"Use of French Leger Regiments in the light infantryRole" Topic

I have been reading Andrew Field's excellent book on Quatre Bras. In it he talks about several leger regiments and their deployment in the battle as whole units in the skirmish role. He goes on to state that Leger Battalions were better suited to this role than their line counterparts. This is the first book that I can recall where an author suggests this. To this point, I have been operating under the assumption that despite their titles Leger Battalions and their line counterparts could fight in both open and close order. Thoughts?

Rob

Some did both, some Leger were light only in name and may not have the ability to fight in open order. Some line did both roles as well but not all. Some line might not even have a adequately trained Lt. company to do even the basic skirmishing.

Depends on the time period. 1805 – 1807 sure, most Ligne Regiments could operate in open order but after that period it's a bit more mixed, unit by unit.

I believe he says in his book the reason the 2eme Leger was deployed on the right flank in skirmish order to fight the 95th rifles was due to their light infantry ability to fight in open order. This also seems the reason they also led the division so they could screen the rest of the division as it deployed. You also have to remember the French Army was much better trained than 1813,1814 army because many of the veterans from Spain and Russian prison camps came back to the army.

I remember reading in James Arnold book on the Battle of Friedland 1807 he talks about how one brigade took less casualties due to the fact all the officers had served in the light infantry their whole career so they were able to fight in open order better than their line infantry counter part who were not use to this type of fighting.

Michael

All nations operated under very similar SOPs: The specialist units, those designated as light infantry, were used first when available and if needed, line infantry supported them.

How much experience light units had visa vie line units varied a great deal, and regardless, line units were used for skirmishing. Obviously, in every army some units were better than others. Leiven in his book Russia Against Napoleon cites examples where Russian Jagers were much worse than Napoleon's infantry and in others, as good or better. Yet, they both skirmished. For instance, contrary to some authors, prussian Line troops skirmished at Jena and Auerstadt, in most cases supporting light troops.

Bottom line? French Legere battalions would 1. be used first to skirmish when available 2. could and did deploy as skirmishers in whole battalions and 3. Did so from 1795 to 1815.

However, this in-itself is not all that different from Prussian Fusilier battalions deploying as skirmishers in 1795 or all three battalions of the Russian Pavlov Grenadiers deploying as skirmishers in wooda at Luetzen.

Wargame rules tend to treat skirmish formations very differently than other formations, they can or they can't. This is a problem because even the worse troops could skirmish to some extent [or that is the argument for the French 'clouds of skirmishers' in the early years of the Revolution.]

Some treats skirmish as a very different animal compared to other combat formations. Rules allow all nations to form square and columns, but we know that all troops were not equally good at either. So why deny troops the ability to skirmish if they did simply because they weren't as good at it as say the French?

I thinks the last comments by McLaddie are correct but how to portray in wargames rules good or bad skirmishing qualities. Would like to see sugestions.

On one yahoo group someone pointed the new Bernadottesque Swedish regulations in ? 1810 stating all troops donskirmish so much that specific lights ceased to exist. Nearly everything in it was imported from Frenh practice.
The 1815 oob where many " lights" are together with other divisions without yet spreading tons of skirmishers, prove that all do more or less well depending of commanders will / attetion to training, and are expected to do so.
Old Brit ( maybe from the " main source" = Penninsula) diehard gaming habits persevere.

Andrew Field as not as steeped in the details of Napoleonic warfare as you might suppose from the number of books he has written, and less so for the French system than the British. In this comment, as others, I think he has assumed that the French system was similar to the British one. One where only light companies and light infantry regiments had the right training to skirmish. In theory anyway.

Actually the French light regiments operated the same organisation and drill manual as line regiments. The difference was in regimental history more than anything.

My understanding is that all French infantry were expected to be able to skirmish if that's what the tactical situation required. The newer and less well trained units would be less able to do this.

