"Spreading Ink Blots From Da Nanag to the DMZ" Topic

"During the United States' involvement in the war in Vietnam, the decision by the US Marine Corps to emphasise counterinsurgency operations in coastal areas was the cause of considerable friction between the Marines and the army commanders in Vietnam, who wanted the corps to conduct more conventional operations. This book will examine the background to the Marines' decision and place it in the context of Marine Corps doctrine, infrastructure and logistical capability. For the first time, this book brings together the Marine Corps' background in counterinsurgency and the state of contemporary counterinsurgency theory in the 1960s – combining this with the strategic outlook, role, organisation and logistic capability of the Marine Corps to provide a complete view of its counterinsurgency operations. This book will argue that the US Marine Corps successfully used counterinsurgency as a means to achieve their primary aim in Vietnam – the defence of three major bases in the coastal area in the north of the Republic of Vietnam – and that the corps' decision to emphasise a counterinsurgency approach was driven as much by its background and infrastructure as it was by the view that Vietnam was a ‘war for the people'. This book is also an important contribution to the current debate on counterinsurgency, which is now seen by many in the military doctrine arena as a flawed or invalid concept following the perceived failures in Iraq and Afghanistan – largely because it has been conflated with nation-building or democratisation. Recent works on British counterinsurgency have also punctured the myth of counterinsurgency as being a milder form of warfare – with the main effort being the wellbeing of the population – whereas in fact there is still a great deal of violence involved. This book will bring the debate ‘back to basics' by providing an historical example of counterinsurgency in its true form: a means of dealing with terrorist or guerrilla warfare at an operational level to achieve a specific aim in a specific area within a specific period of time."

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Amicalement
Armand

This is a topic that perhaps merits further discussion.

My own position is that 'pacification' or whatever you call it cannot work unless the 'pacifiers' take over the country totally and permanently. It was always a lie in Vietnam. Something to bandy around to placate the press and electorate. The people on the inside of US decision making knew all along it was baloney.

That said I gather the USMC made some headway with the Regional Popular forces program. [Ruff-Puffs] And CAP [combined action platoons]. It certainly made more sense than other strategies applied – but without a much larger US presence [like 1 million +] and longer term [you can't provide security if you are constantly talking about leaving] it was always going to fail.

It seems to me the "pacification" was pretty well accomplished in the South. The Marines definitely put it at a higher priority, or at least approached it differently than the Army did. I am assuming that pacification means, in this context, pacifying the population of South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese managed to get the vast majority of the Viet Cong killed off in the '68 Tet offensive.

Not only that, but the Communist hoped for "uprising" of the people in the south during the Tet offensive never happened at all. If that was not evidence the pacification was working, I don't know what would be.

The south,or more properly the Republic of Vietnam, was conquered by a conventional invasion by North Vietnam. Guerrillas did not win this war. They did not take over Saigon. In fact, the North Vietnamese saw that very, very few of them had any position of authority in the south after the conquest by the North.

The VC and internal dissent was a distraction, but by 72 had basically become nothing more.

Tom

The ongoing debate about Vietnam includes a camp that insists that Westmoreland's focus on attrition was a waste of resources and men and that if the Abrams approach, which they claim put more emphasis on protection of the SV villages and pacification had been tried earlier the war was more winnable. I myself believe both are legitimate strategies and could have been implemented in parallel but both require a willing and reliable ally and the ARVN forces could fulfill neither requirement.

Be that as it may – the issue was however much 'pacification' was tried it never proved possible to entirely stop the PAVN/NLF from mounting attacks. And without a permanent occupation by US forces any security could never last.

BTW – we are celebrating 45 years since Reunification/Liberation today.

The losing strategy was laid out at a meeting between Johnson, Westmoreland (kill them all and let God sort them out) and Marine General "Brute" Krulak (pacification and local control) regarding an overall strategy. Johnson went with Westmoreland and did not like Krulak's approach. Krulak was the most qualified military or political figure to determine how to fight a war in Asia.

From the NYT:

Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, a highly decorated Marine commander who championed innovative tactics in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, died Dec. 29 in San Diego. He was 95.

His death was announced by his son Gen. Charles C. Krulak, the Marine commandant from 1995 to 1999.

