"Russian skirmishers " Topic

Just reading the info everyone had on French skirmishers I wonder if the community could impart its considerable knowledge on Russian skirmishers to me!

My understanding is limited, however I am under the impression that (in 1812 at least) there were roughly 2 Jager Battalions per Inf division, and that these provided the skirmisher screen for the Div?

I know these units could also fight as a normal formed body of troops.

How did it work?

Thanks in advance.

TW

Actually there were two jager regiments, each of two battelions per division, with the rest of the division composed of four two-battalion musketeer or grenadier regiments.

Russian jagers were not up to the same level as French, British, or Prussian light troops. At one time I had a link to a paper written about the effectiveness of Russian light troops but it must be on my home computer (I'm at work right now).

This link has a lot about the order of battle of the Russian army during the Napoleonic Wars, but nothing about the tactics. The two links that I did have about Russian army tactics don't function anymore. :^(

Jim

If memory serves, the last time their regs mentioned skirmishing was in the 1780s. It was one of the things that they didn't really address when they did their big reorganization of the army from 1807-10. There seems to have been no standard doctrine other than a vague understanding that third-rankers would take care of it, probably drawn from the Jäger battalions.

I disagree. In good humor and candor, the posts above seem to show an unreasonable and unwarrented prejudice. I think the above posters are saying that the Russians formed jager regiments and employed them in large (1/3) numbers in their divisional organization, but didn't know how to use them. (?!?) Here's a summary from an open source.

link

"…..Generally the Russians formed their infantry division in two lines. In the first line was first infantry brigade of 4 battalions formed either in lines or columns. Approx. 140-210 m (200-300 paces) behind was the second line. Here stood the second infantry brigade of 4 battalions formed in columns.
In front of the division was jager brigade (partially) in skirmish order.

The Russian infantry defended villages in this way: Jagers in skirmish order occupied the outer buildings and gardens. Inside the village in the streets stood individual companies, they if necessary supported the most threatened parts of the skirmish line. Behind the village stood reserve; one or several battalions formed in column(s).
Church and cemetary were defended by grenadiers."

…………………….

There were not many admirers of skirmish formation in Russia, one of the few were Suvorov and Kutusov. Kutusov wrote several sets of notes on light infantry already in the 1780s.

The skirmish line was formed by the Russian infantry this way: the soldiers of 1st rank formed the front chain, the soldiers of 2nd rank formed the second chain, while the 3rd rank formed a reserve behind the center.

The skirmishers acted in pairs with 2 or 5 paces intervals between pairs, maneuvered according to drum signals and moved at a run (150-200 paces per minute). They were trained to use terrain features, to fire from standing, kneeling or lying position.

Jägers (light infantry) were usually the ones sent to skirmish. If there was insufficient number of jägers the line infantry or grenadier regiments sent their own skirmishers.

The troops were sent to skirmish by platoons or companies, which relieved each other in turn, or by entire battalions and even regiments. For example a day before the Battle of Eylau, the Arkhangel Musketier Regiment (line infantry) was deployed as skirmishers to cover the withdrawal of the 4th Division. In Krasne in August 1812, the 49th Jäger Regiment (light infantry) was placed in front of the village in skirmish order.

There were disagreements about the use of large number of skirmishers. Published in 1811 "On Jäger Training" recommended the use of entire jäger battalion (4 companies of 2 platoons each) in skirmish order. The grenadier and strelki platoon were kept in reserve behind both flanks of the skirmish line formed by the remaining six jäger platoons.

Barclay de Tolly was against using large number of skirmishers. He wrote in 1812: "in the beginning of a battle one is to push out as few skirmishers as possible, but to keep small reserves, to refresh the men in the chain and [to keep] the rest behind formed in column. Heavy losses cannot be attributed to skillful actions of the enemy, but to excessive numbers of skirmishers confronted to the enemy fire."
In Berezina in 1812, a large number of jagers and line infantry were thrown into skirmishing in the overgrown terrain. They were shattered by French cuirassiers and 1,500 were taken prisoners ! (Riehn – "1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign" p 384)
In 1813 de Tolly prescribed forming only 1/3 of the whole number of men sent to skirmish. (Zhmodikov – "Tactics of the Russian Army" Vol. II p. 29)

Russian General Prince Eugene Wirtemberg wrote that in Russian army was a tendency to push out a lot of skirmishers and only in 1813 the right proportion was found (only part of battalion and not the entire unit was sent out as skirmishers).

