"Continentals Resurgent..." Topic

The following was in another thread on this forum and I believe that it is deserving of some comment about its content:

Unfortunately, a lot of American historians in the past have "upgraded" them to "the best army in the world" (whilst simultaneously being "the scum of the earth led by upper class twits") in order to "big up" the American win. The reality is that the Boston garrison was, as Winston says, very poor until Howe arrived and re-ordered them to his own vision of how they should fight in North America. On April 19, even the flank companies performed badly – albeit only Percy showed any kind of dynamism in his leadership. It is worth bearing in mind that the minutemen companies, chosen from among the most experienced militiamen, had far more combat veterans in their ranks; even the wider forces at Bunker Hill had more experienced regimental officers and NCOs than their Regular opponents. I would disagree with the "teenagers from the stink holes" idea: the Muster Rolls I've transcribed over the years, from numerous regiments, show a surprising correlation between recruits for both armies – early 20s, from a mix of occupations and areas, but with the Regular generally having more time "in the ranks" than the average Continental.

Again, Winston hits the nail on the head in terms of how we should view the two sides: as the war progresses, the quality gap widens until the 1780-81 period, when it start to close as Washington's army starts producing corps d'elite (the light infantry) and a few select brigades accumulate real combat/campaign experience (eg Marylanders). By the end of the war, there are a handful of Continental units capable of meeting the elites of Cornwallis's army and giving a good account of themselves (although it's worth noting that in Greene's four major actions, it's his Continentals not his Militia that let him down each time), but as a rule of thumb I would rate combat experienced Regulars slightly above similar Continentals in terms of infantry (artillery and cavalry I would put on a par, engineers slightly better than the British due to the French input).

Overall though, the vast bulk of the Continental infantry never really see enough action after 1778 to give an accurate rating, even though three-year enlistments began in 1777, so 1778 was the first time masses of Continentals carried over their bsic training into year two). Whilst the same is true of some British line battalions, it is a mark of how good the British Army became that you find common-or-garden line battalions being used as light infantry – 23rd, 33rd and 71st in the South, 24th in the Saratoga campaign – or mounted infantry (23rd, 63rd, 76th, 80th). I would not rate the Guards and 42nd as anything special in 1776, but such units do start showing real mettle from the Philadelphia campaign onwards.

I'll begin by addressing some of the comments individually:

1.Unfortunately, a lot of American historians in the past have "upgraded" them to "the best army in the world" (whilst simultaneously being "the scum of the earth led by upper class twits") in order to "big up" the American win.

-Which 'American historians' are being referred to here?

-And it was a 'big' American win-fighting and defeating the British empire, albeit with the help of the French, Spanish, and Dutch. The Americans had no army or navy at the beginning of the war and the Continental Army had to be built from scratch in order to meet the British and German regulars on anything like an equal footing. That in itself is a 'big' accomplishment.

2…the quality gap widens until the 1780-81 period, when it start to close as Washington's army starts producing corps d'elite (the light infantry)…

The Continental Corps of Light Infantry came into being in 1778-1779 and in 1779 they executed the near-flawless night assault on Stony Point.

3.and a few select brigades accumulate real combat/campaign experience (eg Marylanders)…

The Maryland Continentals were usually, if not always, brigaded with the Delaware regiment and when they were sent south to Gates' southern army in 1780 they were the 'Maryland Division.'

4….(although it's worth noting that in Greene's four major actions, it's his Continentals not his Militia that let him down each time),…

That is not an accurate assessment. And while Greene never won a tactical victory in the field (he came close both at Guilford Courthouse and Eutaw Springs), his Continentals were the mainstay of the army, and not the militia.

At Guilford Courthouse, the North Carolina militia in the first line ran without delivering the number of volleys they were tasked to do.

And while the 2d Maryland did break, it should be noted that they were a new regiment, full of new recruits that had been recently augmented by some veteran NCOs and officers. It was the Virginia Continentals that defeated and mauled the 33d Foot at Greene's third line and it was the 1st Maryland that counterattacked the 2d Battalion of Guards in conjunction with Washington's cavalry and defeated that battalion.

At Hobkirk's Hill the veteran 1st Maryland did fall into disorder when attacking which ruined Greene's chances for a decisive tactical win.

That being said it was the Continentals that held the army together and without them there would have been no southern army.

