"Bad at skirmishing?" Topic

Inspired by this thread: TMP link

To be bad or poor at skirmishing in the Napoleonic era means what exactly?

Bad shots?
Low initiative and unwilling to press opportunities?
Slow to roll out? Quick to roll in?
Bad targeting decisions?
Didn't skirmish in pairs with one man loaded at all times?
Nationality doctrine required too many paces between shooters making a screen impossible?
Didn't take advantage of available cover?

Maybe all of the above?

What does it mean to say "formation x" wasn't good at skirmishing? Describe skirmishing failure.

Lacl of soldiers used to excersizing personal initiative as opposed to standing in ranks being told exactly what to do.

I'd say all of the above, depending on which formation on which day.

Partially an affliction of gamers – are there really just 3 level of morale? or 4? or ….

Extra Crispy- you diagnosed the problem exactly.
Are these troops "ready", or "steady?" How is their "elan?" How much do pixie wings weigh?

Scharnhorst and other Prussian reformers thought the French were better skirmishers. I assume some of that was true and some was to press their agenda for reforming the army.

Experience plays a huge role in all of the above I imagine. As the hard campaigning veterans of the early wars died off, retired, or deserted the quality probably dropped significantly.

I imagine it would take 200 raw men skirmishing to give the same quality performance, to a general's expectations, that 100 veterans would give you.

Yes, it could be that everyone did the same thing, but experienced troops were better at it. From what I can tell, the French were willing to deploy more men as skirmishers than Allied nations. In doing so, more men gain experience compared to a similar number of Allied troops. However, there are any number of examples of the French not being as good as the Allies… depending on the time, place and troops involved. Read General Pelet's description of Ney's attack at Bussaco.

A good book available on Google, printed in the decades after the Napoleonic wars by a veteran lists what "Good Skirmishing" consists of:

On The Essentials of Good Skirmishing by Col. G. Gawler 1837

Free on Google:

link

Another useful reference is Principles of the Minor Operatons of War by General Lallemand and translated from the French by St. Vincent Troubridge, a field offices of the 7th Royal Fusiliers.

It has chapters on skirmishing, outposts, patrols, reconnaissances, the defense and attack of forests, and the occupation, defense, and attack of villages among other useful subjects.

it could be that everyone did the same thing

The point is, though, that everyone did not do the same thing. In the French army, the employment of skirmishers/troops in open order as the fire support element of an attack, forming a defensive line, or as a main maneuver unit was institutionalized in the French army through both experimentation before the wars and by hard-earned practice and experience.

And this was done without an army-wide regulation or instruction. That did not happen in the other armies of the period. There, the instruction came first, usually after being roughly handled by the French, and then the adoption of the use of skirmishers, though not on the scale of French employment.

Effective skirmishing:
Being smaller and harder to hit.
Making use of available cover whenever possible.
Receiving enough live fire training to shoot effectively.
Receiving training in individual aimed fire.
Being part of a unit (légère, jager) trained/expected to fight in skirmish order.
Experience fighting against irregular opponents and/or in woods, rough terrain, mountains…

Not-so-effective skirmishing:
A tall guy with a big hat with a big plume on it. Kinda kills the whole "hiding behind a rock" ploy.
Inability to shoot effectively leading to frustration and a tendency to close with the enemy w/bayonets.
Believing it is shameful for a soldier to hide.

effective skirmishing

showing initiative

ineffective skirmishing

no initiative

A Russian napoleonic period historian pointed to me about the battle field of Borodino, about my surprise ( old game with the paapropriate ready made ideas from at least the last decade- corrected since) the mass of Russian skirmishers forward and said they rooted there, been told and placed by officers, "stay there shoot the French until told to go".

Yes initiative and collective training.

Mmmm…I do not think I would characterize the actions of the Russian jagers at Doronino, Shevardino and the Utitsa woods as ineffective or portray them as dumb brutes rooted to the ground by careless officers. This is not to say that this did not happen, but I would hate to have anyone come away from this discussion with that as their sole impression of Russian skirmishing techniques.