It was said that until 1806 the Russian skirmishers were below European average. During the numerous wars however they improved. The Prussians, who fought the Russians in 1812, considered the jägers to be competent skirmishers. According to Prussian officer von Clausewitz, the Russian jägers at Borodino fought in the skirmish line with great dexterity. (Clausewitz – "The Campaign of 1812 in Russia" 1992, pp 162-157)

Chichagov however claimed that Russian infantry had not enough wit and adroitness to fight in skirmish order. Barclay de Tolly considered the French skirmishers superior to the Russians in agility and marksmanship and more effective in the woods. Only after 1812 the abilities of French skirmishers declined. "

1968billsfan,

Thanks, the link to which you referred was one of the ones that I used to have and then it went bad. Evidently the owner changed servers and URL. I have updated my bookmark.

I think the reason for my statement about the effectiveness of Russian skirmishing was my conclusion that the Russians tended to fight their light troops in a more "ordered and controlled" way than the French or British did. I think that the French and British tended to give their individual light infantry soldiers a little more flexibility while the Russians, and to a lesser extent the Prussians, tended to have theirs under stricter control. As I said, just my impression and I may very well be incorrect in that impression.

The article that you posted is good food for thought and debate!

Thanks,

Jim

of interest is also:

H-France Review Vol. 7 (February 2007), No. 16
A review of the book
Robert Goetz, 1805: Austerlitz, Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition. Greenhill: London, 2005. 368 pp. Appendices, Maps, Tables, Illustrations and Index. ISBN 1-85367644-6.

link

…."Goetz's book is not the first to examine the battle and employ available Austrian and Russian sources, Christopher Duffy's, Austerlitz 1805, remains the classic account, and it is this history with which Goetz is in direct competition for a more thorough examination of events.[9] What makes Goetz's account intriguing is that he utilizes Austrian and Russian sources that were unavailable to Duffy in 1977. Of particular value to Goetz are the reprints of Karl von Stutterheim's history of the battle, and Alexandre, comte Langeron's narrative.[10] Both sources are used judiciously, along with material drawn from a published collection of Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov's papers, a copy of which resides at the University of Virginia"

………………"The preponderance of Goetz's examples, however, focus on the ability of Russian Jaeger (light infantry) to fight in skirmish order and meet the French light infantry head-on. This approach is not new, as the development of Russian light infantry battalions was a reflection of lessons learned on the Russians' frontiers with the Turks and in central Asia during the eighteenth century, and not drawn from the experience of the Russian army in central Europe. The notion that the allied armies did not possess a tactical flexibility equivalent to the French is based upon a misconception by historians laid to rest in the past decade. Allied soldiers were highly trained and well disciplined, and the greatest difference between the allies and the French lay not in tactics, but in organization, operations and leadership.[13] "[13] An accessible overview rejecting the concept of static armies of the eighteenth century is, Peter H. Wilson, "Warfare in the Old Regime, 1648-1789," in European Warfare 1453-1815, edited by Jeremy Black (New York, 1999), oo, 69-95.

There is a point to be made that the quality of skirmishers is directly related to their initiative. A Russian rank and file conscripted from serfs would be at a disadvantage until/unless trained well – and even then, lack of education could be a factor. There are references to some Russian jager units being better than others, this presumably following from de-centralized and non-uniform training practices. So jager trained on the Finnish frontier will be accustomed to skirmishing in the woods, while a unit trained on the Moldavian steppe might be entirely clueless in the woods. And a unit that had Bagration as shef might have more rigorous training than a unit with a shef who received a patronage appointment. etc.

I think sometimes people have taken the observation that the French were better at skirmishing and concluded that the Russians were bad. Doesn't necessarily follow.

As far as Russian jager officers, most of the "best and the brightest" landed jager commands and thereby had advance/rear guard assignments. Quite a few of the senior commanders came up through Jager commands – Bagration and Barclay among them.

The Zhmodikovs offer a good discussion of skirmishing in the Russian army, and if you have more than a passing interest it would be worthwhile tracking down a copy. I would consider it one of the most essential sources for the Russian army of the Napoleonic wars in English ( the other being Alex Mikaberidze's book on the Russian officer corps ) . Available from George Nafziger: Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars, 2 vols, Alexander and Yurii Zhmodikov, available from the Nafziger Collection ( link )

Billsfan, I would just note that your own source includes:

"Only some Russian commanders used terrain as a cover…. There were not many admirers of skirmish formation in Russia, one of the few were Suvorov and Kutusov." [sic]

It was Kutusov who wrote the skirmish regs in 1786. They describe movements by entire platoons, not the same sort of open order demonstrated by the French, British, or even the Prussian Schützen.

