"What happened when cavalry charged artillery?" Topic

I believe asked this question a few months` back on TMP and the response was very helpful.

Gamers are often left with the notion that a successful wargames tactic is also therefore a legitimate historical one and there seems often to be a shortfall between what wargames rules allow or include and a reflection on table of what the standard operating practices of the day were.
Recently, I found a local heated discussion about the effectiveness of frontal cavalry charges against artillery batteries showed this to be so.

In my own Grand Manoeuvre rules, I have allowed for crews to resist cavalry or evade from cavalry attacks, and made close range artillery fire potentially decisive, but I was wondering what your experiences and thoughts were on this subject?

I`ve just uploaded my optional cavalry v artillery combat rules as a free download here:

link

Even the battery of Drouot at Hanau was in danger to be captured by Bavarian cavalry, only the timely counter charge by French cuirassiers prevented that.
In general batteries, even such as that of Senarmont at Friedlang (supported by two battalions of infantry) were supported either by cavalry or infantry.
So unless batteries are not supported and protected by either infantry or cavarly they are in danger to be captured

IMHO, artillery crews were not trained to fight in close combat and would evade if at all possible. If they could not get away in time, then the cavalry would ride them down. Hence artillery batteries need to be supported by infantry.

When attacking artillery, cavalry would adopt open order and with a troop or squadron attempt to flank the guns.

It is entirely impossible for unlimbered artillery to "evade" cavalry. Artillerymen carried muskets and were trained to defend their selves against cavalry. Unless they were lancers it was difficult for cavalry to do much harm to artillerymen using their equipment to hide and fight back. The problem occurred when the horsemen got into the caisson lines. They would saber the horses and drivers. To prevent this, the drivers would take off with the horses and caissons and while the cavalry by its nature could not remain on the battery, guns can't fire without ammunition or move without horses.

Even after the cavalry was gone it would take lots of time to put things right. To represent this, Craig Taylor and I designed an optional rule, "Rout in Place."

It was bad form for gunners to abandon their guns and once they did artillerymen rarely returned. At Waterloo while mny abandoned their guns, few returned, the others kept running or hid till the battle was over, which didn't make the artillery popular with Wellington.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

You should check out the Battle of Miner Creek in the ACW. Not a definitive illustration by any means as the Confederates had a 3-1 advantage, the federals had no artillery, the rebels had quite a few troops equipped in federal uniforms which helped FoG of War greatly.
Although the Union charge faltered for some reason, they did carry on and got under the guns to mix it up with the Rebel dismounted troops.
It does show that a full blown charge directly at artillery and formed blocks of troops was not a preferred tactic! ;)

Ratisbon touches on the subject I was going to bring up. Assuming we are talking about an unsupported battery that was caught with its pants down, wouldn't it make sense for the commander of the regiment to break the regiment into groups of squadrons and try to hit at least one flank of the battery whle still posing a threat to the front of the battery?

The question of Mercer at Waterloo will keep coming up here. He claims that his battery beat off frontal charges from elite French cavalry. However, his battery would have been anchored on infantry squares, so not possible to outflank. I think he also said that the bodies of the horses killed in earlier charges became an obstacle to later ones.

I tend to go along with ratisbon and have routed artillery count as destroyed for the reasons he gives.

I don't allow gunners to evade, but then I don't play Napoleonic games or know that much about it. I play and know a bit about the SYW and guns didn't come in and out of action like this.

As for the effectiveness of a cavalry charge Vs artillery, an important consideration is the speed at which one is carried out – a speed rarely accurately allowed for under most wargame rules. Example: In 1750 (memory) Frederick ordered that his cavalry should charge from 1200 yards. The first third was at the trot, the second at the gallop, and the third at full speed. This meant the cavalry covered the ground in about two minutes. Artillery would only get a few shots in that time, and then at a fast moving target, and it would take some nerve to deliver the last round of cannister at best range. If that round didn't stop them, and the artillery had no close support…….

