"Troops that fought in two ranks" Topic

In the topic on Prussian frontages TMP link there is a passing mention of Bavarian regulations requiring their line troops to operate in two ranks from 1804. I didn't know this was the case and had always thought that the British were the only troops that generally formed up two-deep.

I mount my figures on different width bases depending on whether they are two or three-deep so this got me wondering which other troops in this era formed in two ranks.

I'm not looking for exceptional circumstances where this occurred or for units that detached the third rank to act as skirmishers (detaching the third rank does not affect the unit's frontage so wouldn't make a difference to the width of the base). Rather, I am referring to armies where the tactical doctrine was to form in two rather than three ranks.

Thanks for any insights you can give.

Wurrtenberg.

Almost all regulations allowed for troops to form in two ranks. The troops that did besides the British:

Prussian Fusiliers 1792-1815
Prussian line infantry during 1792-1795 in the Revolutionary wars

French Legere regiments
Russian Jager regiments

And those are the ones where the regulations and SOPs called for it. During the wars any number of situations had French and Allied line infantry forming in two ranks, even some French regiments at Waterloo.

It all depended.

Austrians during the French Revolution – creating tactical reserve battalions.

Garde Nationale till about to their amalgamtions in the line (from 1791 – 1794).

In fact French infantry when the strength of the battalion became too weak.

The French Armée d'Orient after capturing Cairo

Officially the French fought in two ranks all the time just before the battle of Leipzig (at least those units along with Napoléon)

Bavarian infantry till 1809

Sweden

The main reason for fighting in two ranks was

1. To have the same frontage as a full strength battalion. Most were operating at two thirds or less strength. These included the British, French etc… Also resorted to by Frederick the Great in 7YW out of necessity especially his Grenadier Bns.

2. Those countries that operated a third rank system for their skirmishers and tectical reserve. These included Prussia, Bavaria and Russian Jager.

A column with companies arrayed in two ranks looks as strong as one arrayed in three ranks.

Generals know the size a unit should be to fill a certain amount of ground. The unit needs to fill that ground. It is more critical when the battalion is in line of course.
Stephen

1. To have the same frontage as a full strength battalion. Most were operating at two thirds or less strength. These included the British, French etc… Also resorted to by Frederick the Great in 7YW out of necessity especially his Grenadier Bns.

I think Maj Snort has conclusively shown on TMP that this was not <i/> the case for the British. The theory is simply not borne out by the numbers.

Regards

Thanks for the replies everyone. I've done a bit of digging on the web and come up with a couple of articles.

Magnus Olofsson's article on 'The Swedish Army in the Napoleonic Wars' link says:

"From 1806 to 1809, all Swedish infantry fought in two ranks. The regulations of 1813 revoked this: the infantry was to fight in three ranks again, though all jägare-troops were to keep the two rank line."

There is also Peter Hofschröer's article on Infantry Skirmishing in the Napoleonic Wars: link

I agree with Whirlwind:

Reading Dundas' regulations, he has a discussion of 2 rank vs 3 rank in it. Nowhere does he give frontage as a or the reason for two ranks. He does note the weakness of two ranks in a firefight with troops in three ranks, though.

Napoleon gave the reason for calling for two ranks in 1813 was appearance. The lines looked like more men, the enemy assuming three ranks. That, and the wasted firepower of the third rank. The French often didn't have the third rank volley. Ney and St. Cyr [IIRC] debated the issue back in 1805.

Von Winterfeld

Was interested to read your post about the Army of the Orient battalions being in two ranks. I'd always assumed this would have been the case but do you have a source confirming it?

Von Winterfeld.

Like Duc de Brouilly above, your comment that the French in Egypt used two rank caught my reading eye. Since I have a 1799-1801 French army of the Orient army painted, and based for three ranks, your input would be greatly appreciated.

Per my notes and sources, the majority of French DB's later in the Egyptian campaign were reduced from three battalions to two battalions*, with no mentioning of two rank formations. Could be possible surely… considering the limited French european manpower situation. The DB's did take native Egyptians into the DB's ranks and not just as musicians since the Gaza 1799 campaign.

