a large number of French skirmishers. As this is in 1815, at the end of the Napoleonic wars, it is instructive as to length of time Kempt is under fire, what he does about, and when Wellington intervenes, what HE does about and the outcome.

It gives at least some idea of the 'real effectiveness' of skirmishers and how hard it was for ever British veterans to deal with them.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Well explained bill,

Anyone who reads Marwitz's report of Garwert's actions would see that Garwert didn't simply stand in front of V-H and volley. His first action? [or Hohenlohe, depending on who was actually in command.] He sent out skirmishers. They were badly outnumbered, so he recalled them and then
volleyed? No, he called up the artillery, howitzers and bombarded the town, starting fires which did drive the French away. The line infantry, taking casualties was simply support for those two actions.

This paragraph is very critical in understanding the situation at Jena. As you explained, the French outnumbered the Prussians 2:1 all day long. If you study the battle looking at snap shots of the conflict from hour to hour you see a constant falling back of the Prussian line all day. They could not cope with the numbers fielded against them, and as you explain this means a 1:2 disparity in available skirmishers as well.

He sent out skirmishers. They were badly outnumbered, so he recalled them

It is no wonder the Prussian units either pulled back their skirmishers or failed to deploy them in the confusion and overwhelming situation they faced that day. There was no real battle plan from the Prussians either which compounded the problem further. Even with the Shuetzen, the Third rankers and the Fusiliers the Prussians simply could not cope with the numbers set against them and were driven back wards so constantly that proper tactical deployment and usage of the available skirmishers was impossible.

"IF" the Prussians were able to deploy in the proper order, in a well organized battle line that was not unsettled by enemy deployments, counter actions and rapidity as the French did then I feel the Prussian army would have fought a much closer action against the French.

The actions of Lestoq in the next year clearly are indicative of the inherent ability of the Prussian army's fighting strengths if fighting on their own terms. It is to Napoleon's credit and his subordinates that he created a situation where the Prussians were put on the back foot from the word go and not given a single second to recover their equilibrium…

p.s. Thank you Bill, I very much liked your insight here.

Shane

yeah ok, people relating their experiences might get it wrong or be hazy about things but this is pretty straight forward stuff. I have no idea why you are singling out what I have related here? the information above taken from writings from these people is pretty relevant to the overall picture of skirmish combat.

I do not have the time nor the inclination to do indepth thorough research here that meets the standard you might define and set. I have other more pressing issues to deal with in life. I hope you do also? If you feel you can find much more accurate information that is well sourced and correct in every way then please, by all means show us….instead of singling my efforts out as fake, incorrect, ill researched inaccurate or not relevant.

please show us some "real" research…

Shane

Shane, you are overreacting.

I singled your posts because they were the most thorough, and thus the ones more interesting to discuss. I don't know why you react with so much anger. I am simply pointing to some problems that can arise from using memoires as the main source of information; not that the memoires themselves are necessarily incorrect, or misleading. Just that they should be contrasted with other sources (dispatches, for instance). You say that you are not interested in delve so deep. Fair enough. I believed you were, besides a wargamer -nothing wrong with it… am I a wargamer too!-, a student of the Napoleonic Warfare, and thus I thought you would be interested in a interchange of information and opinions about the issue at hand. Apparently, I was wrong. I apologize for assuming it. My mistake.

I am not your enemy, nor I am trying to show any disrepect to you. I have neither the time nor the inclination to attack anybody. I am sorry if you have feel insulted by my posts.

By the way, if you want I show you my research I would be glad to send to you the archival references -plus some samples of actual quotes- I have worked with. Mind that they come from Spanish archives, so they would be relevant for the Peninsula, but not for other theaters of war.

Again, I would ask you be assured that nothing further from my intention than to attack you.

A.