In one Napoleonic set (long ago now so can't remember which) the artillery could elect to evade (basically run to nearest friendly infantry if there are some around), or to stand and fire. To stand and fire they needed to pass a morale test, and then rolled to see at what range they fired at the cavalry, if eg they fired at 18" and the cavalry started the move 12" away, then the guns were deemed not to have fired in time. As you can see this could go either way, canister at 1" being the other end of the equation.

Can't believe noone has mentioned possibly the most famous cavalry charge against artillery in history…

First line:

Half a league, half a league,

How many people don't know which charge?

It was the first thing I thought of too.

And, even having been shot at from every angle for 2000m they still cleared the gun line to their front after a short melee with those gunners who chose to die with their guns rather than die running. Mission accomplished.

Yeah, poor ol light brigade.

Must admit I posed this question a year or two ago when I asked "Did Mercer really happen?". I meant the idea that his "battery" stood its ground rather than retire to square and somehow managed to stop what he suggested was the Grenadiers a Cheval of the Guard, led by Ney in person, with canister and doubleshot. I just cannot work out how fast they reloaded to stop determined elite cavalry from closing with them. Many responses, some suggesting I was belittling brave men's accounts. I can only say the ethos was different in those days. Retiring shy violets won no plaudits….you emphasised your part in any battle. I do not dare to say exaggerate, I only say you made the best of your part. Understatement and "it was nothing, I really could not comment" came later, in Victorian society.

1 How many cavalry? how many batteries?

2 Period manuals stress that artillery has to be supported by inf. or cav.

3 If not, they are dead. The cavalry will be quick, use terrain, put some platoons to a flank and move in semi dispersed order to approach (if there are no supports).

Most rules where 1-2 batteries with maybe 100-200 dispersed defenders go in a meaningful "melee" with 500 horsemen is a waste of time.
The supports will fight, or if lucky, shooting will discourage the cavalry, otherwise the guns are toast.

I'd happy to read your rules but it seems impossible to easily download them.

Hi Jc,
Your points are noted – these were just the tactics that were recommended at the time!

I would have added the rules to my page for "free stuff" but I had technical difficulties myself.

so… add the file to the shopping cart, go to the checkout and then order and you can then download the file after receiving your email notification – no money needed.

if it doesn`t work for you, I could email it to you if you drop me a line at:

contact@grandmanoeuvre.co.uk

mike.

sent

and I did it myself… the artillery melee, even winning against 500 gelb Hussaren. I remember in shock. I wrote the rule.

And in the period books they also advocate using shielding terrain.
Which is one of the plausible explanation of the Waterloo story for les gros freres.
the crest was higher and steeper than now, and at places may have prevented gallop.
my 2(euro)cents

a very good point. Mercer did point out that low bank in front of his guns, that is still there today. A pile of corpses may have helped as well of course.

"Charge the Guns!" has a great ring to it and, if you do close, at least you are not facing a square ringed with bayonets. But, I'd rather be in the second rank to be honest

liam leeson ( shorter)
just received your rule;
I don't know your grand manoeuvre but beware of not going into petite manoeuvre by wasting any time for what should, be 90% chance a foregone conclusion. Just take the battery out if the crews stayed.
In the capture options maybe a roll to see (esp dragons sapeurs?) if they have nails instead.

I am not to sure "securing the guns" would be their first choice at all .
Just recently read accounts of Rezonville Totenritt in memoirs, the cavalry had orders to KILL the gunners (no POW) as the objective to put out the battery.

JC,

Yes, that is the "foregone conclusion" in the standard rules; and batteries are eliminated if the crews stayed and no morale effect is caused upon the advancing cavalry who have contacted a battery.

As you say, it is, in the larger picture, just a detail – However, I do like to make these things appeal to individual gamers and to their tastes also, so I`d encourage people to vary this if they see fit for the type of game they want.

