"Were Tank Destroyers & Battlecruisers Disappointing?" Topic

Lee494 wrote -
"Both BC and TD doctrine made lots of sense if you assumed the enemy is going to perform exactly as predicted. They don't. So any weapon designed with a narrow focus of fighting ie we're only going to fight tanks, or cruisers or whatever … has a hard time in real war. BC looked like BB and commanders tried to use them as such. Ditto with TD that looked like tanks."

….. With respect to battle cruisers, I would respectfully disagree with the above assessment. The battle cruiser, as originally designed, was very well configured for the primary mission it was intended to fulfill: securing the imperial oceanic trade lanes from high speed commerce raiders. Operation as part of the main battle fleet was a secondary function that followed the example set by the successful Japanese use of their armored cruisers as a fast wing in support of the main battle-line in the RJW.

The broad indictment of the battle cruiser as a design (IMO) rests upon the loss of three battle cruisers of Beatty's BCF at Jutland. I submit that their loss was not a function of inadequate design concept, but rather a result of dangerously unstable propellant combined with unwisely aggressive ammunition handling measures. All three wre lost to propellant explosions. D K Brown once commented that, had the three lost British battle cruisers returned to port after Jutland as crippled wrecks (as did battle cruisers Seydlitz and Derfflinger), no criticism of the battle cruiser as a design concept would ever have emerged. An interesting comparison might be drawn in connection with the pursuit of Graf Spee by three British cruisers in this respect.

It is worth noting that, on the several occasions in WW1 upon which battle cruisers were actually engaged with battleships, all but one escaped.

FWIW.

B

While German industry has (IMO) a well earned reputation for delivering very high quality, but complicated and over-engineered products

Very much agree … And complicated over engineered is harder to mass produce and more difficult to repair and maintain.

The USSR in WWII demonstrate the opposite and that carried on all thru the Cold War. They mass produced AFVs like the T34 series and after the WWII the T54/55 series, etc. A lot of very effective systems mass produced. Even some say the T34 was the best overall MBT produced thru out WWII.

they were also capable of delivering masterfully simple and effective weapons of war (StuG series, Panzerfaust, MG42, MK108) when suitably incentivized.

Very much so, but even this, among other things, was not enough to give them "the edge" they need or hoped for as the war progressed.

This suggests a shortcoming in German industrial strategy

Yes, IMO that is very accurate …

@Blutarski,

You are obviously very knowledgeable, and I agree (up to a point) that battle cruisers were well designed for chasing down commerce raiders. However, I still think that was a flawed strategic concept in the context of the early 20th century. Only very limited numbers of such enormously expensive ships could be produced without seriously weakening the strength of the main battle fleet. Furthermore, in the absence of effective aerial reconnaissance, radar, and underway refueling, the odds of having a battle cruiser in the right place at the right time were not very good.

I think it is doubtful whether the Germans, or any other nation, would have built battle cruisers if the British had not introduced the type at Admiral Fisher's insistence. It certainly did not require a ship as powerful as a battle cruiser to deal with commerce-raiding light cruisers or converted merchantmen. In a sense, the battle cruiser was a dreadnought version on steroids of the well established armored cruiser type. In my view, it would have been far more rational to have put the available resources into building larger numbers of modern armored cruisers with turbine propulsion and more numerous main guns of existing types (9.2 or 10-inch for the British). Then, if an enemy armored cruiser is the raider, you counter it with an armored cruiser squadron, rather than a battle cruiser. With a greater number of units available, the odds of finding the target are better.

@ Daniel S

Yes, and re German ill-preparedness, it's often forgotten that the Luftwaffe had almost no aerial torpedo inventory or doctrine until 1941, not having expected to need either. So the idea one sometimes hears that they could have done to the RN in the Channel what the IJNAF did off Kuantan is fanciful.

@ Blutarski

All the pre-WW1 thinking and theorising about BCs seems to have focused on what they'd do versus other classes of ship. I've not come across an instance of anyone contemplating what would happen if one BC met another, have you? Given the eggshells + sledgehammers issue it was surely obvious that the biggest threat to a BC was another BC, a ship it couldn't outrun, didn't outgun and couldn't risk fighting.

