"Great War infiltration tactics" Topic

Read this thread TMP link
and decided to start a new one rather than hijack it.

I know the Germans developed infiltration (storm-trooper) tactics in 1917. I know the French developed a defensive answer to this. See the thread above.

I know the Allies relied on short bombardments (sometimes none at all), surprise and lots of tanks. Did they also develop techniques similar to infiltration tactics?

Not a small question to which the answer is yes and no. Both armies devolved control down to smaller tactical units. The Germans created dedicated elite units while the Allies trained all the divisions to use common tactics. The Germans were resource poor and burned up their elites while the Allies were fighting a rich mans war and even 'regular' divisions could perform complex actions.
While allied bombardments became shorter in time their quality of targeting and shell size rose massively. Tanks while important are seen often as the difference in the sides but in reality were not war winning machines even in 1918. The important differences between the sides were training, communications, and resources and the Allies were better at all of them.

As above, not a simple question or answer, but all armies moved from the company as a basic tactical unit, to the (semi) independent platoon and making far more use of minor terrain features as covet as the war progressed.

Both the French and Germans were doing this in mid 1916, the British by late 1916. Coupled with the development of defence in depth, turned WW1 from the FPW with machine guns into something resembling WW2.

The concept of 'infiltration' tactics was devised by the British to describe how the German assault forces got through Fifth Army's defences in Operation Michael, March 1918. This is not how the Germans described their assault tactics or Sturmtaktiken.

During Operation Michael (and many other such operations later in 1918) specialist stormtroopers were given really difficult strongholds to eliminate. The attacks were highly scripted and well practiced beforehand. They were not given free rein over the battlefield to find and 'infiltrate' gaps. Heavy firepower was the key, including close support weapons as well as the barrages. It is noteworthy that 18 Army's success (von Hutier) was not mirrored elsewhere on 21st March because Bruchmüller's artillery plan was not adopted wholeheartedly.

On all sides, the standard mantra for attacking infantry was bypass points of resistance if possible and don't wait for your flanking support. This was the basic principle that applied across the standard German infantry attack units, as well as British and French. The principle worked for the Germans in Operation Michael because of the combination of the terrific bombardment and the very thinly spread British forces. It failed dismally in Operation Mars, which attempted to widen the gains of Operation Michael by attacking Vimy Ridge and surrounds.

German tactics reinforced attacking at points of weakness, hence Fifth Army in March 1918 and the Lys valley around the Portuguese forces later that year. While this approach gave early successes, it was not possible to convert these into longer term operational and strategic gains. 'Infiltration' tactics did not work when strong defensive lines were attacked.

Robert

Indeed the German tactic of reinforcing success tended to draw them away from the well defended strategic points such as Amiens. They gained lots of ground but little of it of importance.
The real problem was not breaking into the enemy line but supplying and supporting a break through across the devastated no mans land.

I believe part of what assisted the Germans in operation Michael was the weather, thick fog meant that attacking forces could be practically in the trench before they were spotted and it removed the ability of units to support each other.

Fog was an issue, you are right, but it hindered the German attackers too. More importantly, it does not explain why there was success in some areas and not others.

Robert

The real problem was not breaking into the enemy line but supplying and supporting a break through across the devastated no mans land.

Right. The British and Germans had figured out how to get across no-mans-land by late 1917 but then could not bring artillery and supply forward before the advance was checked by reserves. I'm not sure about what the French experience was. I do know that a French division sent to Italy after Caporetto attacked and eviscerated an Austrian unit.

Great Info online

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I particularly recommend the third link on the development of Canadian Infantry tactics. It shows the changes down to the small unit unit level that culminates in the combined arms platoons with rifles grenadiers and machine guns that continues on as current practice. In essence the specialized infiltration units had been replaced by regular platoons