Shane:

You bet. While the Prussians were outnumbered, the casualty counts are revealing:

Auerstadt where the Prussians outnumbered the French 2:1

French: 27% casualties
Prussians: 20%

Jena where the French outnumbered the Prussians 2:1

French: 6,500 or 15% overall for engaged units. Lannes
Corps suffered nearly 30% casualties
Prussians: 10,000 or 20% overall [Not counting 15,000
prisoners after the rout.]

Considering that Jena lasted nearly twice as long as Auerstadt, I would say the Prussians did more than just retire and become overwhelmed.

It was a much closer contest than many accounts suggest, though badly handled by the Prussian command. There are too many myths surrounding the battle. For instance, Gates says, repeating any number of other historians:

"Ordered to deploy within musket range of the latter [the French], the former [Prussian infantry] dutifully went through the intricate manoeuvres of the Frederickian drill while being riddled with sniper fire… Seeking neither to retire nor to advance, they stood stoically before the French positions for perhaps 90 minutes…"

The Prussians didn't deploy within musket range [which would have been counter that Frederickian drill] They didn't perform any intricate manoeuvres [They advanced into artillery and musket range in eschalon, which was hardly intricate--Lannes divisions did too.]

They didn't stand stoically. The Stanitz Regiment actually retired, and Hohenlohe made two advances, one stopped by a counter-charge from Lannes. Lannes called that event the crisis of the battle. And from all accounts the 40 gun grand battery did far more damage than sniper fire. The second advance, when the French skirmishers were cleared from V-H, was stopped when Garwert suggested the advance wait for Rachel's arrival.

Yet the myths and simple explanations persist. It is frustrating in trying to find out what did happen.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

malcolmmccallum

''I'm told repeatedly how British riflemen destroyed everything that they fought every time they fought.''

How odd. Who by?

''It seems to me that if the battlefield commanders saw how trivially easy it was to equip troops with rifles and give them a couple weeks of training and then entirely dominate the battlefield against any number of enemies then they'd never trained (sic) a single another soldier to form ranks or make another musket.''

Couple of weeks? That kind of light infantry training started in 1802 and took 12 years to reach its apogee. The tactics were developed throughout the war. Individual battalions were placed in the Light Brigade, then the Light Division and took over a year to train up. Wellington formed the 7th division in order to train it up as another light infantry division but it never quite reached the same peak. This was not something a soldier could train for after a 'couple of weeks': it takes months if not years to really become an ace shot, which is why target practice was encouraged. The tactics were recognised as being succcessful by both the French and the British: the 95th Rifles became the Rifle Brigade after the war and more rifle battalions were raised.

As for your main point: well rifles did come to dominate infantry tactics, didn't they? And targeting is fundemental to modern US and UK infantry tactics. Within a few years the French had developed the Minié rifle and the British the Enfield rifle, both dominating the battlefields of the Crimea and the ACW.

I think you made my point for me.

As for your main point: well rifles did come to dominate infantry tactics, didn't they? And targeting is fundemental to modern US and UK infantry tactics. Within a few years the French had developed the Minié rifle and the British the Enfield rifle, both dominating the battlefields of the Crimea and the ACW.

That's true, but first they needed to develop a system that allowed fast training of the soldiers, and fast reloading of the weapons. And in the Napoleonic period nobody found a solution to those twin problems. It was only after the wars (if I remember correctly the Minié rifle is from the 40's, isn't it?), that the technological advacements allowed for a solution.

And as was seen in those later wars, training was not the big issue. You didn't need elite soldiers to dominate a battlefield. You needed accurate, rapid firing weapons to dominate a battlefield, not perfect skirmish tactics.

Really, modern warfare still doesn't rely on the methods of skirmishers to dominate a battlefield. SOme soldiers will still play sniper and look to damage the morale and cohesion of units by hitting when the enemy cannot fight back but bog-standard troops pouring noise as much as bullets into an area is still what you use to take ground.

Malcom:

I can't agree with your assertions:

1. Training wasn't a big issue and that you didn't *need* elite soldiers to dominate a battlefield.

A lack of training led to the Somme, training and 'elite' soldiers led the Canadian victory at Vimy Ridge and the advances during the German offensives in 1917-18.

