"Austrian artillery?" Topic

Is there any proof that the austrian artillery was so good that it should get a reroll for misses or be graded any higher then the french at any time from 1796 on to 1815.

I can't imagine any nation or branch of the army that should re-roll misses. Higher hit probability sure, but no double jeopardy for me thanks. And no, I personally wouldn't rate Austrian artillery higher than French or British.

If anything I would rate French Guard Artillery higher.
All others being pretty much equal.

At their peak in 1809 and Colonel Smola was definitely a gifted artillery officer but still you couldn't rate them anything but average.

IMHO the French "line" gunners were better than average across most of the period and then the French Guard gunners were quite an exceptional group.

All of the artillery of the period could shoot, more or less (some better than others). But artillery should be rated by more than shooting ability.

Organization, education, training, command and control, artillery doctrine and tactics should all be taken into consideration when gauging an army's artillery.

The British, French, and Austrians all had excellent artillery schools; the Russians and Prussians less so. Langeron and Wilson both remarked that the Russian officers, especially the artillery officers, were not well educated. The first Prussian artillery school was not opened until 1791.

British artillery by 1808 had the best gun carriages, limbers, and caissons. French gun carriages had been redesigned in ca 1765 and were better designed than their Russian, Prussian, and Austrian opponents.

In higher-level tactics, which are spelled out in du Teil's Usage, the French were superior, as they were in artillery command and control.

All of the armies had outstanding artillerymen, but the army that got the most results out of their artillery arm were the French, even after the heavy losses in Russia in 1812.

Rothenberg is an excellent beginning reference for the Austrian artillery arm. Duffy does an excellent job of detailing the beginnings and early service of the Austrian Lichtenstein System in the Seven Year's War.

The Zhmodikov's two books on Russian tactics of the period cover the artillery arm very well.

There are excellent references, including volumes on Dickson's and Frazer's correspondence, for the British artillery.

Duffy's study of the Prussian army of the Seven Year's War gives a good introduction to the Prussian artillery arm, and its near-fatal problems inherited by Frederick the Great's successors.

For the French Gribeauval System, the best references in English are Howard Rosen's PHD thesis on the system (as well as references to the two systems of Prussia and Austria).

The artillery manuals of the different nation's are also useful, though most are not translated.

Sincerely,
M

What rules grant the Hapsburg runners a re-roll?

A freind back home was running a made up early italian campaign,,,and useing black powder,,,and seems weighed real heavey for the austrians

I would certainly look st the Smoothbore Ordnance Journal that has explored in detail aspects of European Artillery. SOJ-6 will look in detail at Frederick the Great's Artillery. There is so much that Christopher Duffy misunderstood. The Leichtenstein system evolved over the period and was static as erroneously considered.

The carriages of the AnXI system dated to 1803 and were only modified in 1808 due to the lack of money. The French state since the 7YW was racked with financial crisis. The woodwork was the same as AnXI but used the axles/wheels & metalwork of the scraped Gribeauval carriages.

So much written above is recieved wisdom and mere hearsay.
Stepphen

Actually, no it is not. It is taken from period manuals and from credible secondary source material.

To say that it is 'received wisdom and mere hearsay' is inaccurate.

And if you disagree, then provide credible evidence to the contrary.

Who stated that the Lichtenstein system was 'static'?

I do hope you're not again attempting a strawman argument instead of actual facts about period artillery.

B

There is so much that Christopher Duffy misunderstood.

Jeez!

I wouldn't go too far down that path if I were you – people in glass houses and all that…

Dear Kevin Kiley
I am taking of the ordnance. This is something that can be quantitfied. I am not referring to the men who operated it. The French performed wonders with ordnance that was not as good as some of their oponents. Certainly the Desaguliers block trail system of the British was the best at that time with the universal 5 foot wheel.

The question above was a wargaming question. The efficiency of serving the guns and the quality of the material is put together in this re-roll. When smoothbore guns were deployed, there was little to distinguish them by country as to how they were served.

