"Russian Artillery firing 'too high' at Borodino" Topic

Hello All.

On a recent thread concerning the artillery of various nations during the Napolonic Wars TMP link I raised the point that one of the major failings of the Russian artillery was that they usually shot too high, and that I thought I had some quotes from the 1812 campaign hidden away to support this assertion. Seroga replied that he would be interested to see this information. It has taken me a long time to respond fully, so apologies to those who were waiting.

The quotes all come Paul Britten Austin's huge book '1812 Napoleon's Invasion of Russia'. For those of you who have not had chance to read this fantastic work on the 1812 campaign, a quick note; the style the author has chosen to use is to allow the participants of the invading French and Allied army to tell their story themselves, with the Author only commenting between eye-witness accounts in order to link the narrative and allow it to flow. When reading the book it becomes apparent that the French often refer to the Russian artillery as 'firing to high', as if it is a relatively common and consistent phenomenon during the campaign. All the following quotes are from the chapter on the Battle of Borodino, although I believe I could find more quotes if I had time to re-read the entire Tome.

Please also note that it is not my intention to criticise the Russian artillery at Borodino. All the French witnesses are united in the conclusion that the Russian guns were extremely murderous at Borodino, and accounted for an horrendous number of Allied casualties. My point is a smaller one about the aiming of the Russian guns. Also, I am obviously not trying to suggest that Frenchmen somehow have better eyesight than Russians, but rather that the training of their artillery arm was better (perhaps enough to warrant better marksmanship in war-games?).
All the eyewitness accounts are in speech-marks, Britten Austins comments are not. The first comment about firing too high comes from the author (who obviously was not present at Borodino), the rest are from Frenchmen present on the battlefield.

The losses on the long march have compelled Napoleon to pack his centre, not with infantry, but with Murats four cavalry Corps. And that's where Pajol has drawn up his light cavalry division, brigade behind brigade. At the second discharge Captain Biot, sitting his horse beside him, sees
"a horse running along our front, its riders thrown on to its cruppers. I recognised poor Colonel Desirad. A Russian roundshot had taken off his cranium. From then on we were uninterruptedly assaulted by roundshot and grape. Everything that fell beyond the second line went on to strike the third; not a shot was lost"
As usual, the Russian gunners ARE FIRING TOO HIGH. And roundshot at the very limit of their trajectory come bouncing along the grass at Napoleons command post

Boulart, left behind with his battery, is watching his colleagues fate form afar.
"For a while my gaze followed the three (French) Guard batteries under a well-nourished fire & covered with a hail of roundshot whose falls one could only see by the dust they were raising. I thought they were lost, or at least half so. Happily, THE RUSSIANS AIMED BADLY, OR TOO HIGH"

On the extreme left Ornano's Bavarian Chasseurs have been solidly suffering under frontal fire from the Russian guns beyond the Kolotcha.
"Packed together, we formed a sure target for Russian Artillery, which had ridden up towards us. AS USUAL THE RUSSIAN GUNNERS WERE AIMING TOO HIGH AND A LOT OF THEIR CANNON FIRE PASSED OVERHEAD, so fewer of us in the first line were wounded than might have been expected. But the second line, a brigade of Italian Horse Chasseurs, were worse off; and their officers were having their hands full getting their men to stay put"

Sergeant Major Thirion…is facing the enemy….whose guns are spewing a rolling fire of grape & caseshot.
"Rarely, I do declare, have I found myself in so hot a spot. Immobile in front of the Russian guns, we see them loading the projectiles they're going to fire at us, can even make out the eye of the pointer who's aiming them at us, and we need a certain dose of sang-froid to stay put. Happily, THEY AIM TOO HIGH".

I read this in the above link and thought it wasn't just the Russian Army of the Napoleonic Wars. Many officers said the same thing of the Confederate Army at Gettysburg. Which makes me wonder until optics became better it wasn't a very common occurance.

Telestic,
Thank you for the 4 quotes. Let's look at them in some context.

For the first, capitiane Biot, the contemporary observer does not say "firing too high", it is the conclusionof the modern author. I do not read the passage the same way. To me, it looks like he is reporting being badly torn up by Russian artillery. But if we want to comment on what he says about Russian artillery hitting the third line, there is no reason to assume that they were missing their target. The Russians may well have been targeting the thrid line, and deeper lines, in the dense cavalry column. The Russians had alot more guns than the French. And the Russians seldom used these dense cavlary columns. So, with fewer guns and lees deep targets, the French guns would all aim at the first line, the "most threatening" target. But it would be wrong to assume that the Russians would do the same. With dug-in artillery, and infantry (and sometimes cavalry) awaiting the chance to counter-attack, allowing a disrupted squadron (in 2 lines) to reach the guns (while disrupting the follow-on squadrons) may not have been such a bad result for the Russians, compared to killing the the leading squadron and leaving the deeper parts of the column of cavalry untouched.
Some peopel say that the French did not understand British infantry doctrine too well (reverse slopes, lots of fires, a bayonet counter-attack) because it was not the same same as their own. I don't know if this is true, but perhaps the French writers in most of these quotes just misunderstood waht the Russian were trying to do.