@ attila

Your characterisation is right I think. The battlecruiser was exactly the application to cruiser design of Dreadnought principles of all big guns and turbine power – so much so that they were called things like "dreadnought cruisers" and "battleship-cruisers" until "battlecruiser" was settled on. I am not sure more armoured cruisers was the answer to raiders because most WW1 CAs could do maybe 23 knots to the CL's 26. A better answer would have been a "dreadnought light cruiser" or "BCL" with 8 or 9 6-inch guns and 28 knots on perhaps 8,000 or 9,000 tonnes' displacement. Such a ship would have been very bad news for Emden, could have slipped away from Scharnhorst and would never have contemplated engaging an enemy BB.

With the BCs, part of the hull size requirement comes from range.

If you want a ship that can travel around the world without refueling, you need a HUGE hull. If you want a ship that can travel from the UK to Capetown before refueling, you still need a pretty big ship.

Y'all would be amazed at how much space is in an Ohio-class sub for food stores alone.

Hi Attila –
I have no idea how knowledgeable (or not) I may be in the grand scheme, but I will share what I have learned regarding the battle cruiser and its genesis.

During the period 1890-1905, France's "Jeune Ecole" strategy of commerce interdiction had spawned an explosive race in armored cruiser construction between France and Great Britain. France constructed 23 such ships over the period in question; Great Britain felt compelled to lay down and ultimately place into commission no less than 34 armored cruisers in response. Over time, the expense of constructing, manning, operating and maintaining an armored cruiser grew to equal that of a line-of-battle ship. Starting in the late 1890's, Germany's naval expansion placed a further onus upon Great Britain. Taken altogether, it was an intolerable strain upon the naval budget. By 1904, Great Britain had hit a budgetary wall and could politically no longer sustain its massive naval budget. Fisher was at that point installed as First Sea Lord at the Admiralty with instructions to economize the naval budget.

Fisher seized the problem by the throat and implemented a series of reforms that, in many ways, shook the navy to its core. To address them all, even in cursory terms, would require a book. Suffice it to say that one of the reforms involved defence of the imperial sea lanes. At that time, defence of British overseas naval interests had been conferred upon a great number of small, slow, antiquated second-class cruisers deployed about the globe on the basis of strategic sensibilities dating from the mid-19th century; these were the ships deemed by Fisher to be "too weak to fight and too slow to run away". Fisher ruthlessly disposed of over 150 such ships, an act which was largely responsible for a reduction of nearly 10 percent in the naval budget despite a continuing naval construction program.

Fisher still had to provide for an effective defence of Great Britain's global trade network. By 1905, the threat was defined as not only deriving from conventional armored cruisers, but also from a new generation of turbine-powered trans-oceanic liners of great range and high-speed endurance that could be pressed into war service as armed merchant raiders; no existing armored cruisers (which at that time were all powered by triple-expansion engines) could match either their range or their high-speed cruising endurance. The armed merchant cruiser threat was actually an important feature driving the design of a warship suitable for protecting the oceanic sea-lanes.

Fisher's interest in high speed stemmed from his service as Admiral of the Mediterranean fleet, which was regarded as the most important element in the RN's strategic disposition prior to the rise of Germany as Great Britain's greatest perceived competitor at sea around 1905. He saw high speed to be desirable not only from a tactical perspective but equally importantly from an operational/strategic point of view. Superior mobility functioned as an important strategic force multiplier. Fisher did not scheme up the battle cruiser on his own as a pet project. He convened a design committee of Britain's leading naval architects and naval officers to design the optimal warship to solve the trade protection challenge; the battle cruiser was the result of their deliberations and drew upon important recent technological developments to meet the challenge –

1 – The question of strategic communication was solved by taking advantage of the vast global network of undersea telegraphic cable that had been laid down in the preceding decades and was largely controlled by Great Britain. The development of reliable long-distance wireless made communication between land and ships at sea possible.

2 – Turbine power coupled with Great Britain's global network of strategically located coaling stations meant that it was now possible for a ship to swiftly re-position anywhere within a radius of 4,000 miles in one week.