And, finally, Greene and his army ruined three different British armies in the south and won every campaign. When he was done the British held only Charleston and Savannah, and that was thanks to the Royal Navy. Greene inflicted more losses on the three British armies he fought in the field in the engagements of Guilford Courthouse, Hobkirk's Hill and Eutaw Springs. And it was because of the heavy losses suffered at Guilford Courthouse that Cornwallis decided to march for Virginia and we all know how that ended. The British lost two entire armies who surrendered and laid down their arms because of the fighting ability of the Continentals, not the militia.

I'll stop here for now and perhaps there can be a good discussion on this topic.

If you are going to pick apart what someone else has written, and if you are going to invite people to join you in the task, I think it would be polite to credit the original author and provide a link to the original thread so that the comments can be seen in the context in which they were made.

You are absolutely correct-my error and oversight.

The title of the thread is 'Is the martial prowess of the Redcoats overrated?'

And the author of the subject posting is Supercilius Maximus.

Thanks very much for reminding me to do this.

TMP link

I don't believe the Revolution could have been won without the Continentals.

Yes. Provide a link.
My point, which SuperMax quotes, is that the British in 1775 around Boston were un-motivated garrison troops who performed poorly. They got better. Much better.
The Continentals also improved, but never to the extent to compare in numbers with the British. Arguing over dates is nit picking.
I believe that late in the war, veteran American troops could give a good account of themselves facing roughly equal numbers. (From a gaming point, this is one reason I do not find AWI "points cost" useful. Too many variables.)

There were very good, superb British troops, and some not so good.
Ditto he Yanks.
Nobody can argue that the 7th at Cowpens were in any way equal to tie 23rd or 33rd. Or even to Delaware.
Both sides had good troops, both had bad.
Both had good leaders, both had bad.
Both sides had historians with agendas.

I believe there is a good argument that the British Army in North America reached its peak in quality around 1779-80. When it comes to the quality differential between British regulars and Continentals though, the peak difference was earlier. At the end of 1775 Washington had to rebuild his regulars as enlistments expired. While some troops with multi-year enlistments did join Washington in 1776, a large portion of the army had to be rebuilt again at the end of 1776. By the end of 1777 Washington is leading an army where his troops have for the most part served together for at least a year, and who are also serving under officers and generals who have lead troops in combat, and most of this army carried forward into the next year. While the quality of British forces in North America, including newer raised units and provincial regiments, continued to improve after 1777, I would say by the end of 1777 the overall DIFFERENTIAL in quality between British regulars and Continentals was shrinking.

When it comes to specific actions though, I don't think the labels and overall trends are that important. What matters is the specific units on that specific day. Even late in the war you see so-called regular units that are composed of mostly new recruits who behaved poorly. You also see throughout the war relatively inexperienced units perform at a level as good as the most experienced, and you see experienced units perform poorly in particular actions.

The British regulars at Bunker (Breed's) Hill were not up to the mark in any way except dogged refusal to quit. They didn't charge until rebel fire slacked off. They responded to rebel fire by halting and firing back – not what the later veterans would do when faced by entrenched enemy.

But Howe got them trained up and then put some victories under their belts.

I do tire of hearing the British described as the strongest or best army in the world. Perhaps a better description would be the strongest/best European army that could be deployed in the New World in serious numbers.

The numbers were never adequate for the task at hand. Lord North was not keen on the idea of a war in the colonies. Amherst declined the overall command, but I believe estimated that 65,000 men were needed for the job. Gage predicted that 30,000 were needed early on to end it quickly.

One thing that I think is not well understood is how many
Continentals and Loyalists went to sea as privateers, thus depriving land forces of experienced soldiers.

1.Unfortunately, a lot of American historians in the past have "upgraded" them to "the best army in the world" (whilst simultaneously being "the scum of the earth led by upper class twits") in order to "big up" the American win.

Off the top of my head (this may be wrong, as I cannot access my library at the moment): Higginbotham and Ward in the 1950s, through to Gallagher in the 90s, and Schecter and Logusz in the 2000s.

2…the quality gap widens until the 1780-81 period, when it start to close as Washington's army starts producing corps d'elite (the light infantry)…

I'm not sure what kind of brain-fart I was having when I wrote this, but it is indeed completely wrong (I can only assume it was a mis-placed edit). I believe that in fact, the quality gap starts closing in the summer of 1777, when the Saratoga and Philadelphia campaigns really get going – two years before the Corps of Light Infantry is set up. The performance of the Continental infantry at Bemis Heights (and to a lesser extent, Freeman's Farm) and Germantown (and to a lesser extent, Brandywine) is clear evidence of this. In my view, Steuben's value to the Continental Army is in his work on the generalship and

3.and a few select brigades accumulate real combat/campaign experience (eg Marylanders)…

Not sure why this is in here.

