"Breakin' the Law, Breakin' the Law" Topic

The Real People who Exceeded the Rules thread is great opportunity discussion for what "realism" actually means.

Many of feats of heroism and skill referenced in that thread are clearly far above the ordinary. Do we have historical evidence that any of the above would have had the same performance under the same conditions, including the random ones (fog and friction of war)? How about nine out of ten times?

The Fundamental Principle of Engineering(TM) says that if something happens, it must be possible. The corollary says that just because something is possible, it doesn't have to be likely.

Are we saying that under our rules any of the feats of the above mentioned heroes are impossible … or just very unlikely? The overwhelming majority of rules I have seen (so, with a very few exceptions) would allow any of the feats indicated above to happen, just very rarely.

I recently visited the WWI Museum in Kansas City. (It is awesome. If you have the opportunity, you should go.) Among many other things, there is an accounting of the best war aces.

Does Manfred von Richthofen's performance require special rules? … or just higher skill numbers or bonuses than anyone else? Is giving one unit extroadinary stats different than giving the French a +1 here and the Boxers a +2 there?

This also brings up an imporant point about what are "rules" as opposed to "characteristics" (stats, army lists, etc.), that is the mechaisms that describe combat relationships as opposed to the specific values that are used to evaluate the outcomes.

Tony Stein: Built his M1919 to carry single-handedly and assault Japanese bunkers and pill boxes
link

John Basilone, Audie Murphy, etc.

You can find many more by searching the files for MOH, VC, Hero of Soviet Union, and Knight's Cross.

There are real accomplishments in a war, and those simulated on the game table would be labeled unfair or unrealistic. I'm sure the opposition felt the same way when on the receiving end.

Wolfhag

In the large, do any of these individual feats actually mean anything militarily?

Were their brave and courageous feats repeatable by others?

Or do they only affect morale – both positively to their own side – once feat becomes known – and/or negatively to the enemy?

On larger scales, you can presume things like this are somewhere in the mix when you get particularly good rolls. On a skirmish level you need critical hits and misses.

I think Andrew mostly has the right of it, though every now and then you run into someone who didn't just have a spectacular day, but the sort of career which suggests he can't be accomodated by the usual character-generation rules.

Stoppage, if the feats were "repeatable by others" and the rules don't permit them, then I'm inclined to find fault with the rules. And if I'm under fire and someone takes out the mg nest, that certainly means something militarily. If you mean that spectacular feats of arms rarely decide wars and battles, and hardly ever since the Middle Ages, I would agree--if only because they tend to balance out. That's why I inquired about skirmish/RPG rules.

But how many of us want to play a committee game about the development of doctrine? Or possibly a solo computer game about military industrial strategies? Sadly "important" isn't always the same as "interesting."

It would depend whether we felt if we could distilled what made some people exceptional.
We could stat the red barron… and get shot down in our first encounter… or be locked in to a mechanic where they win 99% of encounters and everyone rolls their eyes because it's no fun to fight against them.

I've had some of the most memorable games with the simplest mechanics. Sid the slinger is still spoken of after a battle where he kept taking out foes round after round with a series of higher rolls… he was Ye Olde Basilone. He did well and became memorable 30 odd years later not because of special rules but by circumstances and unusual or exceptional, occurrences within them.

The other exceptional situations have come about when the rules were about giving the players a set of often randomised elements they have to use to create an outcome. Unlike most rules where the player sets an intended out come and then use a randomiser to decide whether it happens. But exceptional can be define as highly skill, skill being using what you've got to adapt to or control an emerging situation.

Not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that's counted truly counts

I like von Richthofen as an example for this. Because of the nature of air combat in WWI, we have decent details of the inputs and outcomes of skirmish type engagements. It lets you analyze a lot of aspects.

For example, ~60$ of his kills were against recon craft (vulnerable and slow) as opposed to fighters. These were solid military victories, since the major objective in the early war was to stop recon from the air, not down fighters. Keeping focused on the game objectives instead of attrition … hmmm something we all could learn from. ;)

He was nobility. That meant something to the men of Jasta 11, his squadron. It took heavy casualties. I have not found primary sources, but it is highly likely that airmen who would put themselves at risk to give the opportunity for the kill to the baron wouldn't write about it later on.