Boulart seems to report actual misses. But it was not, senso strictu, the kind of typical overshootong one normally thinks of, but rather a more special case. The incident is rather interesting (and reported in Russian literature also). The French Guard artillery had occupied a ravine up close to the Russian lines. The Russians responded with cannister and roundshot, which would have to be placed with extreme accuracy into a close-by covered ravine, by the method of reducing the pre-made charges. As the Russians seem to have used these rounds, and not their shell rounds (which had an area effect), the Guard artillery was not hammered too badly.
However, the battery of the Guard artillery sent forward into the Russian zone of fire was not un-touched : 2 officers were killed or mortally wounded and 9 officers wounded. Using a typical ratio of 15:1 othe-ranks to officers loss ratio, that would mean something like 175 casulaties in total – something roughly like 33% casualties (counting the train solderis). So if not destroyed or half-destroyed, as Boulart notes, they were also not exactly missed completely.

You did not name the witness. But the comments are the same as for Biot – there is no way for the French/Italian observer to have known the Russians' intended target(s) when faced by massed cavalry. And lacking that knowledge, the French observer might again suppose that the Russians would use the same targeting tactics as the French.

Thiron, a cuirassier NCO of the 2e cuirassiers (1st heavy cavalry division, 1st reserve cavalry corps), does not mention it in the pasaage, but the case is the same as Biot and the 3rd observer. The Russians rounds were striking deeper in a dense cavalry column. It was happy for him not to be hit, but we do not lear anything about the Russians' ability to hit their intended target(s), since the writer did not know those intentions.

I am sorry, Telestic, I can't see the conclusions of "Russians aim to high" as really viable from the evidence given in your 4 quotes. I will admit that these quotes may indicate that there was something different about Russian artillery targeting compared to French, but there is no reason to think that this was not an intended difference. Similar is that Russians would more often engage in counter-battery fire, while the French were cautioned to do this only if no other more threatening target presented itself. With fewer guns, the French approach was sensible …. for the French.

In game terms, this is reason I often carp a bit about guys fielding or fighting Russians who do not have the same huge numerical advantage in artillery as existed in the real events. The Russian tactics end up being too "French" for my taste.

Anyway, way cool question/topic and way cool quotes – for which again my thanks! I hope we can continue the discussion in this collegial tone, without others coming to "cheerlead" for their "side". It is really great to discuss this material with you and others with open minds.

============

14Bore,
I think we are also seeing an issue with reporting. Everyone in the era before real indirect (observer controlled) fire reported the enemy firing too high. The reason, I suppose, was ….. if the error was missing too short, the rounds usually carrried into the position of the observer and so were not misses, and (ii) if on target, there is no "miss" to report (and maybe no surviving literate reporter), and (iii) if too long, the the report of the the miss is that they enemy overshot. So the typical misses that get reported (and everyone misses sometimes) are reported as overshots.

The Gettysburg example is somewhat different, but I do agree with Seroga for the most part. Eyewitnesses of enemy artillery fire would often assume their position was the target [human nature] and rate the accuracy of the fire based on whether their unit was it. That may or may not be the case.

At Gettysburg, the Confederates were:

1. Firing up a gradual slope over a mile a way, so it was difficult to gauge the strikes and the elevation needed.
2. 100+ guns firing for an hour throw up a lot of smoke, not counting the smoke produced by the Union artillery in the target area.
3. The targets were lying down, so other than walls and artillery pieces, hits were difficult to judge.
4. Any shots that went over the slope were not seen to hit, so it was hard to judge whether it was a good shot or needed re-ranging.
5. Because of the slope, shells and round shot often buried themselves rather than skipped further through troops.

Bill

I really think full conext is important in evaluating combat reports. I love the Britten-Austin trilogy for its scope and style. But, in case anyone else wants to see the four quotes in full, in the original languages ….

Souvenirs anecdotiques et militaires du colonel Biot, aide de camp du général Pajol
publ. d'après le ms. de M. G. Froberger, son petit-neveu, avec une introduction et des notes par le comte Fleury
Paris : H. Vivien, 1901
link

Mémoires militaries du général b'on Boulart sur les guerres de la république et de l'empire.
Jean-François Boulart
Paris : Librairie illustrée, 1892
link

The 3rd quote was neither French nor Italian, but ….. Bavarian!
Die Feldzüge des Oberstlieutenants Albrecht v. Mural[d]t
Politisches Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft
Herausgegeben Dr. Carl Hilty
Bern : Verlag v. K. J. Wyss, Jb. 8, 1893
link

