"British Artillery at Waterloo" Topic

At Waterloo during the French cavalry attacks the British artillery crews took cover inside the infantry squares. When the cavalry withdrew the artillery crews returned to their guns and continued to operate.
My questions are, how effective was this tactic and how unique was this during Napoleonic war?

Thank the gods you did ask about removing the wheels ;-)

138SquadronRAF, I dont understand you? should I?

I doubt it was very effective after a while for several reasons:

Assuming the question is massed cavalry charges overrunning the battery's position…not some isolated cavalry detachment.

1) The crew couldn't carry off the key equipment to crew the battery cannon with them at the last minute, every time, without fail. If you leave behind the rammer, buckets, reamer, various key tools, handspikes etc the cannon become useless till replaced. And equipment replacements are not generally found on the local trains. Also, who determined when and why the artillery crew to leave the square's protection and return to their cannon?
2) There is the danger of any cavalryman spiking the cannon in some way. Granted the French didn't appear to do this at Waterloo but claiming a cannon as a trophy was a common "victory prize" for the era. If the English cavalry didn't chase the disorganized French cavalry back down the hill how were the artillerymen to reclaim their cannon? The squares were yards away and behind the "ridge point". Battery commanders cannot assume the English cavalry would do their job all the time.
3) What about the limbers and train with drivers? They cannot go into a square. Their position I understand was placement "behind and between the squares" and well within musketry range of appointed infantrymen who covered them by fire against odd roaming French cavalrymen. Not a perfect situation but better than standing out in the open with a dumb short sword.
4) If the limbers and carried ammo went to the rear or between the squares… how did the cannon get there resupply? Once a train or limber driver took off… who stopped them from retiring hundreds of yards (or more) and then what lucky officer had to go chase them (if known) to return with the ready supply of roundshot or cannister? There could have been another trains on "standby" but that assumes "pre-battle thought" to this problem and the typical staff officer wasn't commonly thinking about finding ammo…. that was the battery commander's duty or his flunkey. Do that several times and the battery becomes ineffective real fast.
5) A battery's frontage can be quite wide…. 10-15 yds per cannon and a battery of 8 cannon is 100 yds or so wide. Infantry not in battalion or regimental squares will be overrun by massed regimental cavalry charges. So stationing a company of infantry near the cannon doesn't prevent the cavalry from overwhelming the non-square defenders.
5) These thoughts maybe a supportive reason why Mercer's battery stood fast. He was tired of rounding up his battery crew from the cozy squares or chasing ammo for his cannon.

My thoughts..
Ex

WR

See recent fora on this…….much attention

G'Day Gents

There are actually quite a few accounts of this for the French, One of the best ones that give a first hand account is at Friedland. -not so much that it was used by the artillery crew…but why the battalion was en appui mobile…

As for being effective…yes…

As for other countries…I know that the general principles for an appui mobile for artillery was used by the Russian and Austrian as well…thus I can safely assume it was used by the Prussians as well…to include minor countries…

When the French were formed en bataillons deployes et places entre deux bataillons en colonne serree…if it was accompanied by artillery…the grenadier pelotons were positioned behind the guns as appui mobile.

Hope this helps
Best Regards
Art

Sorry mate; we had it last year and it lived upto this board's reputation ;-)

TMP link

G'Day Gents

According to the French general principles…a battalion en apui mobile is responsible for the limbers…horses…and equipment…by detaching tiralleurs.

For the French…the battalion en appui mobile was even used as a rally point for a grand body of troops. In which case it would normally form an open square from a double column deployed from a colonne d'attaque that had been formed as one body.

Best Regards
Art

From what I understand it was Conky Arty himself who ordered the gunners to take refuge within the squares, and he was sore dissapointed by some gunners who "redeployed" themselves (and the guns) rather hurridly.

Wellington ordered that the gunners retire to the squares when attacked by cavalry. Only Mercer RHA who had not fought under Wellington disobeyed. Wellington expressed his displeasure and delayed his promotion.

1. Cavalrymen do not like to get off their horse especially with the enemy within a couple of hundred yards.
2. If the cavalry had been accompanied by infantry or sapper then the situation may have different.
3. Cavalry were not trained in disabling guns let alone equipped.
4. The French Army was poorly lead, supplied and had very fragile morale.
5. There are plenty of spare equipment. The guns were left but not the limbers or ammunition caissons for the French to capture. So no ammunition or tools.
6. The rammer and the firer would retire with their equipment. The rammer would not have been left by the pieces.

Stephen

WR, I share all your questions, as an ex artillery man myself, I'm looking at it from a practical point of view and as a wargamer and to me it all seems very impractical and as WR says its full of command problems as well. My view is that we know it did happen and the British gunners were skilled in their trade but I believe that on return the gun battery could never of been as fully effective after first abandoning their guns. From a wargamers point of view it would mean not firing that very effective close range canister in the last turn before the charge. Most wargamers in my experience would fire that canister.

I thought I read somewhere that French artillerymen followed their cavalry, not dragging their guns, but attempting to turn the British guns against the defenders.

Yes, I believe that the British were very lucky, in that the cavalry were not followed up by infantry or troops equipped to spike the guns, otherwise it would be a very different story and the gunners abandoning their colours (guns) would not of been well portrayed by history. Hindsight says that wellington made a good call but it was a risky decision.

Captain de Juger, if you read that somewhere I would love to know where because that would change my understanding of the events.

What is the best way to disable an artillery unit if overrun? It's like Pearl Harbour (Harbor). Ignore the ships. Go for the fuel, or block the entrance with Nevada.