The point is, though, that everyone did not do the same thing. In the French army, the employment of skirmishers/troops in open order as the fire support element of an attack, forming a defensive line, or as a main maneuver unit was institutionalized in the French army through both experimentation before the wars and by hard-earned practice and experience.

Brechtel198:

Certainly you have read Duhesme and his description of Austrian skirmish tactics during the Revolutionary Wars?

[1864 reprint of Duheme's Essai historique sur l'Infantrerie Legere page 72.] Duheme was present in Flanders during this time and has a great deal to say about the Austrians:

"These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed their ground long enough to make us waste time and men. They brought us from one position to another till they reached that which they really meant to defend. There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions whose ardour generally shattered itself against their entrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in the most perfect order, they in their turn, threw out skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder and unable to rally most of their men.

Sounds like your description: "the employment of skirmishers/troops in open order as the fire support element of an attack, forming a defensive line, or as a main maneuver unit" and this is in 1794 flanders.

Duhesme later in his work writes,

"We did not have other light infantry only the 12 battalions of foot chasseurs. The Austrians approached with more, more skilful and more tested light troops. The panic, fear and the routs of our troops left the columns of Valencians and Lille to address [the Austrians] as they slipped to the sides of these columns. Their riflemen, hidden behind shrubs, in ditches, afflicted our battalions, which, bravely in line, suffered ten-per-cent loses without seeing their enemy. "(p. 85)

Duhesme (p. 102) gives a graphic description of the Austrian light infantry tactics as it was experienced by him':

"In spring 1794, as already said, the Austrians opened the campaign in the north with the siege of Landrecies, they put up measures, which were suitable to weaken and to exhaust the French élan, which had been so disastrous for them in the past. They concentrated the observation army around that place, put into fortifications, placed big reserves and advanced the advance guards as far as possible. These well commanded advance guards did contest the terrain only as long as possible to inflict losses in time and tirailleurs. By that they drew us from one position to the other till to those they really intended to defend. Then they let us disperse our last battalions and let us exhaust ourselves, whose fire was broken by their fortified lines. Fresh troops emerged in most splendid order from them, placed themselves as tirailleurs into our flanks, and attacked as such with big advantage our disordered and exhausted soldiers and disarrayed units of whose majority couldn't even rally around their colours. Fortunate for those divisions, where a cautious general had retained a reserve which was able to cover the retreat and to prevent a rout."

And then there are the Austrian reports:

"Hauptdisposition, fur die verschiedene Armee-theile."
Hauptquartier Valenciennes, den 1ten April 1794."

"Because the enemy is very easy being pushed back, when we can advance into his flanks or in the back, each column reserves 200 volunteers at the start [of the fighting/attack], each hundred with a captain and 2 officers, which have to be bold and determined men. These men are destined, together with the light infantry and to support these, left and right from the road [formed movement was mostly only possible along the roads, see former messages], to turn the wings and flanks, [of] the enemy troops, positions and post, to facilitate the advance of the columns, or to turn, or storm, the enemy entrenchments when present."
[signed] Prinz Coburg, F.M.

Italics mine. Sounds like your description of French tactics to me: "the employment of skirmishers/troops in open order as the fire support element of an attack, forming a defensive line, or as a main maneuver unit."

A French description of French and Austrian skirmisher action. In 1793, General Giradon informs us about the way in which one employed them:

"the Doriol General, after having made signaled with four shots, detached 100 riflemen per battalion and forced the enemy line back on Bouxwiller. The two battalions of the 2e regiment, that of Chaumont, and those of the 1st regiment, 7th of Meurthe, Dieuze and Chàteau-Saline were sent to go to edge of a wood close to Mietesheim, with order to excavate this wood and to flush out the enemy; 100 riflemen were detach by battalion. Unfortunately, the enemy riflemen made a very sharp fire: our battalions could not support the effort. The Enemy forced us to retire." Hake, p. LXVII, citing the Newspaper of the major Girardon (Files of the War.)

The Austrians had always more riflemen than us in this war. Brushmaker will still notice in 1800 "this crowd of riflemen who usually accompany the attacks by the Austrians." [Of Cugnac, Campagne of the reserve army, fall II, p. 432]

The French learned such skirmish tactics well and indeed institutionalized them to a great degree. That doesn't mean the tactics were startlingly new or significantly different from the tactical uses of say Austrian skirmishers as early as 1794. All the elements were there that you assign to French light infantry tactics.