Souvenirs militaires
Auguste Thirion
Paris et Nancy : Berger-Levrault et Cie., 1892
link
The larger context of Thirion's account is perhaps interesting. Please allow me to paraphase (in English) his description of the 2e cuirassiers actions at Borodino (for convenience, not to replace reading it in full in French at the above link).
After standing outside of the range of the Russians since the morning, the 2e cuirassiers are ordered to charge Russian batteries, as part of the grand charges of the massed French/Allied heavies later in the battle. The Russian batteries that are the goal of the 2e cuirasiers are supported by Russian cuirassiers and dragoons, poised to counter-charge. But the charge of the 2e cuirassiers is brought up short by a previously unseen [!?!] ravine and they are ordered to stand, formed at 60-80 meters from the Russian guns. Thirion anticpates the immediate slaughter of his regiment. But they are not too much hammered, and he reports that (happily) the Russians are shooting sometimes over the heads of the cuirassiers. He goes on to describe the arrival behind the cuirassiers of some shaken Westphalian infantry to breach the ravine (who would have been getting hit by the Russian's "overshooting"), then the 2e cuirssaiers opening their ranks to allow the infantry through, and then closing ranks and forcefully herding the Westphalians toward the ravine and the Russians. Once in the ravine, the Westphalians are covered from direct fire from the Russian guns and open up firing. The Russian cavlary is replaced by Russian infantry and a firefight results. The 2e cuirassiers move back into cover away from the shooting. They are repositioned once again, but never execute a charge nor are again near the enemy's fires.
So, we can estimate that all or virtually all of the casualties of the 2e cuirassiers came from the Russian artillery. The regiment suffered 1 officer mortally wounded and 9 officers wounded – or perhaps about 160 total casualties. They had 33 officers and 759 men on 15 August. So they suffered something like 20% casulaties from the Russian gunners at Borodino (including mérchal-de-logis Thirion himself).
Since the 2e cuirassiers could not move across the ravine to contact, I do not think it is too crazy for the Rusian gunners to have tried shooting over them to hit the Westphalians as their intended target for part of their fires. To Thirion this may have appeared as the Russians missing his regiment, but since there were some measurable damage also done to the 2e cuirassiers, perhaps the Russians, with (as usual) many guns, had just decided to take on more targets at the same time than the French would or could elect to do.

If the full text is not visible for any of these works from an IP address outside the USA, use a proxy server located in the USA.

Interesting responses Seroga, very thought provoking. I had come to the same conclusions as you that it is possible that the Russians were deliberately aiming at the second lines of the Allies, although it still seems a bit counter-intuitive to me.
I will definitely check out your links when I get more time, and write a fuller reply. I will also provide some quotes that refer to the Russian round-shot that was falling around Napoleon's command headquaters on a fairly consistent basis at Borodino (which was obviously far beyond the Russians intended targets).

Thank you for your considered response, and apologies for any confusion over the source of the 3rd quote, which is indeed Bavarian, as you stated above.

Dear Seroga
The firiing too high is either the modern author or the Russian Artillery was shooting at another target. It is wonderful to finally see these in context.
Stephen

@Seroga

Excellent and you clearly demonstrate that one had to consider the context instead of cherry picking

Thank you, dear colleagues, for your kind commments.

I think the rounds landing near the Empereur at Borodino were "carry-though" bouncers nearing their final resting places. Was it de Segur who mentioned someone thinking that one such round was essentially spent, only to be injured when he tried to stop it with his foot? Or was that a Waterloo incident, not Borodino?

Dear Seroga
That also occured at Waterloo and it was a British observation. Not de Segur that time.
Stephen

Lets all please bear in mind that the theory that the Russians were deliberately aiming at the 2nd lines is exactly that…a theory. It's possible of course, but probably not the most likely answer. Certainly the Allied eye-witnesses did not see it that way. Neither did Britten Austin.

Dear T
I think you missed my point here. The eyewitness accounts basically say that the Russian Artillery were not hitting the target that the observer was in.

1. Better other targets
2. The lay of the ground
3. Enemy had not observed target due to smoke
4. Shifting targets takes time

Etc….

Stephen

"The eyewitness accounts basically say that the Russian Artillery were not hitting the target that the observer was in".
I agree.

"1. Better other targets, 2. The lay of the ground, 3. Enemy had not observed target due to smoke, 4. Shifting targets takes time."
I do not necessarily agree.
You list POSSIBLE other reasons for the Russians not hitting the observers. Not DEFINITIVE reasons.

I could be wrong, but the observers seem quite clear as to why the Russians are not hitting them. For example Thirion states that his unit was being aimed at. "Immobile in front of the Russian guns, we see them loading the projectiles THEY'RE GOING TO FIRE AT US, CAN EVEN MAKE OUT THE EYE OF THE POINTER WHO'S AIMING THEM AT US, and we need a certain dose of sang-froid to stay put. Happily, THEY AIM TOO HIGH".

Similarly, the Bavarian observer seems quite sure that his unit is the target of the Russians; "PACKED TOGETHER, WE FORMED A SURE TARGET for Russian Artillery, which had ridden up towards us. AS USUAL THE RUSSIAN GUNNERS WERE AIMING TOO HIGH AND A LOT OF THEIR CANNON FIRE PASSED OVERHEAD, so fewer of us in the first line were wounded than might have been expected".

Now, I'm not saying I think the Russians were bad gunners. They certainly wiped out a lot of enemy soldiers that day (this is evident from all accounts of the Battle)! I'm just saying that at Borodino some of the Allied observers commented that the Russians aimed too high. I've not seen anything definitive either way to say why this happened. It's not something any of us should probably lose any sleep over, as its a relatively minor point (although interesting in its own way). I'll probably retain my wargaming rules that model the French as having a better trained artillery arm than the Russians, but I am certainly open to revision of this in the future.

Thanks for your responses,
TW.

T misses the point, he overshoots his target.

Muralt is quite spcific on this – explaining it very well moreover in other examples he shows how badly his unit was hit by artillery.

Seroga kindly supplied the links, all one has to do is to download and to read them.

While there is probably little doubt that, up to the autumn of 1812, the average French artillery crew were better trained than the average Russian artillery crew, I do not think that the quotes given, in themselves, support that.

As others have stated, all that they show is that:

1. The individuals THOUGHT that they were the targets of the Russian gunners. They could not know this, even though they could see the "pointer".

