"Help me understand skirmishers et al and their effectiveness" Topic

OK--maybe a silly question, but I am confused regarding the effectiveness of skirmishers and the like.

I cannot see how skirmishers et al were effective if your oppenent also has skirmishers et al deployed as well.

Here's is how I see skirmishers et al operating;

1. The French send out their skirmishers, their opponent sends out their's and all the skirmishers do is bang away at each other. Skirmishers cancel out skirmishers.

2. Deployment distance from the main battle line is irrelevant. Each sides skirmishers will deploy far enough forward to keep the other sides skirmishers from harassing their main battle line.

3. If one sides skirmishers are being driven in they will reinforce the skirmish line, either from the skirmish reserve or the main battle line in order to keep the opponents skirmishers from their main battle line.

4. Skirmishers will avoid calvary, unless in some sort of calvary-safe cover.

5. Skirmishers are very good at harassing unsupported arty. In fact, I can see skirmishers forcing unsupported arty to eventually withdraw to escape their harassing fire.

6. Prior to any opponent of the French developing skirmishers et al I see the French as having an advantage in being able to harass an opponents main battle line. This is only harassment, not an action that will decide the battle. The battle will be decided by the interaction of the main arms--infantry, calvary and arty.

7. This being the case, it is only worth resolving harassing fire by skirmishers if the other side does not have skirmishers.

That is mine, a napnewbies understanding of skirmishers et al.

What do the more knowledgable TMPers have to say about the effectiveness of skirmishers et al?

Who's this Al bloke?

THink of skirmishers as providing harassment. They are there to frustrate and annoy the enemy into making a mistake.

Skirmishers are covering a much larger area than their close support opponents and this, combined with lack of fire discipline, means that they will not produce decisive results from fire.

Depending on the scale, skirmishers should have no chance of causing casualties but can decrease cohesion or morale. Perhaps being subject to skirmish fire gives them some kind of -1 to fire and maneuver effectiveness.

Formed troops either stand there and take it, unable to answer back effectively, or they advance to drive back the skirmishers (and perhaps thereby throw their own battle line into disarray), or they throw out their own skirmishers. Artillery might try to deploy elsewhere if they have no support.

et al--Latin, it means "and others".

In this case it means any infantry deployed to act as skirmishers. This includes, but is not limited to; light infantry (either whole units or light companies), third rank, jager, rifles, chasseur and the like.

4. Skirmishers will avoid calvary, unless in some sort of calvary-safe cover.

Are they afraid of being crucified?

et al--Latin, it means "and others".

In this case it means any infantry deployed to act as skirmishers. This includes, but is not limited to; light infantry (either whole units or light companies), third rank, jager, rifles, chasseur and the like.

ad nauseam

That's Latin too

To paraphrase the late Senator, Lloyd Bentsen, "I knew Nap. Newbies, and you, sir, are no Nap. Newbie." Your rationale for the role of skirmishers is quite reasonable.

Much like lawyers the only thing worse than having skirmishers is not having skirmishers when you need them. Larry Brom when asked about the lack of skirmisher figures in his horse and musket games were replied that they were out there skirmishing!

So I guess the point is that the only time that skirmishers were important was when you didn't have any and the other guy did – or the other way around (in non-Latin).

I read that the French in the Peninsula sometimes had difficulty determining where the British/Allied skirmish line left off and the main line of resistance began. They thought that they had breached the formed line but had only driven back the skirmish line throwing off their deployment timing (if what I read was indeed true).

Mr. Brom and others (in non-Latin) don't worry too much about skirmishers so I guess I won't either. However they do look good on the table and add a recognizable Napoleonic look to the game.

Simplistic response to the use of skirmishers.
Defensively deny scouts and intel of the true beginning of friendly formations. these makes it harder to determine accurate ranges for musketry and artillery.
Offensively, to disrupt enemy formations by targeting officers, reduce firepower by targeting enemy artllerymen and other specialists. Another offensive task was to occupy and secure key terrain and ojectives until proper unit arrived.

I asked a similar question (in my case, rules-specific) on the Grande Armee Yahoo site. My contention was, and is, that skirmishing is not (normally) worth simulating, but if you must do it, only worry about cases where one side has more/better skirmishers than the other.

I thought skirmishers were often used as a screen to allow the massed infantry to advance with out being seen as the obvious targets.