My readings had brought me to the conclusion that Austrian light infantry was excellent. But as far as I can see they have a hard time developing th euniversal infantryman, and their line infantry never gained the proficieny of the french in skirmishing in the later revolutionary and earlier imperial period. So when skirmishig became a more universal thing, they were at a loss when tehy did not have enough dedicated light infantry around.

jefrey3
Not brutes but people by habits, way of life, not used to take initiatives unless told to ( out of their homes). As one of our Russians in hiding and with much knowledge said here in one of the utterly interesting past discussions, some of the best Jaeger units were recruited from foresters / hunters. Probably free men in a similar social/ mental state as most French of the period.

I remember this ability for initiative was stressed out in warpac/ nato time as one supposed advantage for us.

Hungarians etc. with a serf society type were also probably hampered the same way.
It could be an interesting socio economic angle to look at.

@Sparta

This impression may rise from the lack of information, seemingly the Austrians were not such at a loss, here some expamples – which I pasted and copied – most likley form the very well informed McLaddie

"Yes, that use of supports was important. However, the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians did deploy infantry by battalion. Archduke Charles in his instructions of 1796, addressed Coberg's large-scale use of skirmishers in Holland 1794: "This misuse [of entire units as skirmishers] must be opposed because it weakens the impetus of the attack."
A few other Austrian examples:
"(…) I will not refrain from informing Your Royal Higness that 3 battalions Lacy & 2 battalions Von Schröder already have arrived in the encampment left of the road from Ostrach to Foulendorf; the 3rd battalion Von Schröder however, which was used for skirmishing inside the forest, is still dispersed and will arrive late – my quarters are inside the first house in Specht ['Spöck' nowedays]"

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv, Vienna; Alte Feldakten, Deutschland 1799/3/225;
The Austrian history of the 1809 battle Krieg 1809 is filled with examples of line troops skirmishing. At Znaym 1809:
"The advanced pickets of the Mittrowsky IR10 engaged, and were supported by their battalion, and covered by a 12 pdr position battery, obstructed the enemy's advance, until one battalion of Kollowrath IR11, and two peices of ordnance came up." Later, "a second battalion was detached to the height, and a chain of riflemen formed, to force those of the enemy back into the village."
A later account, by an officer in 3rd battalion IR63 Bianchi , published in Mitteilungen des kuk Heeresmuseum (1902-1907), describes masses deploying skirmishers at Valeggio in February 1814.
"GM Baron Stutterheim rode up and ordered us to form division masses, then to wheel to the left and march off towards the enemy; muskets were to be loaded on the march". The masses were drawn up in a chequer board arrangement with IR63 on the left. "Our masses sent out skirmishers (from IR3 Erzherzog Karl, IR4 Deutchmeister and IR63); the four guns, which were attached to our brigade, unlimbered and took up their firing positions and now the firing was general. The enemy deployed gradually across a longer front and forced us to dissolve the masses into open order skirmish lines.
'To dissolve battalions into skirmish order would … be a mistake.' -Schwarzenberg, 1812 "

Agreed Frog…very interesting topic to explore.

One difficulty we have here is that "skirmishing" cover a a number of different tasks. General outpost duty, for example requires different skills to sustaining fire in the heat of battle.

But we are probably more interested in the heavy-duty battlefield roles of skirmishers. and here my understanding is that the best skirmishers fought as organised units – with a chain of pairs out front and supports to the rear. The chain would be relieved at regular intervals. To do this well required training and discipline – which often equated to experience. Being a good shot helps, of course, this perhaps matter less in the big picture.

Less effective skirmishers tended to huddle for mutual moral support, and fire away blindly, and burn off their ammunition too quickly. I think it is the discipline of pacing the firing (especially by taking the time to aim properly…) that was the critical thing. Rifles enforced this discipline by being slow to load – one reason they may have been a favoured skirmish weapon, though not by the French.