*British Victory in Egypt by Piers Mackesy – pg 55

For the general thread….

I use the 1815 Brunswickers, Dutch Belgian and Hanoverian battalions in two rank formations. Not sure on the Nassau units of 1815 still.

@TMPWargamerabbit

That was going to be my next question: Did the Allied troops under Wellington's command follow the British practice of fighting in two ranks?

I've always worked on the assumption that at least the Belgian and Hanoverian troops fought two-deep but it's not really based on anything more than the fact that they wore British-style uniforms.

Duc de Brouilly

I was wrong on that – I consulted the volumes of La Jonquiere – but I found instead an order which confirms the usual 3 ranks, in the annnes volume IV – page 644 it was supressed for the first rank to kneel down and all 3 ranks would fire standing.

Thanks for getting back on that Von Winterfeld. I think that order was issued at the beginning of 1799. My hunch would still be that by 1800/01 they would have deployed in just two ranks: with battalions reduced to 2-300 men they would have reduced the number of ranks in order to maintain some sort of frontage. Alas, de La Jonquiere never got round to covering this later part of the campaign!

Troops in 2 ranks included Portuguese, Brunswickers, Hanoverians and 1815 Netherlanders. It is not clear to me whether all Nassau troops also formed in two ranks in 1815. An order was given for all of the Netherlands Army to form in 2 ranks, so this presumably included the Orange-Nassau Regiment (28th of Line in the Netherlands Army) and also the 2nd Nassau Regiment (in Dutch service), but it may not have applied to the 1st Nassau Regiment, although this would have meant that they were the only troops in Wellington's Army not in 2 ranks.

The main reason for dispensing with the third rank was that it was not possible for it to fire safely with the front two ranks standing, as they always were in the Napoleonic era.

Rod

von Winterfeldt. Duc de Brouilly and Rod MacArthur.

Thanks for all in your inputs. Glad to avoid a re-basing for my French Orient army. I concur with the Nassau line of thought for 2 ranks…. would be weird that only the 1st Nassau regt was odd man out. Plan to base in 2 ranks when painted sometime in the future… meanwhile my in French service Nassau (spain) regiments (1809-1813) retain their 3 rank status.

Michael aka WR

A related question- did the third rank give any amount of staying power, since the troops could move up to replace the wounded or dead in the front two ranks? Should such a unit be able to keep up a higher rate of fire longer compared to a 2 rank unit all things being equal? Or did the 3rd rank spend its time loading muskets and passing them forward, which would also increase the rate of fire? And finally,did it have any psychological effects?

Duc de Brouilly

It would indeed be most likely when battalions were small as this – it was the usual procedure of French infantry – including the AdO – to be in two ranks. I still keep an eye open, in the re-print of La JOnquiere Tesseidre issued a volume 6 about Kleber and Menou and as well the 4 volumes about Kleber by Henry Laurens.

About three ranks.

The French used also the fire by each rank –

Feux de rangs.

111. Depuis peu d'années, il a été fait essai d'un feu de chaque rang (2) (Essai général de tactique, chap. 4, par. 49.) que Sa Majesté a fait exécuter plusieurs fois (V. n.o 112.) Ce feu participe de l'ancien feu de quatre rangs (V. n.o 105); mais il en diffère en ce qu'on reste debout. En cela son mécanisme rentre dans les principes qui ont dicté le règlement de 1776. Il participe du feu de file en ce que le troisième rang fait feu, mai déboîte à droite, tandis que dans le feu de file de 1776, il déboîte gauche; différence qui, pour résultat, n'en pas une. Il s'exécute par pelotons, demi – bataillons et bataillons, mais jamais à volonté ni par file. Ce qu'on peut objecter contre ce feu, c'est parait impraticable le sac de dos, à moins qu'un n'empêche le troisième rang de tirer : on pourrait en ce cas, lui faire charger les armes du rang qui précède, ainsi que cela se pratique dans le feu de deux rangs.
L'avantage de ces feux est d'être presque aussi nourri que les feux usités; d'avoir toujours en réserve, les deux tiers ou les cinq – sixième de leur totalité, de ne se faire qu'à commandement d'embrasser un grand front; de faciliter au premier rang le mouvement de croissez la baïonnette, sans interrompre le feu du second rang, t enfin d'éviter les cris , les réprimandes et l'agitation des feux de deux rangs.