That is the enemy waste time and effort on getting rid of the skirmishers thus allowing the bulk of the army to advance.

At least thats how I use them in the games I play.

Ouch, NapNewbie. You walked into Connard's trap. Like walking into a thresher.

skirmishers like any combat tool is important in its assigned role.

Important note – If you do not have skirmishers and the other side does you are going to suffer for it so skirmishers became important and their role changed during the period from one of harrassing the enemy formed line to that of defending your own line from the enemy skirmshers…

Shane

"Ouch, NapNewbie. You walked into Connard's trap. Like walking into a thresher."

Why would Monsieur "Connard" wish to "set a trap?" Perhaps such merde is comme il faut for le connard? Or is this a non causa pro causa?

Skirmishers are there, in essence, to yes, as you stated, cancel out other skirmishers, and also there to (as stated again) harras any part of the enemy they can shoot. Its alot harder to move an entire line around than to take a few stands and put pressure on his flank, making him commit men and resources, which then leaves the other flank open to your….. and so on and so forth.

THanks,
John

[They thought that they had breached the formed line but had only driven back the skirmish line throwing off their deployment timing (if what I read was indeed true).]

Yes I have read that too, which makes me wonder about the relative density of the skirmish line.

If one man's skirmish line can be mistaken by another man for the main battle line, then one size does not fit all.

The British army had two distinct unformed frontages according to Nafziger, I can't remember the terminology of each but will dig them up tonight. The French often mistook the British skirmish line (denser than the usual French skirmish line) for the main line and as such misjudged the actual British base line.

I suspect wellington knew this and used it to his advantage often.

Shane

Which also raises a question about the density of the main line…

It may be easy to be confused about the density of skirmishers, but it's surely difficult to mistake them for men standing shoulder to shoulder in two ranks. Was the main line sometimes a bit less solid than we usually envisage?

I think is was more a case of the British Skirmisher line looking thicker so being mistaken for the main line the French became fooled by it because to them it probably looked more like a ragged and probably shaken main line. Thus they continued forward without deployment on many occasions thus falling trap to the main line when it appeared either from behind a ridge line or suddenly appearing behind the thick skirmish line when they fell back.

Shane

I have read that one of the additional uses of the skirmish line -- though not its original intent -- is that a commander can observe their movement and pick up on the dips and bumps and "hidden ground" between the lines; the stuff that's tactically important, but wouldn't be mapped and is important in the timings of the line advances.

Two things have been left out here. First, the French used skirmishers in very large numbers (battalions and regiments would be deployed as skirmishers if the situation called for it) and as an offensive weapon, not merely to harass. Large numbers of skirmishers could literally shoot a main line to pieces and were used by the French in this way as the fire support element, backed up by artillery at close range, so support an attack in battalion columns. As the line of advancing columns came abreat of the skirmishers, they would go into the gaps between the columns and continue to advance with the columns shooting as they did.

Second, many French commanders would deploy their first line as a heavy skirmish line instead of in three ranks. They would feed that line in the firefight with troops from the second line who were still in ranks, many times in battalion columns, as the fight wore on and troops in the first line ran out of ammunition and had to be pulled out to replenish.

One of the reasons I believe the French had trouble with Wellington in the Peninsula was that when they hit the heavy British skirmish line, they thought it was the main line of resistance and started to deploy, because that was the way they did it.

Sincerely,
Kevin

I agree with "10th MArines" on the French use of very dense clouds of unformed troops. I understand that they would get close enough and be numerous enough to cause effective casulties- but not big enough to be worthy of a charge or advance to displace them. And they could just run away if charged, thereby wearing out and disordering the oppoent. The French would exploit this "in-between land" and the eventual counter-move was to strengthed the opposing scirmishers. I seem to remember that this originated in the early revolutionary days, somewhat spontaneously from over-energetic and under-discipled eager troops and was very valuable for screening columns of attack from fire.

Another result of scirmishers which has not been mentioned explicitly above is to avoid surprises when you advance. Does that small patch of woods contain a forward battery? Is there a hidden rise that has a line of infantry in line behind it? Is there a formation-busting ditch, ravine or thorn fence across the line of march? And are there enemy sharpshooters in those woods to the left of the line of advance that would pick off the officers as they went by?

