"third rank skirmishers" Topic

As we all know, several of the Continental powers used the third rank of line battalions for this purpose.
How does this compare with the French & British practice of using specialist companies?
Also, is the British habit of using flank battalions similar to the third rank concept?
donald

I think the specialist companies were more proficient in well-tarined units, but those form green units would be another story.

Flank battalions is not the same as third rankers, since all the elite companies would be pooled. The battalions left without elites would not have skirmishers/elites and so would be less impressive.

Skirmishing is like learning a language: there may be "rules," but there are a billion exceptions and special cases, and then of course there are regional dialects and variations….

I used to think that I understood it, but now it seems to me more like a set of improvisations, with each army doing it four or five different ways, sometimes simultaneously.

According to their drill manual, the Prussian Landwehr infantry of 1813-15's third rank were supposed to be able to act as skirmishers, though how effective they would have been in this role, and if they ever really were deployed as such during battle I don't know.

When the British flank companies were detached, it was quite common to form detachments of marksmen drawn from the centre companies, often called "flankers" or "picked men". This practice was first seen in the F&IW (leading to the original picket or light company), and was also used in the AWI. The Napoleonic Wars saw the gradual demise of long-term converged flank battalions in British service, due to the perceived effect it had on esprit de corps. After 1800 or so, it tended to be limited to smaller contingents with no other elite formations to use as a spearhead or reserve (eg Graham's force at Barossa), or ad hoc formations for a special purpose (eg the "battalion" of Foot Guards light companies formed to defend Hougoumont).

Ochoin,

There was a discussion on third rankers on one of the other Napoleonic forums – NapSeries or was it NapWars…?
Anyhow (for the earlier parts of the Wars) although there is a just a little evidence of them being used light troops, it seems that third rankers was generally regarded as a formed reserve or being useful extend the line of battle.

The use of third rankers must have compared very well – very simply, comparing a six-company French battalion with a Prussian battalion of 1813, and after deducting men for the supports, and as a fraction of the numbers of men in each battalion, we`re looking at the Prussians being able to put twice the number of men in the skirmisher "chain", or firing line as the French…. Though on balance, the French may have still have had the edge, and been more proficient at that time, having had more experience.

As part of British formation (brigades and then divisions), "light battalions" were to form on the left but act in support of their own brigades according to circumstances. Wellington did not approve of detachments of elites from their parent brigades.

Regards,

Mike.

Hi, Mike,
Yeah, I know this has been discussed at NapSeries. I'm not being critical of their forum (wonderful place) but some topics such as this one garner supercilious replies because the matter is firmly fixed in their minds. I'm still unsure (hence, the question) & I'm a sensitive soul….
I realise the trend for infantry in the Nap Wars was all-purpose rather than specialisation but individual practise may kick the trend.
Interesting your point about Wellington: & yet he did just that at Waterloo! Also, I believe their is evidence from the service records of staff officers in the Peninsula which relate how they commanded divisional Light battalions.
cheers, donald

Were marksmen (from a perhaps non-existant third rank) drawn from British line battalions even if their elite companies weren't detached? Again, I think there may be vidence for this at Waterloo.
regards, donald

The British did have a dettachment of Flankers at the battle of Maida in 1806.

Austrians, Prussians and Russians did all use the third rank concept.

Ney and others did recommend it for the french army too.

Instead Napoleon did introduce voltigeur companies, which was arguably at first just an attempt to widen the recruitment base for infantry duty.
Undersized men had problems to load the long muskets vertically, which was essential for line musketry.
So creating specialist skirmisher companies of small sized people was actually a smart idea and did allow a reduction of minimum size for infantry recruits.
The average height of the french soldiers was lower than in the Austrian, Prussian and Russian armies, the french population was generally a bit smaller.

A possible weak spot of the third rank concept was, that all reglements who did regulate this, did explicitly order the best men into the third rank, which was not meant to be a shooting rank when in line.
Still the prussians for example did use their third rank concept until 1888 and there were never complaints about insufficient line fire power.
For the prussian army after 1807 the deployed line was just the formation for the static firefight, which had to be avoided if possible.

