"Hills in Wargames" Topic

My current campaign is producing a lot of battles in hilly terrain, so I am fighting a lot of wargames with hills. There is a tendency to group defenders behind the crest of a hill to avoid artillery casualties. I know that this tactic was favoured by Wellington. But not, I believe, by most commanders of the period.

I have a vague memory of reading about Wellingtons meeting with Blucher at Ligny. Wellington remarked on the Prussian infantry deployed on the forward slope, and suggested that Blucher move them back behind the crest. Blucher replied that his men would not stand if they could not see the enemy.

In a wargame there seems to be no disadvantage to using this reverse slope tactic. They avoid artillery casualties, yet suffer no penalty in skirmish, musket or melee.

I am no great expert on current wargame rules, having used my own house rules for many years. So I would be interested to hear how commercial rules, or indeed other house rules, deal with this problem.

How do you discourage your non British troops from hiding on the reverse

Well, if the French activate before you do and take the crest before you can react…..well, firing from above is an advantage.

I thought firing from above was a disadvantage as people tended to overshoot their targets.

This is an old canard. The only army that had a reputation for exposing their men to pointless casualties were the Russians. Read Clausewitz (who was at Ligny) and you will soon appreciate that use of terrain to any advantage was part of the Prussian toolkit, including concealment.

And you don't have to look far to find non British examples of reverse slope deployments. The Austrians at Wagram; the French at Salamanca and Vitoria.

Wellington's famous comment at Ligny has not been independently confirmed, and sounds like a misunderstanding. At the time (about Midday) the Prussians were either deployed in a forward line under cover by the stream – or well back and out of sight of the French. Napoleon at that point did not have much idea of the Prussian strength. Shortly after Wellington left for Quatre Bras, Blucher showed his hand by advancing his forces to support his forward line, thus showing his hand. The line of the stream was a good defensive position, but to hold it the supporting troops had to be within sight of the French. These reserves were out of artillery range, though no doubt were exposed as they advanced to reinforce their colleagues.

The Prussian dispositions were certainly open to criticism, and Wellington's suggestion of a deployment further back may have had merit, but they were adopted for genuine military reasons (using the line of the Ligny brook, and the line of advance of reinforcements). The standard British view that they were adopted from old-fashioned pomposity about their men having to see their enemy is nonsense.

Attacking in melee from above usually provides at least a +1 advantage to the attacker as well, in many rules, or at least they used to.

In a wargame there seems to be no disadvantage to using this reverse slope tactic. They avoid artillery casualties, yet suffer no penalty in skirmish, musket or melee.

Why should they suffer any penalties? If you can't be seen because you are behind the crest, then you can't be shot at. It was I think common for skirmishers to be sent forward of the crest, so they would function normally, having the crest to retreat over if they are pressed.

How do you discourage your non British troops from hiding on the reverse

Why should I want to discourage a good tactic? About the only disadvantage that I can see is that troops behind a crest cannot see an enemy so if their commanders are not keeping watch over the crest they could be surprised. It's like a "hull down" position in modern warfare.

Ahhh… my favorite subject.

When one talks about "hills" in war games it should be borne in mind that there is a sort of cognitive disconnect caused by the kind of model hills often used on the table top. One doesn't need an actual hill to block line of sight, but only a rather gentle undulation in the terrain. For instance, if the terrain rises even ten feet over 1000 meters of a field then levels out that will keep any troops at the lower end from being able to see whats on top of the crest of a very mild hill. It's very subtle and shouldn't result in any sort of H2H or combat bonus for troops on the "high" ground. It could have a great effect upon artillery though, plus should keep the player at the bottom from having any idea whats going on above. In fact such a location could be a very strong defensive position. It's hard to depict on the table top though, unless you have a battle mat or some such thing. If your model hills are just the standard placeable flocked foam mounds then the reality on the ground is sort of warped.

Well for starters, playing a game like Black Powder you have your men behind the crest and order them forward to repel that French column and roll an 11 and the general's order get's lost.

In another rule set I use the sudden emergence of previously unseen troops causes a 'Surprised' result on reaction tests for closing with enemy infantry/shooting casualties.

I guess that the best way to flush them out is to either send in an attack or try to outflank the position.