2. The guns did not, on the occasion that they are each describing, hit them.

However, it is apparent that, on many occasions, possibly including these ones, that the Russian guns did hit something, possibly the something at which they were aiming.

Finding definitive reasons 201 years on is, of course, impossible and to imply that one needs to is to borrow the tactics of self-styled "revisionist historians".

There is at least one Russian account from 1812 which describes French artillery firing high "as usual". When I get back to the UK I will pull it out and get a colleague to do a proper translation.

Well, lets look in some greater detail at teh original works in the original languages …. I think we really cannot make an generalized comment about Russians shooting too high based on what the witnesses actually wrote – but let each man decide for himself:

Biot – cavalry staff officer – the passage given by Britten-Austin is rather complete. I have a little comment on one phrase : Britten-Austin renders "dépassait la deuxiième brigade" as "fell beyond the second line" …. wel, it should be "second brigade", but also I really can't say from context whether Biot meant for "dépassait" to express "fell beyond", "overshot" or "passed through" – all of which could be included in the period meaning of "dépassait". See : link

Boulart – artillery officer – a special, and difficult shot at a close-in target sheltered in a ravine, that was being missed by the Russians to some extent – perhaps a situation that Boulart thought could have led to the destruction of the French Guard artillery if he were commanding the Russian guns. My translation : "across the smoke and the dust, everything was a liitle confused, and it was not possible to discern the damage [being done]. I had followed with my eyes, during rather a long time, three batteries of the Guard; they were under a well-nourished cannister fire and covered with a hail of balls whose paths one could see by the trace of dust that followed them. I thought them [the Guardsmen] lost, or at least halfway there; happily the Russians shot poorly and moreover too high."
Well, as Boulart said, it was hard to determine the damage, but it turned out to have been on the order of 33% casualties for the French Guardsmen.

Von Muraldt – cavlary officer – here is the full passage :
"Bei Vierzigtausend der Unsrigen lagen auf dem Schlachtfelde todt und verwundet, worunter vierzig Generäle. Ganze Regimenter, ja Brigaden waren zernichtet, z. B. die 1. und 3. baierischen Dragoner-Regimenter, welche zum Kavalleriekorps des Königs von Neapel gehörten, hatten so sehr gelitten, und ihre Offiziere waren so hart mitgenommen worden, dass nach beendigter Schlacht ein Rittmeister die Brigade kommandirte. Bei uns war der Verlust bei weitem nicht so gross gewesen, doch hatten wir eine gute Anzahl Verwundeter. Die Todten hingegen waren nicht so zahlreich als aus dem anhaltenden Artilleriefeuer der Russen zu erwarten gewesen wäre, da wir in erster Linie waren, und ihre Kugeln uns meist über die Köpfe flogen; daher die zweite Linie, aus einer Brigade italienischer Chasseurs-ä-cheval bestehend, viel mehr litt als wir; auch hatten ihre Offiziere nicht wenig zu thun um die Leute zum Stehen zu bringen. Auf unserem Flügel hatten wir keinen Fuss breit gewonnen, und bezogen nach beendigter Schlacht die nämlichen Bivouacs, die wir am Morgen verlassen hatten, um in die Schlachtlinie einzurücken. Der rechte Flügel unserer Armee hingegen vertrieb den Feind aus allen seinen Positionen und drängte ihn; jedoch zogen sich die Russen in guter Ordnung zurück, und die Franzosen hatten zu sehr gelitten, um an eine nachdrückliche Verfolgung zu denken und viele Gefangene zu machen. So brachte dieser Sieg, weit entfernt allgemeine Freude zu verbreiten, meist nur düstere Ahnungen hervor. Zudem fehlten sowohl Lebensmittel als Fourage beinahe ganz. Mir erging es in diesem Punkte etwas besser als vielen anderen, indem mein Bedienter, während der Schlacht, Mittel und Weg gefunden hatte, sich einer Kuh zu bemächtigen, welche uns eine gute Mahlzeit verschaffte. Aber demungeacbtet war unsere Stimmung keineswegs der Art, wie sie gewöhnlich nach einem errungenen Siege erfolgt; dazu vermissten meine Eskadronskameraden und ich schmerzlich unseren Rittmeister, der uns allen sehr lieb war. Bei Tagesanbruch gruben wir ein Loch, und legten seine verstümmelte Leiche, die wir auf dem Schlachtfeld leicht gefunden hatten, hinein, eine Ehre, die gewiss nur wenigen auf diesem mit Todten besäeten Schlachtfelde zu Theil ward."
Von Muraldt says nothing about being packed together, nor about the Russians aiming too high, only that shots passed over him to hit the unit behind them. Indeed, the Britten-Austin text is not at all a traslation of the original German text, but a kind of re-telling or something of the Britten-Austin's own creation.

Thirion – NCO of cuiassiers – spcifically reports that the cannister rounds were not exploding among/above him, but passing by before exploding. If accurate, he is not really referring to Russian cannister (which like French broke apart upon leaving the barrel of the gun) but Russian shells, which were fused. My translation : "Happily, either from being nervous themselves or rushing, they shot rather poorly, too high, such that the containers of cannister, in view of the proximity, passed by as [whole] rounds, that is to say before exploding and deploying their horrible contents".
So the report is a little confused perhaps on some of the details of the artillery (was it really too high or explodign too late?) and their ammunition (was it really cannister or shells?), as we might expect from a cavalry NCO.