4….(although it's worth noting that in Greene's four major actions, it's his Continentals not his Militia that let him down each time),…

Yes, it is an accurate statement. Let's look at Greene's four main actions:-

1) Guilford Courthouse – He instructs the militia to fire a couple of rounds and then retire; both wings of the militia fire two rounds and retire. I don't have access to my copy of Babits, but I'm pretty sure that it is the poor performance of the Continentals towards the end of the day that decides the battle.

2) Hobkirk's Hill – Gunby's infantry and Washington's cavalry both fail; Gunby is court-martialled, but Washington escapes.

3) Ninety-Six (siege) – Some Continental officers criticise Greene for not seizing the Loyalists' water supply; however, Koskiuzsko also draws some criticism for his attempts at the besieging lines.

4) Eutaw Springs – The Continental infantry stop to plunder the British camp; the Continental artillery set up too close to the house and are picked off; and the Continental cavalry ride too close to Marjoribanks' flank battalion and are shot, with Washington captured.

That is not an accurate assessment. And while Greene never won a tactical victory in the field (he came close both at Guilford Courthouse and Eutaw Springs), his Continentals were the mainstay of the army, and not the militia.

At Guilford Courthouse, the North Carolina militia in the first line ran without delivering the number of volleys they were tasked to do.

And while the 2d Maryland did break, it should be noted that they were a new regiment, full of new recruits that had been recently augmented by some veteran NCOs and officers. It was the Virginia Continentals that defeated and mauled the 33d Foot at Greene's third line and it was the 1st Maryland that counterattacked the 2d Battalion of Guards in conjunction with Washington's cavalry and defeated that battalion.

At Hobkirk's Hill the veteran 1st Maryland did fall into disorder when attacking which ruined Greene's chances for a decisive tactical win.

That being said it was the Continentals that held the army together and without them there would have been no southern army.

And, finally, Greene and his army ruined three different British armies in the south and won every campaign…etc, etc.

This is not in dispute; however, a lot of the strategic advantages Greene held were not his, and my point was, quite simply, that he should have won those four battles. At Guilford, he had more Continentals than Cornwallis had in his entire army; at Hobkirk's and Ninety-Six, he outnumbered the enemy 2:1; and at Eutaw, he had the field until his men let him down.

An interesting thread. For me, the key points of agreement are:

1. There was a range of qualities in the "Regular" units of both armies.
2. The average quality of the "Regular" units improved in both armies during the course of the rebellion, but while there were individual rebel units that could go toe to toe with any British unit, the average British regular unit was at least a bit better / tougher than the average rebel line unit from 1776 to the end.

What would I add?

First, I submit that the biggest quality differential between the British and the rebels was in the leadership at the brigade level and above, not the rank and file. At the beginning of the war the quality of the rebel battlefield leadership was mostly abysmal; a few more resources, and more particularly more "drive" and ruthlessness by the senior British commanders could likely have ended the rebellion in 1776. (An aside: History shows repeated failures to understand that the early phase of an insurrection or, as the professionals like to put it today, "asymmetrical" fight, is usually the only time in which the insurrection can truly be stamped out). The American battlefield leadership improved, and had some bright spots, but was NEVER the equal of the British professionals. Greene is a terrific example. While he demonstrated good strategic vision and good organizational skills, he was out-generaled in every battle he fought, and his poor battlefield management almost certainly cost him victories at Guilford and Eutaw Springs, and very arguably at Hobkirk's Hill too.

Second, the British army in the American revolution was a far cry from that of the Seven Years War or the Peninsula. I've never seen a convincing analysis of why this was the case.

Third, as a student in particular of the late-rebellion southern campaign, I note that the Northern militia appear to have performed much better than the Southern militia. I suggest, based on my reading over the years but without actual hard evidence, that the Northern militia did more and better actual training prior to the beginning of the conflict, were better equipped, and had a much higher proportion of men with combat experience in European-style actions (as opposed to Indian fights) from the Seven Years War.

I note that the Northern militia appear to have performed much better than the Southern militia.

I am having some trouble with this conclusion. The major failures of southern militia late in the war had the same cause as failures of northern militia earlier, namely efforts by commanders to use militia as ersatz regulars. That was certainly the case at Brier Creek and Camden. When fighting on their own terms the performance of southern militia was much better. Kings Mountain was not unusual because it was a success by southern militia. There were a number of those from 1779-1781, either alone or acting in conjunction with continentals. (Remember that perhaps half of Morgan's third line at Cowpens, plus a third of Washington's horse, consisted of militia.) It was unusual because of the size, completeness and strategic importance of the victory.