3 – It was originally intended to arm the projected ship with a 9.2-inch main battery and armor it to be p[roof against 9.2-inch AP at 10,000 yards. But a ship design able to meet the envisioned speed regime (a 4 knot superiority over 22 knot armored cruisers) and radius of action requirements was found to exceed 17,000+ tons – equivalent to Dreadnought herself. Given such a great tonnage, an armament increase to 12-inch caliber was deemed both feasible and justifiable on several grounds: 1- the ship was the size of Dreadnought and could support such a battery; 2- fewer larger guns would resolve turret location and blast interference issues; 3- a battleship caliber main battery would permit the ship to act as both a powerful scouting force and a fast wing in tactical support of the battle fleet.

The ship design that emerged from this process deported itself most admirably –

> It made possible the retirement/disposal of more than 150 obsolete vessels from the navy with a massive commensurate budget savings and replaced something like twenty-five obsolescent armored cruisers too slow and weak to operate with the fleet.

> It accomplished its primary mission of securing the imperial sea lanes by (once finally dispatched by Churchill) expeditiously disposing of von Spee's raiding squadron in short order at miniscule cost.

> It solved the battle-fleet's problem of lack of an advanced scouting force sufficiently fast and seaworthy to screen the fleet at sea, especially in heavy weather. Screening was a problem that the Grand Fleet never really fully resolved during the war; nor did the High Seas Fleet. Armored cruisers were seaworthy but far too slow; light cruisers were either too slow or lacked seaworthiness or both. IMO use of the battle cruisers as a powerful advance scouting force really forced Germany (the only nation that could afford to build them in numbers) into constructing a counter-force.

As mentioned earlier, criticism of the battle cruiser as a design is: far too narrowly focused upon the British losses at Jutland which can all be attributed to excessive propellant volatility and unwise ammunition handling methods; ignores the successful experience of the German battle cruisers in the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea; and ignores the compelling economic factors that were of great contemporary importance to Great Britain.

OK, rant off. That is my two cents worth.

B

Blutarski,

I have no argument about your facts with regard to British thinking. But I still do not agree that the British "solution" was a very good one.

Yes, Britain had a huge budgetary problem, and getting rid of large numbers of obsolescent warships provided some temporary relief. But it should have been quite predictable that introducing radically innovative new warships would ultimately just provoke potential enemies to reply in kind, touching off a new round of building ever larger and more expensive ships--so, no long-term cost benefit.

I also do not buy the argument that you really had to build "dreadnought" cruisers of 17,000 tons to achieve the desired combination of speed and range. As I stated in my last post, if you have more ships of smaller (therefore more affordable) size, then you don't need such long range to have a ship available where it is needed to deal with commerce raiders. As for speed, the desired level was soon reached in the large turbine-powered light cruisers of the county class (one of which--Sydney--did for the Emden), so 17,000 tons clearly was not actually necessary to reach 26 knots.

Even though the British came up with several revolutionary concepts in ship design between 1905 and 1914 (turbine engines, dreadnought battleships, battle cruisers, and oil-burning fast battleships), they still seemed overly wedded to certain fixed ideas that resulted in many designs that were sorely inelegant in detail. Super-firing turrets or triple turrets were successfully adopted earlier by other nations, permitting more compact layouts, while the British continued dithering about blast effect through sighting hoods (instead of resiting the hoods) or reluctance to alter their accustomed gunnery arrangements. So, you wind up with all those wing turrets and midships "Q" turrets with severely restricted arcs of fire.

The battle fleet did need a scouting force capable of penetrating an enemy screen to locate their main force, but you did not need battleship caliber guns to do that--just an armament more powerful than the enemy ships composing their screen. So, unless and until some other country built battle cruisers, that role could have been carried out with cruisers of more moderate size and armament. To be absolutely clear, I mean a modern version of armored cruisers, with turbine propulsion, and 6 or 8 main guns in turrets, preferably all mounted on the center-line, but of something less in caliber than those of a first-class battleship of equivalent age; I'm not a naval architect, but I think such a design was achievable with sufficient determination, even under the constraints of that era. In the event that some other nation did introduce the battle cruiser type, then a more appropriate reply for the fast wing would have been the fast battleship.