When he attended the Naval Academy, he was nicknamed Brute by his fellow midshipmen, a wry reference to the fact that he was only 5 feet 4 and weighed 120 pounds or so.

But General Krulak became a renowned figure in the Marines. He helped develop the landing craft that carried troops, vehicles and supplies onto the invasion beaches of World War II. He received the Navy Cross, the Marines' highest award for valor after the Medal of Honor, for his exploits against the Japanese. He told of the corps' history and ethos in his book "First to Fight" (1984).

Victor Harold Krulak, a native of Denver, joined the Marines after graduating from Annapolis in 1934.

In 1937, while a lieutenant in an intelligence outfit in Shanghai, when the Japanese were trying to conquer China, he used a telephoto lens to take pictures of Japanese landing craft with a square bow that became a retractable ramp, enabling troops and equipment to be dispatched quickly onto an enemy beach.

Envisioning those ramps as answering the Marines' needs in a looming world war, Lieutenant Krulak showed the photographs to his superiors, who passed on his report to Washington. But two years later, he found that the Navy had simply filed it away with a notation saying it was the work of "some nut out in China."

He persevered, building a balsa wood model of the Japanese boat design and discussing the retractable ramp concept with the New Orleans boat builder Andrew Higgins. That bow design became the basis for the thousands of Higgins landing craft of World War II.

"There would not have been a Normandy or an Okinawa or an Iwo Jima without that boat," his son Charles said in an interview.

In the fall of 1943, General Krulak, a lieutenant colonel at the time, commanded a battalion in a diversionary raid on Choiseul Island in the Solomons that enabled a larger Marine contingent to capture the more important island of Bougainville. Although wounded, he continued to lead his Marines in battle, bringing him the Navy Cross. Some of his wounded men were evacuated by a Navy torpedo boat skippered by Lt. John F. Kennedy.

In the late 1940s, General Krulak helped pioneer the use of helicopters to carry marines and supplies into battle, a maneuver employed in the Korean War, when he was chief of staff of the First Marine Division.

When Kennedy became president, General Krulak reminded him of their meeting on Choiseul. He presented Kennedy with a bottle of whiskey, something he had promised him for his rescue work back in 1943 but never had a chance to deliver. In 1962, Kennedy named General Krulak the counterinsurgency adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During the Vietnam War's early stages, General Krulak expressed optimism over the prospects for American and South Vietnamese success. But in the mid-1960s, when he commanded all Marines in the Pacific, he opposed the strategy pursued by Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the overall American commander in Vietnam.

General Westmoreland proposed the use of marines in large-scale battles. General Krulak wanted to emphasize pacification, the effort to win over the South Vietnamese villagers by assisting in economic projects and protecting them from the enemy. He also advocated the bombing and mining of Haiphong's harbor to cut off supplies to North Vietnam. He met with President Lyndon B. Johnson in mid-1966 to press those ideas, but, as General Krulak later put it, "as soon as he heard me speak of mining and the unrestrained bombing of the ports, Mr. Johnson got to his feet, put his arm around my shoulder, and propelled me firmly toward the door."

General Krulak retired from the Marines in 1968. He settled in the San Diego area and became an executive and writer for the Copley Newspapers.

In addition to his son Charles, he is survived by his sons Victor Jr. and William; four grandchildren, and 10 great-grandchildren. His wife, Amy, died in 2001.

In a speech to the Marine Corps Association in 2007, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told of the young marine lieutenant of the late 1930s who pursued his ideas for an innovative landing craft after being written off as a "nut." Mr. Gates said that "Victor Krulak's story and accomplishments" provided lessons in "overcoming conventional wisdom and bureaucratic obstacles."

In his history of the Marines, General Krulak expressed concern over an "all-encompassing military bureaucracy" that "represents a more formidable battlefield than many the Corps has known."

In the end, Kulak's outspokenness was his downfall. Kulak told Lyndon Johnson to his face how men were being needlessly killed because of his approach, the only senior general with the guts to do so, Coram writes.