"Second, the British army in the American revolution was a far cry from that of the Seven Years War or the Peninsula. I've never seen a convincing analysis of why this was the case."

Can't comment on the Nappy period, but for F&I it was a war of sieges. The French, unlike the American's, were defending a handful of fixed positions (Louisbourg, Quebec, Montreal, Niagara) with weak outposts on the frontier screening them. The outposts were really meaningless if the major cities/forts fell – which they did. Few open field battles. More success/failure based on siege craft. The Crown really had few outposts/cities to defend, so they weren't tied down, unlike the Brits in the AWI period (think NYC, Charleston, etc).

Also, the French regular forces were pretty much spent by 1758/1759, unlike the Americans in the next war which pretty much fielded a different army every year.

Hasty generalizations, but still, more or less true.

I would also make the argument it is really hard to say the Continentals got better as the war went on. As noted above, their record in the south was rather mixed. Crown forces varied widely as well, though seemed to field a somewhat more consistently trained army. It is interesting to see their growing reliance on Loyalist units later in the war though, especially horse.

Just a few points…

1. When Greene took over the remnants of the southern army I don't see any strategic advantages in his favor. The British had established their ‘T' of fortified posts in the interior of the Carolinas, held the two main ports in the Carolinas and Georgia, and they also held a numerical advantage over any and all American units.

2. At Guilford Courthouse, the only Continental unit that didn't do well was the newly reconstituted 2d Maryland, which was made up of new recruits. Greene and his subordinates attempted to make up for that disadvantage by posting some veteran officers and NCOs with the new unit, but it didn't help much. When the 2d Maryland was attacked by the 2d Guards Battalion, they fired a ragged volley and ‘departed.' Both Greene and the brigade commander, Otho Holland Williams, tried to rally them but failed. The 1st Maryland under Col Gunby advanced to meet them, and Gunby's horse was shot out from under him. LtCol John Eager Howard took over (he had led the Continental Battalion at Cowpens that attacked and routed the British regulars) and they met the 2d Guards Battalion head on and mauled them, aided by Washington's cavalry that repeatedly attacked in the open ground.

Previously, the Virginia Continental battalions on the right of the American 3d line had bloodily repulsed the 33d Foot and mortally wounded their commander. Greene, despite these advantages gained by his Continentals, decided to retreat as he would not risk the destruction of his Continental regiments. If that had happened the war in the south would have been over. Cornwallis' army was mauled and withdrew first to Wilmington to refit under the protective cover of the Royal Navy and then ‘moved' north to Virginia.

3. At Hobkirk's Hill the attack of the 1st Maryland fell into disorder when the right flank company of the regiment lost its commander, who was killed. Gunby attempted to realign the unit and flubbed it, the British gaining an advantage on the field which they took advantage of. The Americans had about 1500 on the field; Rawdon 900. However, the British suffered heavy casualties they could not afford and withdrew. Greene lost tacitically, but strategically won as the British were mauled and left the field.

It is interesting to note that when Gunby had tactical control of the 1st Maryland they didn't do well. When his second in command did, as at Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse they outfought any and all opposition. In many senses the commander is everything.

4. Ninety-Six was a tactical defeat in a siege by Greene, but after the siege was lifted, the British commander withdrew, destroying the works-that is another strategic victory.

5. Greene attacked at Eutaw Springs and numbers were about even (2200 Americans to 2000 British). Contrary to popular opinion, as expressed by Jim Piecuh (one of the best of the new historians on the war) the Americans did not stop to loot the British camp, as the British were undoubtedly as short on supplies as the Americans were, but the Continental units were disordered by the very nature of the camp itself. Seeing that problem, the British counterattacked. However, the results were the same-a mauled British army in the field that had to withdraw.

6. American Continental units improved throughout the war, and even early on they had successes against British regulars at The Hollow Way (Harlem Heights), Trenton, and Princeton. In the two major battles of the Saratoga campaign, Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights, the Continentals outfought the British and German regulars and forced a British army to surrender in the field (see The Battles of Saratoga by John Elting).

7. In the first year of the war, the Continentals were only enlisted for a year. That wasn't conducive to building a professional fighting force, and Congress increased the term of enlistment to three years, or ‘the duration of the war.' The last years of the war (1779-1783) saw the Continental units composed of ‘hardened professionals' that were ‘generally the equal of any European troops.' –see American Army Life by John Elting and The Continental Army by Robert Wright, as well as The Book of the Continental Soldier by Harold Peterson. The conclusion being that there was not a ‘new' army every year of the war.

