"Is the martial prowess of the Redcoats overrated?" Topic

The British Army hadn't been involved in a meaningful scrap since the FIW in 1764. By the time of Bunker Hill it's ranks were filled by teenagers from the stink-holes of Britain. Arguably, no better than New England militia. Overrated?

Is this reflected for all British units (Guards, as well) in the various AWI rules for the early war period?

Thanks

The Lamb

I don't think the war revolved about troop quality it was more about attrition, supply lines and sea superiority (lost by Britain when France and Spain entered the war. If you want a good read that deals with this try this article from the Smithsonian

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The prowess of the British army in any rules set depends on how you rate them within the rules.
At Lexington and Concord they have no business being rated as highly as they should be at Brandywine. They were basically lazy badly trained Garrison troops, and it showed.
Lance they got off the troop ships and got acclimated they were superior. Some units were, but of course some were not.
My rule of thumb in a made up scenario is that qualitatively most of the British should be superior to most of the Continentals.

Unfortunately, a lot of American historians in the past have "upgraded" them to "the best army in the world" (whilst simultaneously being "the scum of the earth led by upper class twits") in order to "big up" the American win. The reality is that the Boston garrison was, as Winston says, very poor until Howe arrived and re-ordered them to his own vision of how they should fight in North America. On April 19, even the flank companies performed badly – albeit only Percy showed any kind of dynamism in his leadership. It is worth bearing in mind that the minutemen companies, chosen from among the most experienced militiamen, had far more combat veterans in their ranks; even the wider forces at Bunker Hill had more experienced regimental officers and NCOs than their Regular opponents. I would disagree with the "teenagers from the stink holes" idea: the Muster Rolls I've transcribed over the years, from numerous regiments, show a surprising correlation between recruits for both armies – early 20s, from a mix of occupations and areas, but with the Regular generally having more time "in the ranks" than the average Continental.

Again, Winston hits the nail on the head in terms of how we should view the two sides: as the war progresses, the quality gap widens until the 1780-81 period, when it start to close as Washington's army starts producing corps d'elite (the light infantry) and a few select brigades accumulate real combat/campaign experience (eg Marylanders). By the end of the war, there are a handful of Continental units capable of meeting the elites of Cornwallis's army and giving a good account of themselves (although it's worth noting that in Greene's four major actions, it's his Continentals not his Militia that let him down each time), but as a rule of thumb I would rate combat experienced Regulars slightly above similar Continentals in terms of infantry (artillery and cavalry I would put on a par, engineers slightly better than the British due to the French input).

Overall though, the vast bulk of the Continental infantry never really see enough action after 1778 to give an accurate rating, even though three-year enlistments began in 1777, so 1778 was the first time masses of Continentals carried over their bsic training into year two). Whilst the same is true of some British line battalions, it is a mark of how good the British Army became that you find common-or-garden line battalions being used as light infantry – 23rd, 33rd and 71st in the South, 24th in the Saratoga campaign – or mounted infantry (23rd, 63rd, 76th, 80th). I would not rate the Guards and 42nd as anything special in 1776, but such units do start showing real mettle from the Philadelphia campaign onwards.

it is a mark of how good the British Army became that you find common-or-garden line battalions being used as light infantry – 23rd, 33rd and 71st in the South, 24th in the Saratoga campaign – or mounted infantry (23rd, 63rd, 76th, 80th). I would not rate the Guards and 42nd as anything special in 1776, but such units do start showing real mettle from the Philadelphia campaign onwards.

It is interesting, though, that together with his composite grenadier battalions Howe selected the Guards, the 33rd and the 42nd to form his 'corps de reserve' for the New York campaign in autumn 1776.

To what degree does that reflect how he rated those regiments in relation to the rest of the line athat stage of the war?

SM, I agree with much of what you have said. It seems like at the same time as you had common British units progressing to almost elite status, you also have at least some loyalist units that are developing into almost regular status.