The French did not use a fused exploding shell round for the field artilltery, right ?

But the British did us the Shrapnel round, which like the Russian shells, were fused.

Did the British find the cutting of the fuses, or the general reliability of the fuses to be any reported problem or challenge?

I know rather little about the British artillery, but maybe some one else is better informed.

1. Thank you to TW for putting in the time.

2. I think we have overlooked the larger picture in that experience must trump training by quite a bit. In some sense, training is attempting to teach the lessons of experience. The French did have Wagram behind them, which I think is a watershed over how battle were fought – and not a favorable change for the French as it largely negated the quality of their infantry. But I do doubt that French training was fundamentally bettter than Russian training. You load the guns. You shoot the guns. You see what happens.

3. (As has been pointed out) it is near impossible to miss left or right, and missing short means either the shot plows into the ground, or it bounces over the heads of the target, as opposed to simply flying over the heads. So survivors are going to perceive the shots overhead. I think we really must compare what others were saying about French fire to get a comparable picture.

4. I'm unpersuaded that any power could have a systemic problem with artillery aim. It would imply a strong doctrinaire approach and a uniformity of gun construction to override the observed results. I don't see any evidence of that. I would guess that each tube (and powder) varied enough that one aimed, observed, and adjusted.

Serago, I believe everyone had fused zhells. Shrapnel was a shell filled with shot and a small bursting charge. It's weakness was that the shot quickly lost velocity once the casing burst.

Hew Johns,

I agree with all your remarks. Thank you for saying it better than I ever could.

All in all a very interesting response from you fine Gentlemen. Just a few comments.

"The individuals THOUGHT that they were the targets of the Russian gunners. They could not know this, even though they could see the "pointer".
I don't agree with the second half of this sentence. How can we know what the soldiers of Borodino could or could not know? We cannot really know unless we were there, stood in the shoes of the men under fire who provided the eye-witness accounts. If enemy artillery is far off then, yes, it would be very difficult to know for sure if you were their intended target, but at shorter ranges it is easier to see that your enemy intends to kill your Unit. It sure sounds like Thirion experienced this horrible sensation during the event quoted above.

I stand by what I have said all along;

- French Artillery should usually be rated higher than Russian artillery for wargaming purposes.
(I agree with Pas de Charge that the quotes supplied are not enough on their own to conclude this, but of course this was never my intention in this thread.)

- The bravery and skill of the French AND the Russians should be admired. To keep your nerve & discipline in a battle as murderous as Borodino is an incredible thing, if you really think about it.

- The Russians overshot their targets at times during the battle of Borodino, and this should be concluded from the evidence presented in Britten Austins book. Of course, there is nothing at all remarkable that the Russians overshot their enemy at times during the battle. The French did the same thing. It is the nature & limitations of the weaponry of the Napoleonic era, plus the inevitable fog of war.

Finally, is it fair to conclude from the evidence presented above that the Russian artillery in 1812 suffered from the consistent flaw of firing too high? The answer in my opinion is no.
But it has been an interesting debate.

"everyone had fused shells"

Yes, of course the French had them. I could not remember the name for them, "obus", and so thought for a moment that they didn't exist.

Sorry, multi-lingual brain fade. I get that when reading German – I start to lose the ability to remember English or French, or Russian.
:-)

Telestic,

Very interesting thread! Again, hats off to you!

Dear Seroga
Howitzers fired common shell that had a fuse. This was fired from howitzers and Russian unicorns (a form of gun-howitzer). The British fired shrapnel from long guns and howitzers.
Stephen

TelesticWarrior,

Unless the Russian gunners were sending the various diarists and memoirists memos stating that they were going to be the targets of their fire, there is no way that those diarists or memoirists could know that they were the target. They might assume that they were but they cannot know that unless there was only one battery and one possible target on the field of battle.

However, I agree with you that there is not enough evidence to show that the Russian artillery consistently fired high. Where I would disagree is with regard to French artillery usually being rated as better than Russian; I am not sure that this was the case after the Russian campaign. I would also question your assertion that the book you quote provides enough evidence to show that the Russians fired high on the occasions listed. Seroga has pointed out enough flaws in the texts supplied to cast doubt on that.

I don't agree with the second half of this sentence. How can we know what the soldiers of Borodino could or could not know? We cannot really know unless we were there, stood in the shoes of the men under fire who provided the eye-witness accounts.

I think a better question would be 'how do they know they are the intended targets, regardless of where they are.

It reminds me of a movie where a hitman fired a gun pointing at another man ten feet away. The man blinks and realizes he hasn't been hit. He quite reasonably says amazed, "You missed." The hitman says, "No I didn't." About that time you hear the real target hit the ground behind the man who thought he was the target.

That isn't to say the observers were wrong or right in their assessment at the Russians overshooting. I only ask how they could know, [and we could know from the situation] whether the observers were the intended targets of enemy guns, particularly when other units were being hit far more severely.

Whether the Russian gunners were as good as the French is also hard to determine. The Russians lost a lot of artillery crews in 1805-1807 with their insistance that the guns be defended at all costs.

Best Regards,

Dear Bill
You have eloquently put the case. I agree.
Stephen

"Unless the Russian gunners were sending the various diarists and memoirists memos stating that they were going to be the targets of their fire, there is no way that those diarists or memoirists could know that they were the target. They might assume that they were but they cannot know that unless there was only one battery and one possible target on the field of battle."

