"Main Battle Line" Topic

By the Brechtel. I do not think that Nosworthy needs a source for the impulse system. He never claims it as something other have said or written. He uses it as a way of describing th etactical evoulution – it is an academic syntheis of a concept. I think it has some merit as a concept describing individual action of parts of an army as opposed to only general attacks by the whole army.

Friederich could march and deploy extremely fast allowing him to outmaneuvre his opponent, but his system never really changed during the SYW (he invented the frontal deployment but it was not really used)

I was under the impression he used it a Rossbach and possibly Leuthen. At Rossbach especially, it is hard to see how he could have gone to the straight-on approach to a conventional procession deployment, particularly with the narrow front of his attack.

I do not think that Nosworthy needs a source for the impulse system. He never claims it as something other have said or written. He uses it as a way of describing th etactical evoulution – it is an academic syntheis of a concept. I think it has some merit as a concept describing individual action of parts of an army as opposed to only general attacks by the whole army.

I believe it to be made up and does not accurately describe the French tactical system.

That isn't history, it's fantasy.

To the best of my knowledge Frederick feints to the right in a long double column at Leuthen, then deploys in line to the left to deploy for the attack in the conventional way.

At Rossbach the prussians march to their rear to catch the french that are outflanking i column. First the Cavalry deploy conventionally and attack and then the infantry under Henry does the same.

"That isn't history, it's fantasy."

Some call it reflection and synthesis of facts, an academic process which often leads to paradigm shifts. If an academic cannot do that he or she is mainly a regurgitator. I see that a lot in my professional academic field (which I must confess is not history)

@Brechtel198 As the book of Nosworthy forms the basis of my understanding of tactical napoleonic warfare (besides contemporary german sources) I am staggered about your dissapproval of this work. Can you name a better (english or german) book to describe napoleonic warfare, so I can check where Nosworthy is in error other than putting wrong weapons into the hand of units in the wrong year and the wrong theatre?
@sparta: thanx for your description of tactical warfare 1813-1815. I will reread Quimby asap.(and come back with even more questions :) )

cheers

The Background of Napoleonic Warfare by Robert Quimby, Chapters II and XXVI in Swords Around a Throne by John Elting, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Napoleonic Wars by Rory Muir, The British Light Infantry Arm by David Gates, Imperial Bayonets by George Nafziger are all superior to Nosworthy's book and much more accurate and informative.

Christsopher Duffy's Military Experience in the Age of Reason and Paddy Griffith's The Art of War of Revolutionary France are also helpful.

There are also too many errors in fact in Nosworthy's book that make it difficult to use as a credible reference.

Thank you for the information, it will take some time before I get a copy of The British Light Infantry Arm by David Gates from England. Except for Paddy Griffiths book I have already read all of them (I got rid of Muirs book cause I found it too much focused on the Iberian War IIRC). Is there anything in Griffiths book that "Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-94" from Lynn does not provide?
cheers

The term 'impulse' in Nosworthy just means what was originally called the 'Perpendicular' or 'French' system, and latterly 'Napoleonic'. He preferred to use a different term to include the elements in those tactics which didn't originate in France.

It is an absurd thing to get het up about.

Nosworthy's book is very good.

Nosworthy's book is very good.

As compared to what? There are too many errors and making up a tactical system is nothing short of ridiculous.

The term 'impulse' when used in a tactical sense is meaningless which means 'nonsense.'

Wel put Whirlwind – I missed the term Orde perpendiculaire in my summary. As I see it, it trancends ordre mince and profond – which are descriptions of unit formations – and describes the concept breaking up the linear approach into one or more perpendicluar approaches – a bit like Nelsons attack concept in naval warfare.

A good book to read is

Renard : Betrachtungen über die Taktik der Infanterie, Brüssel und Leipzig 1858

link

and in French

Considerations sur la Tactique …

link

A pity to fall back on Quimby or worse Elting, when such authors as Colin, Bressonnet, Foucart, Jany, Erzherzog Karl, Renard, Bérau, Grouard are ignored.

also Grivet

TMP link

when such authors as Colin, Bressonnet, Foucart, Jany, Erzherzog Karl, Renard, Bérau, Grouard are ignored.

Who said they were ignored?

Perhaps for the benefit of the forum, you could also list the titles with each author?

I have Colin, Bressonet, Foucart, and Jany, for example, but perhaps others are not familiar with them?

Thank you for that (TMP) link, I am totally baffled by the amount of usefull stuff.

I am waiting for this to come out:

Instrument of War: The Austrian Army in the Seven Years War Volume 1; DUFFY, Christopher

link

Because I want to learn more about the 'Columnar order of battle' as an early attempt to break up the long army lines. [no doubt this translates into the later French 'perpendicular order' (of battle)]

@dogtail

For me the similarities are a function of sharing the same technologies, hence the term Horse and Musket. Undoubtedly the wider use of the rifle in some armies contributed to their ability to more effectively deploy skirmishers. It's worth noting however that it's lack does not appear to have appreciably held back the French.