Thanks for the memoirs reference… it seemed to me that one of the things that occupied cavalrymen whilst a counter-attack (this being a larger brush-stroke) by supporting troops was underway was their trying to deal with the artillery crewmen etc…

Mike.

Forget the Light Brigade, all drama and poetry!

Casualty figures for the Charge of the Light Brigade:

Total 110 killed, 130 wounded and 58 captured, a loss of some 40% of the brigade's strength and that includes fighting the gunners and Cossacks at the end of the Valley, as well as getting shot up on the way in and partly on the way out!

Seems like a hell of a lot but their were only 673 of them to start with.

Here's the reason why:

Loads of flank fire against cavalry in line and frontally from a Cossack battery – those well known steely eyed artillery men (not).

Good example of a 'it depends on the circumstances' reply to the original question though!

I have read quite a few of the cavalry records of the napoleonic period – cavalry is a bit of a passion of mine. Ratisbon (Bob Coggins) is spot on – light cavalry drill and doctrine was not to frontally charge any battery but to deploy squadrons into open order to pin the gunners frontally and use formed squadrons from one or both flanks to take the battery. This was routine tactical doctrine. Doesn't mean it always worked and both terrain, gunner training, and the presence of steady supporting infantry or cavalry could nullify it. Of course, there are always exceptions. These men were professionals and led by professional officers. It wasn't a game for them and so they devised tactics for any eventuality and then drilled and trained and rehearsed to get it right on the day.

A quick comment on the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava – they didn't actually take the guns and destroy the battery. It was both gallant and disastrous but it wasn't typical, wasn't especially effective and the casualties were unsustainable.

Dear Mr. Jc Prudhon et al,

I have to agree with you and those who submitted that there are two types of cavalry charges that can be conducted on artillery:

1…La charge en ligne

2…la charge en fourrageur (par escadron or peloton) or deployed squadrons or pelotons into open order.

While this does not constitute a charge you also have a peloton dispersed en tirailleurs, which could harass a battery.

For the French, whether an isolated battery or massed battery, there was always an attempt to protect the battery / massed battery if possible with an appui mobile (mobile support).

From 1792 to 1807 it was an additional role of a peloton de grenadier to become detached and support an isolated battery as an appui mobile en compagnie de grenadier.

This is why the grenadiers were expected to be able to assist artillery crews when needed.

For a massed battery, they generally assigned two battalions that were the appui mobile.

The horses and caissons would be centered in between these two battalions formed en colonne d'attaque, colonne double, or carre ouvert (open square).

After the Italian Campaign, Napoleon tried to give the foot artillery a new esprit des corps by proclaiming that it was dishonorable to loose their artillery.

With that said, it doesn't mean they were to die at their guns…but if the massed battery commander thought that his last fire upon a charging cavalry would not stop them…he would order the non essential crew to retire from the guns…the reason being:

The infantry en appui mobile are now formed in square (en soutien) if it is feared that the charge shall be carried home to the battery, a small number of gunners only, shall stay with the pieces to fire one last time, when the enemy are within range of effective feu de mitraille, after firing the gunners shall enter into the square, so that if enemy riders do get close to the guns, the infantry may fire upon them without fear of killing the gunners.

Then the infantry would send out tirailleurs to go protect the guns against cavalry with formed infantry as support.

For an isolated horse battery being charged, a small number of gunners only, would stay with the pieces to fire one last time, while the rest of the men would mount their horses and prepare to receive a cavalry charge.

The massed battery at Hanau, because the enemy cavalry were staggered, only a few cavalrymen made it to the massed battery, and that is why the artillery crew decided to stay with the guns…

As for Friedland, the Russian cavalry never carried home a charge on Sermonts massed battery.

The massed battery at Waterloo had a division assaulted by the British cavalry…due to:

1..The massed battery commander (not listening to a battery commander about the British cavalry preparing to manoeuvre – which he admits).