There are also evaluations of the Russian's, Prussian's, and Austrian's ability to skirmish and fight in open order in Gates' The British Light Infantry Arm and Paret's Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform. Rothenberg's Napoleon's Great Adversary is also useful in this regard. They aren't too complimentary to the continental allies.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Shane wrote

"The French often mistook the British skirmish line (denser than the usual French skirmish line) for the main line and as such misjudged the actual British base line. I suspect wellington knew this and used it to his advantage often."

Shane,

This has been repeated so often now that it seems to be viewed as fact. A British skirmish line was extended a mimimum of 4 times close order frontage, and would have looked a whole lot different. I am sure that the French were experienced enough not have mistaken skirmish lines for close order lines and I have never come across anything written by soldiers of the time that supports this view.

But I would submit that it probably looked like common French practice of employing their front line as a thick skirmish line and they probably thought the British were doing what they themselves did.

So, Shane is bringing up a very valid point and one that I not only agree with but find it very plausibleand probably correct.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin,

Are you talking about skirmishing or fighting "en debandade"? It is difficult to find any period sources that describe the latter in any great detail, although it had been used by ill-discplined troops during the Revelutionary period, especially in broken terrain. Looking at the instructions issued by Reille, Davout etc French skirmish lines were formed in exactly the same manner as those of other nations, emphasising regularity, a widely dispersed firing line, and appropriate supports.

Skirmishing was skirmishing, breaking into a ragged firng line was something completely different.

Captain S is correct that some generalizations in secondary sources about the French/British have been repeated so many times that they have become accepted as fact.

I agree with Captain S. that an experienced French battalion/regimental commander would not confuse a skirmish line for a firing line. There are some extant pictures from the American Civil War taken of units in a two rank line with skirmishers out in front. These pictures were obviously not taken during combat but give us some clue as to what a two rank firing line looked like. It is easy to note the skirmishers from the main firing line. We can also get clues from re-enactment events, and also more recent scholarship.

More recent scholarship has begun questioning some of the older assumptions about the French vs. British encounters. The "column vs. line," reverse-slope tactics, and skirmisher-related arguments tend to dominate the discussions of these encounters and ignore other salient aspects that bear on the matter.

Perhaps the first time a French unit encountered a British line/tactics there may have been some misunderstanding, but to insinuate that such misunderstanding/confusion continued implies across-the-board poor French tactical command ability and the inability of French soldiers to adapt to circumstances.

If Wellington "relied" on such French mistakes to his advantage he was in effect relying on poor French command and tactical ineptitude to win. That shortchanges his (and his commanders') skill and the capabilities of the British troops.

I find it implausible for Wellington to rely on French idiocy for victory. There is much more to the story than oversimplifying the tactics/tactical responses into "column vs. line," skirmishers, etc.

The overgeneralizations in many of the secondary sources are in need of revision. I will add that the overgeneralizations about skirmishing of the opponents of the French are just recently getting a more balanced hearing based on original source scholarship that is not French-biased.

No, I'm talking about deploying and fighting in grandes bandes and/or skirmisher swarms. It is described very well in the chapter on strategy and tactics in Elting's Swords, as well as in Gates, Rothenberg, as well as Quimby and Lynn. The French were deploying entire regiments in open order as late as 1813-1814. And I do not agree with you that 'skirmishing is skirmishing' when the French did it differently and much more proficiently than did the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians. And that is documented by the Austrians, specifically Radetzky, in comments made regarding the Austrian and Russian inability to skirmish skillfully and also by Scharnhorst on the Prussian inability to fight the way the French did.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin,

Would you regard this superiority as a result of better formal French skirmisher training or 'that individual intelligence and that natural aptitude for war which has always characterised the French Soldier?'

Regards

While there were local instructions on skirmishing such as Davout's in 1811 there was never an official one during the period which applied to the whole army. Commanders did train their troops, and Duhesme considered all the French infantry to be light infantry, but training did go on as the most effective skirmishers are well-trained troops.

The French began to experiment with columns and skirmishers in the 1770s with their maneuvers in Normandy run by de Broglie. You can find it in battles, such as Lannes' troops using all types of cover when engaging Grawert's division in a firefight and literally shooting it to pieces while the Prussians stood in the open and fired volleys.