At Quatre Bras the French subjected allied troops to very prolonged skirmish attack. Although this was mostly done by skirmish chains supported by columns of formed troops I do not believe that just the voltigeurs (or Light regiments) would have been able to sustain this. The fusilier and grenadier companies must have been cycled in.

Having said all of which, it is clear that French commanders committed Light regiments to skirmish duties more often than Line ones – their regimental history and ethos clearly gave them an edge over the Line regiments.

I try to model this by having three grades of French infantry: veteran, trained and raw. The veterans can act as proper light infantry; the trained have some skirmish capability; the raw troops are weak at skirmishing. Apart from the fresh conscripts, Light regiments default to veteran; line default trained – but in the best divisions all the regiments are veteran.

As McLaddie suggests, all troops in this era could be asked to skirmish. Some were better than others. Being designated light infantry wasn't necessarily important in this. And there could be a great deal of variation within the same army – the Russians being a particular example.

Anyway, that's how I see it!

General Foy wrote in his work, History of the War in the Peninsula, under Napoleon, and published in 1827 the following:

The voltigeurs constituted the real light infantry of France, inasmuch as they were made to perform habitually the service of tirailleurs. The regiments of light infantry, as they were called, were only so in name, for they were composed, armed, and exercised like the rest of the infantry.

Nice post Ligniere, and with the source provided too.

Tom

The French used tirailleurs in 3 ways

Tirailleurs de marche
Tirailleurs de bataille
Tirailleurs en grande bande

Foy's comment referring to the Voltigeurs respectivly the eclaireurs in the days of the French Revolution had to be applied tirailleurs de marche and de bataille.

But voltigeurs are in that sense also light infantry and more so than the Chasseurs that they were used for any use of light infantry, like river crossings, or to make reconaissances, ambushes etc.

So the French commander had several option to use the voltigeurs, they could be used as tirailleur de marche et de bataille, but also – as it happened ever so often – to form ad hoc units of voltiguers – which would perform special tasks, but not necessarily all of them then were used as skirmishers.

For tirailleurs en grande bande, one would use any regiment regardless of their nomination, just what was at hand and on the spot.

Still – one has to agree that the French light infantry had a tradition to be used more in skirmish order than the line units, at least in the days of the empire, they also would be used to form a front line of skirmishers of a division, as to be the first battle line, while the brigades of infantry would form lines two and three respectivly.

For anyone seeking a detailed explanation of the use and employment of French skirmishers, I'd recommend the following book by Terry Crowdy, Napoleon's Infantry Handbook. (Crowdy also wrote L'Incomparable, related to the history of the 9e Leger, and is also highly recommended].

link

See Part V: Tactical Organization and Drill
Chapter 23 Skirmishing

The book can be dry, but it gives excellent insight into the workings of the French military machine.

Supposing battalion deployed in skirmish order as a screen- what frontage would they have been expected to cover? their brigade or their division?

Here's what Crowdy writes:

In the Napoleonic period the light infantry regiments underwent significant changes. In 1804 each light infantry battalion converted it's second company into voltigeurs (a move copied by the line the following year). Following the changes of 18 February 1808, the special nature of light infantry regiments appears to have diminished. During the later imperial period in particular, voltigeurs were widely recognized as the true light infantry of the French Army, with a different recruitment process, armament and tactics. Whether they came from line or light battalions, the voltigeurs were often combined at divisional or brigade level into special battalions which performed the traditional advance guard role and took on an increasing burden when it came to battlefield skirmishing.

My understanding is that a single peleton/company was expected to cover the frontage of a battalion, with only 1/3 of it's strength at any one time in the skirmish chain, the remaining portion in reserve/support positions. These would be rotated in and out of the chain, or used to reinforce the chain as necessary.

If a voltigeur peleton/company was 100 strong, that means 32+ men in the chain, in 16 files, to cover a battalion frontage of about 160 files frontage. If each file is 22" wide, thats a pair of skirmishers every six yards or so.