Well for starters, playing a game like Black Powder you have your men behind the crest and order them forward to repel that French column and roll an 11 and the general's order get's lost.

That could still happen even if they weren't behind a crest.

Its a matter of command and control, the early continental armies command systems were poor so Generals liked to everything 'up front' and visible to maintain control.Poor skirmish screens to keep the French skirmishers at a decent distance is also a factor. As they got better the disadvatages of reverse slopes ( point well made forwardmarchstudios)were less relevant. Its the usual 'technical advance' and 'catchup' game.
L

The Russians used reverse slopes for protection too. And the Austrians could be just as stubborn about deploying on the forward slope or in the open as the Russians.

Part of the issue is what is mentioned by forwardmarchstudios: Being hidden to artillery fire didn't require slopes the size of Spanish ridges, it is just that there were more opportunities for such reverse slope tactics with actual reverse slopes in Spain than central Europe, and of course, lot of other issues like morale and the actual terrain played a part: Some slopes simply didn't provide the protection needed, or were shaped as to be difficult to defend if positioned behind the slope.

LeonAdler:
Not following you. How did keeping things in sight of the enemy as opposed to positioning on the reverse slopes help command control? I would imagine the friendly general could still see them, and if not, why would not seeing them influence command and control if he positioned them there?

Bill

Aren't Zayas' Spanish troops at Albuera on a hill and not behind the crest while standing for a couple of hours trading fire with the French?

Isn't defending higher ground generally an advantage? Gettysburg, Fredricksburg, Thomas at Chickamagua?

Well, a lot of these issues can be resolved if one separates out the different levels of command through context. That is, if you are playing a war game the position of troops either in front or behind a crest should be a central part of the scenario being played out and factored into the bigger picture.

For instance, if you're playing a game where a division is going to attack along a certain frontage of the enemies position, then the artillery prep beforehand can be adjudicated before the game even begins, taking into consideration any significant slope or other factors of terrain. If you get right down to the hard numbers of the ground scale you'll see that most war game rules, given the restrictions of table space and unit frontage, should only be attempting to show a very small, localized conflict and only a very set amount of time and a very clear cut result depending on the outcome of the table top action. Good scenario writing, in other words, should solve all of the problems mentioned above.

Defending higher ground can be an advantage, but only within the operational context. Holding the worlds greatest defensive position is meaningless if you're flanked out of it, for example. In that case a position that should be a veritable fortress can be taken not with guns or a single casualty but with the soldiers legs… as a fella once said. So if a war game scenario is going to have, say, a division of French attacking a division of British protected behind a reversed slope there should be a clear reason for this situation before the first dice are even rolled. What are the other French divisions doing? What are the other British divisions doing? What are the other corps doing around that piece of elevated terrain? This is often abstracted into semi-meaningless reserve arrival charts/ odds. But if a scenario takes the time to locate it within the big picture it really improves the sense of verisimilitude on the table top.

Of course, that has to be balanced against the fact that the further down you go in the command chain the more abstract the commander (and players) understanding of what he was doing became. A brigade commander therefore might not know why he's being ordered to take a particular bridge or ridge line. That being said, except in a totally fluid or chaotic situation a commander of a body of troops would be aware of the situation generally of the next larger unit above him. Even a brigadier needs to know who's holding his flanks and who is there to serve as reinforcements, if anyone.

So, in response to the OP from Thistlebarrow2, I'd recommend taking a look at the scenario, not the game mechanics, to fix this problem. If hiding units is an issue because players are taking turns placing terrain pieces as is often the case, the solution is: don't do that!

I did a post awhile back about the problematic nature of war game terrain generally. If you look at actual period terrain (or a map of it anyway) its pretty incredible just how much terrain there really was on a battlefield that often doesn't make it onto the table top.

TMP link

For those who have already seen the maps I did I apologize, not trying to beat a dead horse…

I believe thistlebarrow's game situations are within an operational context

Aren't Zayas' Spanish troops at Albuera on a hill and not behind the crest while standing for a couple of hours trading fire with the French?

I think the hill in question was a smallish rise and probably of little use as a reverse slope; besides the French were advancing to contact rather than conducting an artillery bombardment. The Spanish also did not have much time to deploy to face the French, so probably could not fine-tune their position.