His squadron was overmatched frequently, but he actually sought out overmatch for his side and got it more often than not. Again, this is solid military thinking, and good strategy if you can achieve it. One favored approach was to seek out stragglers.

So, with one set of rules, there are many options to create the superior career:

* Stats for the plane and pilot (he had and was exceptional)

* Victory Objectives that mirror the Jasta 11 mindset. RB returning and RB getting the prime kill being worth more VP will create a situation where players work toward his succes at their expense.

* Scenario design that favors Jasta 11, especially initial conditions that put RB in the tactical driver's seat at the outset. If vR can catch the Allies on their return trip (low fuel) when they are on a full tank, that's a big deal in this situation.

* A campaign system that randomizes encounters, but weights advantage toward the Germans creates the career path for him.

On the other side, appropriate scneario design and VP weighting can create an "accurate" lopsided milieu, but still lead to fun.

If the Baron is incentivized to get a couple kills and bag, you can focus VP to let the Allies win by points even though the RB gets his kills and gets away. Commensurately high VP for shooting down the Baron and having a couple recon assets to protect helps this.

At the end of the day it is all just numbers. Give your heroes bigger numbers. One of the things to bear in mind is operations research has repeatedly shown that on the battlefield or in the air, the function of the vast majority of soldiers/crews/aircraft is as targets. The bulk of actual killing is done by a small proportion of them, less than 10%. At unit and formation level this stuff averages out course.

The bulk of actual killing is done by a small proportion of them, less than 10%. At unit and formation level this stuff averages out course.

Do you have some references for that? I would like to read up on it.

I think the number originally comes from SLA Marshall's study of US soldiers in WW2. There has been some significant debate about his findings in recent years.
Phil

While there is certainly a lot of tactical thinking in each instance (such as taking advantage of whatever cover is available or moving quickly), could a lot of the heroics come down to luck? That is, not being hit by the artillery shell, the bullet missing you, the enemy reloading at the right time, etc.

In which case being able to roll consecutive 6's could seem to be the best way to represent these acts.

To be clear, I am not in anyway doubting the bravery or ability of the soldiers mentioned, but also recognizing those who performed similar acts of bravery but did not succeed so we don't read about them.

"Do you have some references for that? I would like to read up on it."

The best book is probably 'The Stress of Battle" by David Rowlands, it was republished a few years ago. It is rather more modern than SLA Marshall…

Some bits of it were referenced in Leo Murray "Brains and Bullets", but that is more about the psychology of combat than how it turns into combat outcomes.

I like the Rowlands' book:

Firing rates are not a fixed metric but a reflection of situational variables, leadership, and training. To claim universal non-participation in combat is to oversimplify a complex human response.

It's supported by empirical data in Holmes' Acts of War:

The claim that only a small percentage of soldiers fired their weapons in battle seems implausible when viewed against the prodigious quantities of ammunition expended by frontline units

Somthing like that is important in understanding outlier behaviour in battles and designing games to implement outcomes that map the range of different situations.

The underlying behaviour that leads to the 60-80% firing rate for WWII and 75-90% for Vietnam is important for the distribution of possible outcomes.

Based on actual shots fired, you have a small number of situations where barely anyone fired – ambushes, pinned positions, and other situations where almost everyone fired. The more aggressive firing doctrine in Vietnam (trying to counter Marhsall's theory) is one factor in higher friendly fire rates.

Situation, employment of forces, and stochastic factors provide a good foundation for undertanding outliers.

I'll have to check out Brains and Bullets.

To be clear, I am not in anyway doubting the bravery or ability of the soldiers mentioned,

Actually, I think the stochastic elements underscore the aspect of bravery in many of the outlier individual performances.

While individuals don't have the clear, precise understanding of the relative probabilities of different outcomes for different orders that we do in a wargame, they still have an intuitive general idea of the odds.