One correction: Three year enlistments for the Continentals started for Virginia and at least one other colony in 1776. Some of these units started out as state units in 1775, so by the 1777 campaign they were going into their third year of service. The down side is that when these enlistments expired in 1778-79, unit strength plummeted and units had to be consolidated.

I have also read that certain New England and mid-Atlantic units raised in 1777 were based on a core group of officers and men who had been together a year or two earlier.

Lamb, albeit later on in the war, writes about how highly respected the 33rd was throughout the Army, and describes it as the best disciplined and trained unit in America. Add in the fact that Cornwallis was its Colonel and OC the Reserve, and it's not hard to see how they earned their place.

The 42nd had a good reputation from both the WAS and the F&IW, as Howe would no doubt have been aware, and had the added advantage of being a double-strength regiment. Highland corps were also seen as being the British equivalents of grenzers/pandours, and were still being used as such, as far as I can ascertain. Both units were something of a shoe-in for the role of elite reserve, IMO.

I suspect the placing of the Guards in the reserve was a safety measure, as Howe had to answer personally to the King for any losses they suffered. It was very rare for a non-royal personage to be allowed to command them in the field.

Yup, over rated. And it was really propaganda that "won" the war, not really the troops at all. Now ain't that a sad thought for us wargamers to ponder?

Just saying'.

Information Operations and Non-kinetic effects being used in a wargame!! "Wibble"

I agree with what has been said concerning the quality in 1775 of the New England militia I have a different opinion on the British regulars. Most of the problems on April 19 have more to do with command and control. Take the expedition to Concord. You have 11 grenadier companies and 10 light companies thrown together. While Smith commands the force (with Major Pitcairn his second in command) I can find no office assigned to commandeer flank company battalion. The only time these companies work together prior to the march is one afternoon. That is it. A collection of companies. Best example of this is their action at north bridge. Three light companies (4th, 10th and 43rd) are left at or within quarter mile of the bridge while four more companies go to Barrett's house to look for cannon. As the growing militia moves to closer positions nearthe bridge the companies fall back towards the bridge. Once Americans start marching on the bridge the British officer form committee to figure out what to do. They agree to withdrawn to the opposite side. Once there it falls apart. Laurie (43) want his men to form for street fighting. Barker (4th) does not understand this and complains the companies are one behind the other. Lister (volunteer with the 10th) doesn't have a clue and volunteer Sutherland (who has has come out for the fun that day and just showed up) hops a wall and calls out for volunteers to come join him in the fields.

Compare this to when Percy's brigade comes out. His brigade has a proven command structure which has operated together in practice marches in the countryside. His position withdrawal from Lexington covering the flank companies while under fire is text book. Read Mackenzie account.

John, I agree with the premise. The Brits were garrison battalions with little combat or field experience. They did however, grow into their role at a quicker rate than the Americans. Already having a standing army with NCOs, drills, etc. brought them up to speed more quickly than their American opponents.

Like most British infantry regiments, the 42nd had not seen action since leaving America in 1764/5. Although I don't believe I have read first-hand reference to it, I understand the CO of the 42nd, Lt Col Stirling, made a point of drilling his men in bush fighting tactics after they arrived from Britain in August 1776.

By the way, LLDOB, I don't know about where you are but in Britain 'stinkhole' means something quite different from what I think you think you meant. Did you possibly mean 'sinks of Britain'?

42flanker,

The British Army was very small; this meant (a) a lot of the officers either knew each other, or knew of each other, and (b) it was probably well known, from the annual inspections, which corps were top notch, which were capable, and which were best left to guard the baggage. The good corps usually had the good colonels!

[Despite the perception that Colonels never served with their regiments, a surprising number of them did during the AWI.]

a) Yes; although- 'very small' ?
b) Colonels- or Lieutenant Colonels? Might it be more accurate to say that some regiments served in armies or forces in which their Colonels held command rather than going into battle, or taking the field, with the Colonel at their head? for instance-
Amherst (60th) Gage (22nd) Howe (23rd)Carleton (47th) Cornwallis (33rd) Grey (28th) Grant (55th)

a) Yes; although- 'very small' ?