But this reference to the "On Jäger Training" in 1811 is very interesting. I wish that the guys on that website had given a full documentation for it, because I've never heard of it before. Who wrote it? Was it the official new regs? Is it available in any language other than Russian?

Where are these guys getting their primary sources?

Open the Pod,

In general, Jager were trained to fight in cover while the musketeer and grenadier regiments considered this beneath them. So while musketeer and even grenadier regiments could and did skirmish, according to Glinka they "were not trained to take cover behind local obstacles; they even considered it shameful … as a result they took very heavy casualties." But it is observed that they "were able to keep enemy skirmishers at bay," though with disproportionate casualties (Zhmodikov, I, 44). At Austerlitz, 6th jager at Kruh and Holubitz and the Leib Jager at Blasowitz took cover in villages. In the case of Leib Jager, we know that the companies were deliberately positioned under cover inside houses and behind garden walls and hedges. Towards the end of the day they were positioned again in the town of Krenowitz to cover the crossing of the Rausnitz. In defending the Ukra line in Dec. 1806, Russian jager concealed in the brush along the banks harassed French crossing attempts. But in 1805-1807 accounts (at least) there is clear indication that not all jager regiments were as effective as others in use of cover – or maybe in use of different kinds of cover, the suggestion being that regional geographic variations resulted in some variation in training/experience.

Trust me, Zhmodikov is $40 USD (plus shipping) well spent (and I have no connection to either the Zhmodikovs or Nafziger, btw!)

Gents, very interesting.

I guess my basic question is do my Jager Battalions pretty much always screen my "regular battalions" of my division in the attack and defence.

Basically I want to know for the purpose of basing my Jager Battalions (i.e skirmish or close order).

Seems like a simplistic question, however maybe I took this for granted and therefore never really looked at it, and also, like a lot of people, my knowledge base tends to be more bent towards British and French organization.

Also, it's worth noting too that it would have taken training to learn to use a musket from the kneeling or prone position, especially if you wanted to have a respectable rate of fire. So having said that regular troops sent to skirmish may have simply been unable to lay down an effective rate of fire while skirmishing and therefore were out-gunned by trained skirmishers. This would oppose the view that the regular troops looked down upon skirmishing, and would suggest rather that they just weren't effective at it.

Food for thought.

TW.

The Jagers if fighting as formed troops would be in the same "elbow-to-elbow" formation as line troops. For gaming purposes, the gaming convention is to have the troops mounted on their stands in a fingertip-to-fingertip spacing between files(at closest!) on the stands. Maybe 15mm width per figure. I don't agree with this and since figures are pretty cheap I try to mount them to look like the paintings/drawings made during those times. (Most regulations had about 27 inches between files. Our 15-18mm tall figures are 1 to 100 scale in height, so the distance between adjacent figures ("pitch") should be 0.27 inches. One standard typical wargame stand standard is to be 1 inch (25mm) in width. Therefore, to match the regulation, there should be 4 figures on such a stand. Actually, its hard to get more than 3 figures on a 1 inch stand.)
How many real soliders a wargame figure represents depends upon your ruleset and the unit scale of your game.

As to skirmishers cf above: "The skirmishers acted in pairs with 2 or 5 paces intervals between pairs, maneuvered according to drum signals and moved at a run (150-200 paces per minute). They were trained to use terrain features, to fire from standing, kneeling or lying position"
(Also, they call out 2 seperated ranks of skirmishers and a reserve)

A pace is typically 2.5 feet, so the real pair of skirmishers should be 60 to 150 inches interval from another pair.(Say 110 inches interval to make the discussion easier). The pair themselves might occupy 70 inches on their own, so the pitch between pairs is 180 inches. 15 feet. To be real-scaled with the 1:100 height of the wargame figure, they should then be 1.8 inches apart. So if you wanted to do a to-scale diarama of what the 1:1 actual skirmish line looked like, 2 figures close together in the center of a 1.8 inch stand would look about right. Of course, in wargaming each figure represents multiple soldiers so if you did this, the musket density of the skirmish line would be almost the same as the line of battle. Maybe one way to approach this would be to make the skirmish line figure density at relative ratio to the LoB density. If the real LoB file density is 27 inches per soldier and the skirmish line density is 2 soldiers per 180 inches, then the skirmish line is 6.7 times less dense. You can then work out how the skirmishes should be based, or stands separated by this ratio. If your LoB unit has 2 files (figures in one rank) per 1 inch stand, then you might base 2 skirmish figures in the center of a 6.67 inch wide stand. Or use a 1 inch stand and require 5.67 inches from the edge of that stand to the edge of the next skirmish figure stand.