Matthew and Frog:

It is a difficult topic because of the wide variety of tasks, often combined between SYW expectations and later Napoleonic uses. Yet, the knowledge of skirmish tactics wasn't unknown. Even in the early years. For instance,
Scharnhorst wrote his Military Field Pocket Book in 1793.

In Section IX, Chapter II, he describes the conduct of detachments including infantry skirmishers in 'petite l'guerre. Yet, buried in Chapter V, unannounced and mislabled according to our expectations is this:

§. 151. Conduct of Infantry when opposed to Infantry.

The more you engage the enemy, while you are advancing,…, the more you lessen the advantage he would otherwise have of being able to fire more frequently than you.

4) If the enemy has artillery and you have not, or if his troops are covered—advance rapidly, and fire only now and then for the purpose of keeping the attention of your men occupied. Small detached parties and skirmishers should be advanced in front, who will fire at 400 paces distance to induce the enemy to fire in return, and will endeavor to make him continue his fire; unless this is done, you will most probably be routed by the more powerful fire of the enemy, when you approach within a short distance of him. [page 181]

The Austrians had serious internal difficulties with their Boarder/Grenzer populations including several revolts from 1796 through 1800. This led Austrian officers to mistrust them and became less inclined to use them as light infantry, instead treating them like line troops where they could watch them.

What is obvious is that the Austrians became less capable of putting skilled light infantry in the field at the same time the French were becoming very proficient at the tactics and far more organized in their application. Even so, the tactics and methods themselves remained largely unchanged. The Instructions written for the British/Colonial 60th Regiment in 1756 reads very much like the methods described in Davout's 1811 instructions from individual actions to regimental deployments.

The Napoleonic wars lasted for twenty years. There is little reason to assume that every nation's army retained the same abilities in skirmishing throughout, or only just improved through experience considering the huge losses in manpower all nations suffered.

Certainly you have read Duhesme and his description of Austrian skirmish tactics during the Revolutionary Wars?
"These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed their ground long enough to make us waste time and men. They brought us from one position to another till they reached that which they really meant to defend. There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions whose ardour generally shattered itself against their entrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in the most perfect order, they in their turn, threw out skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder and unable to rally most of their men. Sounds like your description: "the employment of skirmishers/troops in open order as the fire support element of an attack, forming a defensive line, or as a main maneuver unit" and this is in 1794 flanders.

No, it doesn't. It seems to me that you are attempting to equate what the Austrians did to what the French were doing, in the same way that you attempted, wrongly, to equate the actions of the British artillery at Talavera in 1809 to what Senarmont did at Friedland in 1807. The two, then as now, are completely different.

Further, regarding Duhesme, , the following should be noted, as stated in Bayonets of the Republic by John Lynn, 269-270:
‘It is true that one light infantry commander of the Armee du Nord, Duhesme, wrote an extensive Precis historique de l'infanterie legere; however, as already pointed out, he is not a reliable witness regarding the early years of the wars of the French Republic. Duhesme's categorical statements do not tally with the battlefield reports of the period; in fact, he contradicts his own dispatches and his own manuscript, ‘Memoire Militaire,' a historical narrative of the era now in the Archives de la guerre at Vincennes. His Precis overemphasized the disheveled confusion of the Nord, and, while the rationale behind his exaggerations may be understandable, he still must be read with caution. Understandably but unfortunately, the lack of good accounts has forced many to turn to Duhesme for their sole source of information on light infantry 1792-1794.'

Interestingly, Lynn found reports of five engagements ‘of major proportions' that were fought by the French ‘entirely en tirailleur' during the action, but not all the time: Hondschoote, Roncq, Lannoy, Turcoing, and Mouscron. At Hondschoote, the entire French army fought en tirailleur and Reynier mentioned in his journal regarding Mouscron that, during the pursuit of the enemy, ‘the battalions were not able to follow in order, the infantry was en tirailleurs.' See Lynn, 265-277.