In 1815. Tip over the water bucket! Unless the returning gunners have bladders like horses, how will the sponge man clean out and cool the barrel for reloading? To this day I ask……. where did the gunners find a constant water supply?….

There is no obvious water source on the present battlefield. How the heck was it done, even if not overrun? I know Westfalia do a water cart for the Prussians, but no one else does!

and few even model the bucket!

At Waterloo the British artillery when the French Cav attacked had been firing a few hours and I believe where ammo low, what they did is retire! Yep Wellington was Horrified and stated that not for the reserve RHA batteries he would have been with out artillery!

Do that to a British player and watch them scream.

re Lord Ghee/Deadhead comments,

Few napoleonic game rules I know of, in the Brigade and higher levels arena, cover ammo supply, either infantry or artillery.
Any veteran artillery re-enactor knows after a hour of just pushing the cannon back into position, or lugging the roundshot/gunpowder charge from a limber positioned 50 yards to the batteries rear, you are tired and worn. Additional time the weariness is just increased. Factor in the confusion of battle, wounded/killed crew members and just plain chaos going on around them lowers the rate of firing. And these same English artillerymen, with their total situational awareness somehow remember to scamper away to a local square, carrying all the important firing equipment with them, lay below the wall of bayonets, then pop out again with limited, if any, direct artillery/battery officer command, return back to their cannon. Also, somehow on time, their assigned train and battery limbers appear nearby again with waiting ammo and water for the cannon. Repeat this several times…. and all you have is a disordered battery fire at best but more likely the batteries are silenced till the French massed cavalry retired for good. Isolated crews maybe remanned their cannon…positioned very close to a holding square, but all along the English army frontage covering several batteries?

No doubt it was done at Waterloo… but done on every French charge occasion back up the famous slope, and with full firing effect when the English artillery crew just recently re-manned their cannon, lacking nothing in equipment or ammo?

M aka WR

For the record and off topic, I use ammo supply for artillery in my napoleonic wargames. It reflects the artillery crew fatigue, the supply of ready ammo in the local assigned trains, forces a player to retire a battery and use/call forward a reserve artillery battery in it's place, and prevents players from taking weird, near impossible, un-historical firepower attempts… the shoot the special bearskin grenadier battalion at 1200 yards…. or engage those lone skirmishers out front targeting.

And I have manned a period artillery piece for an hour plus of live fire drills and pushing the cannon back. I was fun till your back reminded you what you did that afternoon on dry (not wet) ground. Sort of like pushing your auto in the driveway back and forth or carry a stack of red bricks for a wall under construction from the front yard to the backyard…. many trips.

In 1815. Tip over the water bucket! Unless the returning gunners have bladders like horses, how will the sponge man clean out and cool the barrel for reloading? To this day I ask……. where did the gunners find a constant water supply?….

Actually you don't have to sponge if you didn't want to…
The is an ACW account, from Gettysburg, where the ventsman was complaining about his thumb burning up because the rammer, Ryan, didn't swab the bore between each shot to speed up the rate of fire. Needless to say Ryan got lucky. I would suspect that he wasn't the omly one to come up with that trick.

Wellington was actually angry at all the artillery. Most abandoned the guns and never returned.

A month or so later still seething about the performance of the artillery, Wellington attended a victory parade in Paris. During the march by a horse in Mercer's battery caught a trace and brought the parade to an inglorious halt. Wellington exploded and ordered he be arrested after the parade but after his battery marched by it went into a trot and repaired to their quarters, a town miles outside of Paris. It was only 2 weeks later when he reported the HQs that Mercer learned he was under arrest and the order was rescinded.

I'm surprised Wellington was capable of preventing his promotion as the Engineers and Artillery were not under the administrative command of the army. As I recall in his maturity Mercer became the commander of Woolrich.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Yes, what Ratisbon and LordGhee said. Not all of the British gunners retired amongst the squares. I am surprised that no-one else has mentioned that.
I am not sure about "most", but many "abandoned the guns and never returned". See Wellington's comments after the battle in regards to the artillery.
I would disagree with Summerfield's claim that it was only Mercer that did not retire to square.

4. The French Army was poorly lead, supplied and had very fragile morale.

I would also question this. And the statement doesn't even have very much to do with the OP anyway. But why let that get in the way of making a sweeping assertion about the French army at Waterloo?

Good points WR, by mid afternoon water would of been a precious commodity on that battlefield, but I'm sure the Royal Artillery would of had an organised supply somewhere? it must of been 'Standard Operating Procedure' for the battlefield.

'I would also question this. And the statement doesn't even have very much to do with the OP anyway. But why let that get in the way of making a sweeping assertion about the French army at Waterloo?'

TW,

Agree. The French Armee du Nord was one of the best that Napoleon ever lead, and if it was poorly led and the troops had low morale, it couldn't have shattered the Prussians at Ligny, fighting outnumbered, and inflicting casualties at three to one. Most of the troops in Nord were veterans.

And at Waterloo with the numbers about even between Napoleon and Wellington, 16,000 of the French total had to be detailed to hold off the Prussians with the French still attacking Wellington throughout the afternoon and evening.

That doesn't sound to me like the army was badly led, nor that the troops had low morale.

Now if we want to talk about any weaknesses with Nord, the army staff certainly was and I would suggest that was the main cause of the French failure in Belgium in 1815.

B

Thanks to 138SqnRAF, I have now read the previous thread from September last year, many good points and comments. For me that's what TMP is all about.
I must say taking a wheel of and on is no big deal for any well trained crew, despite the weight (maybe much more difficult for a group of portly civvies on a w/e)and that's not derogatory just a fact that regular soldiers are very fit, tough and usually very well drilled. In my experience removing wheels is standard crew drills, however abandoning your guns and hiding behind the infantry is not! but under the circumstances it may be very prudent.