At the beginning of 1775, I think Great Britain had the smallest army, as a percentage of the population, of any nation in Europe. Typical strengths were between 1% and 2% (I think Prussia was 1.5%); Great Britain and Ireland was barely 0.5% – and that is based on the paper strength of 48,000, the real strength was around 40,000, so it might have been nearer 0.33% depending on the actual size of the population (somewhere around 12-13 million).

Of course, this was a country that had major maritime resources (civil and military) that few could match.

'comparitively small'?

Of course, the British army expanded and contracted dramatically as conflicts started and ran their course, with existing regiments recruiting to full strength and new regiments being raised for the duration. Is that the real difference?

somewhere around 12-13 million

I think you will find it was about 9 million.

I read the book "Fusiliers" this summer. Mirrors a lot of the discussion above and a fun read. I think it gives a good perspective on the Question without being dry. Recommended.

Regarding winning the war, we forget it was primarily a naval war from 1778 on. Not because of Yorktown, but also the fighting in the Caribbean, Gibralter, and India. It got too costly and too big.

One must always avoid easy generalizations.

The quality of the British regiments (usually, not always, = battalion) varied widely. The 7th Fusiliers, who saw their first (and last) serious action at Cowpens, were soundly beaten and were not combat-ready. Multiple British officers observed them as young, raw, ill-trained and ill-led. The 23rd was apparently not much better when they arrived on station but by the time they were posted to the South, they had become a highly respected veteran unit. Other units were in-between.

I suggest, though, that the true edge that the British Army had, and which it held throughout the rebellion, was in leadership at every level, from corporal up to general. One could argue ad infinitum about whether the British were "good" or the Rebels "bad", but either way, the edge was substantial and narrowed little if at all in the course of the war; the British officers appear to have learned more and faster compared with their Rebel counterparts.

I think you will find it was about 9 million.

No – the population of England & Wales alone was almost that, estimated to be about 7.8 million in 1780 (it is quite common for statistics for England & Wales to be mis-read/mis-represented as for the whole of Great Britain):

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Scotland has no figures for this period, but was somewhere between 1.25 and 1.5 million based on the 1750 and 1800 estimates; Ireland was approaching 4 million by the 1770s, and then you've got the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, etc.

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and then you've got the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, etc.

very small…

…but these islands are far away

Appropriate emoticon

Interesting. My rule of thumb has long been medieval 2m, ECW 6m, 1801 census 10m, add 2m per decade for C19. Did not realise the census did not include Ireland.
1911census.org.uk/1811.htm
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Actually looks as if 11m (source claims to include Scotland) + 4m so about 15m!

Has anyone ever seen info on whether certain British regiments had specialized training – say like street fighting, etc, and that these specially trained units were purposefully placed in different brigades?

I would be pretty sure that there was no provision for anything like this. "Street Firing" was a specific tactic for defending or attacking in a confined space, but the details of how to do it were contained in a pamphlet that was not compulsory reading (hence the confusion at the North Bridge in Concord).

Some units were clearly more disciplined and proficient than others (the 5th Foot had good conduct and marksmanship badges), but this was entirely due to the professionalism of the CO. I know of no instance where units were brigaded other than via numerical sequence, or geographical location.

As we discussed eerlier, on the arrival of Howe's army at Staten Island in August 1776 there was the grouping of certain regiments regarded as reliable, together with the composite grenadier battalions, in the corps de reserve , but perhaps that was not quite the same thing. We are told that the 33rd and the 42nd, assigned to the Reserve, did have a degree of dedicated training training, respectively in light infantry tactics and bush fighting.

One might argue that, on a different scale, the brigading of flank companies into composite battalions, particularly perhaps in the case of light infantry companies, provided the Commander with troops capable of skirmishing and shock action on demand.

I heard this remark from a fairly informed person. Let me query him further to see what evidence he has of this idea.

FYI, but street firing is covered in Bland's along with several other instances of specific fighting – going through defiles, putting out flankers, etc.