Duffy was referring to Prussian and Austrian Ordnance that was produced for the 7YW. This had changed in design by the time of the Napoleonic Wars as I have shown in the writings in SOJ-3.
1. The Prussian guns no longer had ornate dolphins and had full bore chambers. The carriages had been modernised. Introduction of a new limber.
2. The Austrian guns had lost their ornate mouldings, handles simplified and carriages changed. In c1780 introduction of the Cavalry Guns.
Stephen

Dear Sparker
I am now on my second book on the Prussian Infantry of Frederick the Great. There are a few quibbles I have with Duffy but these are minor. It is obvious that he did not have access to the work of Bleckwenn on Prussian Artillery and the new information that has come out of Berlin and the former Eastern Block. This has overturned his mis-conseptions. The table of guns is incomplete and propogates typos by the original M&B tables. These have been checked through looking at extent pieces, archival data and reference to the plans. It shows that Duffy has counted the modification by reboring of cylindrical chambered guns to conical as new casting when you reference to the casting data this is not the case.

Part of this extensive research by Christian Rogge will be presented in SOJ-6. The translation of Bleckwenn by Digby Smith is an important addition to our understanding.
Stephen

Brechtel wrote:
"Langeron and Wilson both remarked that the Russian officers, especially the artillery officers, were not well educated."
Well, …. not so much.
Let's look at what they said, and about what they were speaking.

Wilson's entire "critique" of Russian artillery officer education is found in the following, written in 1807 :
"The Russian artillery is of the most powerful description. No other army moves with so many guns, and with no other army is it in a better state of equipment, or is more gallantly served. The piece is well formed, and the carraige solid, without being heavy. The harness and rope-tackling is of the best quality for service. …. The artillery-men are of the best description, and the non-commissioned offices equal, but the artillery officiers of inferior rank have not the same title to estimation as in other European services, for their education is not formed with the same care, and their service does not receive the same encouragement. To them is toil and responsibility, but the honour is by no means assured them. Some favorite officer, completely ignorant of the science and practise of the artillery, is frequently in the day of action appointed for the day to command the batteries, and the credit is in the dispatches given to him. …. The horse artillery is no less well appointed, and the mounted detachments that accompany the guns ride excellent powerful horses, and form both in real character and appearance, a corps not inferior to any in the European services."
Comments :
(i) Wilson was not an atillery officer
(ii) Wilson had little/no idea about the training curriculum for Russian artillery officers
(iii) His comment is mostly that the artillery officers are not held in a high regard as an "elite" branch of service in the Russian army and that there are not senior officers of artillery in tactical control during battles. However ….
-- The reforms of Graf Arakcheev from 1805 included the granting of an elite status to artillery officers, up to colonel, – one step higher in seniority than regular Army officers in both military and nobilary rank. For example, the artillery company commander billet was changed from captain to lieutenant colonel, and this officer would have the seniority as a ful colonel in the Army infantry. This reform coincided with a greater effort to promote non-noble artillery enlisted personnel and other technical government employees to officer candidate rank, based on superior scores in entrance examinations for thier admittance into the various "Cadet Corps" as higher Russian military academies were then called.
-- As part of the same reforms, the prior artillery regiments were re-formed into brigades permanently attached to Infantry divisions, but with all the guns under the control of senior artillery officers (really quite the same as the French system). Later, this system was expanded to include reserve and replacement brigades attached at the Army (and occassionally the Corps) level of command.
(iv) Whether or not one will take Wilson as an informed and accurate source, in is extremely brief little comment, for an overal impression of the Russian artillery education, one must note ….
-- The comments support a overall positive view of the Russian artillery arm in comparison to that of other nations
-- The comments have nothign to do with the period 1808-1815.