2. Modern warfare doesn't rely on the methods of skirmishers to dominate the battlefield. First, skirmishers, like all other formations didn't 'dominate' the battlefield, however much they were used. Second, all modern armies employ skirmisher methods: using cover, firing from cover, working in small teams, advancing in rushes, dominate the enemy with fields of fire, etc. etc. were the skirmish methods for the entire 19th Century. And Upton's prediction that all infantry tactics would be skirmish tactics have become true.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Bill H,
Yes.

malcolmmccallum,
''Training wasn't a big issue''

Ummmmm……I think General Colbert, Ney's outpost commander and cavalty commander, who was taken out by (and could only have been taken out by) a trained skirmisher, might have disagreed with you! As would have countless French captains and majors who unexpectedly fell to targeted skirmish fire at the decisive moment of an attack.

Actually, certain British units were trained continuously during campaigns and in fact their training had an effect on battlefields.

Apart from anything else, the sheer wastefulness of French untargeted skirmish fire in battles meant that they used up more balls than rifle battalions using balls in pre-battle training plus in the battle itself! If you bear in mind how dangerous the French commissariate's supply lines were, then you might appreciate how lack of training had knock-on effects beyond the battle itself.

''You needed accurate, rapid firing weapons to dominate a battlefield, not perfect skirmish tactics''

If you're not hitting anything, then 'quantity of fire' from skirmishers is going to be less effective. It's the whole reason why muskets were fired in volley by lines. Aside from the fact that a trained rifleman had a similar or better rate of fire to an untrained musket firer, tests show that rifle fire hit more targets at long range.

I notice you haven't referred to any of the battles I've used as examples. I respectfully suggest you to read up a little: the subject is an interesting one.

During the period, the deadliest fire was aimed fire, or firing at will. Napoleon commented that the 'fire of skirmishers' was the best to employ as it caused the most casualties and did the most damage.

I agree with Shane's analysis and his examples are excellent and illustrate what the French tactical system actually was.

Skirmishers in the French system were not merely employed to protect the main body from enemy skirmishers. They were employed in company, battalion, and regimental formations in open or skirmisher order in swarms or bandes for use as an offensive weapon in coordination with troops in line or column to weaken the enemy's line and provide the fire support element for the troops in formation, especially in column, during attacks. Artillery was also employed with them if possible.

The French system was developed to counter what the Prussians had done in the Seven Years' War. Full scale experiments, or field maneuvers/war games were conducted in the 1770s in Normandy to test the new tactical ideas. While they were not them adopted officially, they were resorted to starting in 1792 because of the great influx of volunteers and later conscripts into the infantry. There was never an army-level regulation on how to employ skirmishers or to delineate the new tactics, but they were developed in the field and by accident and design.

What developed was the most flexible tactical system in Europe and one that, if effectively and properly employed, was very hard to counter.

The French didn't invent skirmishers, but they did develop a new tactical system where large numbers of skirmishers were an integral part of the system and were employed in large numbers offensively, defensively, and for fighting in rough country and built up areas. The system became institutionalized in the army and even in 1813-1814 the French were still superior to their enemies in 'help yourself' fighting.

At Waterloo, the tacitcs finally used against the allied line after the failure of the French cavalry attacks nearly cracked the allied line. Close support by French artillery was destroying allied infantry squares at point-blank range and the allied skirmishers were defeated and steadily driven in. You can find examples of this in both Siborne and Houssaye and I also believe in Ropes.

Regarding period memoirs, I completely agree that you have to be careful with them, but there are many (such as Parquin, Pelet, de Brack, Boulart, and others) that can be relied upon to accurately portray how the French fought.

Interestingly, I have noticed over the years that many people who don't understand how the French tactical system worked are very skeptical of French memoirs, but seldom, if ever, question allied, especially English, memoirs. The standards for one should be the same for all.