A photograph shows Krulak lecturing Johnson with pointed finger and Johnson looking hugely uncomfortable. The meeting ended with Johnson propelling him out of the Oval Office. As a result, Krulak did not get the appointment as Commandant of the Corps for which he had been regarded as a shoo-in. He was not fired either, just left to dangle, in a classic example of lbj's vindictiveness. But while Krulak never made commandant, his legacy outweighs most of those who did.

I'm sure Johnson, MacNamara, and Kissenger had their reasons for not mining and bombing the harbors but in the end, they were proved wrong.

Wolfhag

That's interesting. General Krulak really seems to have got the rough end of the stick.

Even if they had followed the strategy he outlined [perhaps more akin to what Kennedy had had in mind] it would still have needed a huge commitment in manpower over a protracted timeline. Something the decision makers were never willing to countenance. They wanted a quick easy war with very few [US] casualties and no risk of escalating the conflict and bringing in the Soviets or China.

There was just nothing to be gained that could justify that risk.

Thanks!.

Question: Johnson was silly or just capricious…?

Amicalement
Armand

Garryown & Wolf +1

The only way the South would have been on the winning side was if they were as motivated and in some cases as ruthless as the North.

The South certainly got a lot of support from the US in troops & equipment. As well as the ROK & many in SEATO providing troops.

Question: Johnson was silly or just capricious…?

Tango, I like you so I won't comment negatively on your question as I originally planned.

Counter-insurgencies cannot work unless you seal off the ability of insurgents to reinforce themselves and get support. It also requires a legitimate government that has the support of the people. More here:
link

Unfortunately, the Marine CAP operations were doomed to failure because the enemy was able to reinforce and resupply. It became a test of wills and attrition. The Army units in I Corps came to their aid a number of times when the enemy was able to concentrate against them. CAP and static firebases that acted as mortar and artillery magnets was not a mission for the Marines. It's what Special Forces was supposed to do. The leadership in DC doomed it to failure. The MacNamara Line was an absolutely ludicrous idea.

When you consider all of the political and economic drivers, options, and alternatives, intelligence, wrong suppositions and advice and all of the people involved it's a very complicated question and not an easy answer for Johnson or anyone else.

To start with, during WWII the OSS worked very closely with Ho Chi Minh in fighting the Japanese and had a good relationship. The Truman Administration could have attempted to work more closely with him to lure him away from Communism but he seemed to be pretty hardcore. Communism was deemed to be the "enemy" now and Ho and company were no longer an ally. All future US presidents inherited that decision.

Eisenhower was anti-colonial (didn't do much to help the French) and anti-Communist and ensured US intervention in SE Asia. Plus Dulles, as head of the CIA, instituted a policy: In a 1954 speech, he said that the United States would meet Soviet provocations not necessarily where they occurred but where the United States chose, based on its "deterrent of massive retaliatory power." including nukes.

In 1955, assistance began to flow to the new nation of South Vietnam, created after the withdrawal of France from Indochina. Eisenhower established a number of treaties like SEATO and supporting Taiwan independence which only served to deepen the potential US involvement and escalation. Once committed the US would lose face and credibility if they did not live up to the treaties. The die was now set for future US involvement and commitment.

One driving factor for Johnson was these treaties that the US promised to help keep their friends/allies from being taken over by Communism and the outside influence of Communist China and the USSR. That's basically what the Cold War was all about.

The US National Security is defined by having cooperative and fair foreign trading partners and still is today. No one is going to invade the US but if our enemy can dictate our economics and foreign policy we no longer have self-determinism. The "Domino Theory" was embraced (whether you think it was wrong or not) and starting a nuclear WWIII was real. The intervention of Communist China in VN like in Korea was something for Johnson and his advisors to consider too if it escalated too far.

The goal of the Communists in the Cold War was to freeze out the US from their global trading partners to weaken them economically and militarily and not engage in a conventional or nuclear war. They were doing pretty good from 1946 to 1955 as one country after another fell like a string of dominos, the Iron Curtin and Berlin Wall.

It appears to me (my opinion of course) VN war was a tactical defeat and the Cold War a good strategic victory. However, is the Cold War really over? Ask Putin. He'll tell you he didn't sign any surrender documents. Game on!