Taking positive action when you know the odds are (sometimes severly) against you is heroism. It's that old saw, "Courage is not the lack of fear, but the ability to do what must be done when you are afraid."

This is part of why I designed my rules to make it difficult (not impossible) for players to know exact odds, but easy to have a general sense.

Regards the firing of weapons, the distinction for me wasn't merely how many fire their weapons but those that fire with an intent to hit.
I recall reading unit reports fronl VN where they had adjusted the training to re emphasise accuracy vs just shooting or volume of fire.
As, as well as projection of threat, is the flip side… the perception of threat. And that is often culturally, socially and geographically specifc.

"This also brings up an imporant point about what are "rules" as opposed to "characteristics" (stats, army lists, etc.), that is the mechaisms that describe combat relationships as opposed to the specific values that are used to evaluate the outcomes."

Very good question. For a very long time now, I have strongly felt that there is no "magic number" of casualties that produces a certain result. It is more important to know what the effect those casualties had upon the functioning of the target unit. Researching history you will find examples of units breaking down with little or no casualties while others fought to the nearly the last man. Therefore, rules that are based upon "numbers of people" is deeply flawed as a value set to base rules upon.

Every weapons system is only as good as the trigger puller! While it's important how the weapons are used (like volley fire in black powder days; the use of machine guns in 1905 verses 1945; individual firing as in skirmish with muzzle loading weapons vs. firing taking place with semi-automatic in a directed area/position. No set rule reflects results when only game results are measured in "whole figure casualties". Again, what is missing are the effects that those casualties have on the ability of the unit to remain functioning. Where do we account for the effects that unit leadership has on the unit's functioning in a firefight? Lumping it all together under the guise of a morale check when every unit of that morale grade is rated the same (an example of linear ratings) keeps it more of a game than a serious attempt to integrate history and reality into our games.

At the risk of being labeled a "Simulationist", what makes our historical games "historical" are the factors woven into the rules. There are some such games where the only thing historical are the toys we play with! Similarly, one does not need 45 charts/tables/multiple die rolls just to determine the results of (say) melee combat! That is a result of the rules author(s) trying to account for things – an exercise that really slows down a game and wears out gamers by requiring them to chart crank instead of planning for the next move. In many cases, the results of all that chart cranking delivers arguable results anyway.

So perhaps a deeper study of how rules depict weapon system efficiency- morale grades- cover and 15 other factors can be re-examined (by period) and put more emphasis on results easily determined in believable results can be looked at?

So perhaps a deeper study of how rules depict weapon system efficiency- morale grades- cover and 15 other factors can be re-examined (by period) and put more emphasis on results easily determined in believable results can be looked at?

This is getting at what we are modeling, the referent, as opposed to how we model it (rules, charactereistics, conditions, meta-rules etc.).

Nobody models reality, so it comes down to what subset of reality you want to model. Believability is a function of what you feel (for whatever reason) is important. It is only in this context that things are engaging or overly fiddly.

"Nobody models reality, so it comes down to what subset of reality you want to model. Believability is a function of what you feel (for whatever reason) is important. It is only in this context that things are engaging or overly fiddly."

"I" am not interested in the details- merely the results. At Grand Tactical levels, playing in the role of Commander, do I care that Private Smith's gun jammed? Probably not. I just want to know if the enemy has vacated his ground or if we still hold ours and if I need to send in my reserves.

There are only two factors I know of that are linear in real life: Time and distance. An hour is always 60 minutes; A mile is a mile everything else in a game is non-linear. Guess it depends on the mindset of the designer if he does the research and uses historical/ real life factors or just focuses upon what his mind feels as important.
The gamers will decide what they like best as no approach will please them all. Not everyone arrives at the same realization of what is important at the same time. What passed as a really accurate game is scoffed at 5 years later after 6 new designs have been played. How many ACW gamers now still play "Rally 'Round the Flag" over newer rules on a regular basis?

Still, we still strive to refine designs in the ever pursuit of the elusive better game. (The hobby is better for it, IMHO.)

"Reality" is something we create in our heads.