Ordre du jour de la première division territorial, an 13, Feux de chaque rang.

112. Ces feux s'exécutent par bataillons, demi – bataillons ou pelotons, en observant pour règle, de faire tirer d'abord le troisième rang, ensuite le second, et enfin le premier. La place des chefs de bataillon, ainsi que celle des officiers et sous-officiers est la même que dans les autres feux..

about passing arms to the second rank, this seemed to by a rare occasion :

A statement by Général Fririon on feu de peloton. cited in, J. Collin: 'La tactique et la discipline dans les armées de la révolution.' p. XVII [1902]
'Le premier rang doit mettre genou à terre: eh bien! je ne l' ai pas vu faire une seule fois. Dans les combats, les hommes, échauffés par l'action, font toujours le feu libre ou de billebaude. Le premier rang tire debout, le deuxième de même; et que font les hommes du troisième rang? Recevant les coups comme les autres, est – il possible alors de rendre nos Français impassibles? Le bruit, la fumée, les blessés, etc……
bref, les hommes, ayant des armes qui resteraient inutiles, tirent aussi; mais pour ne pas nuire à leurs chefs de file, ils tirent en l' air et n' ont fait que du bruit. Dans le feu de deux rangs, nous avons l' expérience que les hommes de troisième rang, dans leur indomptable impétuosité, ne s' astreignent pas à la complication des mouvements exigés, de passer l' arme au deuxième rang; ils tirent aussi comme dans l' autre feu et font le même effet.'
I translate this as…..
'The front rank has to put their knee on the ground: well! I have not seen it done a single time. In combat, men, in the heat of the action, always fire independently. The front rank fires while standing, the second similarly; and what do the men of the third rank do? Being shot at like everyone else, is it possible then for our Frenchmen to stay impassive? The noise, the smoke, the wounded, etc. …..
In brief, men, having weapons that are not being used, also begin firing; but so as not to harm to their file leaders, they fire into the air and do nothing but make noise. With feu de deux rangs, we have the experience that men of third rank, in their indomitable impetuosity, do not carry out the required complicated movement, to pass the weapon to the second rank; they fire as before and produce the same effect.'

Still the third rank had adavantages, losses were filed from it so the battalion could still cover its frontage and when a battalion of 900 men in three ranks did fire, there were about either all firing (third rank shoting more or less in the air – and by that might cause hits not in the direct aim but on resverves placed behind) and or third rank replacing casualties by that mainting the width of the battalion.

There was a great debate of 2 ranks versus 3 ranks in the French army Ney for example was in favour of the 3rd rank.

In the 18th Century, when most Armies fought in three ranks, they fired by the front rank kneeling. In the Napoleonic era, faster and more flexible movement made stopping to kneel less desirable, so just the front two ranks fired in all armies.

Various alternatives were considered for use of the now redundant third rank. The French discussed using the third rank men as casualty replacements for the front two ranks or using them to load muskets (but this latter drill was never popular with the soldiers since they preferred to fire their own muskets). The Prussians and, to a lesser extent, the Austrians used their third ranks as skirmishers. The British, and their closest allies, just dispensed with the third rank.

The British had been in advance of other Nations in reduction of number of ranks. At the end of the 17th Century, where matchlocks were still in use, most Armies fought in 5 or more ranks often leaving wide gaps between files to allow firing by rank rotation. The British took up flintlocks early, closed their ranks, and adopted 3 rank formations. The French were still using 4 ranks in the mid-18th Century.

The British experimented with 2 ranks during the 7 Years War (French & Indian War) in North America, and repeated this during the American War of Independence. There was a tension in the late 18th Century in the British Army between those (like Dundas) who wanted to operate in a Prussian style 3 ranks, and those whose experience in North America had taught them that 2 ranks were better.

The norm for most Armies after the Napoleonic Wars became 2 ranks.