A 1966 military/political/covert intervention in Indonesia was successful in getting rid of a Communist insurgency for General Suharto was pretty much successful but not very pretty and did not need US boots on the ground. I know the gory details, I'm not condoning them just documenting them. Intervention stopped a Communist Insurgency, it was proven to work. Maybe it could work again in VN?

The main difference between Indonesia and VN is that the Communist sympathizers and PKI did not have a safe haven like Laos and Cambodia nor did the receive the amount of military support as NVN did. I wonder if the Johnson Administration took that into account. Two more things, they didn't have a dupe like Kissenger the NVN could sucker in to negotiate away any US advantages or a Socialist leaning press that would do their bidding to turn people in the US into Useful Idiots and Commie sympathizers. Unfortunately, Johnson was saddled with both of those burdens. The Communist NVN leadership had a different way to deal with "dissidents" and owned the press. Evidently that's an advantage when waging war.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident (partially faked it appears) enabled the US Congress to abdicate their powers to wage war to the President and do what they do best – spend $$$$$$. The rest is history.

During the final negotiations with the Vietnamese over ending the war, culminating with the 1972 Christmas Bombings and the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, the president knew that he only had a limited amount of time before Congress finally used the power of the purse to bring the war to an end -- regardless of what the administration wanted. Indeed, to make certain that the president could not reverse course, in June 1973 Congress passed legislation that included an amendment sponsored by Church and Case to prohibit the use of more funds in Southeast Asia after August 15. Sixty-four senators voted in favor. When the House asserted, its vote marked the first time that the chamber had agreed to cut off funds, too.

Most importantly, Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973 over Nixon's veto. The legislation imposed a series of restrictions on the executive branch to ensure that the president would have to consult with the House and Senate before authorizing the troops for long periods of time. This shows how wrong they were with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1965.

So what were Johnson's alternatives? I'm pretty sure the JCS presented the same solution as Krulak did since it is what Nixon used to get the armistice in 1973. In the Spring of 1973, I participated in a high-level logistical war game exercise at HQMC with the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions to invade NVN. The Pentagon had numerous contingency plans, that's what they do. Part of the armistice agreement was that if the NVN again invaded the US would intervene but Congress withheld the funds to do that when Ford was in office. This gave the signal to NVN that we would not interfere and let SVN fall.

The war did not really end in 1975. Up until 1994, the US had a trade embargo on VN in addition to implementing banking regulations preventing them from conducting foreign trade. VN suffered very much economically from this. More proof Socialism/Marxism does not work. With trade opened up in 1994 with VN, I guess you could give Capitalism a small victory because US business figured a way to make $$ in trading with VN and to their credit without putting VN into debt as the debt to GDP is about 55% with $1,357 USD per capita and inflation at about 4%.

Wow – maybe Commies are better Capitalists than Democracies? But after 19 years of no free trade, there was a lot of pent up demand as many people moved to the middle class.

I sponsored a VN exchange student in 2012 and she said that SVN is mostly free trade and the north not so much. Her dad has his own HVAC business (after spending 5 years in a re-education camp) and she and her brother attended college in Californa and got Green Cards with good jobs. They are good American Citizens, unlike my Communist leaning Useful Idiot relatives in SF.

Wars are won by breaking the will of your enemy to fight. It's more than military victories. Just ask King George III.

So what did the US accomplish in VN? Well, looking at the good things, the VN people tasted freedom and what an economic system can bring. They are very industrious people and like all people, did not deserve to suffer as they did. In modern war, it is the civilians that suffer the most. The Communist leadership was pretty brutal in keeping their people in line to keep up the fight. Johnson did not have the freedom to do that nor did he have the same war powers as Roosevelt did in WWII, including control of the press.

Not so simple for Johnson right? Not so silly or capricious once you consider the situation Johnson was faced with. My opinion is he chose the wrong actions for the most part but no one asked me at the time, I was just a PFC.

In some ways, VN war and the AWI had many similarities. The British people did not support the war 100% (had to hire mercenary Hessians, the US needed allies). VN and the British colonies had very few military victories and many big defeats. As time went on it became more and more expensive with less and less support. The colonists broke the will of the British people as they could have sent in more military just as the US could have done in April 1975 but decided not to.