Finally, if the French didn't have a new and flexible tactical system, why were they so successful for years? The combination of the best staff system of the period, the organization of the armies into permanent divisions and corps, the best artillery arm of the period, and excellent leadership, and the tactical system, made the French so successful. They defeated everyone they faced at least once (including the British) and were supreme on the continent for years. The success wasn't because of luck or because they outnumbered their opponents (which they always did not), but because of the military system they developed, and that alone makes them worthy of study.

Sincerely,
K

Kevin Kiley,

''The system became institutionalized in the army and even in 1813-1814 the French were still superior to their enemies in 'help yourself' fighting……..They defeated everyone they faced at least once (including the British) and were supreme on the continent for years.''

I'm afraid not. They simply were not trained in live fire, so their wastefulness was extraordinary. I suspect you know this.

Countless examples after 1808 show the inferiority of French skirmish tactics verses British rifle fire in actual battles. The French were good and the British also had musket-wealding skirmishers I make no observations about. But in the Peninsular after Albuera, French skirmishers were consistantly out-performed by the British, time after time. It's pretty clear from any account that the British achieved parity with the French at Salamanca and superiority afterwards: it's perverse almost to ignore such quantity of evidence from the French themselves.

I refer you to:
(Early battles)
1) the location of most French casualties at Vimiero
2) The seminary at Oporto
3) The closure of French attacks at Busaco
(later battles)
4) French attack columns at Sorouren 2 and in particular:
5) The 95th at Tarbes.

Now come on Kiley. Poor show: you can do better than this.

''I'm told repeatedly how British riflemen destroyed everything that they fought every time they fought.''

How odd. Who by?

You. See above.

malcolmmccallum

''I'm told repeatedly how British riflemen destroyed everything that they fought every time they fought.''
How odd. Who by?
''You. See above.''

I'm looking but it's there only in your mind. Exaggeration is no way to reach the truth.

So, let us know what you dispute about the 95th's performance at Tarbes exactly. Or don't you have any books? As I pointed out, it is an interesting subject….if you can be bothered to read about it. The Mayor of Vimiero is a very friendly individual and an excellent sourse of information about the location of casualties there: if you want to write to him I'm sure he'd be happy to point you towards the evidence.

Regards

You're right. I don't dispute it. The British rifles always won and did terrifying casualties to their opponents. Indeed, all british won all the time. Brutus is an honorable man.

But if they were so good and they were that good from the moment that they set foot in the peninsula apaprently because they were always winning at that point also, then why was the British war in the peninsula such a collosal failure? The french, afterall, won the peninsular war in exactly the same way that the British won Quatre Bras.

If the British skirmishers were so good and the French skirmishers never once beat them…

Countless examples after 1808 show the inferiority of French skirmish tactics verses British rifle fire in actual battles. The French were good and the British also had musket-wealding skirmishers I make no observations about. But in the Peninsular after Albuera, French skirmishers were consistantly out-performed by the British, time after time. It's pretty clear from any account that the British achieved parity with the French at Salamanca and superiority afterwards:

…why did not the British give a rifle to every soldier and train every soldier to become a skirmisher? And if the British lines could beat French formations at every turn and British sskirmishers beat French skirmishers at every turn and british squares beat French cavalry at every turn, why were the British still stuck in the peninsula while European armies marched back and forth across the continent in decisive campaign after decisive campaign in the same time period?

If skirmishers and rifles were effective why did they not conquer Paris? Artillery and national armies won wars, not skirmishers and not elite professional armies. I suppose the language is that skirmishers, like guerrillas, might tie up and prevent 'real armies' from winning wars but they could not win wars on their own and nor could they win battles.

'I'm afraid not. They were simply not trained in live fire, so their wastefulness was extraordinary. I suspect you know this.'

Actually, no I don't. And you are incorrect.

The French, especially Napoleon, stressed training in marksmanship and the French routinely had marksmanship contests. As early as 1792 General Rochambeau stressed that troops be taught to take aim when firing.