Rod

I think most have misunderstood what I have written. The reason for the reduction in ranks is outlined well above by Rod. I was giving a practical reason for the adoption. I think also there should be a closer reading of the Dundas regulations that still referred to the three rank line.
Stephen

Hi Rod,

During the French Revolutionary Wars and the early Napoleonic Wars did the British generally use two or three ranks? For example, would they have been in two or three ranks in India, Egypt and Flanders? Is it known whether they were in two or three ranks at Maida?

Can you say that batalllions whose third rank was used for skirmishing in practice fought in 2 ranks?

Good info in this previous thread:

TMP link

Maj Snort, who really knows his stuff, said that he had never seen a primary source stating how many ranks the British were formed in at Maida.

Regards

Dear Limbourg
Yes, infantry that used the third rank for skirmishing deployed in two ranks.
Stephen

Thanks again Von Winterfeldt. I enjoy reading your posts: always very informative. I have the Teissedre edition but volume VI is of course by Rigault, as De la Jonquiere died before completing the work. It's interesting in its portrayal of Menou: not at all the buffoon that most histories portray, but it's not the highly detailed treasure trove of original documents that you find in de La Jonquiere. I wasn't aware of the Henry Laurens work and will have to search it out!

Duc de Brouilly

Thanks for the feed back, the work by Laurens has 4 volumes, I was lucky to get them quite cheap.
Volume VI as you state is by Rigault and contains a lot of very interesting information.
It is a pity that after the death of Kleber some key officers of the Armée d'Orient did a lot of infighting.

Can you say that batalllions whose third rank was used for skirmishing practically fought in 2 ranks?

I have seen some reports from combats in the Peninsula, where Spanish units deployed and fought in two ranks. However, it looks like that happened more from necessity (to cover more space than a 3-rank formation would have allowed) than from any tactical doctrine. Also it is interesting to note that in those ocassions, the units were on the defensive and never maneuvered (or that it is what is implied in the reports). In at least one case (in 1811, in the area of Ronda) one battalion was routed by a single French squadron, when trying to form into square from a 2 rank deployment (the French didn't pursue too long, as some Spanish cavalry appeared into their flank). Apparently, at Rocaforte (March 11, 1812), the Navarrese battalions of Espoz y Mina attacked the French position while formed in two-ranks. However, the action report can also mean that the battalions attacked in some short of "swarm", without too much order (there are two conflicting reports, one from Mendizabal and the other from Espoz y Mina). In the Carlist Wars, the Navarrese battalions were famous for their attacks with the bayonet, made without any discernible formation, so perhaps that also can be said for those of their forefathers…

Hey, a bug?, didn't post it twice??

I think also there should be a closer reading of the Dundas regulations that still referred to the three rank line.

Stephen:

In his regulations and exercises, Dundas argues for three ranks and the preference of some officers for two ranks, and in doing so, gives the reasons for using two ranks, even though he sees three ranks as superior.

Torrens, in his 1824 regulations, follows Dundas' arguments
A complimentary work in three volumes "The Theory of Infantry Movements" 1825 by Sausso published by the army again lists the benefits of two ranks, mirroring Dundas' and expanding on them, even though the work recommends 3 ranks.

Can you say that batalllions whose third rank was used for skirmishing practically fought in 2 ranks?

It would depend on how many of the third rank were deployed. Usually only part of the third rank would be out as skirmishers, the rest would be considered reserve.

In many cases the third rank would be held as a separate unit and deployed as such, again with part supporting those out as skirmishers.

So, in general, yes, from the Prussans in 1793-1795 through 1815, and then the Russian Jagers etc., Ney's instructions to his corps in 1803 and elsewhere, troops fought in two formed ranks when the third was deployed as skirmishers.

as for the French look at the painting of the battle of the pyramides grtns serg j

As far as the British are concerned, I think that it is important to recognise that Dundas was trying to impose a 3 deep formation in an army that had become accustomed to form 2 deep.

Thus we read in the 1792 regulations that battalions on the current very low peactime establishment of only 300 rank and file can "CONTINUE" to form 2 deep to accustom battalion commanders with the longer frontage that would be typical of wartime 3 deep formations. Dundas expected the battle formation to be 3 deep, but it often wasn't, with examples of 2 deep found in period sources for most all campaigns prior to the Peninsula, by which time it was almost certainly standard practice again.