That is my two cents worth--heck, I'll even throw in an extra penny.

a modern version of armored cruisers, with turbine propulsion, and 6 or 8 main guns in turrets, preferably all mounted on the center-line, but of something less in caliber than those of a first-class battleship of equivalent age

Which was highly doable:
link

Yes she's a 1920s design, but there's no technology there that didn't exist in the 19teens. Historically a couple of 8-inch hits were enough to mission-kill Graf Spee, which was constructively a WW1 battlecruiser (6 x 11" guns, 3" belt armour and 28 knots on ~16,000 tonnes).

Rant, part deux – Some elaborating comments on the battle cruiser discussion -

HMS Exeter benefited from much improved propulsion technology. She required only eight oil-fired boilers to produce 80,000hp compared to Invincible's required 31 coal-fired boilers to produce 46,500hp. In addition, oil fuel delivered (IIRC) about 1.6x the BTU per unit weight compared to coal. At the time of Invincible's design and in consideration of her intended global mission, it was not logistically possible to incorporate oil fuel. The ship architects and designers knew their business and their 17,000 ton figure was not the result of lazy design work.

The decision to build relatively few but very powerful cruisers and hold them in a central hand for dispatch to counter identified threats (as opposed to a large number of small cruisers positioned in various overseas theaters of interest) was not taken lightly. The overall "cost of ownership", i.e. – construction + manning + operation + maintenance was in fact considerably cheaper for large ships in terms of cost per ton of displacement. This was one of the major considerations (apart from its immense tactical superiority) that drove the decision to abandon the pre-dreadnought and adopt the Dreadnought battleship formula. The same logic was (IMO) applied for the battle cruiser project. I don't think the effects of the financial pressures under which the RN was operating at that time have been afforded sufficient attention.

The blast interference issue is a good deal more involved than turret-top sighting hoods and super-firing turrets. For example, the forward superstructures of HMS Nelson/Rodney had to be extensively modified in order to neutralize the blast effects of B turret when fired on ans bearing abaft abeam Blast intereference was a key feature of prudent warship design practice right through WW2. D K Brown discussed this at some length in one of his books/articles; there is also a brief reference plus blast diagram in Oscar Parkes' "British Battleships".

FWIW.

B

@ Blutarski

Really interesting information there, thank you.

I also do not buy the argument that you really had to build "dreadnought" cruisers of 17,000 tons to achieve the desired combination of speed and range. As I stated in my last post, if you have more ships of smaller (therefore more affordable) size, then you don't need such long range to have a ship available where it is needed to deal with commerce raiders. As for speed, the desired level was soon reached in the large turbine-powered light cruisers of the county class (one of which--Sydney--did for the Emden), so 17,000 tons clearly was not actually necessary to reach 26 knots.

More ships means more crew, which need to be paid. And lots more crew at that.

Two 8,500-ton ships require about 3x the crew of a single 17,000-ton ship.

6" guns are just small enough to be manually loaded (shells weigh in about 100lbs each), while anything bigger must be power-loaded.

Very true … if for no other reasons than supply and maintenance considerations. The Germans in WWII violated this concept x10 ! I would have hated to be a Log or Maint. Officer then. There were just way too many types of vehicles, chassis, weapons, etc., etc. to effectively supply, maintain, repair, etc.

Have you looked at how many vehicle types the allies had? In Normandy the allies had vehicles based on Crusader, Valentine, Churchill, Cromwell, Centaur, Stuart and Sherman tanks chassis. There were 6 different engines for the Sherman, probably 4 of which were present in Normandy including Diesel engined M10's. There were 3 different engines for the M3/5 Stuart's. The Centaur and Cromwell look the same, but have different engines. Getting the right parts to the right units must have been a nightmare.

4th Cuirassier wrote -
"Really interesting information there, thank you."

Thank you for the compliment, 4C. It's a period and topic of especial interest to me.