Ignoring the attempt at sarcasm, I will suggest that a person in a certain situation (for example the experience of Thirion, with enemy artillery to his front for an extended period of time close enough to "make out the eye of the pointer who's aiming them") does not deserve to be called a soldier if he cannot tell for sure if he is the one being shot at!!! I will also suggest that without this presence of mind available to him, the aforementioned 'soldier' will not likely survive on a battlefield for long, Napoleonic or otherwise.

McLaddie, I accept your film analogy up to a point. I vaguely remember the scene you are describing, but I can't remember the film it's in? Obviously, your analogy comes from Hollyweird, not real life.

TelesticWarrior,

There was no sarcasm, merely an attempt to make a point to you. As none of us has faced the enemy on a Napoleonic battlefield, we cannot say for sure how much a participant could be, or was, aware of. However, one thing that we do know about the battlefield is that it is a confusing place and that participants will tend to interpret the same situations in different ways. Soldiers in combat usually tend to assume that a weapon pointed in their direction is aimed at them.

If you are standing on a battlefield and see a line of cannons pointing at you, you will tend to assume that you are aiming at you. However, they may actually be aiming at people behind you.

My main point is a key one which has to be considered whenever eyewitness reports are used: a witness can only tell you their interpretation of what happened; they cannot tell you what the enemy were thinking or planning. Therefore, there is no way that the witnesses can tell us what the Russian gunners were intending to do or where they were aiming.

By the way, do you know the distance at which one can actually see another person's eye?

do you know the distance at which one can actually see another person's eye?

I've marched my students in the "Military History" class outside, where they can stand on a nice hilltop and look out across the main campus parking lot, and then I ask them to identify types of cars, or even what color cars are, and they're always astonished by how limited their ability is to see such things, even with strong young eyes, on a clear day with no smoke.

Perception is a very interesting area. Also consider the very poor visibility on the battlefield caused by smoke. I know many historians ignore the experience of re-enactors. Certainly doing it you get a feeling for the unknown.

In addition during times of danger your focus is very short. I can if you wish quote the distances

DISTANCES/ OBSERVABLE/ TIP
5 miles/ Troops massing/ They darken hillsides
1 mile/ Infantry in line/ A solid black line can be seen
3/4 mile/ Infantry formations/ Suggests strength of the enemy, may suggest whether troops are seasoned or green by the 'smartness of the formations.
1/2 mile/ Individual movements/ Suggests activities of troops
1/3 mile/ Grouping of files/ Confirms numbers and organisation.
1/4 mile/ Individual figures/ Identity of units may be possible based on headdress and colours
350 yds./ Design on flags/ Identity of units is likely

You can see a persons eyes from only about 10 yards or less
Stephen

What I find curious is that the method of firing cannonball and cannister at an opponent was usually to lay the top line of the cannon level with the ground, fire, observe the fall of shot, and then correct the leveling so that the projectiles would bounce just short of the target. The purpose was to skip the round projectiles into the target. It is not exactly rocket science, but required only one trained gunner.

Is it possible that the dead men never later wrote other claims as to how they were hit?

Stephen,

10m or so is my understanding and experience as well. I seriously doubt that the Russian artillery would be such bad shots at that range (unless their guns had some odd ballistic properties of which I know nothing), so I think we have to assume that either:

1. The Russians were not firing only at Thirion's unit.
2. Thirion was exaggerating when he described being able to see their eyes.

Of course, as Seroga has demonstrated, the range given in Thirion's memoirs is 60-80m, not the 10m needed to see the Russians' eyes.

This seems to have been the only action the 2nd were involved in on the day and they suffered 20% losses; quite heavy considering the Russians were "firing high".

There are a number of manuals and treatises from the wars describing what can be seen at different distances, such as Scharnhorst's "Officer's Field Manual".

I think we all know that the 'fog of war' could be a massive problem on Napoleonic battlefields.

I just think we should not make arguments that run along the lines of;
a) Fog of War is a massive problem on Napoleonic battlefields, so Fog of War MUST be the answer to what the eye-witnesses are telling us happened.

I have no problems with arguments that run along the lines of;
b) Fog of War COULD be the answer, but we should also bear in mind that what the eye-witnesses say happened, actually could have happened as they interpreted it.

They were there. We were not. It is not up to us to tell the participants of the Battle of Borodino, or any other historical event, what actually happened (unless we have some sort of video footage or other fantastic piece of evidence, and even then there will be problems). Of course, we can postulate theories about what might have actually happened based on common sense interpretations, but that's all they are. Theories.

When it comes to the relative quality of different artillery – apart from doctrine and aggressivenss – I think looking at counterbattery duels is a good indicator. In this situation, the gunners needed to hit quite dispersed targets, which required good gun laying. I am amazed at the many descriptions where enemy guns wehre taken out of action quite quickly by well placed shots. I have tried going through Gills work on 1809 and Nafzigers 1813 books. Situations where one side was firing at a different target should obviously be discounted. To me, there seems to be a consistent pattern of french superiority in duelling with prussian and austrian batteries, that usually are the ones that withdraw or are silenced (which also could be doctrinal) whereas the pattern vs russian artillery is not quite so clear.

Opinions are welcome.