In India the 1792 Dundas regulations were adopted by the C in C Robert Abercromby in 1794, with the sole exception that the infantry would "CONTINUE" to form 2 deep.

The Torrens Regulations of 1824, based on the wartime experience, officially recognised that 2 deep was the standard formation for British infantry. References for forming 3 deep in these regulations are mainly for the purpose of moving to the flank rapidly in column with a frontage of three men (which was useful because the companies would be less likely to extend their length, which had a direct relation to their width if they reformed line to the flank, when compared to marching in file with a frontage of 2 men) not for forming a deeper line for combat. This again was just making practices used during the Peninsular War official. The column with a frontage of 3 men or "sections of three" had been used throughout the Peninsular War for marches on narrow roads and also no doubt for some formation changes.

Major Snort:

No question about that. Anyway, the question about what Dundas was trying to do, or whether the British favored 3 or 2 ranks, but why. What I was interested in were the reasons Dundas gave FOR 3 and 2 rank formations. Below is the most complete explanations printed by the British Army I found:

PP.7-11 The Theory of Infantry Movements, Vol.I 1825 by Baron Saussa Diaz de Fonseca

It was not without considerable struggle, that the number of ranks, in which troops were formerly drawn up, have been reduced to the present establishment of three in depth: prepossession in behalf of long existing customs, countenanced here by the decision of characters of some eminence, in favour of the ancient position, for a long period thwarted all attempts at reduction…

3 ranks: added to the dreadful havoc the artillery and musketry made on troops when drawn up in a number of ranks, at last prevailing, they underwent a decrease; but even then, not to impugn the received opinion, this improvement in the formation took place as slowly as rank by rank, till they have been brought down to three. This is the depth on which the European infantry is now chiefly instructed to act, as the position seemingly the most adapted to our weapons, and which, every thing considered, answers the best, for the twofold purpose of firing and of close contest with the bayonet ;8 however, as notwithstanding this general assertion, the formation in two ranks claims still, under particular circumstances, the preference over that in three; they should invariably be thus reduced, whenever the benefits resulting from the decrease become more momentous than those derived from the additional rank…

In the Peninsular War, the army under the Duke of Wellington fought constantly in two ranks; but this cannot be adduced against the inefficiency of a third, as his Grace found the troops so formed when he took the command, and therefore could hardly venture, at such a period, to make any alteration. He was, besides, fully aware of the character of his infantry, compared to that of the French, which, harassed by many campaigns, had been filled up in a hurry by levies of recruits, and could no longer, from those causes, retain that discipline which constitutes the strength of the foot; for war is by no means so favourable to the improvement of that corps as it is frequently imagined,—since what the soldier gains in confidence, he not unlikely loses in steadiness; and how much the daily replacing of veterans, by indifferently trained recruits, must injuriously operate on the body at large, can hardly fail observation.

The follow the reasons, in support of the regular establishment of three deep; these are:

First, That as the impression made by the firing of musketry is entirely depending on its immediate and sudden effect, and consequently is considerably influenced by the number of firelocks levelled at the time, the increase of a rank, by adding one-third to the fire of that line to where it is merely executed two deep, must evidently become of moment; nor can the difficulty attending the operation of firing in three ranks standing, be alleged, as an objection against it, since, provided troops have been carefully instructed, and properly trained to it, the first discharges thus made will be regularly performed; and that whenever the first discharges prove ineffectual, no great results can be expected from those following afterwards.'

Second, In three ranks troops are more adequate to resist cavalry than if in two, and they are likewise more favourably posted both for attack and defence with the bayonet.

Third, The great object of rear ranks, that of supplying the vacancies occurring in front, is more effectually attained when standing three than two deep, where, in action, a body thus drawn up only in a double would shortly be reduced to a single rank.