The question then for me is how much of what actually happens in the actual experience do we do and use in the "game" we design.

Many games use very little of what actually happens at the level they claim to represent. In part because those thjngs are hard to represent in a TTWG with standard mechanism approaches.

Personally I'm less intersted in weapon performance. Impart because it varies across time and in part the data we have from tests etc do tally with their apprent effect in actual combat. The factor then is human performance, which I've increasingly shifted my focus to in the systems I create. The challenge there is they are harder or imo impossible to model with conventional systems. Which also do poorly in representing those outliers mentioned earlier.

"I" am not interested in the details- merely the results. At Grand Tactical levels, playing in the role of Commander, do I care that Private Smith's gun jammed? Probably not. I just want to know if the enemy has vacated his ground or if we still hold ours and if I need to send in my reserves."

Two ideas really helped me develop a design philosophy. Jim Webster, the Brit one. Said making tbe lines of it was get a truthful/appropriate result was most important. If flipping a coin could do that he would use it.

The other came from Buck Surdu talking about Fidelity and Resolution. Fidelity is in line with Jim's idea.
Resolution is what we focus on or trying recreate to achieve that fidelity.

I agree that what as the "commander" I'm intersted in outcomes but for me the why the details, the appropriate resolution, is important.
At the squad or fireteam level me as commander, not having tbe outcomes becuae kf a jam may be important as opposed to a mere miss or the enemies cover etc. But if im the commander of the platoon or above… no I don't need to know about the individuals rifle jamming.

The details are important… but its as much about tbe appropriate details. Which depends on the resolution of the actions we are representing. For me, too many systems have to high a resolution for the level they claim to represent. But they also don't focus on the fidelity of the experience.

Coming back to the OP… the more "rules" we have which ones do those outliers break to be an outliers… and if we've work out a way to break the rules… haven't we just made a rule… 🤔😉🙂

depends on the mindset of the designer if he does the research and uses historical/ real life factors

"Real life factors" are not an objective thing, they are a thing that we make up; we decide what they are.

Even something as "somple" as the outcome of a battle is an abstract intellectual concept. Is it based on the attrition rates of the forces involved (an objective fact), or is it based on gaining ground (a political concept)? Maybe the ability to move your forces forward the the next fight (a projection of opinion into the future)? Could be different for different people.

Likewise, what factors affect that outcome are chosen, not absolute. Logisitc supply to support the battle could be a factor, but in many games ammo supply is just assumed to be sufficient for the specific engagement being played.

We game the Battle of Peubla freqently (on the 5th of May, of course, plus other times). The French did run out of artillery capcblity during the battle (not sure if it was shot, powder, or possibly maintenance).

Our mechanism for the loss of artillery is a stochastic one. It was picked because the senior command decision space that we wanted to present was not tracking shot by shot each cannister and cannonball. They knew they were close. They knew they could run out. Being aggressive makes you run out faster, being conservative slower. Failures will be staggered unit by unit. Over time, you get a sense of getting closer to being out.

We modeled a general capability risk for employment of artillery instead of bullet counting and sending specific messages from artillery sub-commanders to the senior command. Some people would say its unrealistic if you don't count bullets. Others (like us) would say its unrealistic if the player has perfect knowledge of the ammo state.

Within bullet counting or decision risk modeling, there are thousands of ways to implement under our rules. The scenario has one, with space for a few variants at the discretion of the players,

Do the times when specific units run out exactly match when they did in the real battle? Probably not most of the time, but probably close some of the time. Just because Battery 3 ran out first in volley 7 doesn't mean that is the only historically plausible outcome, especially if the players don't exactly mirror the timbre of orders given.

Based on actual shots fired, you have a small number of situations where barely anyone fired – ambushes, pinned positions, and other situations where almost everyone fired. The more aggressive firing doctrine in Vietnam (trying to counter Marhsall's theory) is one factor in higher friendly fire rates.

One study showed that people are more likely to shoot if they can see that everyone else around them is shooting. If they are by themselves, they are less likely to shoot.