Opinion :

How many Prussian and Austrian sources did you read???

TelesticWarrior,

Your argument B is, of course, correct. However, when analysing eyewitness accounts one has to look at the context and the entirety of the accounts, as well as other accounts. In the case of Thirion, there are obvious contradictions:

1. The regiment came to a halt 60-80m from the guns yet they could see the "pointer's" eyes, which is not really possible.

2. The Russians fired high yet the 2nd Cuirassiers seem to have suffered 20% casualties on the day. As this seems to have been their only engagement at Borodino, we have to assume that the vast majority of these happened in this encounter.

Note that Thirion actually says that "some" of the cannon fire went high; maybe this was aimed at units behind the 2nd.

Anyone familiar with the problems that the police face with eyewitness accounts will understand that what people believe that they see and experience is often not what they actually saw or experienced.

von W

I went through the mentioned works. As far as I can see Gill has many more austrian sources than most prevous english language works and Nafziger relies heavily on the prussian sources in his 1813 books. Do your austrian and prussian sources generally contradict my opinion?

So you did works of authors like Malinovsky and Bonin, Strotha and Vogel, who all list a lot of actions about Prussian artillery – as well as the numerous reports in the different issues of the Österreichische Militär Zeitschrift?

I did only in part and see a more balanced and complex story.

Neither Nafziger nor Gill did write special books about artillery – as did the above mentioned works.

In case you rely completly on English works only, as good as they may be – the results will be one sided.

Dear All
The records and observation of artillery effect are so poor. The understanding of this arm outside the very small number of technical people was very poor. The education upon military matters by most of the observers was almost non existant. The job was learned by most on the job.

In most countries only the Artillerymen and Engineers received a formal military education.

I would suggest you read accounts in SOJ and specialist Artillery treatise. Even then there is very little evidence there.

Remember that fall of shot was very very difficult with gun powder cannon. As soon as you fire your vision is obscured. I put up the distances that observation could be made. Artillery were not at this time supplied with range finders. Most gun commanders did not have telescopes. If anyone has used a telescope to determine ranges, this is much harder than using binolculars.

I have read nothing over the last decade to suggest that anyone was better than anyone else. It is to look at the firing tables, doctrine, quality of the gunpowder, windage and design of gun tubes that more objective analysis can be made. THis is still an ongoing process. Hence the reason for the journal.

Stephen

Does anyone doubt that Kevin Kiley could have contributed to this thread? I think he could have. We don't want to lose any more valuable Members.

The bickering can be annoying (and I know I am as guilty as most in this respect), but I see no reason why we can't all co-exist on TMP. The most important thing is to have members from lots of different Nationalities who can contribute valuable view-points and sources. The likes of Seroga, Von Winterfedlt, Summerfield and K Kiley all provide great material, but the loss of one or more of them would, i fear, greatly diminish the balance of established positions on TMP Napoleonic boards.

I have yet to come upon a special book on artillery that had had anything valuable to add on doctrine and effectiveness – I am again and again disappointed by a blind obsession on material as opposed to doctrine and tactical handling.

'I have read nothing over the last decade to suggest that anyone was better than anyone else. It is to look at the firing tables, doctrine, quality of the gunpowder, windage and design of gun tubes that more objective analysis can be made. THis is still an ongoing process.'

Then I suggest that you're not looking hard enough. I could give you a list of publications, most of which I have already done more than once, that clearly demonstrate the differences, great and small, between the artillery systems of the warring powers in Europe.

And you are neglecting the most important aspects of artillery-command and control and employment in action.

Doctrine was definitely different between France and the other nations. And the only doctrinal publication for the period that addressed matters above the battery/company level was du Teil's Usage published in 1778.

The curriculum of the artillery schools is also a subject to look at and explore.

And artillery systems are not merely gun tubes, gun carriages, sidearms/implements and ancillary vehicles. They include personnel, organization, command and control, education, tactics and anything else relative to artillery.

The material is published and examples abound in artillery employment among the different artillery arms. And finding that material and the facts that accompany it, conclusions can be reached on which artillery system was better or more effective.

For example, the British, French, and Austrians all had excellent artillery schools, the French example being followed by the British and Austrians. The Prussians had no artillery school until 1791, which was quite late, and the Russians had problems with their education system, both in general and in particular the technical schools (artillery and engineer). References have been provided for both. There are three good starting points here for that subject: Engineering the Revolution by Ken Alder; The Development of Technical Education in France by Frederick Artz; and The Systeme Gribeauval by Howard Rosen. Archival research was conducted by the authors and the bibliographies are expecially valuable for further research.

B

TW,

I'm not going anywhere, but I greatly appreciate the thought. Sometimes I merely read a thread to see what's going on, which I did here until this morning.

Artillery is my favorite topic, and it has been for the many years I've been studying it. I am a retired Marine Corps artilleryman, and I believe that helps understand the most important aspects of the arm, command and control, tactics, and overall employment of the arm in combat, which I was also lucky enough to be involved in a small way long ago.

Anyways, thanks for the gracious thoughts, I do greatly appreciate them.

B

Dear Kevin
All that is theoretical and matching to reality. Your comments upon the Prussian artillery is misguided and we have discussed at length that of the Russians. Howard Rosen paints a very partisan view of the Gribeauval system that was not used in its original form during the Napoleonic Wars that slipped his attension.