Though some of the above reasons in behalf of a third may with some plausibility be equally produced in support of a fourth rank, it is right to observe, that this latter has been properly relinquished, since it would become impossible for the men posted in the fourth rank, to discharge their pieces without the risk of wounding those in their front; and that, therefore, besides the great exposure to the enemy's artillery, to which this formation would render troops liable, the loss of a quarter of the fire would by it be indubitably sustained.

The circumstances, however, in which the formation two deep claims a preference to that in three ranks, are thus enumerated by a German author. [General Scharnhorst, Handbuch fur Officiere, vol. iii.]

First, When two battalions of equal strength meet in a
Unless the front rank kneels, the firing in three ranks seems to be precarious, and should never be attempted beyond two discharges to the utmost; beyond this it is ever dangerous.

It is plain, the one in two and the other in three ranks, the position of the former will he more favourable, because, without sustaining any loss of fire, it will, by its greater extension, be enabled to out-flank the latter, and take it in rear.

Second, Where a considerable body of infantry, by its reduction to two ranks, is enabled to outflank and turn an enemy, that order again claims the preference over that of three deep; provided this outflanking can be effected previous to the front being engaged, as otherwise the thinner body runs the risk of being broken in its centre, and if so, to be most probably driven off the field, before it can take advantage of its extension of front.

Third, Whenever an army, from deficiency in strength, cannot take up its allotted position in the line of battle without leaving considerable chasms or intervals (as it was the case with the allies at Minden), the posting of troops in two ranks is preferable to that in three, as when so situated, the loss of fire, on particular spots, as well as the other disadvantages experienced by abandoning the rank, become of no moment, compared to the danger of leaving a considerable part of the ground unoccupied.

Fourth, In night attacks, as the men of the third rank cannot conveniently unload their pieces for fear of hurting those in their front, troops should be drawn up only two deep; the third rank might likewise be dispensed with, when posted behind a parapet," and also whenever a considerable obstacle, such as a river, or a morass, by intervening between the two parties, prevents near approach, and converts the action into an engagement of musketry; as in those cases, besides that some of the adduced reasons in defence of a third rank fall to the ground, the fire, from being kept up for a protracted period, can no longer be sufficiently depended upon, and the execution of a third rank therefore, at least useless, might become, from its continuance and repetition of discharges, dangerous to the men posted in the two first ranks.

The following is taken from the Prussian regulations as they stood under Frederick the Second; it is copied from the English translat., part viii. chap, xviii. num. 3; though the directions therein contained apparently contravene the rules given, the principle will eventually be found the same.

"It the infantry soldier should be equally qualified to act, when formed two as well as three deep, and that he should be made familiar with the modes of transition directed for those changes in the position."

In the ACW, there were instructions for forming march columns, and opening intervals for passage of lines by doubling up the ranks. Perhaps instructions for like motions might supply some information.

Another aspect to consider is that units usually were incorporating fresh, partially trained troops into their ranks. Usually into the third rank, where they could do monkey-see-and money-do without terribly confusing any formation changes and screwing up the unit. They might be considered more pike-men than musketeers and were sometimes armed with pikes or (I suggest) the barely serviceable muskets. Of course, this practical type of problem is hidden from our distance of time.

Another aspect is to consider the fact that the "radius of control" of the experienced NCO and junior officers was quite limited and was defined by their distance to the soldiers under their authority. In a noisy situation, with a lot of scary activity going on, the distance that their voice could carry, and how far away a wavering soldier was from getting a rap with a spontoon or flat of a sword must have affected the effective control from the officers behind the line. Simple math (well within reach of my reasoning capability) says that going from a 2 rank line to a 3 rank line would have (50%) more control problems due to this reason. Please recall that the book "Imperial Bayonets" is full of calculations on the officer to soldier ratios.

In a noisy situation, with a lot of scary activity going on, the distance that their voice could carry, and how far away a wavering soldier was from getting a rap with a spontoon or flat of a sword must have affected the effective control from the officers behind the line. Simple math (well within reach of my reasoning capability) says that going from a 2 rank line to a 3 rank line would have (50%) more control problems due to this reason. Please recall that the book "Imperial Bayonets" is full of calculations on the officer to soldier ratios.

Wouldn't a 3 rank formation make the soldiers on average closer to the NCOS than a 2 rank formation?