Guys who were shy about shooting were put on crew-served weapons, and they performed better. Your team and squad leader are supposed to ensure that sectors are covered and everyone is firing at the correct ROF.

This is part of why I designed my rules to make it difficult (not impossible) for players to know exact odds, but easy to have a general sense.

That's why the timing of actions in my game is somewhat variable with a die roll. The crew type and suppression modify the result + or – from the die roll result based on historical values. The enemy has a general idea but cannot be sure exactly from one turn to another. This creates an interesting FoW.

There are only two factors I know of that are linear in real life: Time and distance.

In combat, time involves how quickly a unit will execute an order, observe the results, and issue their next order (OODA Decision Loop). It determines the initiative and parses the action based on timing without needing traditional IGYG and activation rules.

This timing allows you to synchronize the rates of fire/order execution and rates of movement within the same timing increment (seconds, minutes, hours, etc) eliminating the need for complicated opportunity fire rules and exceptions.

Example: A target moving at 25kph will move about 50m in 7 seconds and be out of the shooter's LOS. If it takes you 8+ seconds to shoot you've lost him.

Rule of thumb: (speed in kph x 3) – 5 = how far the unit will travel in 10 seconds.

Guess it depends on the mindset of the designer if he does the research and uses historical/ real life factors or just focuses upon what his mind feels as important.

Yes, you can do it either way. However, if you are talking about time you need a clock to accurately measure the real life time factors and parse the action.

However, a simple way to do it, getting the right "feel" would be for all players at the start of a turn to select their target and secretly roll a D20 or D10 for each unit that is shooting.

If the gun/unit has a historically above-average ROF, use a negative modifier making it faster. A slow ROF (two-part ammo over 120mm) has a positive modifier making it slower. Ace crews get a negative modifier, and poor crews a positive modifier. You could use a historic ROF base as 7 rounds/minute.

Guns that have an especially high ROF like 2pdr and 37mm get an extra shot at the end of the turn, if they are still alive of course. Start the action with the lowest numbers first. If your opponent shoots before you and you are KIA, too bad you didn't shoot, you were too slow.

You parse the game action without needing normal activation, IGYG variations, and random initiative rules.

Wolfhag

Going back to the original question "Does Manfred von Richthofen's performance require special rules? … or just higher skill numbers or bonuses than anyone else?" We know that ultimately he was shot down. He was doubtless a very good fighter pilot with a very good team backing him up. This presents a two fold game modeling problem. The first is a mechanics issue. How do you model an individual who could edge just a bit more performance from his machine than the other pilots? The other is a player skill issue. No matter how much advantage the rules give to the baron I will never match his tactical acumen.

The latter is, I think, the larger problem. No matter the scale of the game player skill substitutes for the skill of the man in the arena. A friend of mine once cried out in the middle of a game "Somebody save me from myself!" Play Waterloo giving the more skilled player Napoleon and the less skilled player Wellington, then switch sides and play the battle again. How does a disparity in player skill affect the historical outcome of the battle? Not only in a matched points meeting engagement battle but also in an asymmetrical battle.

He was shot down because he broke his rules of engagement. WWII US Ace Tom McGuire was shot down breaking his ROE too. Some good pilots were shot down while watching their kill going down and not checking 6.

His success can be attributed to a combination of natural talent, rigorous training, strategic acumen, and a deep understanding of aerial combat. Here are the key reasons for his exceptional abilities and special rules:

1. Natural Talent: Richthofen possessed sharp reflexes, excellent hand. eye coordination, and a keen sense of spatial awareness—qualities essential for a fighter pilot. His early experience as a cavalry officer honed his instincts for quick decision-making and precision.

2. Thorough Training
Richthofen trained under Oswald Boelcke, one of Germany's pioneering aces and a master tactician. Boelcke's mentorship was instrumental in shaping Richthofen's flying and combat strategies. He learned and adhered to Boelcke's "Dicta Boelcke," a set of tactical principles for dogfighting that emphasized teamwork, positioning, and exploiting the enemy's weaknesses.