At least when looking at the regulations, the french were not leaders in the light infantry business. French generals like Duhesme did boast that every french soldier could skirmish, but nothing was done to regulate this, except the weird small people/voltigeur idea.
The french did essentially rely on the improvised flexibility developed during the revolutionary wars.

Wargame rulemakers often turn things upside down.

The light capacity of the british line was essentially nil.
a single light company in a 10 com bataillon produces barely enough men for picket and outpost duty. Light infantry jobs were left to a small specialist component(95rifles), hired locals(cacadores) or foreigners(KGL).
The designated light regiments did mostly fight as line in battle. An integrated concept of combat in mutual support of formed and dispersed elements did not exist.

The fact that the British army did fight succesfully on the penninsula should not lead to the conclusion that Moore´s/Wellington`s light infantry ideas were modern or innovative or even sufficient for more complicated enviroments.

On paper the Austrians, Prussians and Russians after 1807 had the most modern tactical doctrine, which could be used without major modifications until the end of the black powder era.
The French did rely on improvisation.
The British did follow 18th century ideas.

Capt,

I`m not entirely convinced when you say that "An integrated concept of combat in mutual support of formed and dispersed elements did not exist."
Surely some understanding (a conception) is evident in the orders and instructions given to light troops and in the general orders of the British army!
Did they really have no idea of what they were about?

If you look at a British/Allied "line of battle" as a whole, it will become fairly self-evident that its light infantry capacity was far from "nil"…
Yes, the British did rely on allied elements in their army and did not restructure their army. Surely, it makes sense not to attempt to reform an army whilst fighting a war and if you have resources you don`t squander them.
Besides, Portuguese Cacadores were rather more than just "hired locals" and the "foreign" contingents in the British army were the result of England being subjected to "foreign" monarchs – and their allegiance was sworn to the same monarch!

And its a periodisation isn`t it, that the British army was stuck in the eighteenth century? All these armies were contemporary to one another but had different doctrines.
After all, there was more than just one idea floating around in the eighteenth century on the subject of tactical doctrine!

Re. the empahsis on skirmishing, I think it is a question of the degree of command and control which the British military were keen to retain and later this was seen to break down in the "modern" Prussian army of 1870-71, when junior officers and men sought cover or acted upon their own initiatives – another subject I know, but the concern did not go away.

Mike.

Mike,
there can be no doubt that a well handled experienced British unit could do a lot of things, but doctrine is about the general layout of the army, no army can rely on the experience of just a few formations.
The fact that key missions were given to foreigners tells a lot of things. As far as I see it, Wellington´s main goal was to keep his line intact, it was his mass of decision.
Prolongued skirmisher battles would have been a violation of W´s doctrine, everytime things went a bit into that direction, it must have been a painful moment for the duke.

"Modern" is not necessarily better or a guaranteed success formula, no doubt about this.
After all the "modern" Prussian army did loose at Ligny with superior numbers and as late as 1870 no army, including the Prussians, had found a real effective way to control masses of skirmishers.

But still, having a strong integrated skirmisher component and being able to back them up with columns, did allow fighting everywhere and carrying combat into broken terrain.
Wellington couldn´t do this.
In an era were open ground was usually dominated by artillery, a strong integrated skirmisher component with column support was simply necessary, at least if an army was to fight anytime, anywhere and even under sub optimal conditions.
Wellington did usually avoid this conflict by fighting only under the best possible conditions.

Its not totally wrong to give the thin red line superior defensive capabilties, intact disciplined lines could stop every assault.
But its wrong to make the line the killer formation under all battlefield conditions, napoleonics is not 7yw.

And its wrong and historically inaccurate to ignore or downgrade the skirmishing capabilities of the post 1806 continental Allied armies and their effect on battles.

Those who did follow the third ranker formula, did keep it until the end of the black powder era.
It was the armies which did rely on elites and specialists, which had to change a lot during the 19th century.

Capt.,

I don`t think I`m aware of saying that the thin red line should have a particular bonus in firepower in wargames.
No, I didn`t say that.
But what seems to have happened is that they profitted from the benefit of a better fire discipline than other nation`s troops and that`s not quite the same thing though. OK, some of this was due to the Duke`s protecting them in dead ground and so therefore they were in better morale to withstand a French assault.