B

Have you looked at how many vehicle types the allies had? In Normandy the allies had vehicles based on Crusader, Valentine, Churchill, Cromwell, Centaur, Stuart and Sherman tanks chassis. There were 6 different engines for the Sherman, probably 4 of which were present in Normandy including Diesel engined M10's. There were 3 different engines for the M3/5 Stuart's. The Centaur and Cromwell look the same, but have different engines. Getting the right parts to the right units must have been a nightmare.

Yes, I have and that is very true. However, the allied production rates [of everything], especially the USA's were far superior to anything the Germans could do. The USSR's production rate was massive as well.

But something to remember, many basic parts in various engines, tracks, etc. are same or interchangeable. Again, especially with the USA's systems …

Another accolade for Blutarski. Well said, sir.

- Ix

Regarding logistical headaches and proliferation of version among the land forces, while I can understand Fred C.'s perspective I more inclined even than Legion 4 to offer an alternative interpretation and perspective.

Yes, the "allies" had proliferation of materials. Kind of. Except not so much. Mostly because proliferation was between different organizations with different logistical tails. US forces did not generally receive materials from British logistics, nor vice versa. US forces received support from US logistics. French forces received support from US logistics (a the theater level, and French logistics at the unit level). Polish forces received support from British logistics (at the theater level … don't know about at the unit level). Can't say as I know if Canadian forces had their own log tails or were linked into the British log tail.

The U.S. Army was very focused on standardization. We had only one version of AT gun in the infantry formations at a time. We started with 37mm in Tunisia, then replaced them all with 57mm before Sicily, and retained that gun exclusively through ETO. Germany had 7 to 9 in service at any given time. We had only one version of AT gun (towed) in the hands of the TD formations at a time -- 75mm guns before they went all self-propelled for Tunisia, and then only the 3-inch gun when the towed battalions were formed after Tunisian campaign. The Germans didn't have an equivalent formation type, so I revert to the 7 to 9 in the hands of the infantry.

The US Army had, in general, one "standard", and perhaps two or three "alternate standard" versions of major pieces of equipment at any moment in time. The standard version dominated. Some units may have retained prior standard as the alternate standard because they were equipped before the standard became the standard, or they might have received some alternate standard because of some shortage in the standard, or some other logistical difficulty.

Light tank, medium tank, half track, light truck, medium truck, heavy truck, light howitzer, medium howitzer, heavy howitzer, medium field gun, heavy field gun, scout / utility car, armored car, command car, rifle, pistol, sub-machine gun, automatic rifle, light machine gun, heavy machine gun … etc. etc. were all based on a single standard, with something available in case of some outlying shortage or need.

This standardization was enforced even more heavily if we look just at the field army (deployed overseas force) versus the home army, or if we look at ETO (or any other particular theater).

Indeed there were several versions of the Stuart light tank. But US forces never took the M3 into combat zones in NATO, MTO or ETO. They only took M3A1, until M5 was available. Then M3A1 was replaced by M5 in all units before ETO. Then M5A1 became the standard, while M5s still in service remained as the alternate standard.

So also the US forces settled on M4A3 as the standard medium tank in ETO. M4 and M4A1 were retained as alternate standards, because they had equipped many units before M4A3 became available. Units may have operated M4 and M4A1 interchangeably (as they had the same automotive components), but the M4A3 was generally not mixed from battalion or lower. The 105mm howitzer support Shermans were built on M4 and M4A3 chassis, in order to provide versions to both M4/M4A1 equipped units and M4A3 equipped units with maximum standardization.

Very significant numbers of M3A3 Stuarts, M4A2 and M4A4 Shermans, Studebaker 2.5ton trucks, M5 and M9 halftracks may well have been built. They were never standardized for US Army use in ETO, and instances where they were used by US forces are the exception rather than the rule. Given the size of forces involved, they were pretty rare exceptions.

This approach was DEEPLY ingrained in the decision-making and behavior of the US Army at all levels. It is more than half of the answer to "why didn't the US Army have ______ instead of the Sherman in 1944?" Not because no one cared about the tanker, but because of the exact opposite. Just having something is a very different proposition from having something fully supported in the largest overseas expeditionary force ever conceived or implemented in history. It was that second factor … standardization for scale and for overseas logistic support, that drove the decision making again and again.