I would submit that the French infantryman was adept at skirmishing because he was given his head and probably because there was a natural aptitude for it. It was also a function of training and experience. It was not, however, a lock-step formula as some of the Prussian instructions were and the French probably didn't believe they had to write it down.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin,

As usual, when someone is questioned about these French "Grandes Bandes", a whole load of secondary sources are quoted, and not much else. If you have any primary sources for the Napoleonic, not Revolutionary era, that describe this form of combat in sufficient detail to make a clear case, then I would be very interested in seeing them (Radetsky's comments are not sufficient here).

Breaking an entire line, of say brigade strength, of close order troops into skirmishing order was not possible, as skirmishing relied on space between the files, both to allow each soldier to aim, and to reduce the effect of incoming fire. How would an entire brigade find the space to extend sufficiently to do this, unless it was operating in complete isolation from its neighbours?

Breaking up a line with individuals seeking cover, and every man firing at will on his own initiative may well have succeeded in closely intersected country, but if performed in the open it would have been a recipe for disaster, and such troops would have been completely at the mercy of a close order bayonet charge, or worse still, a cavalry charge.

The accounts of Davout's corps at Auerstadt have been translated in the Scott Bowden book "Napoleon's Finest". A perusal of this translated primary source might be what you are looking for.

In the sources I referenced there are quotes from primary source material that illustrate the situations quite well. Whether or not you agree with it, the French did deploy whole battalions and regiments in open order and that is the way they fought. Again, skirmishing techniques and tactics were not the same between the different nations and the French institutionalized it in their tactical system.

I would highly recommend Scott Bowden's translation of Davout's Operations du 3d Corps. I would also recommend his upcoming translation of Bressonet's book on 1806.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin wrote:
"And I do not agree with you that 'skirmishing is skirmishing' when the French did it differently and much more proficiently than did the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians."

Without wanting to get into a profitless debate on who was at the top of the skirmishing league table, if the French did indeed "do it differently", then why do all the written instructions that have survived from French commanders describe an almost indentical process to that of other nations?

Kevin wrote,
"In the sources I referenced there are quotes from primary source material that illustrate the situations quite well."

Kevin,
Then please, to illustrate your point, select the quote which in your opinion will leave us in no doubt, and post it here.

Thanks in advance

Captn Snort

Captain Snort:

You are embarking on a battle of attrition, but there is hope of a flanking movement.

Keep asking questions!

I would add in response to the comment "Whether or not you agree with it, the French did deploy whole battalions and regiments in open order and that is the way they fought."

Specifically when? Where? What were the conditions (terrain and other)? "That is the way they fought" implies that such tactics (battalion and regimental skirmishing) were regular occurrences. From 1805 and after how many times was such practice mentioned in any valid sources? How often is it mentioned in the Davout 3rd Corps Operations tome? Can we get a statistical result (not employed in X actions vs. employed) to see if it was a rare practice? If one battalion out of 20 in a given campaign employed it we might have a better idea of when the practice was used.

Keep asking the questions for which the secondary sources will provide no answer. The assertions will thus give way to facts. From the facts we can make our own conclusions.

Perhaps such tactics were rarer than the secondary sources insinuate. Gill's recent book (1809: Thunder on the Danube) provides an example of a French battalion in skirmish order protecting the flank of a moving column, but it took up a position in a woods. An Austrian battalion moving through a woods would also no longer be in close order. But I suppose it would be "fighting differently."

I would think that if you were really interested in the situation you'd try and get the material and look for yourself instead of relying on someone else. And it wouldn't be one quote, but a series of material that is in the books to which I referred.

Sincerely,
Kevin

It is pretty common knowledge that most skirmisher formations no matter how big or small of properly trained men fought in skirmish order in pairs, one firing while one protects him etc…This was taught to both the French and English from their experience from the War of Independence in America etc…

It was this experience that gave experienced specialists the ability to teach those after them how to fight this way. Some German units also gained valuable experience from that war and Jaeger formations sprang up all over parts of Germany as a result. It was obvious that this wealth of experience and knowledge would be passed on to the next generation of soldiers so that they could fight effectively in the same manor.

The French Infantry fighting in Grand Bandes during the revolutionary period and beyond I think was out of necessity and not of training. The young conscripts could hardly be expected to fight in Column let alone line and the closest thing they could do was to fight in ragged formations or mobs. They could easily manoeuvre and conduct firing this way and totally harass the enemy line who were much more ordered and structured. When encountering such disordered and ragged French formations I think the outcome went one of two ways, the enemy either swept them from the field or suffered attrition losses due to the constant harassing fire of such a formation.