The Russians used reverse slopes for protection too. And the Austrians could be just as stubborn about deploying on the forward slope or in the open as the Russians

Thanks McLaddie. I don't know many specifics about Russian deployments, just read about Prussian complaints at Lutzen (about leaving their troops exposed rather than anything specific about reverse slopes. What examples do you have about Austrians stubbornly leaving their troops exposed?

We should be careful not to exaggerate the protection offered by reverse slopes. Wellington made use of reverse slopes at both Quatre Bras and Waterloo. That did not stop his men suffering heavily from artillery fire. In the latter case I think one eye-witness said that it was a relief when the French cavalry charged, as the artillery firing stopped.

Partly this is indirect fire. Partly the French could overcome the slope by bringing their guns forward. Both tactics made possible by the relatively gentle nature of the slopes – those Spanish hills were usually much steeper, and offered much better protection.

"I think the hill in question was a smallish rise and probably of little use as a reverse slope; besides the French were advancing to contact rather than conducting an artillery bombardment. The Spanish also did not have much time to deploy to face the French, so probably could not fine-tune their position."

Beresford personally oversees their redeployment. The rise is described as a steep incline. Even 'smallish rises' offer protection on the reverse for line of sight fire. The British have very steady troops with excellent musketry for what we now know are usually short exchanges followed by a charge. Other nations – not so much. The reason for using a reverse slope seems to boil down to avoiding superior artillery, the disadvantage is that it allows the opponent to advance mostly unmolested.

Dear Forward march Studios.

Correct. We tend to model hills by making them an Alp on the table top, but when you see them in real life it's something quite different. For example, Little Round top is what we usually think a hill to look like-- only -- higher. If you stand on Cemetery Ridge at the High Watermark and look out toward the Confederate position where Picket's charge came from it doesn't look like you're standing on a ridge at all. Go to the other side though and look out to the "Little Clump of trees" and you definitely see an upward slope, AND you can't see anything beyond it.

It's the same in other periods. We've seen things name "hills" and "ridges" and they make impressions on us-- kind of like On-- the Alps. The reverse slope is also sometimes no great bargain. If the guns shoot a little high, they may sail over the crest, much to the discomforture of the people on the reverse slope. It wasn't for example so bad on the crest and by the little clump of trees on that third day at Gettysburg, but Meade's headquarters and the hospitals sure caught hell!

Then again there are other examples. The real point being that hills often have very variable effects and something that seems a hill one day, isn't really much of a help the next.

It's the same with woods and most other things. I still take long walks in the country and it's amazing how much I can see, (and cannot see) 100 yards down the road. I remember on a hiking/camping trip many years ago the group of about 8 guys got split up. We both got sort of lost but about an hour later saw each other on roads about a mile or more apart. It seemed to be a flat grassy sward between us, almost like a well tended lawn. They walked towards us and I remember them "going down into the ground" and at times being completely invisible (as was the small stream) between us which neither of us saw. It brought home to me that nothing is as flat as a war game table, and as for hills….

Beresford personally oversees their redeployment. The rise is described as a steep incline. Even 'smallish rises' offer protection on the reverse for line of sight fire. The British have very steady troops with excellent musketry for what we now know are usually short exchanges followed by a charge. Other nations – not so much. The reason for using a reverse slope seems to boil down to avoiding superior artillery, the disadvantage is that it allows the opponent to advance mostly unmolested.

According to Beresford's quartermaster-general it and the other knoll along the ridgeline were "merely swells of an undulating country", and modern measurements show it to be of nor more than 25m in height. Also, as part of a ridgeline, it was quite narrow. The French attack had compromised the ridge position as they were advancing along it. I don't think it is all that clear where Zayas was in fact initially deployed. Dempsey's book (my main source) shows them along the crest of the knoll rather than on its forward slope.

At Albuera all the musketry exchanges, with British or Spanish, were prolonged affairs. A possible exception was Colbourne's attempt to take Girard's flank, where apparently a volley and bayonet attack failed – before the cavalry struck. Seemingly the French formation was too dense to dislodge – though the evidence of what actually happened is a bit thin.

The usual practice for reverse slope deployments was to put artillery on the ridgeline and skirmishers on the forward slope – in that way being able to attack the advancing troops.