At least that is the pattern, that is the tapestry that I see when I look at the thousands of separate threads of US Army WW2 history.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

The Centaur and Cromwell were the same tank. The engine was the difference. Besides very few Centaurs saw service in front-line units. Crusaders were all towing vehicles or AA chassis in RA units. Valentines chassis were also very low numbers either Bridging vehicles or OP tanks again in RA Units. Late war Archer AT were Valentine chassis.
So that leaves Cromwell, Churchill, Stuart or Sherman in Armoured Units. Challengers after August

@ Lion in the Stars,

I don't know where you got your information about manning requirements, but I'm afraid it is seriously in error. I really can't find 8,500-ton British ships of comparable age to the Invincible-class battle cruisers. The closest I can come up with is the armored cruiser Devonshire of 10,850 tons launched in 1904. She was designed to carry a complement of 610, compared to 784 in the Invincible (data from Dr. Oscar Parkes' "British Battleships," 2nd ed., U.S. Naval Institute, 1966). You said two 8,500-ton ships would require three times the crew of a 17,000-ton ship. Three times the 784 complement of an Invincible would make 2,352 men, whereas the actual complement of two Devonshires of 10,850 tons adds up to 1,220.

When you look at the data from the same source, the Invincible-class of 1907 required only modest increases in size, crew, and building cost over the most recent British traditional armored cruisers, the 14,600-ton Minotaur-class (launched 1906-07). But with the Lion-class (1910-12), the unit cost of construction had risen by some 500,000 pounds (from about 1,600,000 each for the Invincibles to 2,100,000) and the ship's complement to 997.

So that leaves Cromwell, Churchill, Stuart or Sherman in Armoured Units. Challengers after August?

Quite so, but the Germans only had 3 if you exclude vehicles that were not tanks, Panzer IV, Panther and Tiger and the Tigers were in separate battalions, so Panzer Divisions only had 2.

You paint a very rosy picture Mark I am not sure the reality was quite as idyllic as you suggest. I have seen pictures of US units with 3 different versions of the M4 in NWE, original M4's, M4A1's and M4A3's and that was a US tank company parked up in a village square. Trying not to mix different types at unit level was not unique to the US either. As I alluded to in my previous post Panzer Divisions were fairly standardised for equipment 2 types of tanks, possibly a different chassis type in the Panzerjäger battalion and usually a single type of towed AT gun. Captured and second line equipment went to second line units, often occupation forces in static positions where the questions of supply are much easier to handle. The Soviets did the same putting lend lease tanks into separate tank brigades.
The US also had the problem of supplying spare parts for all the different versions of their vehicles and making sure they went to the right places, with different engine types and different suspension parts, tracks etc that is quite a challenge.

Quite so, but the Germans only had 3 if you exclude vehicles that were not tanks

Basically true … but an effective combat unit must have more than just MBTs, of course. And another point, e.g. at Normandy the 21st Panzer had a lot of French vehicles of all types, modified and/or repurposed … That was seen throughout in many German units and on many fronts.

The US also had the problem of supplying spare parts for all the different versions of their vehicles and making sure they went to the right places, with different engine types and different suspension parts, tracks etc that is quite a challenge.

Also probably true in some cases. Of course we have to look at Operational Readiness(OR) Rates of e.g. US vehicles vs. German. The US and even the UK were pushing for some sort of standardization. But as tech evolved, some of the older models of vehicles were still in service and/or modified and repurposed. But again, the US had a bigger production, etc., rate overall. And that was something the Germans didn't have for a number of reasons, some discussed here.

I've heard some German units may have had a very low OR rate to the point of @ 50% or less. E.g. As the Allies pushed out of Normandy, they took some heavy MBT loses at times. But those loses were quickly replaced. In some cases by the 100s of vehicles. While the Germans only got a handful of replacement vehicles compared to the Allies. At that time and even later. And the UK did use a number of US vehicles as well. Even though they produced a number of their own.