In the Channel camps where the Grande Armee trained intensely for at least two years, the French corps commanders stressed marksmanship training in conjunction with the other training the troops were undergoing.

In 1804 the battalion annual training allowance for musketry training was 250 kilograms of powder and 125 kg of lead.

In 1812 both Augereau and Victor told Clarke, the Minister of War, that they wanted 50 rounds per man for training.

During 1806-1807 General Delaborde, who ran the training camp at Pontivy, even emphasized mounted marksmanship among the cavalry who trained there along with the field operations and infantry/artillery cooperation that the troops were put through.

In 1813 the new conscripts were put through marksmanship training whenever possible and contests were held in the units. The best shots in each company were given two francs, which would be doubled, and doubled again, for the champions at battalion, and higher, champions. In every celebration involving the Grande Armee, shooting contests were part of the drill, and the prizes awarded the winners were either in cash or clothing.

In 1815 Davout put all infantry and dragoon regiments through a 'refresher' course in musketry, each man using twenty rounds of blank ammunition and twenty rounds of ball.

The regulation French target was 5.5 feet high and 21 inches wide. There were two colored bands across the target, each 3-inches wide, at the top and middle of the target. Troops fired at the targets at 50, 100, and 150 toises (about six feet per toise), and conscripts were required to also fire at 200 toises.

Therefore, live musketry practice was emphasized by the French and was done from at least 1804-1815. Further, the Guard artillery had a firing competition at La Fere every year.

Could you now explain what you meant by 'I expect you know this?' I have posted what I know about French musketry practice, but don't really understand your point?

As for the subject of skirmishing, I was not focusing on the Peninsula, but on the total breadth of the wars from 1792-1815. I would submit that the French skirmisher was at least as skilled as his British counterpart, and a British officer is noted as stating he was impressed with the skill of the French skirmishers as late as 1814 in southern France. Further, the allied skirmishers at Waterloo, including the 95th, were steadily driven in by the French, both line and light infantry, voltigeurs or not.

I would highly recommend you take a look at The British Light Infantry Arm by David Gates, Swords Around A Throne by John Elting, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare by Robert Quimby, Napoleon's Great Adversaries by Gunther Rothenberg, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, and Napoleon's Finest by Scott Bowden. These are a good starting point for the study and analysis of the subject of skirmishing during the period 1792-1815.

The 95th were not good light infantry because they were armed with rifles, they were good light infantry who happened to be armed with rifles. There is a difference. The study of history should be based on historical inquiry where you find, or hope to find, facts that should lead you to a conclusion. I would caution you on stating absolutes that cannot be either substantiated or maintained as well as something as elusive as 'truth.' That is very hard to find and may not exist. Facts do exist, and from assembling facts you may come to a historical conclusion. But you have to look at both sides, and some facts may be contrary to what you either expect or believe. Then you may be able to come to a conclusion. Until then, the argument is not historical in nature but subject to any sort of bias and you should not attack the messenger, but the message if you disagree with it and have facts to back up your theories. So far, you haven't done that. You merely have what you believe to be the truth which is not historical but personal. Your statement on French marksmanship training is an excellent example of this. It was incorrect and not backed up by any facts. Hopefully, the facts I have supplied as an example for this subject has convinced you otherwise. You can believe it or not, but if you wish to disprove what I have supplied, you have to supply facts that counter the argument. I wish you good luck.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin sir,

Just a matter of curosity what was the ranges of the targets forArtillery.
secoundly at the infantry targets above did your source information give a hit rate. what hit rate would be consider trained.

Sincerely
Lord Ghee
El Paso TX.

This whole argument about British superiority is ridiculous and getting quite boring. If the British army was so superior and their tactics, doctrines, drill, training toughness and skill so great why did the war go for 7 long years ?

