"[1805] More on Rsv Gren Dvn- Planning/ Deployment Enigma" Topic

From several earlier threads we've covered the development of the French 'army' that is colloquially referenced in English as "Camp du Boulogne", whereas it was actually a broad based, multiple corps sized structure spread over a long stretch of her Northern (and occupied) seaboard coast and ports.

>> refer: TMP link

I cited the anomaly that arose from multiple [original and secondary] sources of information regarding one specific concern.

My quandry for clarity:

*4 – "Barring one exception- none of these regiments lost their 'elites'." That one belonged to a regiment stationed in "Belgium" or Helder I think (to late to look up). This 'extended' frontier of France was under the military command of the very ablest Marshal- Davout and thus we find the active 'regiment' split among two corps.

His 15th Legere, in Friants Division, was the only regiment 'within' the Grande Armée whose manpower had been 'touched' for inclusion in the Reserve Grenadiers. This produces something of a quandry to analyse as toward the end of the campaign, this little unit was a vital cog in the very major action on the right flank of the Battle of Austerlitz.
I plan to expand on this with another post soon..

Research!
So_ on the day the support and replacement Davout gave to Soults troops along the line of the Goldbach villages being held by Legrands troops (though not in person), not to mention high quality local command and management of the situation over the day, was superb and necessary for the victory at Austerlitz.

The immediate arrival of his ad-hoc avant-garde-a part of his Second Division- merely one infantry regiment (108e deLigne/ 2 bons); two very low strength light companies (15e Legere- called Voltigeurs in various documents); and the 1er Dragons, forced marched from Raigern about 10kms away since 0500 or so after a brief sleep of a few hours to rest.

Arriving at the battle site of Austerlitz around 8:00am, the GBD Heudelet 'avant-garde' of the Third Corps (Davout- who followed not far behind), this command after a sweaty jog I imagine:-

108e de Ligne- 1er et 2eme bons
15e Legere- 2 companies – only 64 men total (*) called Voltigeurs.
Attached- 1er Dragons (Col..)

The most obvious question arises- how could the two 15e Legere companies be Voltigeurs? The regiment was unique in one way- it was the only regiment active in the Grande Armée whose actual manpower had been taken for the elite ‘United Grenadier Division' first formed under Junot since Jan 1803. Subsequently and officially entitled the ‘Grenadier de Reserve' Division, colloquially known then and now named for the commander GDV ‘Oudinot Grenadiers'.

The manpower was designated, by Napoleon (refer to his known copious correspondence) to be the carabinier/ grenadier and another company (voltigeurs or chasseur) from each of the 3 battalions of units formerly known (until mid 1803) as Demi-Brigades. Each of these 6, same regiment companies formed an homogenous ‘elite' battalion by which they were commonly known and addressed by N. in his correspondence. He even admonished subordinates that had used alternative labels, stating that they were to be fully recognised as belonging to their parent regiments.

The balance of the 15e Legere regiments' two bons were still marching up from Vienna, there were 12 companies in total according to one OB source. The calculation is therefore very basic arithmetic.

At 9 companies per bon, this gave 18 companies in the field, less the ‘elites' detached to the Reserve Grenadier Division (Oudinot). which was 6 companies, 3 carabinier and 3 chasseurs/ voltigeurs. Because however only two battalions were ‘in the field' this meant that the main regiment should have fielded 14 companies, not 12. Perhaps there was a simple error in the count of the OB cited (*2 *3).

Or had there been an ‘off field' rearrangement take place of some companies or personnel of the regiment between the two substantive ‘corps'? Had the ‘voltigeurs' been returned to the III Corps and regiment prior to the arrival at and advance from Vienna?

I have the Situation for the United/ Grenadiers of the Reserve 1805 both pre and post battle.

There is no detailled information about the 15e Legere, however kindly Frédéric Berjaud has its 'partner' regiment well documented, so we must rely upon the corrollary effect for some info at link section 2- II/ LA CAMPAGNE DU BATAILLON D'ELITE A LA DIVISION OUDINOT, 1804-1806.

Now I admit that I'd hung on too dear hope (and trust) that all the corps involved in THIS Reserve Grenadier Division were in fact elite companies of their regiments, or at worst became elite companies when the regimental manpower that was despatched initially included 'chasseurs' (no fusliers are ever cited).

While every 'red' company was elite, we can't actually prove it for the 'yellow' company. This anomaly doesn't help!

Any suggestions/ alterntaives or proof?
regards
davew *milk*

- *2-Duffy
- *3-Goetz

Dave,

You are correct about the 15e Legere being called voltigeurs. Letters from Marshal Davout in Napoleon's Finest, constantly refer to them as the companies of voltigeurs. He says in a letter dated 6 December 1805, " The 1st, comprised of the 108th Regiment of the Line and the companies of voltigeurs of 15e Legere… The 2nd comprised of the 15th Legere Infantry [less the companies of voltigeurs] and 33rd Line."

All I can add is from Frédéric Berjaud website on Chef de batallion Louis Etienne Dulong de Rosnay

Le 2 décembre, à Austerlitz, c'est Dulong lui-même qui commande le 15e léger, le colonel étant absent et le major Geither ayant été blessé dès le commencement de l'action. La division Friant combat dans le village de Sokolnitz, à la droite du dispositif français. Le régiment composé d'une majorité de jeunes soldats recule devant la poussée russe, mais Dulong parvient à les reprendre et même à contre-attaquer. A l'issue de la bataille, Davout félicite Dulong, démarche exceptionnelle de la part du maréchal.

Yes err, thanks, I cited that site above.
So there's no alternatives then- Davout said I want my men back, and he got them?
Tant pis!
d

Well, the issue isn't at all cleared to me about up of 'how' two companies of voltigeur ended up with/ back with Davout and the regiment.
Also logically, I can't see only 64 men (or all personnel?) being retained as 'two companies', when that number barely contains the strength of one.

I'd imagine that the 'two' was merely a formal title of whence they originated, but actually performed as a single entity. Given all the who-haa about 'regulations' and tactical doctrine etc.

However, I guess I reconcile myself to creating a 'regiment d'elite' with carabiniers and chasseurs instead of voltigeurs; while the 'petit companie' adjoining the 108eme carries the burden at Telnitz.
cheers d

Historique du 90e régiment d' infanterie de ligne, ex- 15e léger
Author : Belhomme, Victor-Louis-Jean-François (Lieutenant-colonel).
Publisher : C. Tanera (Paris)
Publication date : 1875
link

Text suggests it was just 3 companies of carabiniers detached to the battalion d'elite. They formed a regiment with 12th legere's elite battalion under Colonel Desailly.

Only 2 battalions of the 15th legere took the field as the 3rd formed part of the 2nd reserve corps under Lefebvre.

Heudlet's Brigade with the voligeurs from the 15th legere and 108th ligne preceded by a regiment of dragoons formed the head of Davout's column, followed by Kister's brigade 15th legere (remainder) and 33rd ligne. The two battalions of the 15th legere had no more than 754 men under arms.

Indeed Sir I think you nailed it!!!

I've no possible interest in after-N affairs so wouldn't have been looking there!

Seems strange, in light of N. explicit and detailled administering of 'his' army that such a variation were possible! Though we don't see the detail of the 15e Leg. 'orders' to Berthier like we do the 12e Leg. it hardly seems possible they were different.

He was all for 'balancing' and maximising manpower in 'battle units', particularly at this time in the Reserve Grenadier Division, so one wonders how this became about that one of the said 'elite' battalions, wasn't completed.

We can only conjecture that Davouts skill and abilities to train to sort out the voltigeur companies before the campaign got under way gained precedence over N. desire to just man the war battalions.

That Voltigeurs of the 3rd Bn marched with the 'regiment (1er et 2eme Bons only)'- giving it three under arms and I'd dare to imagine that was in fact why there were really TWO in name only at Austeritz. Possibly the rest was attritional loss of the forced march.

Many thanks, a glass to you Sir!
[though I'm drinking Spanish at the mo']
regards d

However- having said that, I've rechecked the 'Etat' of the Reserve Grenadier Division for 4 December 1805, and the numbers simply do not uphold the theory.
The 15e Legere 'elite battalion' has close to average numbers present in the Division. More detail later.
regards d

From Carnot93's post at TMP link

The short answer – Yes, battalions of 6 companies each.

The long answer:

Oudinot's grenadier division of 1805 originated as an elite division formed 25 Jan 1804 (acc. to Belhomme) as part of the Advance Guard of the Army of the Ocean Coasts. The division was composed of provisional battalions formed by regiments that were on coastal and border defense duty within France. Each regiment formed a 6-company battalion with the grenadier and first fusilier company of each of its 3 battalions. Each regiment contributed 1 chef de bataillon, 1 adjutant-major, 1 adjutant and 1 surgeon for the battalion. These provisional battalions were paired up to form régimentes d'élite and according to the original orders were to be commanded by one of the colonels of the two regiments contributing the battalions. In fact, three were commanded by colonels, two by majors. So each of the elite battalions was 6 companies and each battalion of the parent regiments was left at 7 companies. Only one of these regiments later was a part of the Grande Armée (15e leg) and this is why at Austerlitz it fought with two 6-company battalions at Sokolnitz with the two voltigeur companies detached to Heudelet at Telnitz.