Much of what you have put up there is subjective and has no quantification. The national characteristics of and the motive of writing needs to be taken into account. I have read accounts of battles from both sides and they differ greatly. We do not know the precise makeup of the Grand Battery at Waterloo and the ammunition loadings. Some modern authors state that Gribeauval guns were used in the battle (only a few 12-pdrs, no 4-pdr and 8-pdrs were present. Some of the howizters in the guard 12-pdr battery were Longue Porte howiters.)

There is alas so little about how guns were used in the period. Du Teil is 1778 so what has that got to do with 1815 when you would expect tactics had moved on. None of the French Artillery manuals detail battery maneuvres until the 1824 edition. All we have is fighting a pair of guns.

That is the reason for the SOJ journal attempting to fill the great void in knowledge. Gassendi is unreliable and it is unclear what date he refers to as it become eclectic. More information and footnotes are added but nothing removed.

I have talked of the physical quantifiable part as that is all we have. The observations that have been quoted here are not often by qualified people who give numbers and statistics. Often talking long time after it occured.

I have read the three books that you refer to and I am not impressed at their blinkered approach and inability to consider technology transfer and ideas. The concept that the allies did not improve so why did they defeat the French. Or do we switch to the economic argument to answer this.

It is an interesting discussion but no conclusions can be made in the manner that you frame the question. Alas I am a scientist and it is that I come from. We may never agree or understand each other so talk in different levels.
Stephen

Dear Kevin
Command and control is essential on the modern battlefield BUT what was possible then. You could not see the next gun or target through smoke. Communication was done by signal, drum or trumpet. Your voice carries tens of yards. Orders transmitted at the speed and competance of the carrier.
Stephen

"The Prussians had no artillery school until 1791, which was quite late, and the Russians had problems with their education system, both in general and in particular the technical schools (artillery and engineer). References have been provided for both. There are three good starting points here for that subject:"
Let's have the full titles ….

Engineering the Revolution – Arms and Enlightenment in France 1763-1815 by Ken Alder
The Development of Technical Education in France 1500-1850 by Frederick Artz
The Système Gribeauval – A Study of Technological Development and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century France by Howard Rosen

And from these modern secondary English language sources we can all decide, "French=Best", without for example even any comparative discussion in Rosen's book of the Russian artillery system deployed after 1805 under Graf Arakcheev. Of course, it was that later system that defeated the French in 1812-1814.

Or from Adler – "Russia" is mentioned in the context of anything after 1800 exactly 1 time in the book. Here we find that some tests published by the French in 1811 showed that Russian muskets slightly out-performed French muskets (page 339). Interesting, since these were likey to have been old Russian muskets, not the ones designed in 1808 nor the purchased British Brown Bess muskets, the muskets the French actually faced in Russia 1812-1814 – both rather better designs than the older Russian pieces.

I do not fault these three authors, as they wrote about France, and mostly in the 18th century. I am however dubious about applying these authors ideas and conclusions to areas they did not study. But our colleague "Brechtel" has no similar inhibitions, as he beats his drum, cheerleading "French=Best", utterly deafened by the noise of his own drum to any information that might disturb his bias.

He will tell you "references have been provided for this" and you might think that they were accurate and complete. But if you look closer, you see the references are poorly chosen (such as here), or a negativve quote about the 1790's about a nation other than France has been given (ignoring praises from the same source after 1810), or the little cherry-picked snippet you have been given is out of context, or mis-translated, or summarized by some modern "expert" we are all assured is reliable, or something. And, these sources will usually be only from the perspective of French and English speaking people.

And if we offer any of the missing context or point out any of the errors or omissions of his "sources", or if even if the original author himself publically corrects "Brechtel" (as did one of the Zhimodikov's) – none of this will have even the slightest effect on our "Brechtel". For he appears a true believer, a fit and proper cheerleader for "French=Best".

And if you want information only to support that bias, well then "references have been provided for this".

By the way, I was really enjoying this thread.

Telestic did the real work – he put up some real contemporary sources. We looked over them together as a group, looked at the background of the writers, looked at their positions on the battelfield, I linked the original sources in original language and provided longer translated passages for context. We traded comments and views. Everyone kept an open mind.

And our results were interesting. Telestic decided that Britten-Austin's simple conclusion "Russians usually fired too high" was unproven. I decided that in at least two of the cases looked at that the Russians maybe were not cutting the shell fuzes correctly. Other folks added interesting information from their personal expericne and reading.

Really, it couldn't have been nicer. No cheerleading. No attempts to "convince" anyone of any particular conclusion or sweeping summary judgement. Just interesting discussion.

I would have bought the next round if we were all at a bar (US) or pub (UK). …. But no funky fruit-flavored thing with a parasol in it for you, v. Winterfeldt !
:-)

Engineering the Revolution – Arms and Enlightenment in France 1763-1815 by Ken Alder
The Development of Technical Education in France 1500-1850 by Frederick Artz
The Système Gribeauval – A Study of Technological Development and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century France by Howard Rosen

Relying only on those works won't do to learn more about Prussian – Austrian or Russian artillery.
In fact they are useless for that.
Relying on those only, you are also missing a lot about French artillery and the problems French artillery officers had with it.

The approach of Stephen Summerfield – with his SOJ – is much superior and one is clearly able to access good sources – factual based and by that can form ones own opinion, thank you for that.

By the way – I like parasols ;-)).