I expect many readers will be very uncomfortable with these thoughts because they violate how they have been playing and basing units for the last 50 years.

First, I think acquiring Zhmodikov is an excellent idea. In the first volume, for example, they discuss in detail the skirmish instructions Kutusov gave the Bug Jaeger Korps prior to the Napoleonic Wars, to include the six missions assigned the skirmishers, and specifics on how they deployed to complete them.

The bottom line is that the line and light troops of every army in Europe from before the French Revolution forward, could and did skirmish, and did so a lot, PERIOD . . .

Depending on how you defined the word "skirmish."

In Kutusov's instructions, for example, one mission was to simply screen the line troops as they deployed into line of battle. To do so the Jaeger formed an elbow to elbow line, but only one rank deep, not three. There is no mention in his instructions of skirmish doctrine that even approximates French methodology per Davout's instructions.

First, there was always suspicion that if dispersed in an open formation away from their officers' canes, the untrustworthy serf would simply desert. Barring that, the serf had no experience in initiative or decision making on his own, a direct comment on the society he served. The Cavalry Maiden, Nadezhda Durova, was an eyewitness to this in 1812 and wrote specifically on the frustration of Russian officers during training who had to continually give commands to their Jaeger on what function to perform next, as they seemed not to understand how to do so individually.

The final word for me has always been the directive of Austrian Chief of Staff Graf Radetzky in 1813 who wrote (quote), "skirmishing should only be done in a
very restricted fashion because neither we nor the Russians have mastered this type of fighting."

This is in 1813, when the French are on the ropes, and yet this still tells me Russian skirmishers should be rare and pretty well suck at their jobs, IF your definition of "skirmish" is classic French doctrine.

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

Following on that, as a general impression it seems Russian troops, jager in particular, were actually pretty good at defensive skirmishing, but not particularly adept at offensive skirmishing unless tightly controlled (which limits effectiveness). Thus certainly follows the general idea of greater initiative demonstrated by the French rank and file vs. inherent limitations in the quality of the "raw material" available to the Russians.

Ordering the Nafziger book and will follow up to try to get original source idenficiation from the Napoleon site.

Bill Gray wrote:

The final word for me has always been the directive of Austrian Chief of Staff Graf Radetzky in 1813 who wrote (quote), "skirmishing should only be done in a
very restricted fashion because neither we nor the Russians have mastered this type of fighting."

Bill,

I have seen this quote many times, but what is the actual context of Radetzky's words? Is he saying that skirmishing should be avoided altogether, or is he saying that skirmishing should be carried out with the minimal number of troops necessary? Barclay stated that heavy losses in skirmishing were due to the fact that too many men were committed to the firing line at any one time and that fewer men could achieve the same objective. Clausewitz says much the same thing and states that economy of force is the best policy.

It seems that the French may have been prepared to commit large numbers of men to such combat, although hard information is difficult to come by. It was perhaps not such an advantage as some imagine anyway, and there is an interesting account by Pelet describing the activities of a French division at Busaco that echoes the sentiments of those in allied armies who called for caution in skirmishing:

"Our brigade…found itself almost entirely dispersed into groups of skirmishers, and in the end it was found necessary to support this unit with the second brigade. Thus we covered the entire slope below the convent of Busaco while the enemy successively reinforced their line of skirmishers…They were recalled by horns and replaced by fresh troops – an excellent method neglected by us for too long. Our system permitted French regiments to be dispersed during a battle and in the end only the officers and the bravest soldiers were left.."

Pelet also goes on to say:

"I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casualties."

So here is a French officer calling for much the same thing as Radetsky and Barclay – a limited skirmish deployment. He applaudes the Anglo-Portuguese use of skirmishers on a limited scale supported by organised reserves and replacements, rather than the commitment of large units simultaneously, which can hardly have been regular skirmishing in the first place, but rather fighting "en debandade". Perhaps Radetzky was calling for similar measures to be adopted rather than trying to match the French in numbers in such large scale skirmish deployments?

Back to its wargaming context..