To fill in some command details:

Brigade Laplanche-Morthières
1st Grenadier Regiment (13th and 58th line) – Col. Froment of the 13th
2nd Grenadier Regiment (9th and 81st Line) – Major Brayer of the 9th

Brigade Dupas
3rd Grenadier Regiment (2nd and 3rd Light) – Col. Schramm of the 2nd
4th Grenadier Regiment (28th and 31st Light) – Major Cabannes de Puymisson of the 28th

Brigade Ruffin
5th Grenadier Regiment (12th and 15th Light) – Col. Desailly of the 15th

Interesting article from Sabretache link

There is a problem with the above calculation: in 1805, infantry regiments had only two battalions.

@Widowson -NON, NON, NON!!!!

La Campagne de 1805 en Allemagne (ANNEXES et CARTES)
by Paul-Claude Alombert, Jean Colin
Publication date 1902

See Annex I. Forces de L'Empire au 16 thermidor an XIII
Most regiments had 3 battalions, though I will accept the overwhelming majority took the field with only 2 war battalions:
67 line regiments had 3 battalions
20 line regiments had 4 battalions
2 line regiments had 1 battalion

21 light regiments had 3 battalions
3 light regiments had 4 battalions
2 light regiments had 2 battalions

link

Of necessity I've been distracted by oher things for a few days…

There is a problem with the above calculation: in 1805, infantry regiments had only two battalions.

While there are a number of 'problems'[inaccuracies] with the quote, but that my friend is not one of them- you are dead wrong. You wrote that 'fact' a decade or more ago and [repeating] still haven't got it right.

Apart from the evidence PoE has cited, I'll add this short list of affirmative references:-

N. organisation and designation of 1803 Demi-Brigades (ie 3 battalions) to Regiments

Charrié- Drapeaux…

Armee of the Coast

Austerlitz OB
.

Whilst in certain places outide Paris and major cities, regiments were allowed between 1801 and 1803 to wither away and did not get formal 'recruits' and rebuilt cadres.

The entire army was subject to a revised rationale and forces 'tuned' during 1803 for the inevitable expansion that was planned.

cf Cavalry and expansion/ centralisation of the 'Cuirassier' arm etc.
regards dave

Well, I completed this statistical review some months ago but had hesitated to present the data as I worked as much as possible on bringing my 'projects' to fruition. Sadly a bit of a disturbance in the force prevented my completing either to my satisfaction.

I noted my result for myself at the time:

No reasoned response was received.

Another work states that Davout marched the 3eBon cie de Voltigeurs with the regiment to Vienna- the 1st and 2nd Bons complete except for their ‘other' respective detached elites. Were these true elites, or rather chasseur companies of ‘suitable' sized men?

This would suggest that indeed some chasseur companies (at least one for 15eLg) was present in the Reserve Grenadiers Div. While the citation of ‘two' companies of voltigeurs at Telnitz may be an overstatement, given their number was only 64 men (all) it is repeated in two reports to both the EMG and Emperor direct. From a person of Davouts knowledge and status, it is unlikely to be an error or exaggeration.

This variation can be substantiated somewhat by the following campaigns of '06/'07 where it is found cadres of elite companies outside those of regimental and ‘reserve' units existed in campaign areas. (See SHAT1984 reports- IVCorps 1806).

The likelihood that Davout augmented his command in 1805 the same way with otherwise "missing" elite companies is quite probable.

-

However, as time slips by, here is the actual analysis result- and none of it confirms the origin of the company units, despite all we know of how they were supposed to be organised (and the info presented which is largely unchallenged)- but the question remains STILL:

>>how could the two 15e Legere companies be Voltigeurs?<<
(refer above for all details).

The report two days after battle, including- officers, wounded, 'in hospital' but not prisoners, in actual numbers of men (first column) and per '6' companies present:

SD	45	           -
AvG	537      	  90
min	455		  76
max	610		  102
ra	155		  26
med	533		  89

The 15e Legere, somewhat surprisingly:
536 men (Officers 0.04%) or 86 per company.

You can see for yourself how it 'ranks' to the full data for all 10 battalions.

It is very close to the median AND Average values compared with other units. So in terms of 'less companies present' [ie the volitgeurs were taken away] or other hypotheses of replacements, these don't stack up.

That three companies were Carabiniers isn't in question- unless someone finds it; so perhaps there were 1, 2 or all 3 'other' elite companies were actually chasseurs of the 15eL regiment.

Certainly the stats TWO DAYS AFTER battle give no indication, despite the acknowledged detachment of men.

I am gradually coming round to the notion that those other companies who were seconded to the '5th Regiment de l'elite' were, like the preliminary 'orders' given for the 12e Legere- the brother unit in the '5th Regiment de l'elite', ostensibly chasseurs only or at best one company of voltigeur. An interesting mix to paint up!

regards
davew

Dave,

I doubt this helps, but these are taken from C2 170-173 for the 15e Legere from 1 Brumaire an 14 and 1 October 1806. We find the bat. d'Elite in Paris with 23 officers and 572 NCOs and soldiers in 1806.

Thanks Mike,
Very interesting! Not quite able to read all the text but theres enough in the numbers!
Noting the 3e/15e Leg was mobilised with only 335 men in the
'support' 2nd Corps.

You know not one person told me when at Vincenne that such cahiers existed!

The second item (1806) is of course the second incarnation of the Reserve Grenadiers, as they been 'officially dissolved' as of July 1. This had a few alternate regiments, and more conscripts included, than the 1803-05 version.

As I say Very interesting! Gives a good idea of how methodical N. was keeping tabs on everything, not just shotgun 'decrees and regulations.

My stats are based on post Austerlitz, is simply because I didn't check my earlier ones in campaign. Few exist in such detail.

cheers dave

Let me see what else I can find for you in these files. I have been chatting with Paul Lindsay Dawson, and he has helped me understand what is actually available at Vincennes. I will be taking a trip there in 2022, but as an American, it is slightly different from all the procedures in our State and Federal Archives, and I need to make sure I make the most amount of time for research and taking pictures!

I remember a post about how many battalions a regiment had in 1805 and 1806, but I can't remember where it is at the moment. I see regiments such as the 3e Ligne and 5e Ligne with 4 Battalions in October 1806. They are not huge, but they are there and most likely included the Piquet.

Regimental 'battalion' strengths vary, which is why I gave the answer above because it isn't that difficult and the 'only two battalions myth should have died years ago.

They, or rather 'he' said which unit would increase; how many transfers and conscripts they got; where they went to depot or garrison and their relative proximity to the front, or campaign arena to bolster troop numbers.

That is why your snippets of information ARE important- just look at the nomenclature- Battalions- de l'elite; 1er, 2e etc. Where and how many stationed or en marche…

Having said that, we arent really enquiring about who had what battalions. It is plainly- where did the companies of the 15e Legere come from? There can't have been MORE voltigeur than was decreed (can there?); so really the Bn de l'elite must have contained Chasseur companies, if Davout had TWO partial companies (only 64 men between them) even if and probably they did act as one. As I said above, I have proof that he did the same in 1806- taking 'extras' from the garrison battalions within his Corps.

Yes the French run the system very wisely. I needed a letter of request/ introduction from my embassy in Paris before they gave permission for me to enter. I got that under way real quick because French political turmoil in '84 had been simmering. I was real lucky I had not gone to France a year later- the Rainbow Warrior incident (a detonator placed in the engine room of a sailing brig) caused mayhem for our relationship for a decade or more. I'd never have got inside Vincennes! Or maybe never have come out!

cheers

So … It looks like all of the relevant data is here. There is some ambiguity, as often is the case, but I think no enigma. So to review what has already been noted:

15e légère was not a part of the Armée des côtes de l'Océan, it was stationed in eastern France. It had 3 battalions. Oudinot's grenadier division was formed with battalions of elites drawn from regiments not with the army, those stationed elsewhere in France. 15e légère was one of these. The bataillon d'élite drawn from each of the regiments was composed of the grenadier/carabinier company and first fusilier/chasseur company of each battalion, a total of 6 companies (2x3). This left the parent battalion with three 7-company battalions.

In 1804, the voltigeur companies were formed, replacing the 2nd fusilier/chasseur company. 15e légère would have formed these companies like the other regiments, despite having detached companies to Oudinot's division. So the regiment now had 3 battalions, each composed of 6 chasseur companies and 1 voltigeur company.