2..Ruty in ordering the massed battery (formed in three divisions according to the general principles) commander to leave his post to find another location for the massed battery (his first folly).

3..Ruty ordering a division to move forward (his second folly).

4..The appui mobile…unfortunately…for doing their job in repealing the cavalry, but deflecting the British cavalry into the division that was under orders of Ruty (folly II) to move forward.

Best Regards
Art

Artillerymen carried muskets and were trained to defend their selves against cavalry. Unless they were lancers it was difficult for cavalry to do much harm to artillerymen using their equipment to hide and fight back.

Assuming the cavalry didn't have a firearm themselves, of course.

"Artillerymen carried muskets"

Not Russian artillerymen. They had just short swords, and the various artillery implements, plus entrenching tools. The officers (or their servants) might have provided themselves with private purpose pistols, or long arms for hunting.

Also Russian sappers/pioneers/miners (engineering troops) had only pistols and short swords, plus entrenching tools, until 1813 – when the sappers/pioneers were issued dragoon muskets.

- Sasha

A quick comment on the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava – they didn't actually take the guns and destroy the battery. It was both gallant and disastrous but it wasn't typical, wasn't especially effective and the casualties were unsustainable.

They didn't take the guns – spike or carry them off – but they did "take the guns" in a war game sense. After the charge the guns were silenced for the duration of the battle because the gunners were either dead or dispersed. The Light Brigade cleared the gun line and reformed beyond it – yes, I know about the poem, but it's a load of rose tinted, "we are the brave and foolish, looks good when written down" fertiliser. Some believe that if the heavy brigade had followed up the Russians were looking at a decisive reverse. As it was the Russians could claim a marginal, if futile, victory because they had taken the redoubts. If I was to take a military lesson in history it would not be from a Victorian poet.

It seems that the practice was always to have an infantry unit "in support". With the limited range of the smoothbore musket and the probability that the cavalry could use the battery itself to screen itself from being shot by the infantry, it seems pretty straight forward to me that infantry was there to serve as a place for the gunners to hide if they were about to get overrun. Also, the formed infantry would keep the cavalry from spending a lot of time disability or taking off the guns, since they were right next door and would be shooting into the gun position.

I don't see how these supports would help the guns from being attacked or help in defending them, except for closing off one direction of attack. Another thing is that even if the guns were overrun, immobilized and stripped of ammunition, they and their gunners would not be lost. Infantrymen are cheap to replace. The skilled master gunners and artillerymen who could harness and drive the batteries were not cheap or quick to replace. Having guns but no gunners would be a serious loss in a campaign but not so significiant in a 4 hour wargame.

Any thoughts along these lines?

The topic here was "vs cavalry"
yes helping moving the guns was also often a mission;
the supports might be very much smaller than we do, one or a few companies for one or a few batteries.
They helped keep away skirmishers, another scourge for the guns.

And yes, vs cavalry, immediate refuge would be making sense, and the cavalry would not linger around within musket range to do fancy things with the guns.

Thanks Sasha for the input on Russian gunners. Another sample of the risks of basic all on Brits and French things. The more you dig, the more complicated it is, if you want to go "down in scale".

the casualties were unsustainable.

What, you mean like they were going to try and do it again?

Why I quoted the casualties was to show that it wasn't a massacre. Regardless of the amount of iron thrown in their direction, only 110 of them were actually killed out right!

Trajanus,

Thanks for the post; an interesting take. I am not an expert on the Light Brigade but I do know if 100 were killed the odds are the number of wounded was at least twice the dead given 300 casualties out of 600 or an appalling 50% rate and this doesn't include the dead and wounded horses. So, even though only 110 troopers were killed (an extraordinarily high number of dead per engaged) the brigade was destroyed.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

MichaelCollinsHimself: Some may question the relevance of this contribution to the above topic, (and some may be right), but I wonder if the charge of the 6th Pa. Cavalry upon a line of Confederate guns in the vicinity of St. James Church at the battle of Brandy Station in the American Civil War could add any thing to your discussion. It had some "Balaclavaesque" qualities to it. The point of brining it up here is that the Cavalry, (although their charge did not succeed), closed with the guns. It has been my impression that the general consensus of opinion among modern military historians is that they would not have closed. If ACW artillery was indeed more effective than it's Napoleonic ancestors it suprises me that this would have happened. Just a thought.