So most of the British artillery crews abandoned their guns and never returned! At the rate some people are rewriting the history of this campaign i can see a point in time where the British were never at Waterloo and the debate about who won the Battle will be between The Prince of Orange and Blucher.

Perhaps if the Jocks vote for independence it may be possible to pretend that Britain as a nation state never actually existed and its history can be expunged from the history books. Just need to find a way of explaining who ran a quarter of the planet for a couple of hundred years then.

For what its worth anyone requiring a well researched and scholarly insight into this subject rather than the prejudiced ramblings of a bunch of people on a wargaming forum would do well to read 'Wellington's guns' by Nick Lipscombe. The last chapter is on Waterloo and covers some of the erroneous points made in this thread admirably.

mickthemagpie, that made me smile and you have a very good point, come the revolution all will be sorted.

mickthemagpie,

Thanks for your thoughts. I'll read Lipscombe but the facts as I understand them argue most of the gunners did not return. After the cavalry charges French guns positioned on the ridge after the fall of L'Haye raked the British squares with little or no response from British artillery. By the time of the attack of the middle guard the gun line did not play a significant part in its repulse.

Indeed, Mercer, who did not abandon his battery, had 2 guns left and a skeleton of a crew that was so weary they could not relay them after firing.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

"To this day I ask……. where did the gunners find a constant water supply?…."

- From local observation, that is hardly a problem in Brabant after a night of heavy thunderstorms, as long as you don't want to drink it… Plenty of ditches and gullies around too, before everything was bulldozed by mechanised plowing.

"with limited, if any, direct artillery/battery officer command"

- How so? There's one officer for every two guns plus the battery commander. Where would they all have vanished to?

Regarding the British artillery running off at Waterloo, the only real evidence is found in a single letter written by Wellington six months after the battle.

The fact that the allied artillery were far less effective at the end of the battle than they could have been if they were fresh is beyond doubt, but is hardly conclusive proof that they had all just run away.

This very point has been hotly disputed for many years and it was discussed at length in Appendix A, Volume 2 of Duncan's History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, written in the second half of the 19th century.

G'Day Gents

It would seem that the general consensus is, that the artillerymen taking cover…or using the protection of infantry during a cavalry attack is bad.

Then what was the most effective method that was used during this period?

Best Regards
Art

Major Snort,

Thanks for your reply. I agree there is no conclusive proof either way.

As I recall Wellington was in command of the army and because he did not have a dog in the hunt there was no evident reason for him to claim the artillery did not do its duty if it did. As for Duncan's history it was written half a century after the fact and the RA witnesses do have a dog in the hunt; the regiment's reputation.

Because of this, the fact that those who sheltered in the squares would have suffered as severely as the infantry and due to the lack of effectiveness of the British artillery at the end of the battle, I think the preponderance of the evidence supports few artillerymen returned to the guns.

Cheers.

Bob Coggins

For an article on the conduct of the British Artillery at Waterloo see Smoothbore Ordnance Journal #5 sctn. 1, pt. 6 :

link

Ratisbon

"Because of this, the fact that those who sheltered in the squares would have suffered as severely as the infantry and due to the lack of effectiveness of the British artillery at the end of the battle, I think the preponderance of the evidence supports few artillerymen returned to the guns."

Perhaps you can bring that preponderance of evidence to the thread.

Paul :)

Camcleod,

Thanks for the information. I will endeavor to get copies.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

dibble,

Thanks for your post.

I thought I provided the evidence in my post. Telling is Wellington's letter. First and foremost he is an original source; he not only was there but he commanded the army. Second, there is no obvious reason for him to defame the artillery without cause. In short he had nothing to gain.

To the contrary, the source you site states the case from the perspective of the accused, the RA, which has a reputation to protect. Thus, the preponderance of believability must rest with Wellington.

Additionally, his position is supported by the diminution in effectiveness after the cavalry charges. Finally, on consulting the statistics overall the artillery suffered 8% casualties while Mercer's battery, which remained, suffered over 60%. 8% is an outcome hardly to be expected had they returned to their guns vs. 8% could well be expected had they not.

Thus, in my mind the preponderance of evidence (greater than 51%)supports most artillerymen did not return to their guns.

Cheers.

Bob Coggins

dibble,

My mistake. This is what comes when one uses memory. Mercer's total casualties were approximately 12%. Other batteries suffering 8% in comparison is not dispositive.

Based on Wellington and the reduction in fire I still think most gunners did not return.

Cheers.

Bob Coggins

According to Barbero, most British gunners didn't return to their guns, to the chagrin of the Duke who, again according Barbero, would oppose later to the artillerists being given any kind of prize for their participation at Waterloo.

General Gomm's memoir mentions almost in after thought that Wellington had ordered allied gunners to remove one of the wheels of their pieces and take it into the nearest infantry square in order to avoid the gun's being removed by the French when overrun. Gomm's comment on page 373 regarded Wellington's instructions to the allied artillerymen during the French cavalry charges. This is the quote from page 373 of the memoir:

'By Wellington's orders the gunners, after discharging their pieces when the cavalry were close upon them, unlimbered the near wheel of each gun, and retired rapidly, wheeling the wheels with them into the nearest square. Speedily the French horsemen came up and threw ropes, prepared for the purpose like the South American lasso, over the gun. But they could not make it move along on one wheel; and while striving to drag along their prize, the deadly volley of the square stretched half of those engaged on the ground, and sent the rest headlong down the slope.'