When the Grande Armée was formed, essentially the Armée des côtes de l'Océan less some regiments left behind plus some additional regiments (+ the Army of Hanover and lots of cavalry), they picked up the 15e légère en route to Germany. As with the other regiments of the army, the 1st and 2nd battalions of 15e légère marched with the army with the 3rd battalion left behind. The assembled 3rd battalions formed the 2nd and 3rd Reserve Corps under Lefebvre and Kellermann (3rd battalion 15 légère was in Lefebvre's corps).

So the 1st and 2nd battalions of 15e légère joined Davout's 3rd Corps. According to the regimental history (Historique du 90e régiment d'infanterie de ligne, ex-15e léger), the voltigeurs of the 3rd battalion marched with the 1st and 2nd battalion. This left the 3rd battalion with 6 companies in the 2nd Reserve Corps (Lefebvre). It's worth noting that the regimental history also says that only the three carabinier companies were detached to Oudinot's division, which is contradicted by other sources (and basic math says that 3 carabinier companies can't form a 6-company battalion on their own). Make of that what you will as far as the reliability of the minor details in this regimental history.

So it appears, then, that in December 1805, en route to Austerlitz, 15e légère had two battalions of 6 companies each plus 3 (possibly only 2) voltigeur companies. Some voltigeur companies were detached to Heudelet and marched on Tellnitz, the remainder of the regiment remained with Friant. So the only enigma/ambiguity is whether 15e légère had two voltigeur companies or three with Davout's corps. Most sources seem to place two voltigeur companies with Heudelet, which would suggest that the third voltigeur company remained with the two 6-company battalions of the regiment with Friant. Or maybe all three voltigeur companies were detached with Heudelet. Or maybe the regimental history is incorrect on this detail and the voltigeurs of the 3rd battalion remained in France. In any case, we can be certain to +/- 100 men or so.

Does that move us from enigma to minor ambiguity?

@ M. le Carnot93

Thank you for your thoughtful response to my problem!

I've taken some time to draught out and 'test' for some information before responding so that I could cover as much of your response in detail.
- -
Carnot93 24 Aug 2021 7:17 p.m. PST

So … It looks like all of the relevant data is here. There is some ambiguity, as often is the case, but I think no enigma. So to review what has already been noted:

15e légère was not a part of the Armée des côtes de l'Océan, it was stationed in eastern France.

-Correct. It was cantonned in since August 1803 at Besançon near the Swiss border (Doubs). Under Davout, at Bruges was the 12e legere. I wasn't, before now aware of the ‘swap' of units at the start of the campaign and had thought the 15eL integral to the camp. My mistake.

It had 3 battalions. Oudinot's grenadier division was formed with battalions of elites(*) drawn from regiments not with the army, those stationed elsewhere in France.

15e légère was one of these. The bataillon d'élite drawn from each of the regiments was composed of the grenadier/carabinier company and first fusilier/chasseur company of each battalion, a total of 6 companies (2x3). This left the parent battalion with three 7-company battalions.

-According to the regimental history- only the 3 carabinier companies were detached in 1803. No mention of chasseurs at all.
This parallels the 12eL somewhat, who according to Berjaud "The elite battalion of the 12th Light, formed from the first three chasseur companys of each battalion and 3 carabiner companys, arrived in Arras in 1803".
(*) I cite this as being a case in point where ‘elite' is used as a broad description, but not entirely factual as to the case in point. We now understand that ‘chasseurs' were despatched to help form the division- are to to be believe they also were ‘elite'?

In 1804, the voltigeur companies were formed, replacing the 2nd fusilier/chasseur company.

-Not sure- Many voltigeurs were formed before that decree, but the actual identity is subject to records found. And few I have and not many are documented clearly. Dawson may be changing that soon?

-No- I do not believe ‘replacement' is correct. The dictum used, as least when finally written by orders, if not beforehand by one to one and verbal use (command from superiors) was selection of "appropriately qualified personnel". Do you have specific prrof of this because I've not seen it coroborated beyond reasonable doubt.

-No- When decreed at last when asked the question directly, "where did it rank" the per battalion voltigeur company was to rank third- after the Grenadier, then after First fusilier/ chasseur, then voltigeur company. It was neither replacing the second NOR THIRD company which many English writers have pronounced as fact.

To do so would destroy the tactical ‘integrity' of battalions so sacrosanct to the many generations of writers who drool over drill ‘regulations'.

From the regimental 15eL history:-

On the 13th of March a company of voltigeurs was created in each light infantry battalion (I could be concerned that the translators call them "robbers" ;-). They had the ordinary cadre of the other companies- 2 cornets replaced the drummers; and 104 men. They were armed with dragoon musketoons with bayonets, and were paid the same rate as carabiniers and grenadiers. The voltigeurs remained at the garrison at Besançon.
In May [1804], the elite battalion moved from Arras to Le Havre to provide garrisons and guards naval buildings and to train for the flotilla movements.

In this they acted as ‘marines' as well as gunners on sloops and engaged with the considerable British naval activity and coastal harassment. Again there were injuries and deaths because of these combats. The 15eL elites continued this until the end of July 1805 when they returned to the Camp du Boulogne, now under Oudinot! No word on the presence of chasseurs however at any stage.

23rd August the Reserve Grenadier Division marched out to Strasbourg. At this time the substantive regiment of the 15e at Besançon was ‘swapped' in to the III Corps d'Armée, replacing the 21e Legere that was being left at camp d'Ambleteuse*.

-This is confirmed by Berjaud under the 21e legere:-
"An annex to a letter sent by the Emperor, from Pont-de-Briques, to Marshal Berthier, Minister of War states:… 3rd Corps, Marshal Davout:
[The camp he is in charge of] apart from the 21st light that remains in Boulogne… "

-This appears to be a complex situation where the regiment had been involved in some counter-government controversy and disciplinary issues; had been decimated during 1804 by illness and disease; and finally after receiving conscripts had more than a companys' strength desertions during 1805. It did not auger well for a unit to be fielded in battle. (cf Berjaud).

15e légère would have formed these companies like the other regiments, despite having detached companies to Oudinot's division. So the regiment now had 3 battalions, each composed of 6 chasseur companies and 1 voltigeur company.

When the Grande Armée was formed…they picked up the 15e légère en route to Germany.

As with the other regiments of the army, the 1st and 2nd battalions of 15e légère marched with the army with the 3rd battalion left behind. The assembled 3rd battalions formed the 2nd and 3rd Reserve Corps under Lefebvre and Kellermann (3rd battalion 15 légère was in Lefebvre's corps).
-I don't believe this is too relevant to issue, just a note. The ‘Reserve' wasn't formed up until the campaigns manpower attrition of the Grande Armée was painfully obvious. No matter how aware N. may have been of the need.

-This rather equivocal- those regiments that had 4 war battalions (given by PoE above) had 3 march; thiose that had 3 war battalions only had two march. Bernadottes I Corps (Army de Hanovre-occupation force) the exception to all other Corps with ALL 3 Bns marching likewise. [Sidebar- Admitting only one regiment, the 3eme de ligne in IV Corps also fielded 3 bns, and perhaps for Telnitz just as well!]

So the 1st and 2nd battalions of 15e légère joined Davout's 3rd Corps. According to the regimental history (Historique du 90e régiment d'infanterie de ligne, ex-15e léger), the voltigeurs of the 3rd battalion marched with the 1st and 2nd battalion. This left the 3rd battalion with 6 companies in the 2nd Reserve Corps (Lefebvre). It's worth noting that the regimental history also says that only the three carabinier companies were detached to Oudinot's division, which is contradicted by other sources (and basic math says that 3 carabinier companies can't form a 6-company battalion on their own). Make of that what you will as far as the reliability of the minor details in this regimental history.

So it appears, then, that in December 1805, en route to Austerlitz, 15e légère had two battalions of 6 companies each plus 3 (possibly only 2) voltigeur companies. Some voltigeur companies were detached to Heudelet and marched on Tellnitz, the remainder of the regiment remained with Friant.

-Correct. That was an impression but hadn't been said before quite so clearly. When I alluded to ‘swapped' earlier this year I had no idea that Davouts Camp de Bruges had been broken down like this.

So the only enigma/ambiguity is whether 15e légère had two voltigeur companies or three with Davout's corps. Most sources seem to place two voltigeur companies with Heudelet, which would suggest that the third voltigeur company remained with the two 6-company battalions of the regiment with Friant. Or maybe all three voltigeur companies were detached with Heudelet. Or maybe the regimental history is incorrect on this detail and the voltigeurs of the 3rd battalion remained in France. In any case, we can be certain to +/- 100 men or so.

-No, I don't see as 3 in doubt- were they with the advance guard under Heudelet- probably not as it is in Davouts official reports to HM and EMG, that he took the V/3eme Bn with him, but only TWO under Heudelet (their exact battalions not being cited- but 64 men remains a paltry total for TWO).

As I said above, there is proof (I have copies of Situations for 1806 coincidentally) that Davout did this; so no reason to believe it didn't happen earlier in 1805 as well!

