"Late-war French anti-Stosstruppen tactics?" Topic

Was reading a book on the Battle of the Piave, where the Italian army, with some assistance by the French and British, defeated Austria-Hungary's great last-ditch 1918 offensive. The author states that the Austrian-Hungarians had by this time adopted German Stosstruppe tactics, but then also cites a case of an effective counter-tactic employed by a French corps in response. The French were said to have made a voluntary feigned withdrawal before the A/H attack, waited until the attackers were well into open ground, beyond immediate friendly artillery support and with extended and exposed supply lines, then plastered them with artillery and followed up with a counter-attack.

Bought the book on a lark ("Battle of the Piave – Death of the Austro-Hungarian Army 1918" by David Raab) and it does not really have a well-referenced scholarly sense to it. Has anyone run across any corroborating references to this tactical technique?

B

Yes, this technique was developed under Pétain on the Western Front. He tried to get his Army commanders to execute on it during the German Spring offensives but it wasn't until Operation Friedensturm that Pétain finally forced the tactic on Gouraud. The rest is history, as this was the last major offensive operation attempted by Ludendorff – it failed, thanks to the new tactics.

Robert

Thanks, Robert. Petain again. Interesting

B

The French tactic, as implemented by IV Armée near Reims (I can't speak to the Battle of the Piave), was to empty the main battle zone except for MG nests. These were liberally spread around the impede the German attackers without presenting any linear targets, as per trench warfare. The withdrawal was not 'feigned', indeed the key was to maintain complete secrecy. The artillery line was also pulled back so that the barrages fell into the French forward and battle zones. Only the heavies and super-heavies were able to interdict the German reinforcements on their side of the original line.

Sulzbach writes of the complete shock at not achieving the previous outcomes that he had observed as a gunner in previous operations. There was no call for his battery to go forwards, which was a clear sign that things had failed.

I have a German regimental history for one of the specialist Sturm units. It clearly describes the devastating impact of the French defensive system in Operation Friedensturm.

Robert

Just out of interest, how did the British deal with the Sturm units? Did we just get caught out because they hit us first, or did we have time to adopt the French response?

This "French Method", as you describe it, appears to mimic in several respects the German trend toward a deep defense: the reduction of the forwardmost trenches to a minimally manned outpost/trigger line; the seeding of a deep battle zone behind the front line with numerous non-linear MG outposts to slow, tie down, disorganize and isolate the enemy attack force; the holding of prepared counter-attack forces well behind the battle zone for commitment at a moment deemed appropriate. I'm sure there were differences as well, but there do appear to be some similarities.

B

During Operation Michael, the specialist units like Sturmbataillon Rohr were parcelled out across the attacking force as a whole. One sub-unit was involved in an attack on a British defensive position near St Quentin. The quarry was attacked by an A7V as well as the stormtroopers. The British were overrun.

Robert