And this goes for all sides. Some vehicles that were destroyed and couldn't be repaired, became" Hanger Queens". And used for parts. To keep the other vehicles in the unit running. I also can say this, most maintenance/repair crews can be pretty imaginative. But in the Allies' case they had more to work with because of the US and in some cases the UKs overall production rates. As well as OR rates of Fully Mission Capable weapons system. Much of what I'm saying is basically what Mk.1 just posted and I agree with much of it …

But again I was not there in WWII, so …

as a Soldier, I'd rather have a tool in hand that isn't perfect and work with the limitation, than NOT have a tool but only have PROMISE to be given a tool if the need arises. Then the need arises and you don't get it in time.

That it true to a point and happened not only in WWII. I could list the shortages of some equipment and even men is some cases when I was on active duty, '79-'90. But as with most "good", etc. units you make due. Modify techniques, tactics and even equipment at times to overcome and adapt to those shortages. And I'm sure this was done for many on all sides in WWII [even WWI] and beyond … even today. I'd imagine …

And this goes for all sides. Some vehicles that were destroyed and couldn't be repaired, became" Hanger Queens". And used for parts. To keep the other vehicles in the unit running. .

Not in UK units. Any tank needing repairs that would take over 24 hours was stricken from the unit and recorded as a loss. Allied Regiments did not write-off tanks. That was done back at Base Workshops once the damage was assessed
This is the fundamental difference between German and Allied tank-loss reporting. An Allied Unit could have (for example) 10 tanks needing an engine change and at last light those tanks would disappear from the vehicle count. Thus any historian checking the Units numbers for that day would see a 'loss' of 10 tanks whilst a German Unit in the same position would keep hold of those 10 wrecks and show no 'losses'. This is one of the reasons we get bogus claims that Allied Regiment X lost 25 tanks after being engaged by Panzer Regt Z who have no losses.

Is the above meant to imply that no British armored unit ever technically suffered a tank written off as a result of enemy action?

B

Basically true … but an effective combat unit must have more than just MBTs, of course. And another point, e.g. at Normandy the 21st Panzer had a lot of French vehicles of all types, modified and/or repurposed … That was seen throughout in many German units and on many fronts.

Quite so, but even the Germans tried to keep the vehicles in a given unit consistent. 21st Panzer is a good example. It had a lot of French vehicles, but they were all in that single division, not spread across all the PD's. And of course every division needs a lot of different vehicles, but again the Germans did try and minimise the number of different vehicle types within a division. I have a book on my shelf The Observers Fighting Vehicle Directory by Bart H Vanderveen. The British and Commonwealth section is the largest. If you take just one vehicle type such as 3t trucks there are pages of different models.

Is the above meant to imply that no British armored unit ever technically suffered a tank written off as a result of enemy action?

It is how the system worked. At the end of each day all tanks not with the unit (including those obviously destroyed in combat) were passed over to others to be dealt with as they saw fit. The final say as to a tank being written off as a total loss lay with the fitters. Obviously some tanks were plainly destroyed and beyond recovery.
All a Unit count will tell you is that (for example) 10 tanks were struck from the Unit and not that 10 tanks were totally destroyed. Anyone trying to work out how many tanks in a Regiment were destroyed on a certain day might assume the the number of tanks struck from the rolls that day were all total losses but they would be wrong. A Unit could mark its losses as 10 tanks but it could be 5 of the 10 were repaired and returned to service. The daily Unit count was a simple record of tanks present with the unit. A Unit that struck off 10 tanks is not saying all those 10 tanks were total losses.

the Germans tried to keep the vehicles in a given unit consistent. 21st Panzer is a good example. It had a lot of French vehicles, but they were all in that single division, not spread across all the PD's. And of course every division needs a lot of different vehicles, but again the Germans did try and minimise the number of different vehicle types within a division.

Yes, would only make sense …

A Unit that struck off 10 tanks is not saying all those 10 tanks were total losses.

Yes, very true. The factors getting those repaired or replaced as soon as possible and back in battle would be critical, etc.

I thought 21 pd had It's French weird stuff replaced before it saw combat in 44.

I thought 21 pd had It's French weird stuff replaced before it saw combat in 44.

It had it's French tanks replaced, but AFAIK went in to combat with the SP gun conversions on French chassis.

Yep, you're correct Fred.
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