Does that move us from enigma to minor ambiguity?
-I concede the issue is less cloudy than earlier. Certainly makes the ‘Elites' of the Nafzigers et al of this world less thorough and robust than heretofore considered.

Many thanks for the additional information and together with this I've created a matrix of the Elite Battalions' composition. There are acknowledged far more ‘Chasseur' companies in the establishment of the Division than we've been lead to believe. Of the four de ligne regiments, I've not seen a single source suggesting ‘fusiliers' were present.

regards
davew _9Sep21_
≠≠≠ ≠≠≠

-
regards davew

From Berjauds site I read the confirmation of:

Le général Davout est nommé commandant en chef du camp de Bruges
… Le camp de Bruges sera composé de trois divisions
… La 2e division sera commandée par le général Durutte ayant à ses ordres les généraux de brigade : Heudelet, Reille.
La 2e division sera composée des : 21e légère, 33e de ligne, 108e id, 111e id
… Le ministre de la Guerre et celui de l'Administration feront former sur-le-champdeux camps en baraques à Ostende sur la droite et sur la gauche du port pour qu'au 1er vendémiaire, la 1re et la 2e division puissent s'y baraquer …
Le général Davout établira son quartier à Bruges et partira le 16 fructidor …" (Correspondance générale, t.4, lettre 7972).

A fascinating document link for the 108eme but highlights all the associated regiments and formations.

Clears my misunderstanding about the 15e Legeres' origins and subsequent inclusion with the Grande Armée.

If just such similar detail could uncover the machinations of the introduction of voltigeurs, anywhere, would be outstanding. [Please don't recite the known crap from the epics- it does not compute..].
d

First, I need to note the regimental history I referenced in the prior post. I thought I had included it. Belhomme, Victor Louis Jean François. Historique du 90e régiment d'infanterie de ligne, ex-15e léger. Paris, C. Tanera, 1875

So to address the first part regarding Oudinot's grenadiers and the formation of voltigeurs:

(*) I cite this as being a case in point where ‘elite' is used as a broad description, but not entirely factual as to the case in point. We now understand that ‘chasseurs' were despatched to help form the division- are to to be believe they also were ‘elite'?

A standard regiment was ~11% grenadiers/carabiniers. Oudinot's battalions were 50% grenadiers/carabiniers. So it seems to me that battalions d'elite is accurate enough. If they were all grenadiers/carabiniers, I expect they would just be called grenadier/carabinier battalions.

-Not sure- Many voltigeurs were formed before that decree, but the actual identity is subject to records found. And few I have and not many are documented clearly. Dawson may be changing that soon?

Regiments could and did do non-standard things, particularly in period 1793-1804. 1804 is when the light regiments were ordered to form voltigeurs. By decree. See Napoleon's decree from Paris, March 13, 1804 regarding the light regiments. I'll post a translation as a separate post, it describes the process the regiments were to use.

-No- I do not believe ‘replacement' is correct. The dictum used, as least when finally written by orders, if not beforehand by one to one and verbal use (command from superiors) was selection of "appropriately qualified personnel". Do you have specific prrof of this because I've not seen it coroborated beyond reasonable doubt.

I disagree that it's not an appropriate term. A company of voltigeurs is created by selecting men from the other companies, then the 8 chasseur companies are compressed into 7. The 8th chasseur company vanishes, but the voltiguers occupy the position of seniority/rank occupied by the 2nd chasseur company. I'm not sure there is a better word than replacement (remplacement), which is the term used by some rather authoritative French historians on the era, for example:

Paul Claude Alombert-Goget, Campagne de l'an 14 (1805): Le corps d'armée aux ordres du maréchal Mortier, combat de Dürrenstein (Paris: Berger-Levrault et cie, 1897). « Un décret du 2e jour complémentaire an 13 (19 septembre 1805) crée par bataillon une compagnie de voltigeurs en remplacement de la 2e compagnie de fusiliers.»

Also, see Napoleon to General Lacuée, Camp of Boulogne 5 August 1805: "Also make me a draft decree establishing a company of voltigeurs in each battalion of line infantry. It would be made up of small men, armed with dragon guns, like the voltigeurs of the light infantry. It would not increase the battalions, because we would eliminate a company, as we did with the light infantry."

-No- When decreed at last when asked the question directly, "where did it rank" the per battalion voltigeur company was to rank third- after the Grenadier, then after First fusilier/ chasseur, then voltigeur company. It was neither replacing the second NOR THIRD company which many English writers have pronounced as fact.

Many English-speaking writers pronounce nonsense as fact. Non-English ones too. But use of the term ‘replaced' is accurate in two contexts. There is the organizational context in which one company of chasseurs is eliminated and replaced with a company of voltigeurs. There is the ranking/seniority of companies, in which the 2nd chasseur company is replaced in its position as the third ranking company in the battalion (getting bumped to 4th ranking).

**end part 1**

The orders describing how the voltigeurs would be formed is below. You may already have this.

Paris, March 13, 1804
ADOPTED
ORGANIZATION OF COMPANIES VOLTIGEURS
TITLE 1.
ARTICLE 1. – There will be, in each battalion of light infantry regiments, a company which will bear the name of Company of voltigeurs.
ART. 2. – This company will be made up of well-formed, vigorous and nimble men, but of the smallest size. The non-commissioned officers and soldiers who will be admitted there may not be more than 1 meter 598 millimeters (4 feet 11 inches), officers more than 1 meter 625 millimeters (5 feet).
ART. 3. – This company will be constantly maintained at the foot of war and composed as follows: 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 1 sergeant major, 4 sergeants, 1 quartermaster, 8 corporals, 104 voltigeurs, 2 instruments military; total, 123.
Instead of drums, this company will have for military instruments small hunting horns called cones.
ART. 4. – The officers of these companies will be taken from the entire regiment, in their respective rank, on the presentation of three subjects made to the Minister of War by the colonel. These officers will be replaced in their original companies. Thus the number of officers will be increased, by battalion, of a captain, a lieutenant and a second lieutenant.
ART. 5. – The number of non-commissioned officers of each battalion will be increased in the same way by a sergeant-major, four sergeants, a quartermaster and eight corporals; but the strength of the battalion, with the exception of three officers, will remain as fixed by the organizational decree for the year XII. For this purpose, the strength of each company of light infantry, except that of the carabineers, will be reduced by fifteen men.

TITLE II
ARMAMENT, CLOTHING AND INSTRUCTION OF VOLTIGERS
ART. 6. – The voltigeurs will be armed with an infantry saber and a very light gun, dragoon model.
The officers and non-commissioned officers will have, instead of fusil, a carbine rayée.
ART. 7. – The voltigeurs will be dressed like the light infantry; they will bear the distinctive marks of their respective bodies; a collar of buff cloth.
ART. 8. – The voltigeurs being specially intended to be transported quickly by the troops on horseback to the places where their presence will be necessary, they will be trained to climb nimbly and with a jump on the back of a man on horseback, and to descend from it. with lightness; to form quickly, and follow on foot a trotting rider.
Voltigeurs will also be particularly trained to shoot with promptness and great accuracy.

TITLE III
FIRST FORMATION OF VOLTIGEUR COMPANIES
ART. 9- – The officers and non-commissioned officers of the companies of voltigeurs will be named immediately; the officers, as was said in article 4. The First Consul will name their replacements, and will take them either in the body, or without.
The non-commissioned officers will be appointed by the colonel on the presentation, which will be made to him by the captain of the voltigeurs, of three subjects for each place, but always with the conditions relating to the size.
ART. 10. – It will be chosen, by each captain of voltigeurs, forty-eight soldiers on the totality of the battalion, at the rate of six per company; they can only be taken from among the twelve smallest men of each company; they will form the nucleus and the head of the companies.
ART. 11. – The companies of voltigeurs will be supplemented immediately with conscripts of the years XI and XII, taken among those which were exempted from marching by lack of size, but whose constitution will be strong and robust. The quota of each department will be determined according to the bases fixed by the decree of 29 Fructidor year XI.
ART. 12. – In the year XIII and following, it will be designated to each department a particular contingent for the companies of voltigeurs. This contingent will be taken from the individuals of the class who will be less than 1 meter 598 millimeters. Those who will be appointed will be reimbursed for the sums they have been required to pay in execution of the decree of 29 Fructidor, year XI.

TITLE IV
BALANCE OF VOLTIGEUR COMPANIES
ART. 13. – The pay of the companies of voltigeurs will be the same as that of the companies of riflemen.
ART. 14. – The Minister of War is responsible for the execution of this decree.

Now moving on to the specifics with the 15e and 12e légère and a few other points:

In this they acted as ‘marines' as well as gunners on sloops and engaged with the considerable British naval activity and coastal harassment. Again there were injuries and deaths because of these combats. The 15eL elites continued this until the end of July 1805 when they returned to the Camp du Boulogne, now under Oudinot! No word on the presence of chasseurs however at any stage.