First, Gomm was not in the unit's in square under attack during the French cavalry charges, being assigned to Picton's command on the allied left. So, Gomm could not have witnessed this if it had actually taken place.

Second, French cavalry were not equipped with ropes with which to make a 'lasso' and I really cannot see any French cavalrymen, in a desperate action which the charges were, attempting to move a field piece minus a wheel. It cannot be done.

Third, it makes no sense in time or opportunity for the allied gunners to fire at the French cavalry attacking them at the last moment and then have time or the inclination to disable their own pieces and run for the nearest square pushing and rolling a heavy artillery wheel in the mud and mess along with them.

Lastly, is the memoir itself. The memoir was not put together by Field Marshal Gomm, but it was put together from his papers by an editor, a civil servant named Francis Culling Carr-Gomm, who explains his methodology somewhat in the preface to the book.

And, finally, the quoted passage from page 373 is in a section of the book entitled 'Some further excerpts from his [Field Marshal Gomm's] Waterloo jottings are added:' This leads me to believe that the subject quote may be out of context.

So the conclusions seem to be obvious:
-Gomm did not witness the stated 'action' by allied artillerymen.
-There is no evidence that Wellington actually gave the subject order.
-The memoir was assembled after Gomm's death with the help of his wife and the editor.
-The subject quote may be out of context and may not be an accurate accounting of what actually happened.
-The subject quote cannot be taken as fact or as a primary source from the memoir. It could have happened, but probably in my opinion, did not. Someone evidently said something to Gomm or he heard a rumor. He certainly did not witness it.

In Wellington's Guns by Nick Lipscomb regarding Wellington's orders regarding artillery and the actions of the allied gunners, this is stated on page 376:

'Wellington's order for the Gunners to leave their guns and fall back on the security of the infantry squares appeared straightforward enough, yet it is evident that not all artillery commanders had been properly briefed. Some Gunners left their guns and sought sanctuary within the squares, others moved to the lee of the squares and a few even moved some or all of their guns within the squares; some left the field completely, with or without their guns, and others executed a combination of these actions.'

So, some allied artillerymen left their guns in place and went to the infantry squares for protection. Others left the field, some of which probably didn't come back.

From Lipscomb, page 378:

'Strangely, there does not appear to have been an officially accepted and practiced procedure for the withdrawal of guns or Gunners into infantry squares; instead it depended on the tactical situation, the ground and the commanders' direction and preferences.'

Lastly, Lipscomb addresses briefly the alleged removal of artillery wheels described by Gomm, on page 379, but no reference is given:

'This is fairly conclusive evidence [referring to a quotation in the previous paragraph] that three allied artillery batteries quite the field at some stage during the cavalry charges. Wellington undoubtedly would have witnessed this. He would also have witnessed the French cavalry in possession of many of the allied guns that had been left, as directed, on their platforms. Incredibly the French cavalry made little attempt to drag these guns back to their lines. Some of the guns had their near wheels removed to hinder such exploitation but more perplexing was that fact that none ofhte guns were spiked in situ. This has never been satisfactorily explained and the consequences of this failure seldom fully appreciated.'

B

'It would seem that the general consensus is, that the artillerymen taking cover…or using the protection of infantry during a cavalry attack is bad. Then what was the most effective method that was used during this period?'

Guns were to be defended to the last and then defended in the gun position against the attacker until assistance arrived.

Drouot's gunners, with him among them, did this at Hanau in 1813 as one example. The gunners fired into the attacking allied cavalry until the last moment and then fought against them with bayonetted musket, rammers, and handspikes until friendly cavalry counterattacked against the allied cavalry.

Mercer at Waterloo kept his brigade to their duty and did not withdraw, drawing Wellington's censure and negative comments. Mercer, however, did what an artillery commander was supposed to do.

One fact is being overlooked when discussing Wellington and artillery. Wellington was no artilleryman and may or may not have been well-versed in artillery employment on the battlefield. He did have competent artillery senior officers to advise him, such as Dickson and Fraser, but whether or not he listened to them is another matter.

B

G'Day Kevin

"Guns were to be defended to the last and then defended in the gun position against the attacker until assistance arrived."

For the French this in not true…no…wrong…I will not even argue the issue with you.

Even the massed battery at Friedland had the 1er bataillon du 9e Leger en colonne d'attaque…ready to be deployed en colonne double to form a square when needed…for it was the appui mobile for the massed battery…which is in accordance to the French general principles within their military system.

But this does not discredit your continuing argument that the massed battery was not supported by either Dupont or Ney…because they did not support the massed battery with their infantry divisions. -least someone confuse the two general principles… or two different types/levels of support for French artillery.

When seeking anomalies to any general principle within the French military system…you shall always find them…your very comment proves that Drouot thought (and did) that he could hold out until friendly cavalry arrived. Otherwise he would have retired to his own appui mobile.

Best Regards
Art

I have not stated that Senarmont was not supported at Friedland. I have continually stated, and posted, that it was the supported unit as the de facto main attack after Ney was defeated in his first attack.

And I have seen no evidence that Drouot would have retired at Hanau. I also have not seen that it was French practice to abandon artillery if they were about to be overrun. On the contrary, it was usual French practice to defend their artillery if pressed.

One example of this is Senarmont at Friedland when he was attacked in the flank by Russian cavalry. He changed front and defeated them with two canister vollies, he didn't abandon his guns because they were threatened with being overrun.

B

Regarding Wellington's comments about the artillery running off, it is likely that the batteries that prompted his displeasure were Sandham's battery of Royal Artillery and Kuhlman's battery of the KGL.