The three other enabling factors required are the training, the morale component (confidence?) and the command ability to exploit 'it'. Where 'it' is the flexible deployment and redeployment in depth you describe, whatever title you wish to bestow. The good old military instruction steps of Explain, Demonstrate, Imitate and Practice requires repetition to achieve mastery. When mastered on the exercise ground it requires confidence to do it in the face of the enemy. If junior commanders are not empowered to employ, opportunities will be missed.

As beguiling as the cross comparison of drill manuals, marching pace and cadence are, they are of secondary importance at best. The drill itself is less significant than the troops having been drilled, and the officers proficient in it's employment. At first glance this seems at odds with conscript rather than professional armies. However, by 1813 most European armies had received considerable 'on the job' training.

It could be argued that the British system, lacking centralised officer instruction, benefited from the craft style of learning. Empirical feedback empowered by regimental custom and practice produced some highly capable units and formations.

This aside, on a table top can we defeat a Napoleonic army deployed in a Fredrician linear fashion with another doing the same? Of course! Does having generic rulesets covering the whole period that fails to reward period correct deployment not help either? I think it's resonable to assume so. Then again, do we want a game or a simulator?

The military goes to a great deal of trouble to select and train it's staff college graduates to a standard where they can fully study and appreciate the conduct of war. All we require is the ability to roll a die and perhaps wield a paintbrush. The professional soldier approaches it differently, as must the historian. Of course, you can be all three!

@dogtail

A point on firepower, I think we can overemphasise musketry. Most period tests showed up the woeful innaccuracy, and the casualty returns for most battle bear this out.

Artillery however, particularly cannister, when concentrated or employed at close quarters seemed much more deadly. Many memoires that refer to casualties caused by a ball might not therefore be evidence of musketry.

Hence the all arms tactics of using cavalry to frighten the enemy's infantry into compact formations and then employ artillery to decimate

I wouldn't downplay musketry – though woefully inaccurate – as well as artillery (which had to be protected by infantry of cavalry) – it caused casualties, Frederick the Great had to experience this badly at the battle of Prague.

I agree with Handlebarbleep that one has to see those tacitcal developments in evolution from the 7YW to 1815 – Grivet is a good start on this – also the mentioned book by Renard and for the French Colin.

I have the 1st edition of Duff's mentioned work about the Austrian Army, but find it in contrast to many other quite disappointing in regard of battle field tactics

Perhaps for the benefit of the forum, you could also list the titles with each author?

I have Colin, Bressonet, Foucart, and Jany, for example, but perhaps others are not familiar with them?

why not recommending them – and instead using – in my view – second class works as Quimby and Elting?

Instead of accusing me incorrectly you should read my posts

TMP link

You denigrate excellent works because of what?

If you have problems with what those authors have written, then bring up those points for discussion.

I wouldn't get too excited about Gates' 'Light Infantry Arm'

He is selective with his sources, some of which are of dubious merit, in support of an insubstantial premise.

That being the case, the book has some exceptional material, mostly primary source stuff, that can be helpful.

It is much better than the Nosworthy book.

Which sources of Gates' do you believe 'are of dubious merit'?

@Handlebarbleep
Thank you very much for sharing your thoughts: Dankeschön!
I used to wargame for several years, but I avoided the napoleonic period as I never found a ruleset of my liking. Except for one wargame: „Kriegsspiel" von Reisswitz. As neither me nor my gaming buddy are professional soldiers, and a third person was nowhere to be seen, I considered gaming Kriegsspiel impracticable. Still Napoleonic warfare is fascinating (I don´t have to explain this in this forum, right?) I do believe that wargaming could be used to support the understanding of history, especially as Kriegsspiel was meant to teach professional soldiers.
I have two 6mm Army Corps, one French, one Prussian. If 2"/5cm represent 100 Prussian steps/75m, my battlefield could be 2,7 km deep. As you said, marching pace and cadence are of secondary importance, the difference between my „opponents" regarding that are ignored.
The hardest thing to represent is the morale component, and it is absolutely crucial, if my understanding of tactical warfare is correct. I guess the moral effect of getting shot at while not being able to reply is what makes skirmishing and cannister fire so effective. Even the numbers of casualties does not give an automatic reaction, thank god dices exist.
As I am German, some sources are way easier to understand than L´Essai génèral de tactic, so I tend to read more and more stuff from the Prussian perspective. Clausewitz wrote:

We deploy relatively only a small portion of the whole, and let it wring itself out in a fire-combat which lasts for several hours, only interrupted now and again, and removed hither and thither by separate small shocks from charges with the bayonet and cavalry attacks.