I see what you`re saying though re. the use of supporting columns in rough terrain – but the British were known to use columns in advance and with the support of their ad hoc light battalions (e.g. Myers advance at Albuera).
These manouevres in columns were possible, but the British mindset of the time was to do with the moral effect of the volley and bayonet, which was done best in line and on the defensive and let alone doing it in rough terrain it was a more risky on the offensive.

I just wondered what you mean by it being; "wrong and historically inaccurate to ignore or downgrade the skirmishing capabilities of the post 1806 continental Allied armies and their effect on battles."
As I believe pre-1806 skirmishers had more importance on the battlefield – I`ll be interested if you could let us have some examples of decisive skirmishing post that date.

Regards,

Mike.

Since skirmishers performed two primary task…the first disconcerting the enemy formation and the second preventing their own formed troops from being disconcerted…it seems logical that any open order troops in advance of the parent formation would be effective at screening that formation…

similarly, when firing on the enemy's formed units, big target likely did not require a great deal of skill to hit…

so, where training comes into play is when two skirmish lines are fighting one another or reacting to the sudden appearance of enemy cavalry…in these cases training could make a big difference…I suspect third rank skirmish screens took heavier losses then their opponents, but that may not have detracted from their ability to do their jobs…

Another point at which training and/or experience would come into play is in knowing when to deploy skirmishers, how far ahead to send them, when to have them fall back on the main line, and (perhaps especially) how the skirmishers should merge back into the line -- all without getting "gobbled up" by enemy cavalry or large formed body of infantry. In a word: "timing."

One point that often seems to be missed is that 1/3 of all troops in the 7YW had a 'light' designation, whether it be Grenzer, Jager, FreiKorps. In addition the British appointed light companies for campaign – see Wolfes instructions to his battalion in Kent England (when expecting to fight in England). The French were further along and it was in their Campaign Regulations that a 'piquet' platoon would be formed and kept for the entirety of a campaign. All this some 50 years before Jena.

Montbe and Hoepfner on Jena can easily be scanned on Google and their references to employment of entire companies, 3rd rank detachments, and specialised light units being used as skirmisher screens on the battlefield by Saxon and Prussian troops are not that hard to find.

Th Russians managed to have instructions to form 1/2 platoon of lights and 1/2 platoon of grenadiers, and shortly after also issue instructions on 3rd ranks skirmishers. Which seems a nice mix up.

Digging through the 1806 Foucarts shows up that the French Lights were different from the line. In that whenever light duties came up it was the lights, if present, who were used.

There appear to be no black and white standards to put down on all this and that includes any claim to an 1807 watershed.

The major difference we can see is an increasing use of battlefield skirmishers integrated into Brigade operations with an expectation that all troops if required would have some capability in this, whilst at the same time having specialised troops who were properly capable and producing regulations to explain what was expected of them.

At what time each army reached what point in this is rather debatable as may be expected from the melange of information available.

With the French army of 1805 there were only two Corps with proper designated Voltiguer companies in each Ligne Btln. These were the Corps of Davout and Soult. This, however does not mean that the other Corps did not have Light Infantry Skirmish companies. On the contrary, every Ligne Regiment btlns had a company of Fusiliers who played that role with just as much ability as a designated Voltiguer would, the only difference was that the "Voltiguer" term or designating one company as Skirmishers under the name, Voltiguer was only just beginning at the time.

So basically every btln of every Regiment of every Corps had a Fusilier company designated to skirmish. Davout's and Soult's Corps were the first to term them as "Voltiguers" as a designated company as such. Eventually every Ligne btln designated a single Fusilier company as Voltiguers. These early years of 1805-1807 were years that the French Voltiguers were at their best, well trained and versed in Light Infantry tactical drill and training. As the years went on this ability or Adeptness in this role diminished with the decline in recruit quality but more so the endless losses in trained skilled veterans who knew how to perform the role of Voltiguer to perfection of the earlier years.

Regards,
Shane

And yes, the Legere Regiments of the time played an important role as Light Infantry supporting arger formations such as Brigade and Divisional levels. Their skills of the early period all the way up to 1812 cannot be undrestimated.

Shane