Both Colonel Adye who commanded the artillery of the 1st Division and Kuhlman admit that these two batteries limbered up and retreated as the French cavalry were approaching, fearing that they would be isolated. The batteries rallied and returned to the line but this took some time.

Also under suspicion are Cleeves KGL battery and possibly Lloyd's battery of the Royal Artillery, both attached to the third division. There is good evidence that these batteries did follow Wellington's orders for some time, retiring to the squares and re-manning the guns when the French cavalry retreated, but later in the day, according to Kielmansegge, both batteries had run out of ammunition and had been sent to the rear. Cleeves account indicates that there was much confusion in his battery, with guns dispersed and abandoned and ammunition wagons sent back to Brussels.

Three or four batteries are not "most of the artillery", although all these batteries were in the key central area.

I spoke to the archivist at the RA museum. He told me that there was no existing correspondence from 1815 – a WW2 bomb had destroyed the lot, including letters from Wellington!

I reckon they've got stuff stashed away in a drawer somewhere!

The Duke had a bit of a track record of using a broad brush when castigating parts of the British army. His most famous examples being that of British Officers after the retreat from Burgos, and also of the British soldier being painted, ‘without exception on both counts' as being negligent and ‘Scum of the earth'. If you read up on the Dukes correspondences you will find other broad-brush approaches when he showed his displeasure at incidents not to his liking.

Isn't it funny how Francis Duncan's book is an excellent source; until that is, we get to the Wellington letter rebuttal. Suddenly the book becomes unreliable even though it successfully argues its regiment's corner.

Link to Duncan's tome Appendix A. page 444:

link

Lipscomb's tome also fights the RA/RHA CASE by saying this:

"it is therefore quite extraordinary that Wellington, who was at the heart of things throughout the day, could have viewed the situation so differently. Many historians, authors and military men have over the past 140 years, dissected this letter and discredited much of the detail. In the most part, they have been correct in their analysis and individual conclusions, but on the whole most have considered the Royal Artillery companies and Royal Horse Artillery troops only and have not included an examination of the Hanoverian, Kings German Legion and Dutch-Belgian batteries."

He goes on to say a lot more on the subject but if you want to read more you should go buy the book

After reading Sibourne's published and unpublished letters, Glover, Franklin and Field's first hand accounts from all sides in the battle; there is not a shred of evidence that the British Artillery ran away.

Basileus66

According to Barbero, most British gunners didn't return to their guns, to the chagrin of the Duke who, again according Barbero, would oppose later to the artillerists being given any kind of prize for their participation at Waterloo.

Barbero says a lot of things in his tome like:

BARBERO
p.186; "The same thing happened to the British artillery that had happened to the Grande Batterie a short while before, further testimony to the terrifying impact on gunners of a cavalry charge. In at least two cases at Waterloo, the battery commanders themselves, seeing the cavalry advance, gave the orders to limber up the guns and take them to the rear. One of these, Captain Sinclair, had already lost four guns in a clash with the French in Spain two years previously, and the consequences for his career had been distinctively negative. There was no lack of extenuating circumstances, but Wellington remained furious."

What he should have stated was:

"Captain James Sinclair's Battery of the 6th Brigade, which was assigned to Major/General Lambert's 6th Division. Of the five British batteries employed at Waterloo, Sinclair's consisted of six guns-five of which were 9 pounders and one a 5.5 inch howitzer. Captain Sinclair's Battery came into action at 4.30pm, being positioned to the west of the Genappe Road. Here the battery consisting of 200 ranks became heavily engaged against the massed French Cavalry attacks and later the Imperial Guard assault.
During one severe charge by the French 8th Cuirassiers at 5.00pm, the Battery was forced to withdraw abandoning one gun. However, it returned quickly to recover this gun and continued the fight."

RATISBON
"After the cavalry charges French guns positioned on the ridge after the fall of L'Haye raked the British squares with little or no response from British artillery."

The battery commanders were obeying the Duke's order not to engage the French guns.

RATISBON
"By the time of the attack of the middle guard the gun line did not play a significant part in its repulse."

This from Lipscomb:

With the arrival of Chasse's Division, his integral guns under the command of Capt. Karl Krahmer, were quickly brought into action on Lloyd's right. There was now a total of 13 Allied batteries engaged in the fight; they were exhausted and their ammunition low, but their collective fire undoubtedly having an effect on the advancing Guard Infantry. Lieutenant William Sharpin was deployed with Bolton's Company, which had recently been moved further to the right..

" A few minutes before the French Imperial Guards made their appearance the Duke of Wellington rode up to the battery and hastily asked who commanded it; I replied that Bolton did, but that he was just killed, and that it was then under Napier. His Grace then said, ‘Tell him to keep a look to his left, for the French will soon be with him‘,. and then rode off. I had scarcely communicated the Duke's message when we saw the French bonnets just above the high corn. And within forty or fifty yards of our guns. I believe they were in close columns of grand divisions and upon reaching the crest of our position they attempted to deploy into line, but the destructive fire of our guns loaded with canister shot and the well-directed volleys from the infantry, prevented their regular formation. They remained under the fire for about ten minutes, advancing a little, but finding it impossible to force our position they gave way, and went to the right about upon which the Duke ordered a general charge to be made, and in a moment our infantry and the French were mixed together that an end was put to our firing for the day"

VOICES FROM THE NAPOLEONIC WARS
By
Lieutenant-Colonel D. D. Vigors, RA (Retired)
IN AUGUST 1815, the Prince Regent instituted the Order of the Guelphs, as a means of rewarding the
services of His Majesty's Hanoverian subjects. There were three classes of the Order, similar to those of the recently re-organised Order of the Bath, but in addition the Guelphic Order contained a medal. This latter was to be ‘for such non-commissioned officers and privates as shall have
distinguished themselves by valour or prudence in the field.'