As I think the soldiers oft he time knew their trade I believe that napoleonic wargames should be similar to that. So I am looking forward to find the Holy Grail, and in the meamtime, I am writing my own rules.

cheers

@dogtail,

Good luck. I think that most rules struggle with the issue that you describe, that long hours were spent in slow, attritional combat whether from skirmishers or artillery, between the launching of attacks.

Hi

I suggest you look at the following primary sources, these are also available on Google Books (and Gallica for the French) many have plates illustrating the formations

Macdonald, John (1803) Rules and regulations for the field exercise and manœuvres of the French infantry, issued August 1, 1791 (this is the French regulation in English – there are issues over the translation, but an easy guide)
link

There are a number of copies of "Réglement concernant l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie » ie the 1791 regulation, but not all have plates unfolded.
link
(Note see the last section on the "Ligne" also there is no concept in French Military thinking of a battalion in "line" such as in the British. In French regulations and drill the wargame "line" is "battle order".)

Ney, Michel 1833 Military Studies (some insights on how to manoeuvre a corps)
link

Also see – you will need to google the following
Austria (1807) Exercier Reglement … Infanterie
Austria (1815) … Plane … Infanterie (this has plates)

For some analysis see (if nothing just look through the plates and maps)
Gerome, HC (1895) Essai historique sur la_tactique
Grivet, M (1865) Etudes sur la Tactique

The British sources seem to stop at the battalion. The only brigade formation seems to eb Wellingtons instructions around 1808n that brigades are to form in two lines

If anyone is interested in more reading on ordre perpendiculaire – then the following article may be of interest

Le Spectateur Militaire : Recueil de science, d'art et d'histoire …, Volume 18, Pg 484
link

@ dogtail

In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, of course, there is! Warfare is an incredibly messy business, even to the trained professionals indulging in it. An illustration of this is the composition and deployment of D'Erlon's corps at Waterloo. Many more hours of discussion and pages of analysis have been generated than probably that devoted by the participants.

In reality, we are peering at battles through the wrong end of a telescope, trying to infer the general from snippets. Any sense we get of coherence is probably false, and is mostly a product of the cognitive bias we have to construct narratives. We should recognise that sometimes an army won despite it's tactical system rather than because of it.

thanks for the link about ordre perpendiculaire – a lot of drill regulations can be found at

TMP link

@dogtail
If you are looking at your own rules and are familiar with Kriegspiel, then you may find interest in the following group who are (rather were) working in a similar vein

link

Have you drafted your rules enough for review or play test

for Austria 1807 a nice synposis with plates

Auszug aus dem Exercier Reglement für die K.K. Infanterie vom Jahr 1807.

link

Okunev. Examen raisonné des propriétés des trois armes, l'infanterie, la cavalerie et l'artillerie, de leur emploi dans les batailles, et de leur rapport entre elles:

link

The British sources seem to stop at the battalion. The only brigade formation seems to eb Wellingtons instructions around 1808n that brigades are to form in two lines

Scott;

Actually, the 1798 Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field-Exercise and Movements of His Majesty's Forces has an entire section IV on the movement of battle lines of eight battalions or more. pp. 282-374.

link

Thanx to all of you, it is quite impressive how helpfull this forum can be in its good moments.

@Scott Sutherland
No, in the moment my rules are only a mixture of some weird ideas, some woodsticks, painted coins, to-hit numbers, the Reisswitz rules, and the utopian dream to do some kind of free Kriegsspiel where both components or better gaming partners are the referees. It will be more of a Matrix game I guess.

@handlebarbleep: Friction…and chance and courage

Again, thank you all for all the encouragement and usefull information Reading all that stuff will take quite a long time…

cheers

dogtail,

See:

clausewitz.com

Also:

link

Look for the Appendix at the end of Volume 3:

" APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF THE INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE AUTHOR TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE CROWN PRINCE IN THE YEARS 1810, 1811, AND 1812↩
SCHEME WHICH WAS LAID BEFORE GENERAL VON GAUDY↩"

Which contains:

THE MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OF WAR TO COMPLETE MY COURSE OF INSTRUCTION OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE CROWN PRINCE↩

Also of special interest at the end of the Appendix are propositions 1 – 604 which form the section entitled GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT↩

- Ned

I wouldn't get too excited about Gates' 'Light Infantry Arm'

He is selective with his sources, some of which are of dubious merit, in support of an insubstantial premise.

Just got hold of a copy of this and read it. It was quite interesting and I can see it being really useful if anyone wants to dig deep into the weeds of how the British light infantry were raised, trained and organized. I didn't think his overall conclusions were correct though (on his own evidence) and I think that trying to hammer it into the framework of WW1 assault tactics and even worse, recommendations for the BAOR in the 1980s, was a real stretch! Maybe time for a new edition…