As we know, the Revolution for the French was a 10 year period of much trial and error, learning from mistakes and devising better ways as time went by to fight. By the end of the 1790's the French had pretty much perfected their formations which by now were full of experienced veterans who could now fight in solid firing lines against the best of them. These same men who only a few years earlier had no idea nor clue what they were doing, especially many officers…

By the time 1800 came along the French army had pretty much perfected its fighting style of following the 1791 regulations with many unofficial adaptations for fighting in skirmish order, it was not just the country that went through a revolution, the army did as well. The problem was, none of the other European armies went through the pain the French went through during this time and were mostly happy to continue with their tried and true regulations and this is why the French were by 1803-1805 years ahead of every other nation.

It took the other European nations the next 10 years or so to catch up….some did it faster than others and some were still by 1815 fighting in the old Linear styles of the previous century. We only have to look at the 20th century to see how one nation gained an advantage whether it was a technological advance or doctrine and what it gained for them before the other side caught up…The only nation which other than France which had dedicated and well trained Skirmishers by the outbreak of war in 1800-1805 were the British and even then they were still in the process of building this arm and even during the Peninsula war they were still rushing to turn Line regiments into Light regiments.

Other nations did have Light Infantry regiments but I dare say their ability in skirmishing was probably more so in name than actual ability. The only formations I feel were capable as skirmishers would have been the various german Jager units which were fairly rare.

As for my comments about the French mistaking British skirmish lines as ragged main lines and thus giving Wellington victory

I would like to clarify that I never meant this to be across the board and the total and only reason the French lost. I feel the early Peninsula period the British were themselves still learning the tactic of skirmish order and thus the men were much closer than they should have been to affect better command and control of them. I feel this would have been a natural thing for officers to do when unsure of a particular tactic they had to carry out. Subsequently the French may have made many mistakes when encountering such a line of thick skirmishers, not always but enough to make a problem. It would not in any way mean that the French officers were stupid or inept because even the wisest of them could be fooled on occasion, but enough to cause wrong decisions to be made.

Later on when the British had more or less perfected their own skirmisher tactics by say 1809-10, the French were by then well and truly up against Wellington and his tactics for dealing with the French. He also inherited the perfected skirmish line from Moore and a whole gamut of other advantages to aid him against the French skirmish line, namely the Rifle btlns, much more experienced Light btlns etc…Any advantage the French may have had was lost. However, in mainland Europe this was not the case and the French still enjoyed a fairly high skirmish advantage until say 1813 onwards…

All I have said is purely my own conjecture and speculation, none of which is intended to be said as gospel or fact, just observations based on my own reading. I want to make this perfectly clear.

Shane

picture

As the battle continued the lines and columns fed the skirmish lines or broke down into skirmish lines themselves. The skirmishers used terrain, trees and buildings as a cover. Their primary target were enemy's officers, trumpeters, drummers, gunners, and skirmishers. The skirmishers also annoyed the flanks of the enemy and created terror when succeeded on appearing at the rear.

I hope this is helpful to what is being explained by LWF, Kevin and Shane. I can't explain it any better then this and if they wish to add by all means go ahead.

Regards
James

Here are some references and quotations on the employment of light troops during the wars as well as the use of troops in open order:

'If the campaigns are studied, the Republic certainly owes most of her victories to her light infantry.'
-Scharnhorst

'Probably never before has a greater number of light troops appeared on the battlefield than among the ranks of the present French army, nor has military history ever been given more irrefutable examples of the essential value of such troops than during this war.'
-Scharnhorst

'The physical ability and high intelligence of the common man enables the French tirailleurs to profit from all advantages offered by the terrain and the general situation, while the phlegmatic Germans, Bohemians, and Dutch form on open ground and do nothing but what their officer orders them to do.'
-Scharnhorst

'operations en tirailleur can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting.'
-Radetzky

'fighting en tirailleur shold be done only in very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the maniere de tirailleur.'
-Radetzky

'The skirmish lines that they occasionally tried to deploy in their front or flanks did not know how to spread out or to maintain proper direction. The majority of their NCOs are not capable of fending for themselves, and there are few who understand how to lead even a small patrol.'
-Duhesme on Russian jagers

'Their riflemen wee shod with boots very much resembling those of our fishermen, coming up considerably higher than the knee; thus rendering them…incapable of celerity of movement, one of the chief requisites of a rifle corps…'
-William Surtees on the Russian jagers