Awards of this Guelphic Medal were made from 1818 to the end of 1843 from submissions
by former members of the King's German Legion and Hanoverian Army. Although the individual
could himself apply for the award, his statements had to be supported wherever possible, by two officers, witnesses at the time the deed or deeds, were performed. The originals of all these applications were destroyed in 1943, but fortunately the majority of them are to be found either complete, or by extract, in a littleknown book written in 1846 by Ludwig Von Wissell, a former King's German Artillery officer. Useful material is to be found too in both Beamish's and Schwertfeger's histories of the King's German Legion.

Many interesting deeds and facts are related and the main value is that these statements are authenticated and thus can be taken as accurate accounts of the time. If only the Order of the Bath had had a similar Medal, we should now have been able to read the equivalent material submitted by British soldiers. However, the King's German Legion were reliable units of the British Army, and fought integrated in British formations, so that we may consider their armament, organisation and methods to be very similar, if not identical. Among these submissions and reports are a
number from the King's German Artillery (KGA) and some of these give a useful insight into the way in which the guns were fought. A selection follows:—

1. 2 Foot Company, KGA ‘At Talavera Sergeant Bostelmann with four gunners and four workmen was entrusted with the supply of the Battery from the ammunition waggons in its rear. The enemy's bombs had set fire to the dry heath and the flames spreading, Bostelmann was constantly obliged to change the position of the waggons, in order to keep them away from the burning heath. Just as four full limbers had been sent off to the Battery, the enemy, directing their fire upon the ammunition park, set the whole space between and around the waggons in flames. Two waggons, the limbers of which had not yet been sent off, could be immediately removed, and they reached the high road in safety; but the empty limbers of the remaining four not having yet returned from the Battery, the danger became imminent, and the quick explosion of these waggons appeared inevitable. ‘Bostelmann, determined to attempt the presentation of the waggons, regardless of the personal danger with which the effort would evidently be attended. Of his assistants, the four gunners only were available, the workmen having run away; and with the aid of these four men, Luttermann, Zingreve, Warnecke and Lind, the gallant Sergeant succeeded in removing the heavily loaded ammunition waggons through the burning heath and placing them on a spot in the rear, which a little trench had preserved from the flames. Here they awaited the empty limbers, which at length arriving, enabled them to remove the waggons to the high road in safety.
‘This important service of the Sergeant and gunners met with a deserved acknowledgement from Major Hartmann, who called them forward and publicly expressed to them that approbation which their spirited conduct so well merited. Bostelmann was afterwards rewarded with a commission.'
(Beamish.)

Gunner Zingreve only obtained the Guelphic Medal for this service in October 1843 after changes in the rules for the award made it easier to claim for deeds performed before 1813; the other two gunners may well (138 Voices from the Napoleonic Wars) have been dead by the time the rules were altered.
The men called ‘workmen' by Beamish should more properly have been termed ‘tradesmen', ie.
saddlers, farriers etc, who considered themselves to be non-combatants. This extract from Beamish gives a clear picture of the ‘normal' supply of ammunition by the sending forward of full limbers from the wagon line to the gun line and should be compared with the unusual procedure at Waterloo, described below:—

2. Captain Andrew Cleeves, commanding 4 Foot Company, KGA ‘When enemy cavalry attacks became more frequent, the battery moved into a position between the squares, where they remained, until they had expended all their ammunition. Then they retired to the area of Mount St Jean to obtain a new supply. However it was not until evening, when the enemy had made his last attack, that they were able to come back into action.' (Schwertfeger.) At Waterloo, instead of full limbers being sent forward it appears that Batteries expended their ammunition, then returned to a suitable position to refill before returning to the front line. That this particular Battery was not alone in adopting such a procedure is shown by the next extract:—

3. Major Henry Kuhlmann, Commanding 2nd Troop, KGA ‘Later in the afternoon . . . an enemy attack
took us unexpectedly in the left flank and made it necessary for us (both Batteries under Lieutenant
Colonel Adye) to withdraw. ‘A short distance away we found a reasonably free space, already occupied by some other Batteries, where, so far as circumstances allowed, we sorted ourselves out. About this time Colonel Adye brought up the English Battery, which had retired further back, and ordered them to hand over some ammunition to us, as they had fired fewer rounds on the 16th. When this had taken place Colonel Adye led both Batteries forward to re-occupy our original positions, where we rejoined the battle.' (Schwertfeger.) (The second Battery in the 1st Division was Captain Sandham's Brigade. It was fortunate that so many of the horse artillery troops had been reequipped with 9 prs and so Kuhlmann was able to be re-supplied by Sandham!) So, here we have evidence that at least three batteries, both KGA and RA, moved out of action to replenish ammunition. Possibly the congestion, confusion and general lack of visibility on this particular battlefield made such a method the only one possible at the time. The extracts which follow, in some cases, refer to batteries pulling back to refill, but also give an insight into action taken when enemy cavalry attacks developed:—

4. Bombardier Henry Niemeyer, 1 Troop, KGA ‘Before coming into action, this Battery remained
for a long time in the second line and thereby suffered many losses through enemy artillery fire.
When at last they advanced to the first line, from which some batteries were going back through lack of ammunition, they came under a violent fire . . .. . . Niemeyer himself received a case-shot wound in the left calf, nevertheless did not leave his duty and in the evening brought up the reserve ammunition, which in the confusion had been stationed one hour from the battlefield.' (Von Wissell.)