8. The conclusion is that without the Continental Army the British would have won the war, and stating that the Continentals let down Greene in the southern theater is wrong. The talent among Greene's subordinates was very high-Otho Holland Williams, John Eager Howard, Carrington, Kirkwood, and William Washington performed excellently, Washington arguable being the best cavalryman either side produced. Williams took over for Morgan when he left the army after Cowpens and was the rear guard commander that kept Cornwallis off Greene's main body on the retreat to the Dan River and Virginia. I would submit that Williams did a much better job in that mission that Morgan would have.

9. Regarding some American historians of the 70s, such as Higginbotham and Shy, the latter is too effusive over the achievements of the militia, who many times hampered American operations, and whom the Continentals referred to as 'long faces' because of their demeanor when called up. Higginbotham I had as a college instructor and to say the least I was not impressed. He was another of the militia-proponents and was a right pain in the classroom. I was called on the carpet for replying to one of his intended insults to the regular army. Needless to say it wasn't I that was punished.

With regard to point 2., the performance of the 2nd Maryland at Guildford Courthouse, I just read Greg Novak's guide to the Southern Campaigns link and he argues that "The long held view that the 1st (Maryland) Battalion/Regiment had the experienced soldiers, while the 2nd Battalion/5th Regiment was made up of recruit (sic) does not bear up under close scrutiny." He goes on to argue that there was "no real difference between the 1st and 2nd Maryland. Both units were formed from the remains of the Maryland Brigades, and drawn on for the Maryland Delaware Light Infantry Battalion."

I have only just started reading about the Revolutionary War so I have no idea whether this argument stands up but I thought it might be of interest.

First off, there was no 2d Battalion, 5th Maryland Regiment at Guilford Courthouse.

The veteran 1st Maryland were present, and the newly-constituted 2d Maryland was also present.

The 2d Maryland, according to Babits and Howard in Long, Obstinate, and Bloody: The Battle of Guilford Courthouse, published in 2009, and is now the definitive volume on the battle, had been organized in the summer of 1780 as the Maryland Regiment Extra 'with recruits from across the state (Babits and Howard, 70). They had marched south in October 1780 and joined the southern army in December (Babits and Howard, 70). It is clear that it was a 'newly-designated regiment' (Babits and Howard, 71). Further, 'by all accounts the regiment was understaffed at the company level' (Babits and Howard, 72).

This volume is thoroughly researched by the co-authors and I spent an afternoon with Joshua Howard discussing the battle and he gave me copies of some of the primary material they had assembled.

I did my master's thesis on Guilford Courthouse and I'm going to expand it into a book. It will be used as a model in examining the effectiveness of the Continental Regular. I've been researching Guilford Courthouse since 1999 and have spent much time in multiple visits to the battlefield and talking with the Park historians who have also done much valuable work on the battle.

The reference you cite appears to be repeating an old and often repeated error on the 5th Maryland which was not at the battle and which after Camden in August 1780 ceased to exist.

Thanks Brechtel. I guess Greg Novak's book must have been written before Babits and Howard published their work on Guildford Courthouse and brought the information to light. (He does cite Babits in his bibliography but it is for his book on Cowpens).

Part of the confusion about the designation of the Maryland Continentals at Guilford stems from actions by the State of Maryland. In January of 1781 the state reorganized the Maryland line, taking all of the previously existing regiments and officers and allocating them to five regiments. Best I can tell the reorganization didn't get beyond the paper stage. However because the commander of the Second Maryland at Guilford was designated as commander of the Fifth Maryland in the reorganization plan, the Second has sometimes been misidentified as the Fifth.

The reasons usually advanced for the Second's failure at Guilford was that it was new and it lacked officers. This doesn't tell the whole story. The Maryland Extra regiment had been raised the previous summer which meant they should have been at least as experienced and probably better equipped as the two Virginia continental regiments at Guilford, both of which were raised in the months after Waxhaws.

As the Maryland Extra marched southward in the fall of 1780, SOMEONE convinced Maryland to authorize the unit to be broken up, its officers be discharged, and its enlisted men used to rebuild the regiments shattered at Camden and Fisher Creek. Fortunately that didn't happen. However when they reached the Southern Army the regimental officers were sent home. Their commands were given to surplus officers of the former Camden regiments that were with Greene's army. The result was at Guilford you had an untested regiment being lead by officers who were unknown to them, and possibly with an uncompleted reorganization which left officer slots unfilled.

Excellent posting Bill-very well done and you explained the issue much better than I did.