I really must find my copy of Bland and read it again.

I can understand the 33rd being in the reserve – it was Cornwallis's own regiment, and by common consent (according to Lamb) the best disciplined unit in America. As far as the 42nd is concerned, I believe there was still at least a perception that the more aggressive/primitive character of Highlanders naturally suited them to grenzer-like activities.

Indeed, as we discussed earlier, but my point was the specific training that the 33rd and 42nd had received or were in the process of receiving prior to the Long Island operation.

I suspect, though, that there may be a danger of imposing too much of a modern perspective on the specialist expertise that was acquired.

It is interesting, however, that the battalion coys of the 33rd do not feature very prominently in accounts of the fighting till they went 'Southward'in 1780 where they formed part of Cornwallis' hard marching, hard fighting but ultimately ill-fated army.

By contrast, the 42nd battalion men turn up more frequently, regularly fighting as skirmishers, at New York, in the Jerseys, Pennsylvania and in coastal raiding expeditions until 1780. After which their war quietened down considerably.

A curious juxtaposition.

I really must find my copy of Bland and read it again.

SM

Bland on street-firing

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When the emphasis shifted southward, the 42nd's former role was taken on by the 71st. This makes it easier for us wargamers of the southern campaign, as the 71st shows up in most of the major actions from Savannah in 1778 through Guilford Courthouse in 1781.

Interesting discussion. Thanks to those involved.

When the emphasis shifted southward, the 42nd's former role was taken on by the 71st. This makes it easier for us wargamers of the southern campaign, as the 71st shows up in most of the major actions from Savannah in 1778 through Guilford Courthouse in 1781.

Another interesting juxtaposition. The 71st had arrived in America effectively untrained, apart from a core of 7YW veterans from Fraser's 78th. After the battle of Long Island suffering badly from sickness among the troops, the regiment had seen little action until they were sent'southward' in autumn 1778, although the Light company made up for that somewhat in their operations under Hon John Maitland and Sir John Baird. After they arrived in Georgia, the two battalions of the 71st, under effective command of the newly promoted Maitland and the light corps led by Sir James Baird, seem to have hit the ground running.

The 71st was at Brandywine, as well, but appear to have been assigned baggage guard duties behind Knyphausen.

Easy to see how that would have happened, especially if they were still "in training."

"Compared to the Americans, the British had no major allies, and only had troops provided by small German states to bolster the small British Army. At the onset of the war, the British Army was less than 48,000 strong worldwide, and suffered from a lack of effective recruiting. By 1778, the army was pardoning criminals for military service and had extended the age range for service to be from 16 to 50. Although its officer and non-commissioned officer corps were relatively professional and experienced, this professionalism was diluted because wealthy individuals lacking military experience could purchase commissions and promotions. As a consequence, inexperienced officers sometimes found their way into positions of high responsibility"

professionalism was diluted because wealthy individuals lacking military experience could purchase commissions and promotions. As a consequence, inexperienced officers sometimes found their way into positions of high responsibility

Couldn't the same be said for many 18th century armies?

The Hanoverian kings were actually great military reformers, not in a dramatic sense, but in achieving change without major upheavals or putting entire sections of society's noses out of joint. Purchasing of commission was retained as long as it was because it helped fund the pay of serving and half-pay officers – so it was actually a net benefit in peacetime. In war, ways could usually be found to circumvent the seniority-over-merit conundrum.

All of the senior British commanders in America had prior experience – almost all of them with considerable success and solid (if unspectacular) reputations among their peers. Other than Burgoyne, who was promoted beyond his capabilities but was still massively popular at regimental levels, it's difficult to think of a senior officer serving in the AWI who was actually incompetent.

In a European context, the weakness of the British Army was that senior officers typically lacked experience (and any hope of ever attaining it) of leading large formations of troops much above brigade level, as the relative size of the Army meant it was always fighting with allies, invariably as a junior partner. Interestingly, this is the same weakness the Continental Army has (albeit at unit level, rather than brigade level) vis-a-vis their Regular opponents in the AWI.