I had a dilemma with basing for shako where I have to decide at the start of a game whether my Jagers would be formed as a regular body of troops or in skirmish order.

Obviously I don't want to be painting and basing 48 figure battalions of Jagers in close order when in reality I will always be deploying them in skirmish order (Shako II).

I think I will have them always skirmishing as to me it looks right on the table having your line units screened in this way.

Interesting debate though..

Cheers,

TW

Another article of interest is:
link

"Tactical Doctrine of Russian Foot Skirmishers"
By Alexander Zhmodikov

The "napoleon series" seems to have all sorts of nooks and crannies with interesting stuff. From everything that I see, the Russians had extensive experience in skirmishing, going back to the 7YW and, unlike the Prussians, had this in their standard doctrine and Table of Organization. Jager and light troop tactical doctrine seens to be poorly documented by a number of nations. I remember a British drill/maneavurer book, which also referred to light unit tactics and formations as something like: "well known and practiced but not capable of description". (I'll find it and post it).

Captain and Bill,

This is one of those cases where we are in violent agreement, but its simply tough to realize it.

Its true that both the Austrians and Russians on occasion deployed huge amounts of so-called skirmishers, primarily because they had no choice, and took grievous casualties as a result. The reason was that they needed more men than the French to cover the same amount of ground. Note above that it says the Russians deployed Jaeger with 3 – 5 meters between pairs. Open order to be sure, but still not close to the 15 – 20 paces recommended by Davout in his 1811 instructions.

Why? Bill hit on the reason in his post. After the war the same Count Radetzky who advised against skirmish warfare specifically said the problem with both Austrian and Russian skirmishers was (quote), "too much drill." Austrian FML Count Rosenburg supported this analysis when he wrote that Austrian soldiers were (quote), "not fully prepared and too incapable of helping themselves. They are too used to being in closed lines and to acting automatically on the word of command, but they must be capable of relying on their own initiative."

Now (don't ask me how I remember this), if you look on page 98 – 99 of Nadezhda Durova's book The Cavalry Maiden, she describes being in a ravine with another officer and she notices Russian Jaeger "to their woe," standing up to engage the enemy when they should have been taking cover. The reason was that no officer had been available to order them to do so. Its like the story from Eylau when the French could not segregate the Russian wounded, because no Russian would moan in pain as their last order had been to march silently.

The close distances were needed to allow the officers to direct the fight on a near individual basis. This was only to be expected in armies where rote drill and unquestioning obedience to commands was what made the army function. In other words, "too much drill."

Pelet's description is actually not of limited skirmishing, but really the way it should be done. And given he is commenting on a army that had a reputation for deploying so many skirmishers that the skirmish line was often mistaken for the battle line, I think he is somewhat suspect as well.

What the French actually thought comes from French historian Jean Colin who explained (quote)"it was absurd and a nuisance to draft regulations to fix the number and the mode of action of these enfants perdus." He further noted that if the regulations did not mention skirmishers, that it was merely because "it was not considered useful to regulate the deployment of swarms of skirmishers." After all, "That which by its nature is irregular submits badly to rules." Light infantry expert Gen Le Couturier expressed the opinion of his day by saying that skirmish warfare was "in effect so simple that intelligence can take the place of rules, and that some wise advice, given in writing or verbally, is worth more than artistically composed and described maneuvers."

And this is why we have an instruction from Davout, vice a French regulation, and why Radetzky is advising against getting into a skirmish match with the French. It was done, sometimes the Austrians even won, but not often, even in 1813.

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

Bill,

I totally agree with you, I have read this also and as a result I stipulated in my own rules that Russian and Austrian Skirmishers are to be based in "Open Order" as compared to "Skirmish"Order" for my French. Open order is much closer in order than skirmish order in my system and the differences pretty much counter-match each other.

The Light Infantry in Open Order have more figures to fire with per 100yds but the Skirmisher order Light troops are harder to hit etc…However, many of the Austrian and Russian Open Order Infantry are also lesser in quality (morale grade and ability) so they often come off second best. Later on in the wars this disparity closes and actually crosses over in 1813-14.

Shane

Theword,

why not purchase & base several skirmirshers per jager battalion ( aprox. )seperately .

You will find you will not use every single battalion in skirmish order at once , and you will have more then enough to field entire jager battalions in full skirmish for your gaming.

…because the other guy on my shoulder told me that it would mean less painting if I only painted skirmisher stands..