But what happened to the US and Britain about 100 years later? Now we're the best of friends. Now 45 years later, VN ditched purist Marxism in the 1980s, Vietnam's Communist rulers now embrace China-style capitalism. With closer US economic ties hopefully, in our lifetime, the US and VN can progress to that level of the US and Britain. I know that would gladden the hearts of many VN vets and probably a lot of VN people too.

Wolfhag

Wow – that was a long read Wolfhag. There is a lot I disagree with but this is the biggest issue I have with what you wrote.

"The war did not really end in 1975. Up until 1994, the US had a trade embargo on VN in addition to implementing banking regulations preventing them from conducting foreign trade. VN suffered very much economically from this. More proof Socialism/Marxism does not work."

The economic warfare waged post 1975 in no way proves Socialism/Marxism does not work. It rather indicates it might work if allowed to operate without outside interference.

Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia are other examples of the US policy to crush any economy that attempts to challenge the sacred cow of Capitalism.

If Socialism/Marxism doesn't work – why don't they just let it fail by itself?

For my part, a mixed economy seems the best way forward. Some things are best kept in public ownership, and some things are best left in the competitive, market economy.

Wolf +1

If Socialism/Marxism doesn't work – why don't they just let it fail by itself?

Kill it before it grows …

But in the Big Picture it was not just about Socialism/Communism vs. Capitalism. But the classic Us vs. Them. The Communists, both USSR and PRC were trying to spread their influence, dogma and doctrine. Which threated the West. Even though the West was doing similar. E.g. the Marshall Plan, Mac's rebuilding of Japan, etc. Keeping Europe, Japan, etc., from becoming Communist "puppets", etc.

It was similar to fighting the Nazis and Imperial Japan in WWII. They aggressively spread their forces and was a threat to many. Regardless of being Capitalist, Communists, Fascists, Nazis, Imperialists, etc., etc.

Again as always it was Us vs. Them, e.g. the AWI, ACW, etc. No Communists there, AFAIK …

This is great information all. If I may a question somewhat still on topic?

I am just about mid-way through Hastings' Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, and wondering how political leaders seem to have had a pulse on public opinion without today's modern media platforms? There seems a lot of time spent in the build up years almost polling potential decisions. While that's obviously politics 101, what, besides newspapers, did these individuals have to pinpoint public attention or was a lot of that simply perceived/guessing?

Many thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

wondering how political leaders seem to have had a pulse on public opinion without today's modern media platforms? There seems a lot of time spent in the build up years almost polling potential decisions. While that's obviously politics 101, what, besides newspapers, did these individuals have to pinpoint public attention or was a lot of that simply perceived/guessing?

ToySoldier, I laud your study of and interest in Vietnam War. There a lot of good books on the topic, etc., many of which I have read.

Also highly recommend the Ken Burns recent documentary series which is really a seminal work on the US involvement there IMO.

I take it you are not an American, or very young or both ? Which is not a criticism. Just an observation. I grew up every morning watching the news before going to school. Then in the evening news as well. And in magazines like Time, Newsweek, etc., plus news papers local, national and worldwide covered the war at all levels. Footage was shot by the news media in SE Asia and 24 hrs later aired on the TV screen with the daily news.

The when I graduated high school, in '75, join Army ROTC at the local university. Most of the ROTC cadre had served in Vietnam. Sometimes multiple tours. Then when I graduated in '79 and was commissioned a 2LT in the Infantry. Again many of our instructors and troops in units where we were assigned to had served in Vietnam.

My first duty assignment was as a Rifle Plt Ldr in '80 in the 101. Which had served long and hard in Vietnam. With many of our senior Officers and NCOs being very combat hardened and Vets of the war.

So I got a very good education from those who were there. And used many of those lessons learned for the next 10+ years on active duty in 4 Infantry Bns.

I mentioned all as from someone who was too young to go to Vietnam. But I certainly got a lot of information from many sources and my own study.

The US political leadership, many that served in WWII and some in Korea. Got a lot of their information to assist in making decisions from the public by watching the daily news feeds. And this was waaay before the internet. And in those news feeds they saw what the man on the street thought, along with the troops in Vietnam, the families that were at home, etc., etc.