Langeron's "critique" of the Russian artillery is even more off-point to a discussion of the Napoleonic era. I believe that Brechtel is relying pon this passage from the work of the Zhmodikov's:
"A serving officer in the Russian service, the French emigre Langeron wrote that most officers were not well educated and trained and that the three cadet corps were too small to provide the number of junior officers needed for the army. He also mentioned in the 1790s that Russian artillery pieces were too heavy and that the artillerymen were not well-trained in aimed fire, but could shoot rapidly."
Comments :
(i) Actually only the first sentence of the above is from Langeron. The second sentence is actually from Kosciusko. Both pertain to the late 1780's and early 1790's.
(ii) Langeron was actually full of praise for the Russian artillery in his "Memoires de Langeron, general d'infanterie dans l'armee russe. Campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814". A sample follows, describig the artillery of his corps in 1813 (my translation) :
"General Blücher always gave me evidence of his satisfaction with the material perfection of my artillery and the intrepidy of the artillerists. Never did they show a more brilliant bravery and such great talent than on that memorable day [at Leipsig]. The company commanders [named] acquired the most justly deserved right to the greatest praise in my view. General Veszeliski (who throughout the campaign had commanded my artillery and whose zeal and care had contributed so effectively to bringing it to a state of perfection), despite substantial losses that had been suffered, merits also the same praises for his personnel courage and his talent in placing the batteries. During the four days of the battle of Leipsig, my 175 canons had fired 12,500 rounds and I had lost 400 artillery horses."

Dear Seroga
Thank you for this and it makes more sense. I have been writing a book on Russian Ordnance for the last 4 years. Obtaining plans from Russia has been a long business.

Tsar Paul started the overhaul of the Russian Artillery that culminated in the Arakcheev system of 1805. That actually itself eveolved as we have changes in carriage design. The 1780s artillery was cumbersome and had not improved from the 7YW. In the late 1780s and mid 1790s there was considerable amount of work done to improve the ordnance. The accession of Tsar Paul put more focus upon this and it was headed by Arakcheev who had been his artillery commander at Gatchina when he was a Tsarevitch.

Wilson as you say was just as scathing about the British Artillery. Let alone the writings of Wellington (see SOJ-5) calling the Royal Artillery cowards at Waterloo.

It is often important to look at the material and design rather than what was written for political or other reasons when considering technology.
Stephen

I answer the question of Runicus in an other way. Probably not. Told this is true Austrian napoleonic army is bad treated in rules. It's due to predominant historic Anglosaxon view and the indisputable French principal role. Austria suffered the rising star of Napoleon, beated it the first time, beated his generals sometime. In wargame rules Austrian troops and generals are the poorest, probaly the generals, but Charles was better than Wellington, infantry doesn't walk slowly than French, his fire was not worse because French fired a dozen more shots in a year and cavalry is understimated. The evidence is given by playng Wagram with every set of rules you have.In a battle where French can field over 15000 guards and Austrian the same number of Landwher, nobody playng as French has the same number of crisis and the same ordinary results.

Dear Alessandro
The Austrian army was not as poor as it is portrayed in the English Language. Mainly due to the lack of ability to look at German sources because French is easier for them to read.

Archduke Charles was an excellent General being the first to defeat Emperor Napoleon in open battle at Aspern Essling.

The Austrian tactics evolved during the period and were a solid oponent as the Russians would admit during the southern campaign of 1812. They returned with fewer losses than almost any other contingent.

Their staff corps was still primative compared to the Prussian Staff but better than the Russian and on a par with the French by 1813.

The training of the Artillery was excellent. Alas niave comparisons have been made stating that there were not enough officers. Pairs of guns were commanded by NCOs rather than Lts. There was a Artillery NCO school so the job and training was comparable.

Stephen

Both Wilson and Langeron were more than qualified to remark on the education level and technical proficiency of the Russian artillery arm through long service with the Russian army. They didn't have to be artillery officers to understand and recognize technical competence.

And Russian artillery education for officers was neglected and/or substandard up until at least 1808 (see the Zhmodikovs' excellent study on Russian tactics of the period).

And the Russian artilley arm had problems above the company/battery level in employment, command and control, and aggressiveness. Artillery training in general for a good portion of the period was not either practical or enough to ensure profiency.

A lack of Russian artillery generals was also a problem.

A good reference for technical training and its development in France is The Development of Technical Education in France by Frederick Artz. All of the artillery schools in Europe took their cues from those in France, which were first founded in 1679 at Douai. Another good reference is Engineering the Revolution by Ken Alder.

B

The Archduke Charles defeated Napoleon at Essling because the French were heavily outnumbered. And the Austrians could not drive them into the river.

It would have been interesting to see what would have happened if the roles were reversed.