You are, of course, right…

TW

Bill Gray wrote:

"And given he is commenting on a army that had a reputation for deploying so many skirmishers that the skirmish line was often mistaken for the battle line, I think he is somewhat suspect as well."

Bill,

Presumably your comment is aimed at the Anglo-Portuguese army? If so this seems to be another myth that appears only in secondary works. Show me an example from a primary source that describes the Anglo-Portuguese skirmish line being mistaken for the main battle line.

As for Jean Colin's comments, it may be true that the French "skirmish" swarms were beyond regulation, but if they were so successful then why did commanders such as Davout and Reille, who I doubt could be described as either absurd or a nuisance, seek to control their use with regulation spacing and formed reserves? We must be careful to distinguish between regular skirmishing and the actions of close formations breaking down and fighting as individuals.

The Russians were not thought highly of as skirmishers by the French. General Duhesme stated that Russian jagers were not too flexible in open order and that their NCOs were particularly unskilled.

The Archduke Charles believed them to be inadequately trained and that they lacked the necessary tactical skills.

A British light infantry officer believed the Russian jagers to be improperly uniformed and equipped which robbed them of the speed and dexterity necessary for light troops to fight in open order.

I would also submit that Radetzky's opinion on the inability of both the Russians and Austrians to fight well in open or skirmish order is not taken out of context.

Nobody employed mass skirmishers in the manner of the French. Most of the belligerents used them defensively, even the British (whom I would consider on a par with the French). The French used skirmishers in large numbers in open order and many times would employ a heavy skirmish line as their first line instead of in the usual three rank formation.

Sincerely,
K

K wrote:

"I would also submit that Radetzky's opinion on the inability of both the Russians and Austrians to fight well in open or skirmish order is not taken out of context."

K

It is difficult to tell whether Radetzky's comments are taken out of context or not. They are quoted many times on internet forums, but the quote, a single sentence, is lifted from secondary sources without access to the whole document. It would help if we knew what the rest of Radetzky's words were and what he actually proposed for the Austrian and Russian skirmishers. Was it the commitment of less troops, or was it to avoid skirmishing altogether?

K wrote:

"A British light infantry officer believed the Russian jagers to be improperly uniformed and equipped which robbed them of the speed and dexterity necessary for light troops to fight in open order."

K

I presume that this is a reference to the large boots worn by Russian Jagers mentioned by Surtees in 25 years in the Rifle Brigade:

"Their riflemen were shod in boots very much resembling those of our fishermen, coming up considerably higher than the knee, thus rendering them, I should imagine, incapable of celerity of movement, one of the chief requisites in a rifle corps; they also wore large cocked hats and long green coats."

It should be pointed out that this comment refers to the Russians in the 1799 campaign in the Low Countries and is therefore irrelevant to the later campaigns.

K,

"I would also submit that Radetzky's opinion on the inability of both the Russians and Austrians to fight well in open or skirmish order is not taken out of context."

Perhaps, you can provide us with the context – i.e. original source document in which his opinion is found?

S

Just a point.

Napoleon stated that the Austrins taught the Frecnh how to Skermish in Italy. I assume this was the hard way by being out skermished by the Grenz fro a while untly you figure it out.

Lord Ghee

Steven,

Radetzky made that comment on september 1813, as per G. E. Rothenberg's 'Napoleon Great Adversary's Archduke Charles and the Austrian army': "fighting en tirailleure should be done only in very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the manière de tirailler"
I agree with Kevin in that the quote does not appear to have been taken out of context.

"Trust me, Zhmodikov is $40 USD USD (plus shipping) well spent (and I have no connection to either the Zhmodikovs or Nafziger, btw!)"

The book has arrived.
Thank you for suggesting it.
It's worth every penny.

A challenge to those proposing that French mastered skirishing and other nations were completely inadequate.

Excepting early Prussian examples,

give examples of situations where French skirmishers overwhemed their opponents and make a major influence on a battle by shooting up formed units or artillery.

I don't see this as a consistent pattern or even a regular pattern. It is not exactly rocket science to figure out how to use these guys.

It is probably why most rule set work by ignorning skirmisheing- both sides could null out the opposition and leave the final decision to to the formed units.

I'm swinging to the opinion that we might consider playing the skirishers out (and slowing games but with some added interest) or alternately considering how much resources each side should allow to skirishering and then go from there. Maybe the peasant Russians (rural folks, used to dealing with nature) should be at a disadvantage to French shopkeepers and tradesmen recruits and require more troops to neutralize the French.