Yes, although this was something a bit different from service as actual marins – they were temporary muscle aboard the vessels as they transferred from the point of construction to the point of assembly. The regimental history refers to them as ‘garrisons'. And if you're still doubting the presence of chasseurs because the regimental history neglects to mention them, just ask yourself how three carabinier companies would form a 6-company battalion.

Since you seem particularly interested in 15eL, the naval actions are described in the regimental history as follows (apologies for a quick and probably flawed translation, but enough for the gist of it):

From Belhomme: In May [1804], the elite battalion went from Arras to Le Havre to provide garrisons for the ships of the flotilla (bâtiments de la flottille) [translation note vs. your translation above: bâtiments could translate as buildings or as ships, but since in the next sentence the bâtiments sail from Le Havre to Boulogne, I'm thinking ships] As the ships were ready, they were directed from Le Havre to Boulogne, each having, in addition to the crew, a garrison of 25 to 30 infantry, commanded by an officer.

The movement of the flotilla gave rise to several episodes. On January 29, the English cruiser took the gunboat n° 337, which had for a garrison 25 carabiniers of the regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Prévost.

On June 10, a division of the flotilla sailed from Le Havre, with Captain Barron's company of carabiniers on board. At 8 o'clock in the morning she was attacked by a frigate, two brigs and two English cutters; they fight while continuing their course, and anchor at midday near a coastal battery. At one o'clock she sets sail, and the cannonade begins again, not to cease until 4 o'clock, following the entry of the flotilla at Fécamp. The detachment of the 15th light had 1 man killed and 5 wounded, including Captain Barron. On July 23, this same division, setting sail from Fécamp, was again attacked by the English cruise; the combat ceased at 10 o'clock in the morning, by the retreat of the English, the frigate and a brig having had their mât de perroquet [parrot masts? What does this naval term translate to?] shot down. The detachment of the 15th light had 1 man killed and 6 wounded; the flotilla anchored at Dieppe.

-This [leaving 21e légère on the channel coast] appears to be a complex situation where the regiment had been involved in some counter-government controversy and disciplinary issues; had been decimated during 1804 by illness and disease; and finally after receiving conscripts had more than a companys' strength desertions during 1805. It did not auger well for a unit to be fielded in battle. (cf Berjaud).

I think Berjaud is engaging in some conjecture here. Absent some correspondence stating a specific reason, there isn't a particular reason to regard being left as part of the 1st reserve corps as a result of controversy or disciplinary issue. There was a major concentration of vessels/stores at Ambleteuse. So a regiment already there was left to secure them. Also, Berjaud may be confusing 21st light with 21st line: Napoleon to General Lacuée, Camp of Boulogne 5 August 1805: "The 21st and 33rd line, the latter recruiting from the Eure, have the most deserters." Despite this, the 21st and 33rd line both marched with the 3rd Corps (3rd division). As for 21st light, it was one of the 6 full regiments left to defend the coast. The others were 22e ligne and 72e ligne (both from Legrand's division – were these also suspect regiments with disciplinary issues?)– and the three Italian regiments. These were augmented by some 3rd battalions of 4 battalion regiments (3/21e ligne and 3/72e ligne).

-I don't believe this is too relevant to issue, just a note. The ‘Reserve' wasn't formed up until the campaigns manpower attrition of the Grande Armée was painfully obvious. No matter how aware N. may have been of the need.

Um … no, you are entirely mistaken in that. The regiments of the Army of the Ocean Coasts (AOC) that were "left behind" by the Grande Armée were placed under the command of Carra St-Cyr on 27 August 1805 (see Le Ministre de las guerre à M. le maréchal Soult, 27 August 1805 in Alombert and Colin, Vol 1, 341). Between 27 August and 29 August this was expanded with some 3rd and 4th battalions and assigned to Brune. The remaining 3rd/4th battalions of the regiments of the Grande Armée were ordered to assemble at Mayence and Strasbourg around the time the Grande Armée marched from the channel coast and by 19 September were formally organized into divisions to form the 2e and 3e Corps d'armée de reserve, commanded by Lefebvre (Mayence) and Kellermann (Strasbourg) [See Correspondance, Napoleon to Berthier, St. Cloud, 19 September 1805 and several subsequent orders with additional details] Also on 19 September Napoleon ordered the formation of a flying corps at Poitiers to cover the Vendee and Biscay coast. This was all long before there was any "painfully obvious campaign attrition", it was a part of Napoleon's thorough planning. 1er corps to defend the assembled flotilla and naval stores on the coast, 2nd corps in position to intervene in Holland in the event of a 1799-style Anglo-Russian incursion, and the 3rd on the upper Rhine in position in case something went wrong in Bavaria or if the Prussians got feisty. Napoleon even wrote a nice reassuring letter to the nervous Dutch Admiral Ver Huell (29 Sept) describing these precautions.

-This rather equivocal- those regiments that had 4 war battalions (given by PoE above) had 3 march; thiose that had 3 war battalions only had two march. Bernadottes I Corps (Army de Hanovre-occupation force) the exception to all other Corps with ALL 3 Bns marching likewise. [Sidebar- Admitting only one regiment, the 3eme de ligne in IV Corps also fielded 3 bns, and perhaps for Telnitz just as well!]

The AOC had depot/reserve battalions intended to be left in France when it crossed the channel. So the regiments of the Grande Armée that had been part of the AOC had depot/reserve battalions. Those of the Army of Hanovre and Italie did not. My bad for not mentioning that about Hanovre when it joined the GA. And not all 4 battalion regiments marched with 3 battalions – 17th and 21st line, for example, each marched with 2 and left 2 behind at Ambleteuse (these were a part of the 1st Reserve Corps).

-Correct. That was an impression but hadn't been said before quite so clearly. When I alluded to ‘swapped' earlier this year I had no idea that Davouts Camp de Bruges had been broken down like this.

There are people who will insist loudly that the Army of the Ocean Coasts was simply renamed the Grende Armée, but there were a lot of tweaks to the organization, stripping some regiments for the 1st Reserve Corps, adding some other regiments from here and there, absorbing another army (Hanovre) as an extra corps, adding the cavalry reserve … the core of it was essentially the same but with a lot of adjustments.

-No, I don't see as 3 in doubt- were they with the advance guard under Heudelet- probably not as it is in Davouts official reports to HM and EMG, that he took the V/3eme Bn with him, but only TWO under Heudelet (their exact battalions not being cited- but 64 men remains a paltry total for TWO).

Good that that's nailed down then.

-I concede the issue is less cloudy than earlier. Certainly makes the ‘Elites' of the Nafzigers et al of this world less thorough and robust than heretofore considered.

Many thanks for the additional information and together with this I've created a matrix of the Elite Battalions' composition. There are acknowledged far more ‘Chasseur' companies in the establishment of the Division than we've been lead to believe. Of the four de ligne regiments, I've not seen a single source suggesting ‘fusiliers' were present.

I think you've been reading the wrong sources then! Most English language sources do gloss over it, but why bash Nafziger? In his discussion of the several iterations of Oudinot's division [The French Army: Royal, Republican, Imperial, 1792-1815], he states: "The ‘elite' battalions were usually formed by stripping the elite and other companies from various battalions." Not very precise, but certainly not inaccurate.

That's enough for now, enjoy your research!

@Carnot93

Interesting to see how Berthier developed Bonaparte's brief into a decree:

493. — PLAN TO CREATE IN THE LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALIONS A SPECIAL COMPANY OF TIRAILLEURS.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER, MINISTER OF WAR.

Paris, 30 frimaire an XII (22 December 1803).

I ask you, Citizen Minister, to propose to me a draft decree written according to these bases:

There shall be in each battalion of the light infantry regiments a company called the horse company, or expedition company, or partisan company, or any other similar name.

This company will always be the third of the battalion, counting the grenadier company for the first. It will be composed of well-constituted, vigorous men, but of the smallest height. No sub-officer or soldier may be more than 4 feet 11 inches; officers may not be over 5 feet.

It will be armed with lighter muskets than those of the dragoons and will be exercised in shooting. Officers and non-commissioned officers will be armed with rifled muskets. The men of these companies will be trained to follow the cavalry at the trot, sometimes standing at the rider's boot and sometimes at the horse's tail, to climb agilely and jump upon the rump of the rider, so that they can be so quickly transported by the cavalry.

These companies will always be completed and maintained on a war footing. The number of men from elsewhere will enter the complete regiment.

Once these principles have been adopted, it will remain to train the companies. All non-commissioned officers and light infantry soldiers who would be less than 4 feet 11 inches would be admitted, and a call of 6,000 men will be made in the conscription of the years IX, X, XI and XII. These men would be taken from among those who had been exempted from conscription by default of height.

Make me a project on these bases.