5. Bombardier Christian Nolte, 2 Troop, KGA ‘Nolte commanded one gun of my section with distinction. The courageous enemy cavalry charged four times into the Battery; the first time they came from the left side and were for a long time mistaken for Belgians; our people threw them back, but were
then menaced from the flank, and the cavalry of both sides pushed each other time and again from one side to the other, so that the Battery was prevented from firing. The gunners ran to the squares behind them and back in fine fashion to their guns, as soon as the latter were free from the enemy. Here Nolte was always the last to leave his gun and the first to get back to it. On one occasion he had to throw himself underneath, as he could no longer get to the rear. Soon afterwards the Battery, with others, retired so as to replenish ammunition.' (Von Wissell.)

6. Driver Andrew Hanke, 4 Foot Company, KGA ‘Several times the courageous enemy cavalry broke into this Battery. Hanke was alert and quick to bring his limber up to the (Voices from the Napoleonic Wars 139) gun so that this alone of the six in the Battery was able to be taken into the squares behind.'
(Von Wissell.)

7. Sergeant Christian Deneke, 4 Foot Company, KGA ‘Enemy cavalry approached unexpectedly from the left flank. Deneke commanded the howitzer on the right flank and had not noticed the approach
of the enemy, being engaged on another target. One of the drivers, Eickmann, however did so and immediately came up with the limber and shouted to his Commander that the enemy had reached the left of the Battery. Because of the soft muddy ground, the gun could not be limbered up quickly enough; several gunners sprang on to the limbers with the rammer and hurried to the square. During this time, Deneke fired off the loaded round and then threw himself under the gun. On subsequent attacks, Eickmann was equally prompt at bringing the limber up and the gun was able to be withdrawn.'(Von Wissell.)

These last two statements, 6 and 7, once again show a departure from normal procedure. On the approach of enemy cavalry the usual practice was to remain firing until the last moment and for
the gunners then to take refuge in the nearest infantry square. It would seem unnecessarily risky
to move guns each time, but these two accounts by men of 4 Foot Company say that this was done and
the words were endorsed by officers of the Battery present at the time. So we must accept this as the
truth, but almost certainly only in respect of this one unit.

Two main points have emerged so far, first the unusual method of ammunition replenishment by
both RA and KGA batteries at Waterloo and second, the withdrawal of both men and guns by one battery on the approach of enemy cavalry. Both these involve the movement of men and guns from
the firing line, when such moves might not be expected. Could it possibly have been sights such
as described above, that misled the Duke of Wellington to write the following most unjust
criticisms of the Royal Artillery at Waterloo? ‘To tell you the truth, I was not very well
pleased with the Artillery in the Battle of Waterloo. . . . The French cavalry charged . . .within a few yards of our guns. In some instances they were in actual possession of our
guns. We could not expect the artillerymen to remain at their guns in such a case; but I had a right
to expect that the officers and men of the Artillery would do as I did, and as all the staff did, that is,
take shelter in the squares of the Infantry. . . . But they did no such thing; they ran off the field
entirely, taking with them limbers, ammunition, and everything; and . . . Mind my dear Lord, I do not mean to complain; but what I have above-mentioned is a fact known to many; and it would not do to reward a Corps under such circumstances. The Artillery like others, behaved most gallantly; when a misfortune of this kind has occurred, a Corps must not be rewarded.' These extracts are from a letter written by the Duke of Wellington to Lord Mulgrave, Master General of the Ordnance, from Paris on 21st December 1815. It was first made public in 1872, when the ‘Supplementary Despatches' were published. The criticisms came as a great surprise to the Artillery, whose conduct at Waterloo was
generally considered to have been both gallant and effective.

The circumstances in which the letter came to be written are as follows.

After the victory of Vittoria in 1813, special gratuities had been granted to senior officers of the Royal Artillery, including those commanding troops and Companies. The Duke of Wellington had not been consulted, since the Ordnance Corps (Artillery and Engineers) came directly under the control of the Master General, and had not approved. After Waterloo, a similar petition had been made for some such reward, but, on this occasion, Lord Mulgrave had referred the matter to the Duke. The passages quoted are from the latter's reply.

Various writers over the years have dealt with the very serious allegations made, among them Major Duncan, Lieutenant-Colonel Hime and, more recently, Sir James Marshall-Cornwall. They are able to point out the inconsistencies in the letter, and the obvious injustice done to the Royal Artillery,
by quoting eye-witnesses, but they do not totally refute the Duke's statement that he saw guns and gunners leave the field. However, the Duke must have seen some movements, other than by Dutch-Belgian units, to make such positive accusations. The (140 Voices from the Napoleonic Wars) extracts given may describe what he saw and, understandably, misinterpreted. One further extract is of interest in another way. It was acknowledged during the Peninsular War that the best horsemasters were the KGL cavalry; the best units in the British Army in this respect being the RHA! Among foot batteries, the advantage again lay with the Germans in the KGA, because their drivers were an integral part of the
battery and not attached from a separate Corps of Royal Artillery Drivers.

8. Driver Sergeant Henry John Duensing, 4 Foot Company, KGA

‘The Fourth Foot Battery, during the campaigns in the Peninsular and France, acquired a reputation
not just for their artillery achievements under fire, but also because their teams were always in better condition than any others despite long marches and shortage of fodder. In the Battle of Toulouse, the
artillery had to move forward out of a valley up on to a difficult height and, on the way, cross a deep
ditch. The Battery crossed the latter and moved on to the hill in excellent order; not so an English
battery, their horses did not have sufficient strength, and required the help of the German teams. When towards the close of the battle an English battery had to retire with their infantry, their horses were so exhausted, that they only were able to perform their duty with the assistance of the Germans. This was both a source of pride and pleasure to the Battery. A great part of the credit, which came to the Battery through the condition of their horses, was ascribed by the officers themselves to this efficient NCO . . .' (Von Wissell.)