The instructions issued to Davout's corps in 1811, prior to the Russian invasion, were meant to ensure that the center and grenadier companies had the same essential knowledge as the voltigeurs when in came to understanding the concepts of skirmishing. These were instituted, because it was felt that the voltigeurs might not always be available with the parent regiments/brigades, and that their role would need to be filled by center or grenadier companies. Therefore, some training was considered appropriate to ensure a level of sophistication and competence.

The instructions issued to Davout's corps in 1811, prior to the Russian invasion, were meant to ensure that the center and grenadier companies had the same essential knowledge as the voltigeurs when in came to understanding the concepts of skirmishing.

Yes, but Morand [who was actually the author] noted the knolwedge the voltigeurs possessed, but also noted a copy of the instructions to was sent to General Barbanègre of the 33e léger. The reason was not stated, but it was for the General's feedback on the content.

All regiments had voltigeurs including the leger battalions, and they are an example of the specialists being sent out before the center companies. If so, then it is obvious that the voltigeurs through that 'habitual' use, would become the most proficient. None-the-less, the center companies of a leger regiment would be deployed before line troops in most cases.

That center troops of line and some Leger battalions didn't have the same amount of experience, even in Davout's corps. This is illustrated by Morand's and Davout's efforts to have the center exercise with the voltigeurs.

I agree that the various 'systems' of skirmishing, while the same in most cases, were utilized in different ways. Here is Pelet's eye-witness description of Ney's attack at Bussaco:

The French Campaign in Portugal, 1810-1811
An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet. Translated by Donald D. Horward 1973
Page 181

"As Loison's division was thrown back, a brigade of Marchand's division [of Ney's Corps] was pushed forward, but too late. It occupied the abutment beyond the passage of the upper Moura after a dispute with the enemy; each occupied it successively. The English maneuvered and fell back as soon as they received some cannon fire. Our brigade, attacked on its flank by artillery, was thrown to the left of the road. After fighting for some time, it found itself almost entirely dispersed into groups of skirmishers, and in the end it was necessary to support this unit with the second brigade. Thus we covered the entire slope below the convent of Bussaco while the enemy successively reinforced their line of skirmishers, hidden behind the rocks and the trees, but these Allied troops were not allowed to stay there very long, they were recalled by horns and replaced by fresh troops—an excellent method neglected by us for too long. Our system permitted the French regiments to be dispersed during a battle and in the end only the officers and bravest soldiers were left, and they were completely disgusted, even with having to fight for an entire day. The Portuguese were interspersed among the British; they acted perfectly, serving in the covered positions. Nevertheless, our skirmishers gained ground on the enemy and from time to t time pushed them beyond the reserves, which they were obliged to reinforce.

Italics and bold mine. [Two paragraphs on how Mermet's division reinforces Marchand's two brigades, and the how the rest of the day passed after the French attacks were repulsed, both sides firing cannon and skirmishing. ]

p. 182-183
….Thus the day passed, skirmishing and losing men uselessly. I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casualties or, as one my day—drop by drop. Two new attacks against the position, just like the first, would not have been more deadly. I could not resist saying a few words. The skirmishing ended on our side and the enemy started it again. As a matter of fact, it was extremely difficult to stop bickering except by withdrawing our troops, and this was not without inconvenience for either advantageous terrain or the morale of the army. However, I do not think skirmishing can be allowed for its own sake in any case, unless it is to prepare attacks, cover movements, or momentarily detain the enemy at one point while they are being attacked or outmaneuvered at another. General Reynier had wisely withdrawn his troops and taken up positions. There was hardly any more fighting in this direction.

Now, this is five years after Austerlitz and Jena. Here entire brigades have dispersed as skirmishers. Pelet calls this kind of skirmish part of "Our system" and compares it unfavorably to the British. [Read Oman's account of this attack… in his version, the French attack in columns.]

The bottom line for me is that we should be slow to make sweeping generalizations about how it was without noting that there existed a lot of variation, even within the same army over the twenty year period of the Revolution and Empire.