John Miller

To clarify:

It has been my impression that the general consensus of opinion among modern military historians is that they would not have closed.

I think modern military historians would say cavalry closing to contact is against the odds, not that it is impossible.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Ratisbon:

It was bad form for gunners to abandon their guns and once they did artillerymen rarely returned. At Waterloo while mny abandoned their guns, few returned, the others kept running or hid till the battle was over, which didn't make the artillery popular with Wellington.

So there you have it, The Allies had no artillery at Waterloo because almost all the gunners had 'cleared off'.

Same old myth trotted out I see!

TMP link

Paul :)

Bonjour Sasha,

That is indeed interesting…I would really like to read their principles on the matter.

I know that you warned me once that the accounts of Sir Robert Wilson were slightly passionate…which is understandable…nevertheless there is plenty of useful information to be taken from him.

He stated that the Russian artillery wisely do not attach too much reputation or disgrace to the possession or loss of a gun.

They think that it is better to fight it to the last moment, and let an enemy gain it dearly, than withdraw it too soon for a preservation that also preserves the enemy.

With that said, they seem to have lost less guns than the French, Austrians, and Prussians on the whole.

Do you have any information on the Russian appui mobile for the batteries?

I wonder if there were other nations that did not have their Artillerymen armed with muskets.

I even wonder if this may have been the general rule for most countries during the 7YW…

Best Regards
Art

Privet Art!

I will skip over the use "regimental" artillery, which was not uncommmon in the early years, and focus more on the doctrine that accompanied the Arakcheyev reforms beginning 1806.

"better to fight it to the last moment"
Yes – this was a correct observation of Wilson's. There were explicit written instructions to this effect issued in 1812. I believe those by the commander of the artillery of the 1st Western Army are the most often cited.

However, I think there is another reason that the Russians lost fewer guns – they did not advance foot artillery aggressively in large battles. Interestingly, the offensive movement of guns in small engagements was quite common. But in large battles, prepared/improved positions were used where possible – and the guns typically did not displace forward from those positions.

Another oddity of Russian artillery was the lavish scale of equipment (measured by ratios such as throw-weight per infantryman or per kilometer of battle line **). The lavish scale of provisioning allowed rotation of artillery units. A company (12 pieces) that had become fatigued, or one with disabled equipment or casulaties, or one that had shot all their ammunition – these rotated out of the battle line and were replaced by a fresh company.

There was little of the complaining about or repeated instructing against counter-battery firing, compared to the French. Either more of this was tolerated, or the large number of guns did not require saving fires for enemy infantry and cavalry.

The doctrine of moving horse artillery quickly to reinforce the battle line was taught, and executed reaonably well. However, this – in my opinion – further comtributed to the tendency to not advance the foot artillery.

As for appui mobile …. I think one might consider the Russian approach more of an "appui d'attaque". The doctrine – repeatedly demonstrated at Borodino, for example – was to permit an enemy to execute cavalry and infantry attacks on positioned artillery, and then to launch "counter-charges" on each flank of the artillery position, hopefully finding the enemy both weakened by the guns' fires (and with luck some jδger firing at the flanks as they advanced) and in a false position relative to the counter-attack. The counter-attack would be 1-2 battalions on each side of the gun position (typically in close columns on the frontage of a division) – and/or – a (heavy) cavalry regiment split into two 2 divisions attacking on squadron frontages. Wave after wave of follow-on troops would come in as needed until the enemy retreated. There was no hesitation in launching an infantry counter-attack on enemy cavalry, especially if they were in among the gun position. The action at the "Rayevskiy" redoubt saw this.