'A lively regard for honor, for competition and distinctions, the ability to learn quickly and to adapt easily to changing conditions and circumstances make French soldiers better skirmishers than those of any other nation.'
-Scharnhorst

'In the woods where the soldier breaks ranks and has no movements to carry out, but only to fire under cover of the trees, they are not only equal but superior to us; our men, accustomed to fighting shoulder to shoulder in the open field, found it difficult to adopt that seeming disorder which was yet necessary if they were not to be targets for the enemy.'
-An anonymous Prussian officer

'The action would be opened by a cloud of skirmishers…who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his artilery by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they also received considerable reinforcements to increase their overall effect. It was rare for any army to have placed its flanks in impregnable positions; in any case every position presents natural loopholes which favor an attacker. Against such points the sharpshooters would concentrate their efforts, and elan and inspiration were not often lacking at such times amongst such troops. Once the chink in the foe's armor had been revealed, it became the focal point for the main effort. The horse artillery would gallop up and oen fire from close range with canister. Meanwhile, the attakcing force would be moved up in the indicated direction, the infantry advancing in column (for it had little fire to offer), the cavalry in regiments and squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy bullets or cannon shot began to slacken…the soldiers would being to move forward as the drums beat the charge…'
-Foy

'The French, since the Revolution, have so successfully introduced such a new military system, that it becomes impossible to opose them effectually, by any other mode than adopting one founded on similar principles. They send a number of riflemen in front of their line to annoy their adversary, and conceal behind them the different movements of their columns: nothing can be effected against this disposition, but by opposing light troops to light troops.'
-Anonymous British general officer

Sincerely,
Kevin

General Brock,

Well done and thanks for the picture.

Sincerely,
Kevin

well researched Kevin, that might enlighten many people as it has me…

Thank you.

So wargame rules should allow a French divisional attack to be 1 battalion of dispersed soliders peppering away at a formed unit and causing it some real casulties, fatigue points and first-fire effects, while screening and chasing away advanced, deployed artillery….. and 3 battalions in company or division column, coming up under their cover to deliver a concentrated punch.

It would be nice if we used 8 stands a battalion, so the company column could be shown to impact ca 1/8th of a battalion in line. If it gets there, its a real punch through force. If there are 2 stands/battalion, a division column attack formation looks and acts like (for the wargame table) a line-on-line charge.

I think this discussion can better help explain some of the French ability in napoleonic battle- better than just giving them a +2 modifier in melee.

Kevin,

It seems that you operating here in two guises; Kevin Kiley and 10th Marines. If I am mistaken please accept my apologies.

We need to rewind a little here, and look at the words that you originally wrote:

"Second, many French commanders would deploy their first line as a heavy skirmish line instead of in three ranks. They would feed that line in the firefight with troops from the second line who were still in ranks, many times in battalion columns, as the fight wore on and troops in the first line ran out of ammunition and had to be pulled out to replenish."

This is what I have a problem with. What is a heavy skirmish line? How far did these troops extend their files? Did the whole front line deploy at once or were some platoons kept in close order as supports? Which commanders used this formation? At which (Napoleonic) battles? If the troops did not extend their files properly or keep formed sections in support, but merely broke ranks and fought every man for himself, then you are describing a unit fighting in disorder, en debandade, helter skelter, or any other term that could be applied to such chaos.

The quotes that you provided, with one exception, merely describe skirmishing, carried out by skirmishers, and not the type of operation that you originally discussed when asserting that the French mistook British skirmish lines for main lines of battle, because you think that French practice was to deploy skirmishers almost as thickly as close order lines.

I am well aware that the French always covered their movements with skirmish screens, but I particularly stated that I was not looking for proof that the French were superior in this type of combat. Most of your quotes merely state that the French were better skirmishers, or that they had more light troops than other nations, not that they used any different system from others when actually in the skirmish line.

Skirmishing was carried out by extended lines, in pairs, backed up by formed supports in sections or platoons, and this was practised by all nations including the French, as evidenced by the instructions of Davout, Reille and others. Whether the individuals of a certain nation making up these screens were better shots, more adept at taking cover, or wore heavier boots than those of other nations, is irrelevant to the point.

1968:

Hard to tell if you are being facetious or not ("chasing away advanced, deployed, artillery . . .").
Beware the overgeneralizations about French Skirmishing. If this thread has accomplished anything it is that there are many unanswered questions. Most of the overgeneralizations and assertions are of little value for wargame design.