Deploying cavalry on a reverse slope, if it wasn't too steep, could be a very effective tactic. It worked well for Wellington at Waterloo – and also for the Austrians on the first day of Wagram – if I have correctly understood the sequence of events.

I would second Matthewgreen. In many of our games troops behind reverse slopes are invulnerable to artillery fire. At Waterloo the reverse slopes provided some protection but the Allies still suffered heavily. Wellington ordered his line back because of artillery fire and this retreat got Ney to start the cavalry charges.

A round coming over the crest late in the day took off Uxbridge's leg.

25m is plenty, as a rise or ridge. They are not on the reverse slope, that much is clear, as they are shooting and shot at. Other musketry duels, short or long, are tangential to the point here.

If the opposing artillery is superior, counter-battery will drive it off the hill, skirmishers can annoy advancing formations but generally cannot stop or drive them off, especially if the other side has their own skirmish line. The French are often described, in the Napoleonic era by eyewitnesses and historians, as having 'clouds' or 'swarms' of skirmishers ahead of their advances.

At Fontenoy, for example, the French position between Fontenoy and Redoubt d'Eu is at the top of a very gentle rise. They have a number of small battalion guns, 10 or 15, along the 'ridge' while the infantry of the 1st line is behind and in the dead ground. British & Hanoverian counter battery fire, from some 30 to 40, guns drive these guns off but have no immediate effect on the infantry in the dead ground. Round shot does pass over and land in the cavalry of the third line, so much so, that the overall commander of artillery is asked to do something but is killed by round shot before he does. Subsequently, the Gardes Francaise, on their own, decided to go forward and try to take 12 British 6 lbrs that have moved forward of the advance. The Gardes get there just as the British Guards & the rest of the allied advance do and are driven off in the fire fight. Accounts of this are found in Colin.

McLaddie,
As always in these forum type posts difficult to get across the point without a lot of shorthand being used.
You have to think in a more C18 th frame of mind. What things looked like from the enemies point of view was way less important the way things looked to you as the General and looked like to your army as a whole.
If the General took a position on the 'forward slope' he would be able to see his army arrayed in its correct alignment, he could position and observe his artillery and cavalry and everyone knew where the General was positioned.
And of course the enemy would be able to see the full might of your forces and hopefully be intimidated. Concealment and masked deployment were not of importance ( not to the run of the mill type General). Situations and Generals of talent of course often broke the rules.
If on the other hand you deployed on the reverse as the General you'd have to be on the forward slope as the General to observe the enemy, deploy your artillery and light troops. In many occasions this would mean you lost full contact with your main line as the command and control wasn't up to the job.
Small inefficient staffs, poor courier organisation meant that a General liked to have all his forces to hand.
All this of course a gross generalisation but its pretty much the essence of the explanation , well its one explanation anyhow! lol
L

matthewgreen wrote:

According to Beresford's quartermaster-general it and the other knoll along the ridgeline were "merely swells of an undulating country", and modern measurements show it to be of nor more than 25m in height. Also, as part of a ridgeline, it was quite narrow. The French attack had compromised the ridge position as they were advancing along it. I don't think it is all that clear where Zayas was in fact initially deployed. Dempsey's book (my main source) shows them along the crest of the knoll rather than on its forward slope.

I visited Albuera a couple of years ago. The hill is a gentle downward slope, which levels out for a bit then falls off again. The crest of the hill on the allied side is higher than that on the French side of the valley. Zayas would have been able to have seen the French advancing down the slope on their side of the valley, probably disappearing from view at the lowest point. According to our guide (Nick Lipscombe, who wrote the Peninsular War Atlas) the Spanish came over the crest of their hill to a position where the slope levelled out. They threw their skirmishers forward to the "ridge" (really a crest line before the slope fell away more steeply). Zayas main position would have been effectively on a reverse slope from the perspective of the French advancing up from the lowest point of the hill towards the Spanish skirmishers on the first crest.

Rod

I'm afraid we're not answering the question "How do you discourage your non- British troops from hiding on the reverse?"

"How do you discourage your non- British troops from hiding on the reverse?"

Wellington is an excellent defensive general. One aspect of which is his eye for ground. He has steady, well-disciplined troops in relatively small numbers.

Most other generals don't have his eye for defensive terrain and some with larger armies don't need it.