BONAPARTE

Appreciate your time and qualified response AND data Monsieur Carnot!
Magnificent to actually read a clarification on matters that have eluded 'the truth' for many years.
I shall return…
many thanks,
davew

Interesting to see how Berthier developed Bonaparte's brief into a decree:

Not bad for an officer who has continually been derided as nothing more than a 'chief clerk.' 👍 😁

@Brechtel198
I am sure he had some help, but appropriate delegation is one of the marks of a good manager ;-)

OTOH___

Not the issue with the 15e Legere any further, but a quote from Duffy irked me somewhat.

108e de Ligne- 1er et 2eme bons
15e Legere- 2 companies – Voltigeurs.

Regarding the successful and surprise assault of Heudelets' 108e de ligne bayonet charge through Tellnitz; after the initial action against the 7e Jaeger, they reformed in the Northern quadrant of the villages roadways.

Having done so Duffy on p110 states:

He [Oberst Baron Mohr with the Hessen-Homberg Hussaren] launched an attack… the Austrian hussars laid about them with all the greater zeal because they mistook the 108th for Bavarians, whom they hated.

I wondered about this:-

Why did Austrians think the 108th were Bavarians? and

Why did they hate them?

Surely a friendly ally a few months earlier could hardly have caused an affront to have such a reaction.

One must understand there was smoke residue from the several hours intermittent combat and fog/ mist still blanketing the area, which is how a couple of squadrons could manoeuvre and perform a flank attack on a unit that was otherwise in line and facing the East.

So I can see that there could be grounds for mistaken identity, after all there was the 'friendly fire' incident only minutes later as well.

Do we have any corroboration of this encounter as its source is not noted, though it does follow the brief statement from the KreigsArchive documentation he used?

My mind goes to pale greatcoats perhaps being worn (which my unit are not!), whether grey or pale blue would be subjective when viewed in the circumstances given. I can't see any other reason that could lead to such an act.

Despite the effusive Austrian wording of the encounter, "cutting down MOST of the force, scattering the rest", no Eagle was taken, although the days tally of officers killed and wounded was 15 according to Martinien.

Certainly the IIICorps losses were extensive for the direct elements included in combat. The rest of the Division was yet to arrive and fight, over Sokolnitz.
Thanks
davew

@Dave,

I note that Duffy in talking about the Hussars attack has reference to endnote 15 as ibid which relates to "Kreigsarchiv (KA) Vienna: Feldacten for the Northern theatre in 1805 esp. Weyrother's operational Tagebuch FA Deutscheland 1805 XIII 59, and the detailed account of Austerlitz in FA Deutschland 1805 XI 661/4 Kurzgefasste Beschreibung der in dem feldzug 1805….. gemachte Bewegung nebst einer Ausfuhlichen Relation der am 2 ten Dezember 1805….vorgefallenen Schlacht (abbreviated for our purposes to Ausfuhlichen Relation)". Unfortunately not been able to track down online.

Ian Castle's "Austerlitz Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe" page 157 has an account of Heudelet's discomfort – which endnotes as sources "This narrative for the battle of Tenitz is based on the accounts of Stutterheim, the history of the KK Grenz Infanterie Regiment First Szeckler Nr 14 and Second Szeckler Nr 15 and the account of Corporal Blaise of the 108eme Ligne". He doesn't make any reference to being mistaken as Bavarians.

Robert Goetz pages 132/133 in "1805: Austerlitz Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition" covers the discomfort of the 108th but again nothing about being mistaken for Bavarians.

Lieut-Co1one1. General Eberhard Mayerhoffer "The Battle of Austerlitz December 2, 1805" pages 45 to 46 cover Telnitz, but again nothing about being mistaken for Bavarians.

Neither could I see any such reference in Stutterheim's account.. so clearly we do need sight of the documents Duffy referenced.

Ian

>>the Hussars attack has reference to endnote 15 as ibid

Ian- which I take is the comment before the Endnote. Not a sentence following, at least how I;ve understood them for my lifetime. Or are you suggesting it is an editing error?
I too considered that but discounted it.

Very thorough- if I had been I also could have cited them as well! I like brevity, sometimes too much ;-)
cheers d

>>the account of Corporal Blaise of the 108eme Ligne"

BTW Ian, do you have Blaise?
I've passed it over several times as some of the quotes seemed, less than credible to me, yet I never imagined I'd be modelling his unit for Austerlitz or later.
cheers d

I did read the account of Blaise and confirm that the states the the Austrian hussards mistook them as Bavarians, as to why he came to the conclusion, no idea, the 108e suffered quite badly from that charge, Blaise memoires sound quite credible for me.

Thanks vW, it may just have been the excerpts I saw (or translations I suspected) that caused me to avoid.
Well, off I go, another hunt… :-)
cheers

As quoted by David Chandler in 'The Campaigns of Napoleon', citing our friend Blaise:

'Before ordering the attack, Marshal Davout – who did not leave though the bullets were beginning to bother us – recalled to our minds the action at Marianzelle. Then General Heudelet put himself at our head and we marched boldly forward in battle order until we were halted by a ditch which was too large for us to cross. General Heudelet thereupon ordered our colonel to move us over a bridge away to our left. This necessary movement was the cause of our undoing, for the soldiers were so eager to come to grips with the vaunted enemy infantry that they disordered their ranks in spite of les sages avis of our officers; and when we tried to reform our battle order under heavy fire, some Austrian hussars, mistaking us for Bavarians in the thick smoke and fog which was a feature of the day, wounded a great many of us and captured 160 men including 4 officers.'

Which just goes to show that nobody knew anything about the 'enemy' positions or placements.

That a regiment formed in 'battle order'- what line or columns of divisions??; then had to defile across a bridge AND then turn left down a 'street' (village) going North, to oust the Russian jaeger occupying (or as cited -pillaging) in the street and houses before crashing into the reforming Grenzer battalions stnading at the Northern end of the village.

Not sure I have any returns for IIICorps, but I will look up that 160 captured statement.

Just as a note- it's a shame that any activity the token two companies of 15eLegere Voltigeurs (64 men) perfomed isn't recorded anywhere.

Thanks Allan,
dave

Given the pandemonium of the eventual Allied retreat is it not possible that significant numbers of French prisoners escaped and rejoined their units?

From Mayerhofer (translated by Harry Bell, Master Electrician, Army Service Schools Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1913) – but no clue as to formations used:

"However, the attack of the allies now encountered fresh troops. With the advance guard of his column Marshal Davout had started toward 6:00 a.m. from Raigern via Rebeschowitz to Turas; in Rebeschowitz he received orders to march to Sokolnitz and started for that point via Ottmarau. This advance guard was under command of General Heudelet; it consisted of the 1st Dragoon Regiment, the 108th Line Regiment, the Voltigeur companies of the 15th light Regiment, and 2 four-pounder guns (approximately 900 rifles, 200 sabres, 2 guns). It was followed at 30 to 40 minutes distance by the main body. consisting of the 48th and 111th Regiments (Brigade Lochet), 15th light and 33d Regiment (Brigade Kinser). The rear of the column was brought up by the 4th Dragoon Division Bourcier.

During the march on Sokolnitz General Margeron reported to Marshal Davout that at that time quietness reigned at Sokolnitz, but that the 3rd Line Regiment in Telnitz was being seriously attacked. Whereupon Marshal Davout sent the 1st Dragoon Regiment on ahead toward that place and. ordered his advance guard to take the same direction. When its infantry reached Telnitz, it received a hot fire from there but immediately threw itself on the enemy and charged into the village. Here a bloody battle ensued, a hand-to-hand conflict, in which the Austrian troops and the leading battalions under Dokturow, Jagers and the Regiment Neu-Ingermannland were finally defeated. They fled from the village in complete disorder and carried that disorder into the battalions deployed in the fields east of the village. The hotly pursuing French were then charged by Austrian cavalry – a few squadrons of Hesse-Homburg Hussars ¬ and driven back; Russian Fusiliers and Jaegers, led by Buxhoden personally, completed this success and the village was soon cleared again of the French. General I1eudelet fell back with his troops along the road leading to Turas, overcame a very critical moment, in which a few companies of the 26th Line Regiment Legrand, mistook fleeing at that time from Sokolnitz, mistook the 108th Regiment for enemies and fired on it; he finally took station, by orders of Davout, on the heights west of Sokolnitz. Dokturow did not follow up a charge by Austrian cavalry drove back the Dragoon Division Bourcier. Telnitz was again strongly occupied and one battalion with two guns took over the protection of the left flank on the hill southwest of Telnitz.

In the meantime, the troops under Generals Przibyszewski and Langeron had broken the stubborn resistance of the 26th Regiment and of the Tirailleurs du Po at Sokolnitz and Chateau Sokolnitz, had taken these places and captured two guns in spite of Margeron's interference and placed artillery themselves in position on the heights west of the lowland. But thereafter the attack came to a standstill; the troops which had become disordered in the village fight commenced re-establishing order and there was no one of the generals who had led the troops forward who now understood to complete the victory so far attained. The noise of battle coming from the Pratze hill probably was not heard by the fighting troops; but General Langeron already knew that serious events were happening at that point – in his right rear. This may account for the fact that. the Russian attack halted after the line of the creek had been taken.