I think I can see some similarity in the Duke of Wellinton's methods at Waterloo, albeit with much less use of formed infantry fires by the Russians.

Bien fort amicalement,
- Sasha

** An 1810-1815 Russian infantry division had 8 battalions of heavy infantry (4800 rankers at "full" strength ). The division disposed of a brigade of 36 artillery pieces – one piece for every 133 rankers:
-- 16 6-lber guns
-- 8 unicorns of 12-lber calibre
-- 8 12-pounder guns
-- 4 unicorns of 24-lber calibre
Additionally, there might be some over-complement pieces (extra tubes mounted on the division's 6 spare carriages) and there could be reinforcement from reserve artillery brigades.
The division also had 2 battalions (2400 rankers) of jδger.

dibble,

Thanks for your post. Not all batteries were in the sights of the French Cavalry, but of those artillerymen who were, most ran, some to squares and some to Heaven knows where. And for Mercer, whose men stayed his battery was down to 2 guns, lots of dead horses and men so weary they couldn't re-lay their pieces.

As for the myth, blame Wellington, not me. He was so angry at the artillery as a branch he attempted to prevent it from sharing in the honors for the victory.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Generally 10 – 20% casualties (dead/wounded/captured/missing) will give most units pause for thought. For the Light Brigade to suffer somewhere between 40 – 50% (dead/wounded/captured/missing) in a single charge at Balaclava – thats unsustainable. Meaning, they cant keep fighting like that day after day and sane officers would describe it as a failed tactical approach and not to be repeated. Thats unsustainable.

sane officers would describe it as a failed tactical approach and not to be repeated.

Although I agree from a historical perspective, soldiers in an army were thought of as more expendable in the past. Phrases like 'A healthy butcher bill' were commonly used by officers at the time to describe what the modern eye sees as carnage. I think it was Frederick the Great who said 'Men are like lemons, they are there to be squeezed.' Heavy losses were quite often seen as the mark of a courageous effort rather than a tactical failure. The charge of the Light Brigade might be where this attitude started to change in popular, press led opinion in Britain (I don't know, just a guess).

The fact is, the tactic – cavalry charging artillery – wasn't abandoned. I think the circumstances leading to the charge (wrong guns, down the wrong valley, with enemy on every side – classic failure of command), not the tactic, led to the virtual destruction of the Light Brigade. The British press and public certainly went after the generals rather than for a change of tactical doctrine.

Thanks gents for some more interesting contributions here… Supporting infantry or cavalry was an important factor, and an SOP worth looking into some more.

When I looked to examples of when cavalry had captured, or reached enemy atillery positions I found that many were situations where the artillery had either been previously unsighted (and unable to fire defensively), or it had been attacked the in a flank or the rear.
The successful frontal assaults I found were the work of some high quality cavalry units, which could be very costly in terms of casaulties (e.g. Somosierra Pass)
But in many cases the primary objective of the cavalry had not been the destruction of batteries, nor the capture of guns but had started with the defeat of their supporting troops.

Actually, concern for casualties was a direct result of the democratic process. Soldiers were no longer simply a monetary cost but also voters and the civilian leadership of the country (and thus their suboordinate generals) couldn't simply expend them, but had to either keep the casualties extremely low or convince the country that the sacrifice was worth the result. The Crimean War was right in the middle of the change, probably why conditions were right for Florence Nightingale too.

Bandit: Thanks for you reply. I agree with that but I have been under the impression that some modern commentators consider these kinds of charges almost suicidal and the officers that ordered them inept fools. IMHO that was not necessarily the case. Don't know how Balaclava fits into picture however. In line with some of the remarks above I don't believe people in general, in the time of our particular discussion, were as repulsed by these things as we are. Thanks again for your remarks, John Miller

JcFrog,
I think you have it backwards. The ridge at Waterloo was not higher in 1815, and the soil removed from the slope to build the "mound" rendered the slopes MORE steep after than before.