The media not being 24 hrs like now, showed everything they could about the war at least twice a day. They media was right up there with the troops at "the Front". And in the streets when public opinion was frequently shown by protest marches, demonstrations of all types, riots etc.

The US leadership at that time did a very poor job running the war from their chairs in DC. They didn't understand what was really going on in the field. They simply saw it as war against the spread of Communism. Like what had happened 10 years before in the Korean War. But they also knew this was a side show. The real Communist threat in their minds was in Europe.

So to answer your original question … The political leadership saw what the public thought at all those televised protests, Peace marches, demonstrations, riots, etc. As well as in many magazines, newspapers, etc., that as time went on, wrote and published many articles that were very negative about the war and the way it was being run by DC …

I hope my lengthy post answers your question. I feel the more information I give on a very complicated topic the better.

Legion, much appreciated for taking the time. I know my question probably seemed juvenile in nature, but I really was looking to get a feel for what & how media was delivered in that era. It's not immediately clear in Hastings' book. I am an American, just recently picked up Vietnam again after a long time focused on the Civil War, and what seems like more talkative vets lately. I come here because many of you are very intelligent and far more real time experienced in this era than I.

I grew up in the 1980s and felt fortunate to have a tv series like Tour of Duty & what seemed like a study stream of Vietnam films that peaked my interest and got me to ask the vets so many questions. I was at an age where I didn't quite comprehend how poorly many were treated and why my questions didn't get the same in-depth answers as when I'd ask a former Marine from the Pacific in WW2. So I kinda dropped it and moved to other eras. Now that I'm older and taking a second look at the war, I've been trying to immerse myself in the mechanics of daily life during that era rather than just the war itself, as that seems to have had a profound impact on those that fought. And the likely cause of my inability to get the vets to talk many years ago.

To start, I've been reading the transcripts between McNamara & Johnson and Hastings' book at the same time and it just struck me as incredible how effective a perceived "slower" media cycle still was in polarizing the leaders & population. Perhaps it wasn't actually all that slow based on your assessment above?

It seems like today a poor tweet on Twitter can end a career, but at the same time, not much different than the Vietnam era without Twitter, so perhaps the birth of opinion news is the driver behind the cautious and fumbling of decisions? Is that a fair assessment?

I guess it just surprised me quite a bit to see the policy leaders talking so much about what people are going to think about X or Y, but yet somehow still failing to define the mission effectively to those same people. And this happens over the course of multiple administrations and quite a bit of internal strife as well. Many of the vets I speak to from Vietnam now, always seem to say "well in my area we did…". It's so different than WW2, where the overall mission seemed so obvious to every single soldier regardless of where they were. So I had assumed that Americans just didn't have access to enough material (especially in the early years) and as such the policy makers got away with poorly defining the missions while literally acknowledging they were doing so. I think my assumption was wrong and your assessment on how quickly this news actually moved makes more sense now.

Btw, I have a pretty extensive Vietnam collection including the M16, just finally started to seriously take time to really learn about it. Also loaded up on miniatures and books, so you all can expect the dumb questions to keep coming:) many thanks.

With ref. to the AWI….French intervention – especially at sea – was pretty important. Also; Hessians were subjects of King George, so really no more mercenaries than any other soldiers getting a wage.

Glad to help ToySoldier … as I said I meant not criticism. As I said with my background when I joined the Army when I did. Along with my studies, training and the media as I was growing up. I was very much immersed in the history of the Wars in Vietnam. Including reading and studying about the French War in Indochina, '45-'54 …

It seems like today a poor tweet on Twitter can end a career, but at the same time, not much different than the Vietnam era without Twitter, so perhaps the birth of opinion news is the driver behind the cautious and fumbling of decisions? Is that a fair assessment?

Today is a lot different than back during the war. The Politicians had a number of things they had to deal with. Besides the "pending" Cold War in Europe. But fear of escalating the war in SE Asia could bring the Chinese into the conflict. Like what happened in the Korean War '50-'53. Had they not intervened the US/UN Forces under MacArthur would have ended the war my Christmas. And there would be only one Korea today under the democratic South …

So if the PRC sent large numbers of troops directly into combat with the US/ROK/SEATO forces in Vietnam/SE Asia. widening the war. Possibly causing WWIII. The USSR may have taken the opportunity to push in West Germany and head to Rhine then the Channel.