3. Tactical Brilliance
Richthofen was a strategic thinker who understood the importance of positioning and surprise in aerial combat. He often approached his targets from above and behind, where they were least able to defend themselves. He avoided unnecessary risks (except on his last mission), prioritizing precision and efficiency over showmanship.

4. Superior Aircraft
Richthofen often flew the Fokker Dr.I triplane, which was highly maneuverable and suited to his tactical style. While not the fastest aircraft, it allowed him to out-turn many opponents. His ability to understand and exploit the capabilities of his aircraft gave him an edge in dogfights.

5. Leadership Skills
As commander of Jagdgeschwader 1, the "Flying Circus," Richthofen led by example and inspired his pilots to excel. He fostered a sense of camaraderie and discipline among his squadron, ensuring they worked cohesively as a team.

6. Keen Observation & Situational Awareness
Richthofen had a sharp eye for identifying enemy weaknesses and patterns of behavior during combat. He was patient and methodical, waiting for the perfect moment to strike rather than rushing into an engagement.

7. Mental Fortitude
He was calm under pressure and maintained focus during intense aerial battles. His psychological resilience allowed him to handle the stress of combat and make calculated decisions.

8. Relentless Practice
Richthofen constantly refined his skills, studying his encounters and learning from both successes and failures. His commitment to self-improvement made him a progressively better pilot over time.

9. Fearsome Reputation
Richthofen's growing reputation as the "Red Baron" had a psychological effect on his opponents. Many pilots hesitated or made mistakes when facing him, giving him an additional advantage.

10. War Conditions
During World War I, air combat was in its infancy, and many pilots were less experienced. Richthofen's superior training and tactical understanding gave him an edge over less-prepared adversaries.

Manfred von Richthofen's combination of natural ability, disciplined approach, and strategic brilliance made him a legendary figure in aviation history, with 80 confirmed aerial victories. His legacy endures as a symbol of skill and leadership in aerial combat.

Why the Triplane was better. One reason was the wing chord was 3x other planes and the short wingspan gave quicker banking ability. Maneuverability can be measured by how quickly you can change direction, not turn rate:
link

Maneuverability can be measured by how quickly you can change direction, not just instantaneous or sustained turn rate.

How do you model an individual who could edge just a bit more performance from his machine than the other pilots?

Well, let us ask an air-air combat expert, Col. John Boyd. At 11:30 he gets to the OODA Loop:
YouTube link

Erich Hartmann, the ace of aces, talks about his interpretation of the OODA loop in his biography. His version was, "See – Decide – Attack – Reverse or "Coffee Break". The Coffee Break was to zoom climb and "loop back" to See (Observe in the loop) and do it again.

Technical advantages can be helpful too. In the WWII Pacific US pilots found that if they kept their airspeed at least IIRC 250kts IAS, the Zero could not get a firing solution on them. At that speed and above their ailerons became too stiff to change directions with Hellcats and Corsairs.

The P-38 was at its best when it got hydraulically boosted ailerons. The FW-190's advantage was its ability to change direction better than most other aircraft, too. The same when the F-86 got boosted ailerons. In a dogfight with Mig-15 without the boost, the pilot would get tired and the F-86 pilot did not.

Fighters that were aerodynamically unstable had an advantage too. This enabled them to change direction vertically and horizontally much more quickly than stable aircraft. This was the big advantage of the Sopwith Camel and Snipe with the rotary engine turning to the right.

Some ME-109 pilots flew with the tail trim tabs forcing a nose up position. This forced the pilot to fly with slightly forward pressure on the stick to maintain level flight. The advantage was that if jumped, the plane would nose up more quickly, and fractions of a second mattered in air combat.

The two best examples of WWI air combat with aircraft that can change direction more quickly than their opponent is Werner Voss in a DR-1 YouTube link

and Billy Barker in a Sopwith Snipe.
link

Modeling air combat for miniatures is extremely difficult using traditional game rules for 3D combat, especially in the vertical. The "Fighting Wings" and "Birds of Prey" systems are pretty accurate but seem to be too detailed for most players. Check 6 is pretty go but it's an IGYG system. "Down in Flames" card game does a pretty good job limiting or adding cards depending on the aircraft, pilot, and damage.