In today's military, the rule of thumb is that a unit that has suffered 33% casualties is combat ineffective for an extended period (weeks to months).

To lose ~50% of your troops in a single attack is to court the utter destruction of the unit. The survivors are likely to have had their morale shattered.

Sure, the Light Brigade took the guns, but there's a reason the Victoria's Cross is made from the bronze of those guns!

Bonjour Sasha,

Your information is brilliant as usual…

Here is a follow up on the principles of artillery against cavalry, and the principles of fire depended upon the nature of the cavalry charge.

For the French; it was understood that in the confusion of battle, cavalry due to its speed can be a very dangerous adversary to the artillery. One of the general principles mentioned, states that enemy cavalry should never be forgotten, that the artillery should never lose sight of the enemy cavalry while in a battle –such was the case with the massed battery at Waterloo, due to both the Provisional Commander of the massed battery (of his own admittance) and most importantly that of Ruty and his act of absurdity.

If a single battery is isolated, a portion of the battery shall have one or two pieces in reserve. When there is a massed battery; it is always subdivided into three divisions. The center division is quite often the reserve division or formed to the rear and centered behind the other two divisions. Of course this order of battle can change due to particular circumstance.

In a previous posting I mentioned that an isolated battery or massed battery, that there was always an attempt to protect the battery / massed battery if possible with an appui mobile, but if there was no appui mobile to support the massed battery, it is to form par l'ordre en echelons. An example is the massed battery belonging to Seroux (VIe Corps) at the Battle of Friedland.

This way each echelon may protect the echelons flank to its front, while the principle echelon (the first division) may protect the opposite flank.

It is a concentration of fire that shall produce the greatest effects on cavalry. When a cavalry charge a battery, the battery first executes a non-aimed fire, this is done with a "feu de salve" (salvo) against a charge on the battery by cavalry at 700 to 400/300 meters, with 300 meters having the best effect. Then at the appropriate distance, tir a obus should also be executed. This manner of fire, affects the moral, adds confusion, which may cause disorder or staggering effect on the cavalry, even the horses are affected by the noise, flames, and smoke. Then discharges employing canister should be use.

If there is a successive charge by cavalry, it is indispensable that the command be given to conserve a portion of the artillery "avec le plus grand sang-froid".

It shall be the commander who must observe the movement of the other enemy squadrons and determine the best measure of fire, which shall be difficult due to smoke, and the rapidity of the enemy cavalry movement / advance / charge…

The charge en fourrageur (par escadron or peloton) or deployed squadrons or pelotons into open order presents a particular danger, sine the cavalry has a greater circumference, which makes it difficult to keep the cavalry away. This is where the terrain plays a vital role in defense against cavalry. Therefore if the battery is well positioned, by using both terrain to its front, and flank (appui fixe), it should be able to hold the enemy cavalry at a distance.

The charge en fourrageur should be coup par coup (aimed fire) and never executing all its fire at once, but keep a portion ready for a sudden charge. Once the fourrageurs have begun to retire at a distance, the battery should fire ball.

tir a obus should be used when the fourrageurs use the terrain movement to hide behind.

With mounted tirailleurs and isolated cavalry, tir a obus is recommended which cause fear by means of explosions.

When the enemy cavalry has become staggered, forced to retire or retreat in confusion, the artillery should take the offensive and execute a tirer a boulet. The reason for firing ball is the following:

To effect the moral of the enemy that stand before you en pied ferme, staggered, retiring, or have turned their backs to the artillery, tirer a boulet is used for the noise which is frightening, it adds to the damage of their moral, and shall increase the terror as the sound of the boulets passing by unseen.

If cavalry are noticed that they are manoeuvring to charge from the flank, if possible the battery / massed battery should be positioned so as to execute a flanking fire.

