From another thread, supposition and heresay, not factual in any way- numbering is mine for reference below:
( 1805 was mainly true as elite being the elite co of the [i ]3rd and 4th [ii ]depot battalions) up to 1809 [iii].
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1. While called ultimately 'the Reserve Grenadier Division', it was composed of Grenadiers and either formatve or actual Voltigeurs companies for line; or Carabinier and chasseur (formative) or Voltigeur companies from Legere. Most of these would be classed as elite.
I use 'formative' because- under the decrees set out by N. some of the chosen regiments had integral Voltigeurs already selected, others did not.
Many writers cite the late date of Spet.1805 as the official 'start-date' for Line Infantry formed Voltigeurs- in fact like uniforms, this has been misinterpreted and/or mis-translated, then repeated ad-infinitum as fact by English texts.
Napoleon raised in mid COnsulate the idea of the 'vaulters, tirailleurs/ eclaireurs previously in use under the Directory and some still existed, before as a means of enhancing reconnaisance and intelligence, as well as combatting enemy probes, using light cavalry as temporary 'hosts'. Mixed light legions had been used earlier as we know.
The biggest fallacy perpetrated in English texts is that either the second or third fusliers entire company(s) were to be "converted" to this new form, called Voltigeurs (decided upon via Min. of War etc./ Berthier).
What he actually preached was that the able, nimblest, but bravest or most resolute, who had performed feats of valour and deserved recognition (having received arms of honour etc.) but too short to be Grenadiers, would be enabled and welcome in such a company.
This meant that regimental manpower was 'adjusted' to suit the needs and criteria- thus men from all companies had to be considered- the good conduct clause ensuring that officers couldn't quit themselves of worriesome individuals or face penalty themselves.
Given this- it is inconceivable (and has been worrisome to me for decades) that an entire 'company' suddenly becme the voltigeurs 'elites' (and with the extra pay awarded the grenadiers).
The errors arise where his (N.) response to a query from the Min. of War as to 'ranking' of this 'now officially sanctioned' company. All the tactical matters had been covered- the opposite end of battle line to the grenadiers; opposite end of a column, except the column of attack formed inverse, when both companys would be side by side in the front, or rear.
The problem given was where was it in the regimental/ battalion structure rankings? Napoleons response was- the third- First the Grenadiers, then the First Fusilier company, then the (third) Voltigeur company,followed by respective balance of the fusiliers in order.
2. The 'corps' was designated from 1802, near the end of the Consulate and with a peace-time treaty of sorts, training opportunity despite the 'inconvenience' of the English.
In 1803 approaching a new regime, the title of 'Regiment' became re-established and along with it a lot of tweaking of the army organisations as had been for a decade. This change from Demi-Brigades of the revolution included much soul seraching and strengthening of units AND formations, as well as tightening of leadership values, morals and expertise.(*5).
A demi-brigade by nature, was 3 battalions, half a brigade. Thus 1803 found 90% or near that of 'regiments' with three battalions. A very few had 4, another very few had only two. These were active service, battle battalions. Except in very few exceptional cases (perhaps like distant Corsica), there was a depot elsewhere to the cited post of 'the regiment'.
Napoleon, like Baldrick, was full of cunning plans. One was, he didn't assign regiments to their home depots'- to do so only incited desertion.
No, they were despatched far from their homes for 'service'. Thus we find that the Tirailleur du Po from the the old Cisalpine Republic formations and the newly created Tirailleur Corse both ended up in North west France; while 'French' regiments went South to Italy, Naples and the various 'island' and overseas garrisons as well as Netherlands and ceded Hanover etc…
Napoleon ensured that the Armee des Cotes de l'Ocean had mostly full, three battle battalion regiments on hand. Barring one exception- none of these regiments lost their 'elites'. [See addendum below (*4)].
The Reseerve Grenadiers Division in 1805 was drawn from other regions garrisons- there were 25 military districts to choose from- and each regiment of them yielded their first, second and third battalion elites, such as existed. Each of these regiments 6 companies, formed one elite battaalion. No extras were dictated, so fourth battalions men, if such existed beyond 'depot/ home recruiting' troops, were not used until the much later campaigns when extensive manpower changes occurred (by 1809 some regiments had 5 full service battalions etc.) presaging the 'massive effort' for 1812.
3. As stated in previous explanation, each campaign, each year, or 'war' if you like, was a discreet entity that had its' own particular nuances. The premise cited by some that a continuous 'entity' existed is a complete fallacy. Even when in some parts this has been acknowledged it is often incorrectly dated or glossed over
While the Armée des Cotes de l'Ocean became on August 1st 1805 the first 'Grande Armée' care of Napoleon, Junot, Corps Genereaux-en-Chef and ultimately General de Division Oudinot leading the Reserve Grenadiers, immense training and work had gone into the administration and work ethic of the body. Thye had trained not only for land warfare, but naval as well, on the pretext of the invasion of England, loading and unloading, manning cannon and rowing exercises etc.
If the 'army' had been just veterans it would only been have been a part of one thing. The fact that it had, much like both Armies of Italy and Egypt (Orient), been 'customised' and fine tuned with bags of additional knowledge and experiences.
The express leadership, enduring welfare, uniform, equipment, special housing of the 'camps' etc. if not actual good tucker and pay on time on campaign, was a significant step beyond what many nations provided their soldier class.
Arms of hounour had been supplemented by the Legions cross and emolument in 1804 and the time had come to step up for another and be recognised.
THe 'brotherhood' of the Army and the 'elites' of the line, given privileges similar to the Emperors Guard determined many to be recognised, regardless of the reasons for doing so.
Thus these men were far distant from those of 'the class of 1809' who formed a far different and less homogenous body, despite the title similarity and leadership.
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*4 – "Barring one exception- none of these regiments lost their 'elites'." That one belonged to a regiment stationed in "Belgium" or Helder I think (to late to look up). This 'extended' frontier of France was under the military command of the very ablest Marshal- Davout and thus we find the active 'regiment' split among two corps.
His 15th Legere, in Friants Division, was the only regiment 'within' the Grande Armée whose manpower had been 'touched' for inclusion in the Reserve Grenadiers. This produces something of a quandry to analyse as toward the end of the campaign, this little unit was a vital cog in the very major action on the right flank of the Battle of Austerlitz.
I plan to expand on this with another post soon.
*5- AN anecdote on 'experience'- Whilst travelling to inspect a portion of the Army on the coast, on the road between Paris and Boulogne, he came across a Major who had recently changed regiments. Napoleon, as he did, cross examined the man closely about his unit, the officers, who the NCOs were he trusted; their arms, rations, illnesses etc. The major was unable to provide very many satisfactory answers whereas he should have known his men and their needs intimately.
Napoleon was dissatisfied with this, and upon dismissing the officer on his way, had his military clerk note to Berthier, that Major such and such was to be transferred to the Reserve Grenadiers under Junot and his Generals so that he could learn his proper role in the Army.
At a later Imperial review the Major gave a much better indication and impression as second ranking officer in command of a regiment.
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regards davew