The 4th Foot Company was for four years the divisional artillery of the 4th Division and much
esteemed and respected by the latter. The first mention of help to an English Battery almost
certainly refers to Brandreth's Brigade. It is hoped that these extracts will have been of
general interest. They should have at least the merit of novelty, since Beamish is long out of print and
the other two sources have never been translated, as far as is known. References

1. Major F. Duncan; "History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery", Volume II, Appendix A. John Murray, London 1879.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel H W L Hime; "History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 1815-1853", Appendix D. Longmans
Green and Co., London 1908.

3. General Sir James Marhall-Cornwall; "The Royal Regiment in the Waterloo Campaign, RA Journal, Volume XCII.

4. B Schwertfeger; "Geschichte der Koniglich Deutschen Legion, 1803-1816", Hannover, 1907.

5. L Von Wissel; "Ruhmwurdige Thateu welche in der letzten Kriegen von Unteroffizieren und Soldaten der englisch-deutschen Legion und der hannoverschen Armee Werichtet Sind",
Hannover, 1846.

6. N Ludlow Beamish; "History of the King's German Legion", London 1832 & 1837.

thanks very much for all that dibble!

dibble,

Thanks I have saved and will read Duncan. I did note the sources including Dickson were artillerymen. Wellington commanded the entire army and viewed the battle holistically not narrowly as an artilleryman.

I am well aware of Wellington's foibles which included a streak of unfairness. Nevertheless, no one would question Wellington demanded excellence. The question remains,why would he dump on the artillery if it didn't deserve it?

The irony is Wellington's orders could have been interpreted as a "free pass." After all though ordered to retreat to the squares he didn't order the men to return.

So, why would the artillerymen not admit their performance wasn't the best? The answer is simple to protect their personal reputations and the regiment. Finally, I would note in the forward Duncan thanks Dickson for his help. The question is help doing what? The answer is evident, to understand what fine brave fellows were in the RA and RHA.

As stated, I'll read Duncan but as Army Commander, the preponderance of evidence supports Wellington's letter.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

ps: I think the RA and RHA is most admirable and was and is an excellent unit. But on occasion…I remember just before Pickett's charge a soldier saw a rabbit running the opposite direction and said, "You run little hare, if I was you I'd run too."

I'd say the great preponderance of evidence as presented in this thread doesn't support the assertion of large scale permanent quitting of the field by allied gunners.
Ratisbon's stance is to be admired though- if this were the film Waterloo, Wellington would certainly have granted him his stripes by now.

Perhaps the quit the field argument is right however- maybe most of the gunners did melt away. The nervy fainthearts of Sandham's Company RA mentioned above only fired 183 rounds per gun during the battle after all……

Ratisbon

"preponderance of evidence supports Wellington's letter"

All there is is one letter. We today have far more access to accounts than the Duke, and in those accounts, we find almost nothing from the allies or French of the Royal Artillery running away.

"The question remains,why would he dump on the artillery if it didn't deserve it?"

To answer your question, you should do some reading on the well known antipathy the Duke had with the Royal Artillery, that went back to when he took command of the army in the Peninsula.

As what is said in Duncan and Lipscomb's tome. If a British regiment left the field, would the whole infantry arm be castigated?

If you think that the refuters of Wellingtons letter were/are wrong, you should show how they were/are wrong.

Glover, Franklin, Field and I reckon Muilwijk, have/will not show that the royal Artillery 'ran away'

The Waterloo battle is now at the point where 6 'English' squares (as many as 8 'English' regiments) were broken, the 'English' 95th, with the 'English' Artillery, ran away and the 'English' cavalry put to the sword.

If this rubbish was all true, it shows just how bad Napoleon was as a commander and how easy it was for the Allies to totally destroy his 'useless' army. Especially as the French successes are highlighted by the taking of a farm house and the breaking in of a wooden gate.

Seneffe

"Perhaps the quit the field argument is right however- maybe most of the gunners did melt away. The nervy fainthearts of Sandham's Company RA mentioned above only fired 183 rounds per gun during the battle after all……"

Again, it means that Sandham fired at cavalry and infantry, not 'blast away' willy nilly, even so, your 'rounds fired is wrong.

"On the morning of 18th June 1815 the Company was posted between La Haye Sainte and Hougomont in support of the 1st Division, under Maj Gen Cooke. The Company is credited with firing the first shot from the Allied Artillery, and expended over 1,100 rounds during the day."

26thregra-asc.com/16bty.html

See page 426 and foot-note of Duncan's tome.

Paul :)

@ dibble

Er, 1,100 rounds fired from a six-gun field brigade is indeed an average of 183 per gun.

please read

SOJ 5(06)
The Waterloo myth of Royal Artillery cowardice
Henry William Lovett Hime
This defence of the Royal Artillery and King's German Artillery still had to be made almost 100
years after the battle in 1908 and has been repeated in many modern and respected histories.
Such is the slur of the words of the Duke of Wellington.
Henry William Lovett Hime (1908) History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery 1815-53,
Longmans, Green & Co., London, pp 125-140.

Seemingly this is another political discussion on TMP – some just ignoring the evidence supplied by numerous articles in

SOJ 06

You can get it online on Napoleonseries.org