I suggest an advantage be given to other than British troops on higher ground and a disadvantage given to standing troops who first see the enemy within charge range, or one move, say.

Generalship can certainly be legislated into rules through plusses, or extra movement points if using a pip system.

the disadvantage is that it allows the opponent to advance mostly unmolested.

Only for the last 100 yds or so. But when the enmeny was that close you'd want your uniots to be over the crest to meet them anyway.

I suggest an advantage be given to other than British troops on higher ground

So British troops on a hill get no advantage?

It was interesting to read your comments. I have also visited a large number of Napoleonic battlefields, and have often been struck by how even terrain features can be hidden by even slight dips.

However my current concern is how to tackle the problem of grouping bodies of troops on hills to avoid enemy artillery fire in a wargame.

This specific problem would not appear to be addressed in any of the popular wargame rules.

My wargames are all produced by a non historical 1814 campaign. I would prefer not to restrict this tactic to British troops only, as it would give them a huge advantage. I like to give each nationality advantages and disadvantages, and it is difficult to avoid making even regular British infantry elite supermen.

I suspect that by 1814 both the French and allied commanders had learned from their earlier strategic and tactical mistakes.

All of the armies involved were of a similar standard and ability, though I accept that the British were possibly the best trained and most experienced.

I would prefer to allow all nationalities to use this tactic, but to introduce a deterrent to avoid it being used all of the time.

I like the suggestion by Tom Loback that any troops behind the crest take a morale test as soon as they sight the approaching enemy. I would restrict it to a singe D6 dice throw. The options would cover everything from rout to stand and fight. This would suit my house rules, which are pretty Old School and rely on the luck of the dice already.

Thank you all for your comments and recommendations

Once you get in close range of the enemy your command and control starts to degrade quickly. The British were better able to withstand that degradation then their enemies, thus the losses to artillery were more significant to them than the sudden appearance of an enemy infantry formation at short range. If Wellington had green troops instead of well-trained veterans (and I mean green like oplechenie or Spanish militia, not unblooded like many of the British at Waterloo) he'd have been chased off the hills in Spain by the French army.

This specific problem would not appear to be addressed in any of the popular wargame rules.

I think it's one of those things that evryone kind of assumes. The simplest approach is to mark the crest lines or define them in some way relative to the shape of the hill (if it's there it will probably be buried in the rules on visibility or line of sight).

Add the simple morale check suggested ny Tom and you're done.

Also make sure than only steep slopes provide full cover against artillery. Within limits blind fire with ricochet shot and shell should be allowed where the enemy is suspected – which will often be the case.

Also if the hills are quite small there might be exposure to flank attacks, especially by cavalry.

And it is possible to think of tactics that will counter the reverse slope problem. For example attack the crest with a heavy body of skirmishers with artillery in close support, with the aim of either forcing the other side to bring their men forward to the crest (and canister range) or being able to push the guns onto the crest itself. Heavy skirmishers and guns in close support was the tactic the French used at Quatre Bras. The French tried to use heavy skirmishers without guns at Bussaco.

If possible try not to create terrain that resolves into either or both sides defending a ridgeline.

But my wider point is that the tactic of hiding troops behind reverse slopes was historically used by all armies throughout the era. Wagram for example was before all Wellington's Peninsula victories except Rolica and Vimiero. And at Rolica the French deployed on a reverse slope – though the forward slope was too rough to deploy on.

The tactic may be over-used on the tabletop – but you need to get beyond the idea that only Wellington used this tactic whatever British historians say (and Wellington himself). Very often the only evidence produced is that Ligny incident, which can be easily explained away.

Hills and command and control – reminds me a of a story I was once told by a former Foreign Legion Sergeant Major.

It was the late '60s, and my mate Pete (a car thief from Nottingham on the run from the police) had only been in the legion a year or so. At that time one of the most famous soldiers was a Spaniard, who was renowned for his fighting skills, but not – shall we say – for his intellect.

Given Sgt. Javier's (I'll call him that – can't recall the name) obvious bravery the 2eme Rep decided to reward him by making him squad leader, and Pete was in his squad. Soon after the platoon were sent on a map reading exercise in Corsica – each squad was dropped off by truck and told to make their way to map reference x, which was the summit of a hill (Corsica being very hilly), first one up would get the kudos.