Key questions (such as "when did these French battalion and regimental" skirmish episodes occur? How often was the practice employed? What were the ground and tactical situations?) were not answered.

The overgeneralized quotes (such as Foy's) are of no assistance because there are no specifics about time, place, and situation. The assumption is that such practice was a regular occurrence. Yet, many detailed accounts of campaigns (including battles) rarely mention the practice. Most of Foy's experience was in the Peninsula (and his book was about the Peninsula). What is a "cloud of skirmishers?" No specific definition/explanation is offered and thus it is open to interpretation. Secondary authors read these kinds of remarks and interpret them based on their own preconceptions.

If the French "super skirmishers" were such an important factor in their victories wouldn't the opponents of the French counter them more aggressively?

French skirmishing is a microcosm of a larger macrocosm. In designing a wargame the "whole" must be considered (and the relationship among the parts). If a pot-pourri of tactical minutiae are patched together the result may be a wargame (in the sense that it is a game based on war), but the validity of the resulting model will be in question.

Rules that give the French bonuses in order to represent supposed superior capabilities are as bad as rules that would treat all cavalry as equal. Statistical averaging is a simple mechanism for representing "factors" but the devil is in the details.

Ask yourself this question? If the French tactics were so superior then why, when Napoleon was not present, did the French lose at least 75% or more of the battles that they engaged in (vs. about a 90% victory ratio when Napoleon was present)? [I could supply the details for this claim--but you can research it yourself by reviewing battles from 1796 on that were of a given size and noting whether Napoleon was present or not].

If superior tactics or "elan" were the main rationale for the French victories then the French would have won more battles when Napoleon was not present.

The human factor (command, communications, morale/motivation, training, experience, etc.), terrain/ground conditions/situation, and other factors bear upon the matter more significantly than do minor tactical differences such as skirmishing practices.

A cardinal "sin" of history is overgeneralization. For the historian the devil is in the details. It is the practice of social scientists to generalize. Historians delve further into the detail. The overgeneralized statements and assertions provided as "evidence" prove nothing (except that the person making them is not trained in history). There should always be more questions than there are assertions.

You would increase the validity of a simulation by stripping out all "bonuses" for various nationalities (and speed up the wargame). If training, experience, troop condition, leadership context, ground condition, tactical context, etc. are not used to determine when a particular nationality's units might have an advantage then it is better to ignore them. Of course accounting for situational details requires a knowledgeable referee and his ability to use his "coup d'oeil" as well as wargamers that don't want to argue about his decisions (i.e. a "rare" occurrence). Trying to account for nationality differences by applying bonuses is trying to represent uniquely human factors using statistics--a practice that has bedeviled designers for decades (and there is no quick and dirty way around the problem when relying on "rules").

It is easier to apply mathematical "bonuses" for human factors which is why designers do it. If you worked with a group of people at your place of employment and the "boss" rated your work group as a +2 compared to other work groups in terms of work effectiveness--does that mean that your group "always" gets the +2 bonus, that other groups cannot improve, that a different leader may decrease your effectiveness (and conversely increase another group's), that your effectiveness "bonus" applies every day as though it was a constant fixed in stone?"

Note in Gill's latest book (1809: Thunder on the Danube) how Napoleon's presence spurred on the Wurttembergers and Bavarians (including their light infantry--that supposedly was "inferior" to the French). It is the eternal verity of leadership (i.e. a human, not a mathematical factor) that accounts for the difference). Of course, a wargame designer would give a +2 bonus to Wurttembergers or Bavarians when Napoleon was present! [just having a little fun].

Captain S:

Per "I particularly stated that I was not looking for proof that the French were superior in this type of combat. Most of your quotes merely state that the French were better skirmishers, or that they had more light troops than other nations, not that they used any different system from others when actually in the skirmish line."

Good point! However, overgeneralized comments, such as Foy's "cloud" can be interpreted to mean anything (and thus mean nothing).

The answer lies in training, experence, doctrine, leadership, . . . and not in a "different system."

You asked for an example: Friant's (2nd division commander in Davout's III Corps) after action report for Auerstadt mentions that a whole battalion of the 48e de Ligne was deployed as skirmishers during the battle.