This is what Foy said describing a French attack-note that all three combat arms are present:

‘The action would be opened by a cloud of sharpshooters, some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his artillery by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they also received considerable reinforcements to increase their overall effect. It was rare for any army to have placed its flanks in impregnable positions; in any case every position presents natural loopholes which favor an attacker. Against such points the sharpshooters would concentrate their efforts, and elan and inspiration were not often lacking at such times amongst such troops. Once the chink in the foe's armor had been revealed, it became the focal point for the main effort. The horse artillery would gallop up and open fire from close range with canister. Meanwhile, the attacking force would be moved up in the indicated direction, the infantry advancing in column (for it had little fire to offer), the cavalry in regiments and squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy bullets or cannon shot began to slacken…The soldiers would begin to move forward as the drums beat the charge…'

Lallemand expressed his views, similar to Foy's observationi, in his volume, Principles of the Minor Operations in Wars, 38-39:

Russians nor we have mastered the maniere de tirailleur.'-Radetzky, 1813.

‘A new system of fighting was introduced. This system consisted in the calling into play a considerable number of skirmishers-and to that France owes, in part, her early successes.'

‘During the first campaigns, when an army was to be attacked, or a position defended, a part of the battalions detached as skirmishers performed in front of these battalions duties of an advanced guard at the commencement of an attack, sweeping the enemy from the whole front; and, in the same manner, these detachments formed in skirmishing order and dispersed along the front of their battalions, commenced the onset by a well-directed fire, which annoyed the enemy, shook his ranks, and thus weakened the resistance which he might otherwise have offered to the masses or the advancing lines. So much for the attack; now for the defense.'

‘When the enemy, after having forced the line of advanced posts, approached the position occupied by the army, a cloud of skirmishers thrown out in front of this position often succeeded, by the efficiency of their fire, in putting a considerable portion of their adversaries ‘hors de combat,' carrying disorder into their ranks, and often forcing them to abandon their undertaking.'

‘Thus the objects proposed by the enemy's generals miscarried; the attacks of posts were repulsed, or important posts abandoned. The enemy's lines thus exposed to a fire of skirmishers, were quickly thrown into disorder from the losses they suffered; they broke their ranks, and the loss of the battle followed…'

The following observations from two officers regarding the French also is instructive:

‘Probably never before has a greater number of light troops appeared on the battlefield than among the ranks of the present French army, nor has military history ever been given more irrefutable examples of the essential value of such troops than during this war. If the campaigns are studied, one may be tempted to maintain that, at least on the French side, this is entirely a war of light troops: the Republic certainly owes most of her victories to her light infantry.'-Scharnhorst.

‘…The French armies, compelled by the situation in which they found themselves and aided by their natural genius, had devised a system of tactics that permitted them to fight on open or broken ground, in open or close order, but this without their being aware of their system…everywhere in the autumn of 1793 they won because of their open order and tirailleurs. In the spring of 1794, the battles…were won in the same manner. Decisive actions fought in close order were rare, though not unheard of-they occurred only when it was impossible to gain the objective through skirmishers.'-Scharnhorst.

‘The French, since the Revolution, have so successfully introduced such a new military system, that it becomes impossible to oppose them effectually, by any other mode than adopting one founded on similar principles. They send a number of riflemen in front of their lines to annoy their adversary, and conceal behind them the different movements of their columns: nothing can be effected against this disposition, but by opposing light troops to light troops.'-Baron Gross.

Here is the viewpoint of three senior Austrian officers on the employment of troops in open order/skirmishers:

‘Skirmishers lacked strength…unless supported by a formed body of troops giving them drive, persistence and steadiness. Regular, trained, and solid infantry courageously advancing with closed-ranks at a rapid pace, supported by its artillery, cannot be impeded by scattered skirmishers…It should close with the enemy as swiftly and in as good order as possible, overthrow him and decide the battle.-the Archduke Charles.

‘In action troops must remember not to lose time with firing. Only a few tirailleurs are necessary to screen the front. If these are followed by troops advancing courageously in close-order, with bands playing, and keeping their formation, such as advance cannot be repulsed by an enemy fighting in open order.'-Zach, Melas' chief of staff, 1800.

‘…fighting en tirailleur should be done only in a very restrictive fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the maniere de tirailleur.'-Radetzky, 1813.

Lastly, the following comments, one from Christopher Duffy, and the other fro Johann Ewald, might be helpful in understanding what the French had come up with and continually developed, beginning about 1760 and continued with experimentation in the 1770s and finally practical application beginning in 1792.