But lets talk about the battle of Salamanca for example. it was in 1812, the same year that saw most of the French army and her allies fighting thousands of miles away in Russia. The year before almost half the French occupation forces stationed in Spain were pulled out to make ready for this endevour.

The Rifleman…

The British Riflemen were few and far between, they had a total of 3 btlns of the 95th, 1 btln of the 60th and the Brunswick Oels. There were several other smallish units but nothing else to speak of. Put this into context and you get a much better understanding of the impact the British riflemen had on any battle, action, combat, skirmish or bar fight of that war.

Yes their weapon was superior, yes it was more accurate, yes it was an advance in technology and yes, it was even deadly at long ranges. However, it was harder to load, took longer to load, fouled just as easily as a musket and simply there were not enough of them to make a difference. It seems that too much emphasis is made of this weapon due to a certain mini series running on TV for the last couple of decades…

I am amazed when people claim that somehow the French did not practice live firing drill and the British did. It is clear from many sources that they did and it was done on a regular basis depending on the command they were part of, the Generals level of concern and the year. Yes, later on in the war training in the use of aimed fire or any other fire might not have been as regular but it was still part of the training of the men.

I suspect some people might want to read more about French tactics, training and doctrine than they do. And put a stop to their own ignorance by doing some of their own research on the subject of the French rather than take cheap shots, snide remarks, insulting and belittling the efforts of others.

This is called, respect for your peers…

Lets look at some facts,

A standard British btln was made up of 10 companies, one company were designated as Lights = 10% of their number.

The British had few Light btlns from 1808 to 1809. The need for them arose due to the fact that the French used masses of them to great effect. After 1809 we see a steady increase in the number of British Light btlns which slowly rise to ratio parity by 1812. The Light Division came about from the need to increase the numbers of Light troops but they were concentrated, this I don't feel was such a great idea overall.

A standard French btln was made up of 6 companies, one of which were designated as Voltiguers = 16.7% of their number. Take also into account the preponderance of the French ability to also use normal Fusiliers and even Grenadiers as Light troops especially in the earlier years such as 1805 to 1809 and you get a 100% skirmish capability.

The French army had an average of one Legere Regiment per Division which was about 1/4 of the total number of troops in the field. These regiments primary use was to conduct skirmish and screening tactics. They were purpose designed troops. By 1812 their ability to skirmish over regular Ligne troops might come into question but from the period of 1805 to 1812 they were superior, especially from 1805 to 1810 at least.

But the point of all this is to say what? That the French were highly trained in skirmish tactics, they knew how to fight in that order and fought very well in that order. This is not to say that the British were superior of inferior at all, but to say that the British first learnt about the effectiveness of skirmish tactics from the American revolution and indeed had highly trained units for that purpose.

Their problem was that they had no idea just how important this style of combat would be in 1808-09. It was evident in 1806 at Maida that the British would need more skirmishers because of the ad hoc use of "Flanker" sub-units in that battle. They had to innovate quickly in order to match the numbers of highly skilled French Voltiguers they fought. This need was a wake up call for them. The British felt the need for skirmisher capable units as stated due to the AWI period but had no idea of the numbers the French actually used.

The British were shocked into quickly and rapidly converting Line Infantry regiments into Light units and by 1809 there was a programme put in place to begin converting several units into light Infantry. This conversion did not stop during the entire wars and in fact increased after the wars. These units newly converted were in no way experts in the tactics of Light Infantry fighting but were trained quickly and sent into the field.

They were trained well and fought well but were not superior to the French in any way whatsoever. I have not seen any evidence to support this, if using the fact that the British won a battle to support the notion that British Light infantry must be superior is a gross overestimation of the facts. Winning a battle does not give one the justification to say that British Light Infantry skill and tactics must have been better. That is absurd.

Shane

LG,

Great questions and I haven't seen the data that you request or that it was even kept. Scharnhorst, however, did keep data on the tests he conducted so that might be helpful.

Do you know if the data for British target practice was noted and kept?

Sincerely,
K