So with all 3 of the Super Powers having Nukes. Someone may have started tossing nukes around and that would be to no ones advantage. No need to risk that.

Also note the PRC had large numbers of troops as instructors/trainers. Along with the USSR and even North Koreans on country. Supporting the NVA and VC.

So as I said Vietnam was a Sideshow, in the Big Picture. And another thing we have to look at is politicians are always looking to the next election. So they really had to get a large base to insure winning the next election. So as always that influences many of their decisions then as today.

To pull out too soon from Vietnam would also show the Communists the US was weak, would not support it's allies, etc. Even Saddam before GW1/Desert Storm, '90 thought the US didn't want to take high losses like occurred in and in turn we and our allies would not deploy to stop his invasion of oil rich Kuwait.

So what happened in the past has influenced what was going to happen in Vietnam based on the Korean War. And then in the GW1 over 30 years before.

Many of the vets I speak to from Vietnam now, always seem to say "well in my area we did…".

Now I talk you Vietnam Vets frequently at the Y where I workout. And I am on the Staff of our local Military Officers Asso. of America[MOAA]. Many of the members fought in Vietnam. Their insights are spot on from their standpoints. Whether a Rifle Plt Ldr, Huey Pilot, etc. Vietnam was not like WWII in many ways. My Father [and some of my Uncles] served in WWII as an Inf SGT with 90ID in France.

Their war was not the Vietnam War. They seemed to have an overall objective to defeat the Axis. And return the world back to normal so to speak.

Vietnam started out as sending advisors and support to help the SV Forces expel the Communist NLF/VC from the South to stop the spread of Communism. We saw what happened in WWII with China going Communist and the USSR "annexing" much of Eastern Europe under their Communist umbrella. Whether they like it or not. Then 5 years later what occurred in Korea.

In Vietnam there as no real front lines, per se. You were fighting a nationwide insurgency plus an invasion for an outside nation with strong support for fellow Communists, i.e. the PRC and USSR.

To make matters worse you fighting in very difficult terrain. The thick jungles, mountains, rice paddies, etc. And the forces you support have poor leadership and many dislike their own gov't. You were fighting a war of attrition in a region that had a high birthrate and were more than willing to take looses.

As the war progressed most of the SV forces were not up to the task. With a lot of negatives being seen from the SV Gov't leaders, etc. The US thought it could do what is did in WWII or even Korea. With the help of our Allies, i.e. thr ROK and SEATO. Send in massive amount of troops defeat the NLF/VC along with the NVA which had crossed into the South in large numbers supported by our enemies, the USSR and PRC.

As we have learned it is hard to win an insurgency. With an enemy who knew they didn't have to win … they just didn't have to lose. They were not going anywhere. Keep killing the Americans and sooner or later they will tire of losing blood and treasure. They saw how many in the US did not support the war. So North had time and numbers on their side.

I'm going on to long here. IMO had there been no draft the Anti-War movement would have populated by few save for the likes of Fonda and Baez. Most Americans couldn't find SE Asia on a map. And could care less about the "peaceful rice paddy farmers trying to survive under an unpopular gov't.

Most NLF/VC were not Communists, they didn't like their gov't or later they didn't like another Whiteman coming into their lands and kill them in large numbers. With overwhelming firepower from land and air.

How that helps as I said this is a very complicated topic with many shades of grey, etc., …

With ref. to the AWI….French intervention – especially at sea – was pretty important. Also; Hessians were subjects of King George, so really no more mercenaries than any other soldiers getting a wage.

Very true but many saw the VC as we were fighting the Brits. For our independence, etc. And we in turn were the "Red Coats" … invading SE Asia, etc.

Legion, excellent analysis and very much appreciate the time in replying. Thank you!

Thank you ! Feel free to ask anytime.

Also if you scroll thru the other threads on the Vietnam War Boards here. You may find some more insights from not only me but more importantly from those who had served in SE Asia. Some very interesting information !

E.g. TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

TMP is a great source – I followed all those conversations and learned a good deal.

Me too !