General Langeron galloped back toward the Pratze heights to find out what was happening there. What he saw filled him with fear and fright.

Toward 10:00 a.m. the main body of the Column Davout debouched, thus presenting a new enemy to the troops under Langeron and Przibyszewnki. The Marshal had convinced himself in the meantime that Telnitz was finally lost but he still hoped that the 3rd and 108th Regiments and the remainder of the Tirailleurs, supported by the Dragoons, would succeed in maintaining themselves on the hills northwest of Telnitz. It appeared that the enemy had no intention of carrying the attack to beyond the village for the moment. On the other hand, driving the 26th Regiment ahead of him, he pressed forward to beyond Sokolnitz and brought guns into position west of that Village. The Marshal saw the masses of the infantry of Przibyszowski and Langeron on the other side of Sokolnitz.

These facts induced Davout to prevent the danger of being completely cut off from the main body of the army by sending the Brigades Lochet and Kister toward Sokolnitz and no more troops toward Telnitz.

Arrivine at Sokolnitz , General Lochet hesitated not a moment , did not wait until his troops had fully deployed , but threw himself with the 48th Regiment immediately and decisively on the enemy. The regiment captured the Russian battery west of the village and, with the general at the head, forced its way into the village, capturing two colours there.

General Friant supported this success of the 48th Regiment with the 111th Regiment. Two Russian guns wore brought back, but the elan of the Brigade Lochet was gradually broken by the stubborn resistance of the enemy. The regiments became shaken and had to finally fall back.

The Marshal, being personally present, now inserted the Brigade Kister in the fight. He directed the 15th light Regiment toward the north end of Sokolnitz, the 33rd Line Regiment toward the Chateau; but these troops also had to finally give way. The Russians did not lose a yard of ground; but they' did not gain a yard either and by noon their entire success consisted in holding the villages in the valley of the Gold creek. Marshal Davout, who had held with his 16 battalions (in round numbers 7,000 men), 16 guns, and 6 to 8 very weak cavalry regiments (3,000 troopers) (* It cannot be ascertained how many of his regiments General Bourcier had actually present. The 25th was detached, but nothing is known of the 18th and 19th Regiments.) from 30,000 to 35,000 men for many hours, had been enabled to group his troops west of the creek line for a renewed combined attack, the commencement of which was not long delayed."

"Why did they [the Austrian husars] hate them [the Bavarians] ?"

Really a mystery.
I think I found only three possible points of friction, none really very explanatory ….

1. 1n 1805, the hussars inhaber's lands in Hesse-Homburg had beed subject to intermittant claims from Bavaria. But why would the hussars know or care ? Austrian Inhabers didn't even go on campaign with their regiments (like British honoray colonels and unlike Russian "shefs").

2. The hussars had been billeted in 1798 at Wasserburg in Bavaria. I can't find any mention of friction with the locals, but who knows ?

3. At the battle of Hohenlinden in December 1800 and during the subsequent retreat, the hussars were organized with the Bavarians in Kollowrat's column for the battle and then Lichtenstein's reserve during the retreat. The Bavarians pretty much melted away at the end of Hohenlinden, losing 80% of their men and all 18 pieces of their foot artillery. Later, during the retreat, Oberstleutnant Baron von Mohr (the regiment's commander in 1805) was surrounded with a division (2 squadrons) of the husars and had to cut his way out. Maybe there was blame somehow cast upon the Bavarians ?

[1805] More on Rsv Gren Dvn- Planning/ Deployment Enigma

==Reply @Carnot93 19 Sep 2021 7:25 p.m.

Not so much as a rebuttal at all but merely clarifying what I may not have put down in electron flow…

>>First, I need to note the regimental history I referenced in the prior post.

Yes I've had that since PoE supplied the link. Only recent and I have to admit to have only scanned rather than read/ translated what I should have.

>>So it seems to me that battalions d'elite is accurate enough.

No problem with ‘Battalions' just the inference from both Nafziger and others that they were comprised elite companies, isn't quite.
As this becomes an even biger ‘issue' by the 1809 campaign, well, clarification is everything. I'm modelling ‘the Division' (having given up on ‘La Garde' years ago (then recanted!)) so I suppose another 5 guys on the planet will do the same.

>>1804 is when the light regiments were ordered to form voltigeurs.
Yes, but again they existed beforehand, so the ‘decree' only reinforces what was practice, as you yourself point out. That magical date of conception, well isn't. Lucky there was not much warfare happening between 1801 and 1804 so that the ‘administration' had time to deal with ‘internal matters'.

>>I do not believe ‘replacement' is correct. >> Do you have specific proof of this because I've not seen it coroborated beyond reasonable doubt.

Well done Sir, I've never seen that information actually clearly presented before! I also like the giveaway quote in 1805

like the voltigeurs of the light infantry.

. It does summarise the issue of current usage and formulating future plans.

>>The orders describing how the voltigeurs would be formed is below. You may already have this.
Not in its entirety so I thank you for this also.

>>…a bit different from service as actual marins – they were temporary muscle aboard the vessels …

Muscle yes but practised rowing, sailing and naval gunnery as they pitched against British sloops.

>>moving on to the specifics with the 15e and 12e légère and a few other points: …ask yourself how three carabinier companies would form a 6-company battalion.
I never had to as I never thought such a thing. It is all about identifying WHERE they came from or who they were is another way.

>>I think Berjaud is engaging in some conjecture here.
OK my misleading then, the article is by the late Didier Davin, published on the ‘berjaud' web site. I have collated a few separate paragraphs into what I thought may have been a tangible reason for the change in original planning.

I suppose a worthy exercise would be to examine ALL the camps and review what regiments were retained.

>>Um … no, you are entirely mistaken in that. The regiments of the Army of the Ocean Coasts (AOC) that were "left behind" by the Grande Armée were placed under the command of Carra St-Cyr on 27 August 1805…

Ok more than happy to read that. There are so many complexities of the structure of the Grande Armée and its' ‘support' that have been left untouched by ‘general historians' that again I merely used what I thought I did know. Happy to be corrected.

>>There are people who will insist loudly that the Army of the Ocean Coasts was simply renamed the Grende Armée, but there were a lot of tweaks to the organization, stripping some regiments … extra corps, adding the cavalry reserve … the core of it was essentially the same but with a lot of adjustments.

And I'm more than happy to say that I've been arguing against that ‘closed eyes' view for many years. Just as the ‘organisations/ OB' get trotted out time and again as if they were stiff necked manequins unable to be seen in any other form.

>>but why bash Nafziger?
I'm not bashing George overall- if he's made ‘adjustments' to his histories all the better; unfortunately I've not been able to purchase much or any of his new works. However even given he wrote it in good faith decades ago, the matter of incorrect information remaining and being regurgitated from static sites like N-S isn't helpful. Other pages contain misleading ‘summaries' of issues as well.

Even here it is help up as an ‘authorative and acedemic' site beyond reproach. yet it holds history's that are just in places, deceptive I believe (not yours!).

GN's just a document that I also happen to have followed myself via the SHAT and didn't find any other single source.

I chose not to be distracted by other campaigns, as I pursued the IV Corps through to 1807. [I'll declare that I did research the 1813 campaigns as well however and 1814 as I was going to drive the Marne/ Champagne region of events].

Thank you again for your contribution of facts and help providing a much needed review of a small slice of history. I do appreciate it very much,
cheers
davew

@Michman

Thank you for the extra information. Frankly I wasn't going to go any deeper but you seem to have done well finding this quickly.

What remains is the other half "Why did they think they were Bavarians".
Given that there is no specific information on the 180e uniforms (one can speculate as I have that greatcotes may have been an issue) I see nothing that could lead to such a thing, except the very close misty environment itself.

@Allan
Quite so and if I had the data I would run there quickly. Sadly I wasn't 100% into the contribution of Davouts Corps to the effort and so I have no primary documents for him.

However I'll look for any comments about them in the IVCorps information that I do have.

Given the Russian 'reserve' division (Buxhowden) here was a dozen battalions I'd assume the prisoners were scooted away fairly promptly and until the end of the day they'd not have much opportunity to get loose until the Russians themselves had to shuffle East and North to avoid the entrapment that the 2nd and 3rd Columns both suffered.

@PoE
From Mayerhofer (translated by Harry Bell-- thanks, interesting but we can shoot holes in this 'summary' fairly quickly while not destroying its overall 'worthiness'.

I can't decipher German to save myself and have never heard of this author before. Is he contemporary, not the translation?
However I feel there could be translation difficulties as well, because a number of the statements that "he did this…" are frankly so wrong we know from modern research that someone was 'patching' the facts with supposition.

Again I'll have to come back…
cheers all

@Dave,

No not a contemporary but member of the General staff some years after the Napoleonic Wars.