So after the truck had chugged off into the distance, Javier says "d accord, up that hill!" – pointing to the nearest mountain. The squad knew their Sergeant pretty well and gently hinted that it might be a good idea to look at the map first – so Javier get out the map. The map is of Algeria. By now they are pretty sure its all going to go pear-shaped, but Javier grunts and says, "look its a map, its got all those lines on it, so those must be hills – it will do."

They march up the nearest hill, half way up they run into a bunch of tourists hiking back down – by now the whole squad bar Javier know they are way off course – there should be no tourists, they should be in the military training area. Javier is not discouraged, instead he piles into the poor unsuspecting hikers with a rant on how they are trespassing on army property and the guillotine awaits, sending them scurrying down the slope….

Pretty soon they reach the summit – and the rest of the platoon is nowhere to be seen. Javier is very pleased with himself. An hour passes, and by now its dark. Eventually the radio crackles into life…

"Javier, where the hell are you?" Its the Lieutenant.

"On top of the hill, Sir"

"Which hill?" –

"The one you asked us to climb"

"Turn on your torches"

In those days the French army had mostly Korea vintage US equipment – those old green flashlights with a 90 degree bend.

"Point them all to the West." So the squad all form up on the hill top and shine their flashlights west – and sure enough the next mountain top, some 10km away, is ablaze with the 25 odd flashlights of the rest of the platoon. At least the Lieutenant knew his soldiers well, and guessed that Javier would make for the first objective in front of him.

It was funnier in the telling but, I guess the moral of this story is hills and command and control don't mix.

Last week we played the Battle of Maipo 1818, fought in the foothills of the Andes, we roll for who gets the honor of the more difficult situation – in this case the Royalist. I got the Patriots under San Martin with a larger army and 12 gun to 4 advantage in artillery. With the Royalist obliged to attack, I deployed on the hill in full view, there was no reverse slope on the table but with a 3 to 1 superiority in guns I didn't need it.

Here's the Battle Report on the message board here: TMP link

We did the initial artillery fire wrong, but counter battery would have prevailed anyway. I kept my guns closely support so that they would not be overrun – one battery was anyway.

No disrespect intended but when I see this kind of comment:

"I like to give each nationality advantages and disadvantages, and it is difficult to avoid making even regular British infantry elite supermen."

I remember this from the THW forum discussing napoleonic (and by implication all historical eras) gentle jibe:

"What always made be smile was "national characteristics" of troops. As in the French get a bonus in column, etc. What these actually reflected in real life was the training, command structure, and officers of the nation more than anything else."

"Generalship can certainly be legislated into rules through plusses, or extra movement points if using a pip system."

Okay, I understand the temptation to do this but if the player is commanding and is in the role of some brilliant or incompetent personality he/she should be able to command within the structure of the army being commanded and not assisted or hampered by some writer's thoughts on how brilliant or stupid the historical commander was.

You play "Napoleon" you should not benefit from some mystical interpretation of Napoleon's abilities but, if playing a historical based scenario as the Command position Napoleon had historically, should strive to measure your success compared to the historical result Napoleon achieved. Ditto Lee in ACW, etc., etc., etc., for all of history.

Having the historical context is enough of an advantage as it is. I am always amazed by games where people play badly or have a bad run of dice rolls then blame the game system/historical armies for their results rather than poor plans, poorly executed good plans, or just plain bad luck.

"Okay, I understand the temptation to do this but if the player is commanding and is in the role of some brilliant or incompetent personality he/she should be able to command within the structure of the army being commanded and not assisted or hampered by some writer's thoughts on how brilliant or stupid the historical commander was."

Not really a temptation, many rule sets already have these to represent poor leadership and command and control problems or lack of same. Most of it is not 'a brilliant maneuver that will force the enemy to lay down his arms' but a restriction on the advantages of hindsight that every wargamer has refighting an historical scenario.

Vincent Tsao's Napoleonic new rules that we have been testing & developing have a structure for command & control that includes, to some degree, a rated ability of the commander and occasional sub-commander.

You can see some of the this on this forum where Auerstadt was replayed 3 times. There really wouldn't be a chance to represent what Davout did without some factors regarding command.