‘Mesnil-Durand, Joly de Maizeroy and Saxe were among the authorities who called for a closer working of regular and skirmishing tactics. Marshal Broglie did something to put this notion into practical effect when he assumed command in western Germany in 1760. He upgraded the grenadiers, established a company of chasseurs in each battalion of the line…Broglie and his fellows encountered much opposition from conservative circles, but in his officially approved Regulation of 1764 he was able to explain how regulars could be employed in skirmish order to prepare the way for columns of attack. The seeds had been sown. A light company was formed in every battalion of English infantry in 1771-2, by when military Europe was being conditioned to accept that regular troops could be used in ways that had once been the preserve of the Croats and the free corps.'-Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 279.

‘In order to obviate the inconveniences which must arise from a want of light troops, it would be advantageous for an army that the troops of the line should be instructed to perform the duties of light troops.'-Johan Ewald, A Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops, 1803.

‘When a certain number of light infantry or light horse fights dispersed, it is called flanking, skirmishing, or acting en tirailleur. This kind of fighting requires more training than any other, as the light horse or jager is generally left to himself, and must follow his own judgment. Frequent use of calls must be made, and the men well-practised to obey them, as given with the trumpet, bugle, or drum. They must also be taught to extend briskly, form a kind of chain, or a half circle, and to occupy without delay the whole of such ground as may be advantageous, or which has been pointed out to them. They must know how to outflank the enemy's tirailleurs, and be so alert and collected, that should a single flanker of the enemy separate from his party, he must at the same instant be killed or made prisoner; and as they frequently engage singly, their bravery must sometimes be temerity, and they must be good shots, in order to command the respect of the enemy. For these reasons, every jager cannot be employed in this kind of duty, and the officers commanding companies must of course endeavor to know among their men such as are fit for it.'

‘Companies must be divided into sections of flankers, according to individual merit; for instance, the bravest and fittest non-commissioned officers and men will be called first flankers, the best after them are called second, and the lowest class will be third. Although jagers be thus picked out for this kind of duty, every jager must nevertheless be taught to perform it, as in war it frequentsly happens, that whole companies and whole corps must be employed to skirmish, as in reconnoitering, or to conceal a maneuver from the enemy.'-Ewald, 37-39.

The French and the Austrians had two completely different tactical systems. Skirmishing had been done for years, but the employment of regular troops as skirmishers, and skirmishers in large numbers, combined with infantry in closed formations was a French innovation as shown.

however, as already pointed out, he is not a reliable witness regarding the early years of the wars of the French Republic. Duhesme's categorical statements do not tally with the battlefield reports of the period; in fact, he contradicts his own dispatches and his own manuscript

Alas this can be said of pretty much any contemporary commentator in these wars, especially when they try to generalise about tactics "This is what the French did…" etc. The only way to get an accurate picture of the tactics actually used is to pick apart the individual battles and work it out for yourself.. Context turns out to be all, in my experience. This is no doubt as true of light infantry tactics as it is of old chestnuts like French column attacks on British lines.

Yes it most certainly can.

But the point made, I think, is that Duhesme contradicts himself, which Lynn undoubtedly found during his research.

And that is why Duhesme needs to be used with care.

I don't agree that we cannot get an accurate picture of the tactics of the period from period memoirs of those who actually participated or commanded. Foy makes an excellent picture of what happened in an attack, and that is from the 1790s.

I found it interesting that above the term 'riflemen' was highlighted and the point brought out that the French didn't use the rifle, but kept to the smoothbore musket for all of their infantry.

The rifle took longer to load and was shorter than the musket. And the rifle does not a good light infantryman make. Solid light infantry armed with a rifle is one thing, but merely having light infantry armed with a rifle does not make an advantage in the field. And it should be noted that the percentage of riflemen to the remainder of the light infantry is generally low.

In short, the rifle was not a battle winner at this period in military history. Their are many myths and legends of its use and effectiveness, especially during the War of the Revolution and the battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812. And a little careful research will put the rifle during the period as an excellent weapon, but neither a battle nor a war winner.