There are two options which are available:

"changer de front" if there is adequate time, or if a sudden charge by an execution of "changer de flanc".

When le manoeuvre de changer de front is executed, the battery changes their front in a methodical manner, and jalonners are used on the ligne so as to execute a just fire.

Whereas a battery or massed battery executes le manoeuvre par le flanc; it is due to being surprised, charged by cavalry, thus it is to be executed with minimum movement, and conditions needed to fire, so as to gain precious minutes.

As an example, Senarmont had ample time and ordered le manoeuvre de changer de front…because he was not too concerned about a charge being carried to his flank.

If the massed battery is formed par l'ordre en echelons, it must not be a divergent fire on the charging cavalry, two echelons fire with the same lateral execution of fire as the first echelon.

If the cavalry attempt to charge the flank of the massed battery, the second and third echelon shall executes le manoeuvre par le flanc, while the primary division continues firing at its original object (term used when firing at men, mounts, artillery) if possible or needed.

Best Regards
Art

Victoria Crosses are not made from the guns that the Light Brigade charged at Balaclava; they are made from Chinese guns captured at the Taku forts in 1860. However, the first Victoria Crosses were alegedly made from Russian guns captured at Sebastopol, which were almost certainly not at Balaclava.

link

Jurgen

Ratisbon:

Thanks for your post. Not all batteries were in the sights of the French Cavalry, but of those artillerymen who were, most ran, some to squares and some to Heaven knows where. And for Mercer, whose men stayed his battery was down to 2 guns, lots of dead horses and men so weary they couldn't re-lay their pieces.

The CinC ordered that in case of massed cavalry attacks, the gun crews should abandon their guns and run to the shelter of the squares, either in or by them. That Mercer's troop stayed with their guns means nothing other than that Mercer judged the situation as he saw it and reacted appropriately; as did the other commanders in the same position.

With all the evidence that is now in circulation, you should be able to produce "the bad form" of the Artillery at Waterloo".

I brought bucket-loads to the discussion in the link I posted above! You on the other hand trot out the tripe below without any; other than a single letter.

It was bad form for gunners to abandon their guns and once they did artillerymen rarely returned. At Waterloo while mny abandoned their guns, few returned, the others kept running or hid till the battle was over,

So! All the arguments over 'why oh why the French cavalry didn't spike the guns?' has been a waste of 200 years of argument on the matter, as there were no gunners to service them anyway!

Paul

G'Day Gents,

In a previous posting, it was mentioned that cavalry attempted to kill the gunners and assigned personnel of the battery…yes this was the norm…

Actually this does not coincide with the posting…but its good information:

In 1806 Napoleon issued an order that prior to each campaign, 500 to 600 Soldiers would be assigned as auxiliaires for the artillery.

8 Soldiers for each 12 pounder

6 Soldiers for each 8 pounders and obusiers

4 Soldiers for each 4 pounder

Napoleon then instructed that these 500 to 600 Soldiers, that it was the division Commander who would designate which men would come from his division to assist in serving his own divisional artillery.

And for those who wondered where the artillery got their water to put in their buckets… -well I have ;-)

It was the responsibility of l'Etat Major de l'Armee to position the artillery park near a water source…or locate a source for a detail to fill up the barrels at the artillery park.

Best Regards
Art

dibble,

Thanks for your thoughts. I wasn't aware that Wellington's comments were tripe, and I doubt Wellington considered them so. As I recall, he was there.

I would point out, I don't hold a brief against British artillery. Once men, of all armies, leave the fire zone it's very difficult to get them to return, especially when individuals from a unit are scattered beyond control of their officers.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

ps: Here's a comment made by a soldier in Pickett's division, on seeing a rabbit, just before the advance, "You run little hare, if I was you I'd run too."

Art,

Do you have a copy of the subject order or a reference to it?

Sincerely,
M