About 80% of the planes shot down never saw their attacker. If you are the flight leader and spot the enemy first you should end up being the high-scoring pilot in your unit.

Some of the related discussion was here: TMP link

Wolfhag

I also suppose that we've to consider if we want to play as these outliers or have circumstances that allow outliers to happen.

Quantifying what makes exceptional people exceptional may or not be possible. In game terms, where we're dealing with rather simplistic and abstracted approaches, then quantifying it in game terms will, I think not make them outliers.

If the game is well thought out it will allow circumstances, with player input, outliers to appear.

Also are we seeking to understand something about outliers or just circumstances where the outliers appear.

Sid the slinger was memorable not be cause of player choices or game stats, but it doesn't make it any less of an outlier or memorable.

are we seeking to understand something about outliers or just circumstances where the outliers appear.

The thread is in response to one linked in the OP that asserts that there are people who need "special rules" to represent in wargames.

You could easily need several different sets of rules to answer different questions in the point you raised. But I don't tihink you would want a game with different rules for "normals" and "outliers". You certainly don''t need them.

I'm just asserting that "special rules" for "outliers" are not necessary in the rules that we here genrally play and talk about.

Wolfhag provided a great analysis of contributors to vR's success in battle. Any one of those factors may or may not be represented (or representable) in any given set of rules. But given that a listed dynamic is represented in the rules, you can, and I think most rules do, handle that with characteristics (stats) rather than special rules.

I think it comes down to whether you want to have a historical scenario (unbalanced and unfair) or an unhistoric balanced scenario. As I've said before "Reality Sucks."

VR and other top Aces don't fight fairly or engage unless they have an advantage. Most game scenarios I've seen start balanced with neither side having an advantage.

Ken Cassens, a Fokker D7 pilot, at the Old Rheinbeck Airdrome stated to in a 1997 telephone interview that he has timed the D7 in a 360 degree "flat turn" "using no bank" and "only rudder" in eight seconds.

Further, Ken stated that two Dr. 1 Triplane Old Rheinbeck pilots that he knows (Dave King and Brian Coughlin), stated to him that the Fokker Dr 1 when timed did a flat turn "using no bank" and "only rudder" in four seconds.

He stated the turn quickness was because of the all-moving tail and small side surface of the Fokkers. Further, he stated that most WW1 planes and in fact most planes today can do a flat turn as well. The flat turn offers more options in a combat situation.

Dr-1 maneuvers:
YouTube link

If you are going to capture the flavor of WWI air combat and how it was different from WWII, you need to implement an interactive way to portray these types of maneuvers.

I'd expect the downside to flat turns to be deceleration and a chance of stalling. You can have an almost 360-degree field of fire but it will be inaccurate and only a fraction of a second of shooting. It appears that this is how Voss put bullets into every SE5 but nothing fatal.

If the Dr 1 could flat turn 180 degrees in 2 seconds attempting to line up a shot on their 6 o'clock it could be very dangerous. Although I doubt if novice pilots would attempt it.

Wolfhag

As you say, a lot of real world combat is unbalanced. Pretty much every famous military strategist has their version of "a fair fight is a sucker bet", then their advice on gaining as much advantage as possible before the first kinetic engagement.

Still, I don't think an unbalanced situation has to mean an unblanced game.

Noone expects the Americans to "win" the Battle of Short Hills. In fact, it wasn't their mission. Their mission was to be a small, aglie force and delay the advancing Brits while the rest of the Americans effected an orderly retreat and regroup.

Wile severaly outmatched militarily, for the game, I can arrange the victory conditions so that either side has an even chace of winning the game. The Americans actually won the tacsit, since they did delay the Brits sufficiently. But still for game purposes, "The American players achieved their tactical objective, but not as well as the real American forces in the battle" could be set out as a win for the British players, if not one for the British forces represented on the table.

What you have is extrodinary effort on the part of the American guerillas, where a small number of people outfought a ,uch larger number of professional forces. No special rules needed, just better stats within the rules we used.