The French lost all three with the last very close and decided only on the final turn of the game. It gave us all a greater appreciation of Davout's accomplishment.

A few observations… The natural penalty for those units on the back slope of a hill is they are at a distinct disadvantage if the enemy gains the crest, and they then have to fight and move up hill while under fire. This disadvantage is partly physical, as it exhausting to move uphill quickly when carrying lots of gear, and psychological. I would suggest movement penalties for moving uphill and a morale check for closing on an enemy that is on a significantly higher piece of ground would be adequate. There should not be a penalty simply for standing on an area of ground. Also, while the overall commander may indeed be able to see all of his units ( not accounting for the smoke) the regiment itself will need to see signals and move in concert with it's brother units. A reverse slope then but not down into dense cover.

Also, perhaps there should be a difference in reaction for a unit standing in formation on said reverse slope, and one lying down. The prone unit should have a reaction penalty as it needs to stand up, regain formation, and accept commands before it can respond to a rapidly closing enemy unit.

In our local gaming group the problem of the non-French setting up in reverse slope defensive positions has gotten way out of hand. Especially with the ridge terrain usually within 12" of the table edge, so forget about trying a flanking manuever. It's almost always a game of 'hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle' for the French. With the usual result of a French defeat followed by congratulatory backslapping by the non-French. I feel your pain, TB2.

Next time, if there is a next time, I'm going to insist on being able to field converged batteries of howitzers and tons of skirmishers. After all, decisions were made by higher commands to put the s behind the ridgeline in a prior time period to the game. I'll assert that seeing this, and remembering all the other wondrous successes against these types of positions, our sides higher ups will come up with a different plan. Then I'll march my batteries into range, place my infantry in support of the howitzers, leave the regular artillery in a place to shoot the s if they come out to play, and then send in the skirmishers and lob the bombes over the ridge. Heck with it!!!

Too many hey diddle diddles …….

Kevin in Albuquerque-

In order to resolve that tedium I'd suggest just changing the scenario to preclude such a (lame) tactic. Why not have some chance of a French (or allied) division appearing on the flank of the ridge, as would be quite plausible unless it's one really big ridge.

I still think the scenario-based solution to the cheesy reverse-slope tactic is the most practical one. If you're just lining up troops and naming one side the attacker and the other side the defender then you'll get Warhammer battles. Throw in some off-board reserves, tinker with the size of your units until you have space for flanks to matter and that should go pretty far to solving the reverse-slope dilemma.

I think KinA has the right idea. Don't ban effective (and historical) tactics. Rather find a way to counter them. Both KinA and FMS make good suggestions for countering an opponent deployed on a reverse slope.

Of course, the really interesting question arising from this discussion is – why did the French not counter British reverse slope tactics in a similar way?

Well, Major Bumsore, I think the answer is that they did. Or they tried. At Bussaco their heavy skirmish tactics went wrong as they bumped into the Light Division, who were better at that game than they were. They made better progress on their other attack, but were well beyond artillery support and could not break through.

At Albuera the French turned the flank and tried to roll it up – and again scored casualties at rate the British couldn't really afford. At Fuentes de Honoro Massena declined the frontal attack and tried round the flank or through the village.

At Quatre Bras and Waterloo they used heavy skirmishers and artillery, and score heavy losses on the other side, but lacked the fresh infantry to finish the job off – and unsupported cavalry didn't work either.

The main battles where the British really score with their reverse slope tactics are Vimiero and Talavera. Not coincidentally the first ones. After that the French were wise to it – but the British had a core of very stubborn and well drilled infantry that were difficult to beat… where the French kept diluting their good regiments with new conscripts and sending the veterans to form cadres on new ones.

There are a lot more slope, funny little depressions, little bumps sticking up and such in any battlefield than gets into the records. A 2 degree downslope for 50 yards and then a 4 degree upslope for 50 yards is enough to hide a division "hiding" behind a 6' tall hedge. 50 twelve pounders could be set up and have no target. If you have ever spent much time rambling around the country side, you will know how limited your field of vision is. However, if this same terrain is on your wargame table, then the artillery has a 300 yard open killing zone. ……..We got do better.

I am not sure why we would have to keep other nations' armies from using reverse slope tactics. Who says they didn't? Using the terrain to hide movement and forces was nothing new.