NapNewbie,

I think you've got it sussed pretty much. Just some points:

''1. The French send out their skirmishers, their opponent sends out their's and all the skirmishers do is bang away at each other. Skirmishers cancel out skirmishers.''

Unless one side had more trained skirmishers and especially if that advantage is backed up by longer-ranged rifles.

''2. Deployment distance from the main battle line is irrelevant. Each sides skirmishers will deploy far enough forward to keep the other sides skirmishers from harassing their main battle line.''

Unless one side is using rifled bores.

''3. If one sides skirmishers are being driven in they will reinforce the skirmish line, either from the skirmish reserve or the main battle line in order to keep the opponents skirmishers from their main battle line''.

Unless the 're-enforcements' are trained,they're not going to be effective and I haven't heard of this happening.

''4. Skirmishers will avoid calvary, unless in some sort of calvary-safe cover''.

Fuentes de Onoro.

''6. Prior to any opponent of the French developing skirmishers et al I see the French as having an advantage in being able to harass an opponents main battle line.''
Not sure when the French would have an advantage. What did you mean by this?

''7. This being the case, it is only worth resolving harassing fire by skirmishers if the other side does not have skirmishers''

Well, another factor is what kind of skirmishers. If one side has genuine light troops, I mean troops trained to go in battalion, brigade or even army line skirmish order and then re-form, then you're dealng with a very different animal.

You also have the power of skirmish troops regularly trained in live-fire proceedures and officers entering into accuracy contests, verses troops who were not.

You have the issue, in some late period battles, of skirmish trained troops, taking on formed battalions and winning, eg Orthez.

You have the issue of skirmish-trained troops placed so thickly that they can be mistaken for the main army line, something with the potential for confusion, as Foy found at Bussaco.

Herr Fritz:

"You asked for an example: Friant's (2nd division commander in Davout's III Corps) after action report for Auerstadt mentions that a whole battalion of the 48e de Ligne was deployed as skirmishers during the battle."

Good. That establishes that one battalion was deployed as skirmishers. Now if we could determine if only that one battalion of the entire 3rd Corps was so deployed. We still don't have the circumstances, although it may have been screening the division's movement against the Prussian flank. But even one battalion for the entire division is not a "cloud" of skirmishers (at least in the sense used by some authors as a swarm).

It is interesting that you can find examples of non-French battalions in "open order" in descriptions of battles also. But without the details we are only left with a vague conception of what was occuring.

If we had the specific details and how the skirmishers were utilized in that particular engagement we would have more meat to chew. That is one of the problems of research--the details were known at the time but not described specifically enough for those studying the campaign many years afterwards.

Lest we Forget,

You state that game designers will give a +2 etc for effectiveness for one troop type over another for example. Maybe so but not for me, I have designed my own set of rules with very detailed rules for skirmishing with the main differences being with regards to firing ability which I base solely on the experience of the men, I also have movement differences from unit to unit based on the same differences, experience.

In my rules there is not one situation where I state the French get a +2 (for example) over an opponent etc… I base everything on unit experience and even then the differences are only minor except where it comes to Morale or Command control etc.

I also use a novel matrix for firing whether it be skirmish fire or formed fire. I have seven fire disciplines from 1st to 7th down one side while the other has a break down in brackets in 5% increments from 01% up to 100%. You roll a D100% dice and cross index it to find the actual bonus (or negative) for that unit for their fire for that particular turn only.

The table is set up so that regardless of whether your unit is Old Guard or Conscripts if both sides roll 95 on the dice then both sides will gain a +1 on factors. It is when you roll say a 5% on the dice where the real differences occur. On a roll of 5% the Guards might have a -2 on factors but the Conscripts will have a -5 on factors.

This is how my rules work, I basically said that men are men no matter who they are, how they are uniformed or how well they were seen to have fought. A Conscript unit might on occasion fight just as well as a Guard unit given a chance, a Guard unit might fight poorly on occasion. The probability is aimed and geared towards the units fighting as they should but the random factor (dice) may come into play to modify this and give surprise situations and outcomes.

I actually saw a Spanish Btln of poor troops out fire (excellent dice rolling) a French Elite Grenadier (rolled poorly) btln in one battle we played in three consecutive turns causing the French Grenadiers to waver, the Spanish commander called charge and the French morel test was failed and they broke. This might not happen every day but when it does it is remembered and these are the things that get into the history books…

anyway, I digress, sorry.

Shane