Wiki- entry: link

he son of Lieutenant Field Marshal Stephan Maria Mayerhoffer von Vedropolje (1839–1918 in Vienna ) and Maria Köhler (1849–1930), left the Theresian Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt in 1890 as a lieutenant in Infantry Regiment No. 100 and pursued the general staff career.

He attended the war school from 1893 to 1895, and from 1895 to 1897 served as the general staff captain of the 19th Infantry Brigade, then in Infantry Regiment No. 1 . From 1899 he worked in the General Staff Corps in the General Staff Department of the 15th Corps and as a teacher at the Corps Officer School . On April 29, 1902, Mayerhoffer was assigned to the War History Department of the War Archives, on April 1, 1906 he was promoted to major in the General Staff, with the date of May 1, 1908 teacher of war history at the War School , then Lieutenant Colonel in the General Staff on May 1, 1910 assigned to Infantry Regiment No. 54 on November 1, 1911. Finally, on May 1, 1913, he was appointed Colonel and subsequently on June 20, 1913, command of the Bukovinian Infantry Regiment "Archduke Eugen" No. 41.

On September 11, 1914, Eberhard was seriously wounded by a shot in the spine in the second battle of Lemberg in Bołszowce, after considerable military successes, which he had always directed from the top, and transferred to the Fürth sanatorium in Vienna, where he was succumbed to his injury a few weeks later.

For his brave behavior, he was of Emperor Charles I with the imperial Austro-Order of Leopold with war decoration Knight's Cross of excellent. The medal was presented to the terminally ill at the sickbed by Archduke Eugen von Österreich-Teschen personally.

After the consecration, Archduke Eugen accompanied the funeral procession to Koltngasse, where the half companies of infantry regiments No. 49 and No. 4 were in line and gave the salute. The dead man was then taken to Vienna's Nordbahnhof for transfer. The officer was buried in the family crypt of the Barons von Rolsberg at Leitersdorf Castle near Troppau.

Eberhard was one of the most valuable employees of Emil Woinovich and Maximilian Ritter von Hoen in the processing of the Napoleonic campaigns in the war archive. Especially with regard to this age, he also came out with books and numerous special studies.

Works
The battle near Nouart and the events in the Maas army on August 29, 1870, Verlag LW Seidel, Vienna 1896, 64 pages
Applicatory study of the battles near la Fourche on January 5th and 6th, 1871: For this purpose an overview map and detailed sketch, 1 oleate, 4 other supplements, Verlag Seidel, Vienna 1897, 99 pages
The infantry fight of the 9th Corps from Amanvillers-La-folie (August 18, 1870), Verlag LW Seidel, Vienna 1899, 79 pages
A detachment war game: layout, management, implementation Verlag Seidel, Vienna 1900, 41 pages
Austria's war with Napoleon I. 1809: With 20 sketches and 14 text supplements, LW Seidel & Sohn, Vienna 1904, 228 pages
The battle near Jajce on Aug. 7, 1878: based on field files and other authentic sources, edited in the War History Department of the K. and K. War Archives, LW Seidel & Sohn, Vienna 1904, 82 pages
The organizational measures of Napoleon after the campaign of 1812, organ of the military science associations, vol.
1805: The war of the 3rd coalition against France (in southern Germany, Austria and northern Italy) Verlag LW Seidel, Vienna 1905
Wars under the government of Emperor Franz: War 1809. Regensburg; with a political prehistory of the war, Volume 1 (together with Oskar Criste), Verlag LW Seidel, Vienna 1907, 710 pages
Volume 2 (Italy) from War 1809: Edited from the field files and other authentic sources in the War History Department of the K. and K. War Archives, (together with Maximilian Ritter von Hoen, Oskar Criste, Alois Veltzé, Hugo Kerchnawe), Verlag LW Seidel, Vienna 1908
1806: The campaign of Jena and Auerstedt, Verlag LW Seidel and Son, Vienna 1909, 131 pages
Neumarkt-Ebelsberg-Wien: History of the struggles of Austria (together with Maximilian Ritter von Hoen and Hugo Kerchnawe), Kriegsarchiv Wien, Verlag Seidel, Vienna 1909, 751 pages
History of the struggles of Austria: Wars under the government of Emperor Franz
Wars under the government of Emperor Franz: War 1809. Neumarkt, Ebelsberg, Vienna Volume 3 (together with Maximilian Ritter von Hoen and Hugo Kerchnawe), Verlag LW Seidel, Vienna 1909, 751 pages
The Battle of Austerlitz on December 2, 1805: Makeshift for inspection of the battlefield, Verlag LW Seidel & Sohn, Vienna 1912, 58 pages
Learning aid for war history for the KUK cadet schools, Verlag LW Seidel, Vienna 1913, 164 pages

@Dave
Goetz gives total French prisoners as 567, so 120 from a single regiment looks very high. Alombert & Colin give losses by Division, but I don't have access to that source at the moment (and I don't know if they distinguish prisoners). I realise this is a bit of a diversion from your main research.

@PoE
That is a seriously interesting reading list. Thanks for posting.

@PoE
Thanks Ian but that bio doesn't help improve anything for me.
It does pinpoint that military 'academia' [thinking] before WWI was uniform in its bizarre coverage and self glorification of history.

The disertation itself is so full of errors and assumptions I've stopped recounting them now. It holds no merit in my mind that clarifies anything, if it did I would question that even more!

I can wait to find out if Duffy's source gave a more relevant and precise meaning to the matter. Overall it is unimportant anyway- they were enemy clashing and thats that.

The microcosm of warfare that the [isolated] Tellnitz area combats show is however fascinating. The 'fog of war' literally at its peak here between 0600 (dark) and 0930 when it was barely lifting, with both sides acting like they know enough, but just not enough to secure themselves.

The inertia of the allies 'order' greatly aided the French victory, when otherwise masses of troops just like later battles, would have overwhelmed such a small force.

Indeed Napoleons star shone bright that day, and luck was very much on the West of the Goldbach!
cheers

@PoE
Ian
>>and the account of Corporal Blaise of the 108eme Ligne"<<

While I recognose the name I have been unable to find a copy or reference, even French.
Paul Meekins link can only offer another named person.
Can you provide anything more specific on the memoire reference?

I only have the Praeger version of Ian Castles' Austerlitz in which his reference is to the hussars having 'suffered all morning under the French skirmish fire and so attacked with elan in revenge'.

Thanks
dave

Dave
The source is 'E. Fairon and H. Heusse, Lettres des Grognards (Paris, 1936)'. I cannot find a copy online.
AbeBooks have copies for sale:
link
Kind regards
Allan

Wow!
That's a very special book and the kind I wold probably have bought when I was in France, however it would now be out of the question.
But thanks for finding another rarity Allan.
~d

Dave,

Just found this officer Etienne Declareuil who was part of the 15e Legere in 1805 serving with the Grenadiers de la Reserve. He was part of the 2e Co de Carabiniers of the 8th Bataillon of the Grenadiers de la Reserve. I doubt this does anything, but just wanted to post it for you.

link

An analysis by Bernard Quintin reports that the 108e de ligne recorded 7 officers and 47 other ranks killed or mortally wounded at Austerlitz. The report does not mention numbers missing. Link:
link

Thanks Gents, both very interesting items.
Any individuals are of interest- sad that theres only a single document and not any broader information.

Those numbers are interesting; I'll compare with the IVCorps data I have just as a broad assessment. Certainly I'd have expected more from a close cavalry assault but perhaps again we see a gross exaggeration in 'effect'.

Apologies for delay acknowledging your works!
regards dave

"individuals are of interest"

I do not have his text of his "leeters", but perhaps it would be interesting that Jean-Pierre Blaise was born on 18 January 1783 in the luxembourgeois Ardennes village of Cherain, annexed by France in 1795. His parents were Richard Blaise (~1755-1785) and Marie-Josephe née Legré (1758-1785+).

He was a conscript of the An XII, and reported to the depot battalion of the 108e on 19 June 1805, passing to the 1st company of fusiliers of the 1st battalion on 16 September, likely finding them on the march near Mannheim. He was wounded by a ball in the right leg at Austerlitz.
He was promoted to corporal in January 1807, and then taken prisoner at Eylau. Repatriated after Friedland, he was honorably discharged in September 1808.

He settled at the village of Xhoris, 20 km south of Liège, and became the secretary of the village administration. He married Marie-Josephe Seret (1799-1874), with whom he had a daughter and a son before passing at Xhoris on 11 February 1831, age 49 years.

link
xhoris.be/html/dat20.htm#6

@Michman
Ahh recruit #2557!

My that is interesting. First company so I'd assume he was above average height as well.

An educated young man it seems and a remarkably short (and successful) military career for the turbulent times the regiment saw.

That leg wound must have been quite some damage to get a discharge so readily, yet not have medical complications that threatened his life.

How the heck do you pronounce "Xhoris"?
thanks davew