Remember the rough terrain in Spain, unlike a central Europe. And Wellington's small armies…An entire 20,000 man army could use terrain in ways a 50,000 or 100,000 man army could not, let alone find terrain that would cover an entire larger army. Also, as pointed out, a number of Wellington's battles didn't involve using reverse slope tactics. It all depended on the terrain, and one vital skill for any general was having an eye for terrain.

Even so, individual generals did or didn't use reverse slopes, a tactic that was known in all armies.

I'm afraid we're not answering the question "How do you discourage your non- British troops from hiding on the reverse?"

But why would we want to do that? I'm with MatthewGreen on this, he has written a series of excellent posts with many specific points to challenge the old canards and myths.
The Austrians deployed on a reverse slope to good effect at the battle of Wattignies, way back at the start of the French Revolutionary War. I think Matthew is correct in stating that they did the same (or similar) at Wagram some 15 years later. The accepted "wisdom" regarding the Prussians and Russians also needs to be challenged.
Could it be that the use of these kind of tactics depended as much on circumstance as it did on national doctrine? Commanders used what was geographically available at the time, and their decisions also depended on the disparity in numbers of men between the two opposing armies, and other strategic considerations. Wellington did not invent these tactics, he just used them better than any other commander, and perhaps had more opportunity/need to do so.

Deployment should depend on the battle in question, i.e. the geography, the numbers involved, and the overall strategic picture. It's not helpful or accurate to impose restrictions on armies that say more about our prejudices than they do about the reality of the Napoleonic era.

In terms of 'dead ground' occurring on battlefields where it is effectively flat on the table, due to the difficulties of representing this. I don't worry too much about representing this specifically. When artillery fires on a target a die is usually rolled. If the artillery 'misses' (ie does no damage). This could represent a number of causes, including all or part of the target being obscured by dead ground or being told to lie down to present less of a target. A hit the next turn on a unit that has not moved could represent a lucky shot from the battery howitzers even if the target is still regarded as in 'dead ground'.

The rules I use generally have a leadership modifier for a General being present with a unit, this also represents a number of factors including the proximity of a senior commander who is more likely to be experienced enough to position troops to protect them from incoming artillery fire. Different armies have different numbers of generals at different levels representing different abilities in command control (effectively the number of General figures is shorthand for how much command control and tactical experience an army has)

As regards specifically positioning on reverse slopes that are represented on the battlefield, well perhaps an approach would be not to make them immune to artillery but just more difficult to hit, and according to the tactical doctrine of the army allow for some idiot to move them onto the forward slope because they know better. In the rules I use I have a 'restraining' role which controls whether a unit is likely to advance once it is aware of enemy based on quality and morale, as well as leadership; 'assertive' generals make this more likely. This could include those situations where the less tactically astute moved troops onto a forward slope thus exposing them to more artillery fire.

In terms of awareness of using reverse slopes by different nationalities I think it is difficult to generalise. Much depended on the experience of the commanding officers, at every level, on the ground which in most armies varied to a degree and in some varied wildly. Thus an inexperienced general with raw troops may actually end up exposing his troops on a forward slope in one brigade whilst another in the same army sensibly tucks them away due to more experience. Of course even at Waterloo certain battalions had to be exposed to fire to ensure a secure line (the 27th Inniskillings for example), so even Wellington couldn't keep all his troops on a reverse slope all of the time.

I have just been reading about the first day at Wagram. The main Austrian army was on a plateau. Though this was not at all high (10 metres or so only) it was invisible to the French as they advanced. This was one of the reasons that Napoleon launched attacks that night – he wanted to find out what strength the Austrians were in, and to make sure they weren't quietly sneaking off. These attacks, of course, fared badly in large part because the French did not know what they were up against, and hadn't had time to prepare a properly coordinated attack.

This was no Busaco, but it does illustrate what an important role dead ground played even outside the Peninsula.

It would actually be rather more interesting to find cases where commanders exposed their troops on forward slopes, and try to understand why that happened. The Prussians at Ligny has been explained (they were exposed only as they advanced to relieve their colleagues in the villages). I am struggling to find other cases.

As Matthew says, although only on a slight elevation the Austrian troops on the plateau away from the edge of the Wagram should be considered concealed by the crest of the hill.

Thanks to:

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