For example, when Crowdy writes:

During the later imperial period in particular, voltigeurs were widely recognized as the true light infantry of the French Army, with a different recruitment process, armament and tactics. Whether they came from line or light battalions, the voltigeurs were often combined at divisional or brigade level into special battalions which performed the traditional advance guard role and took on an increasing burden when it came to battlefield skirmishing.

However, there are some caveats to this. When Crowdy writes the Voltigeurs had "a different recruitment process, armament and tactics", this is only partly true because
1. The Leger before 1804 and they and the voltigeurs after both had a particular recruiting process, starting with their height that continued through to 1815.
2. The tactics weren't different than any unit skirmishing: Reference Davout's 1811 instructions as an example.
3. The voltigeurs MIGHT have different armament, but not ever entirely.
4. Voltigeurs and Grenadiers both were formed into separate battalions for special roles throughout the wars, not just in the latter period.
5. The reasons for grouping voltigeurs into separate battalions at the final years of the war was because really experienced light infantry were becoming scarce and generally wasted if scattered amont all the relatively inexperienced infantry, both light and line.
6. The line may have become as proficient at skirmishing as the Leger in a number of instances, but the fact is that Napoleon went to extrodinary lengths to keep the ratio of leger and line at 3:1 right up to 1814 and beyond. If there was no difference, then there would have been little reason to designate them leger, let alone still employ them that way, including the continuing practice of spreading them out among the divisions.
7. Up till the end of the wars, Leger regiments received light infantry training, including the practice of deploying in two ranks whenever they were expecting a skirmish action.

We can kibbiz about the level of quality and other differences between Leger and line infantry in the French army depending on the period, the theatre and particular troops, but the fact remains that there was a difference in training, place in divisional organization, perception and use throughout the wars.

Crowdy writes text book style based on Bardin, it is not reflecting the diversity of the system of skirmishing.

We should not confuse skirmishing, a tactical formation with light infantry duties and specialities.

Voltigeurs became the primary formation for light infantry duties and tirailleurs de marche et de bataille, but when not at hand – what then?

One of the big downfalls and decline of French infantry was the new organisation of 1808 which made battalions rediculously small when the elite companies were detached.

For tirailleurs en grande bande – all units were taken to be used – regardless of line or light, at the battle of Hanau 5000 skirmishers were in the main woods.

There is a good discussion about skirmishers and how the French used it in the works of

Rogniat : Considerations sur l'art de guerre and then the refutation of
Marbot : Remarques critiques
and
Rognait : Réponse aux notes critiques de Napoléon

all are available on the net for free download

Voltigeurs did not have different armament in regard that they were equippend with a smoothbore musket as well, and should have had a musqueton de dragons which was a bit shorter than the usual fusil d'infanterie.

Great discussion gentlemen. That really helped me out. While there are exceptions in general, from say 1809 onward:

1 – Voltigeurs, because of their training and experience have to be rated in a wargame setting superior to that of their Fusilier/Chasseur/Grenadier/Carabinier compatriots when deployed as tirailleurs.

2. – All infantry can be deployed in a skirmish capacity but its true combat effectiveness man for man would not equal that of the Voltigeurs.

3. – Leger battalions would need to be taken on a case by case basis to see if they would warant the voltigeur bonus.

Rob

Duc de Limbourg 15 Oct 2015 11:35 p.m. PST
I thinks the last comments by McLaddie are correct but how to portray in wargames rules good or bad skirmishing qualities. Would like to see sugestions.

I have a very simple approach to this question of differing quality of skirmishers. Skirmishers fire as individuals – one dice each – 6 to hit (5 or 6 point blank). Leger Voltigeurs & Rifles gain 1 in 3 (so 3 men get 4 dice). French Line may skirmish but lose 1 in 3 (So 3 men get 2 dice), Spanish new light regiments lose 1 in 2 (So 2 men get 1 dice). (Skirmishers themselves suffer half casualties).