The Austrian staff corps was not 'primitive' compared to the Prussians. It was the Prussian staff from 1813-1815 that was still in the embryonic stage, not the Ausrian-and it was the Austrian staff under Radetzky that ran the war from August 1813-1814, not the Prussian.

The Austrian artillery arm was excellent-it was better trained, organized, and run better than either the Prussian or the Russian.

B

'I am taking of the ordnance. This is something that can be quantitfied. I am not referring to the men who operated it. The French performed wonders with ordnance that was not as good as some of their oponents. Certainly the Desaguliers block trail system of the British was the best at that time with the universal 5 foot wheel.'

I've already mentioned the British gun carriages, limbers, and caissons from 1808 onwards.

The French ordnance was excellent, and inferior in design only to the British from 1808 onwards. The Prussian, Russian, and Austrian gun carriages were an older design, as was the rechtsmachine they all used. Further, French gun sights were simpler, easier to use, and remained on the gun tube during firing.

'Duffy was referring to Prussian and Austrian Ordnance that was produced for the 7YW. This had changed in design by the time of the Napoleonic Wars as I have shown in the writings in SOJ-3.
1. The Prussian guns no longer had ornate dolphins and had full bore chambers. The carriages had been modernised. Introduction of a new limber.
2. The Austrian guns had lost their ornate mouldings, handles simplified and carriages changed. In c1780 introduction of the Cavalry Guns.'

The outside appearance of gun tubes had little, if any, effect on the performance of the guns themselves. That was mere cosmetics. The Gribeauval field pieces were more robust than either the Austrian or Prussian pieces and threw a heavier shot. The Austrian cavalry guns were the same as the regular field pieces and the new gun carriages were longer and awkward. I wouldn't call that modernization. The 'cutting off' of the cascabel knob on the 6-pounder for cavalry battery employment is something that was lazy above anything else. And the elevation system was also a throwback to an older design.

B

'At their peak in 1809 and Colonel Smola was definitely a gifted artillery officer but still you couldn't rate them anything but average.'

Agree-although the point is arguable.

'IMHO the French "line" gunners were better than average across most of the period and then the French Guard gunners were quite an exceptional group.'

The French artillery arm as a group was considered elite.

Even in 1813, with a newly rebuilt arm after the losses in Russia, the French artillery usually outfought and outshot its opponents. Drouot's artillery attack at Lutzen, the first large battle of the campaign, was exemplary as well as decisive.

B

Gentlemen….all the information provides is excellant….but still I ask …was the austrian artillery crews of so much better quality during the 1790's campaigns in germany and italy to warrent them getting a reroll on misses……….I say no..so what if austria had an artillery school,,,dang near everyone else did as well.
And
I do not think the french artillery branch suffered near as bad as the others from the revolution.

The answer to your question is No.

By 1789 the rearmed and reorganized French artillery arm was probably the best in Europe, regaining a reputation that had been held by the Austrians since the Seven Years' War.

The French artillery arm did suffer less than the cavalry and artillery from emigration, and in many ways it was the French artillery that held the army together in the rough first few years of the Revolutionary Wars.

And the French artillery arm retained and enhanced its reputation during the wars up to and including 1815.

And the French first had an artillery school in 1679 at Douai and the other nations copied the French artillery schools in technical training and ability. And Gribeauval's reforms, beginning in 1763, revamped the artillery schools' curriculum and also established artillery schools for NCOs.

Frederick Artz' The Development of Technical Training in France is highly recommended.

B

I can't see any reason any unit should get a re-roll for misses. Tables are made up and a unit rolls accordingly. Misses are made up from all sorts of factors, and some have nothing to do with skill.

So, Runicus, lots of interesting discussion on this thread. But I think the simple summary for you in wargaming terms is that there is not sufficient justification for your friends rules modifications to make the Austrian artillery superior to the French in the 1790's Campaigns in Germany or Italy. Indeed the reverse is true.

Dear All
Here are various articles that may interest from the Smoothbore Ordnance Journal. It should be noted that the journal is taken by a number of institutions including the Royal Armouries (UK), Royal Engineers Library and the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

AUSTRIAN ARTILLERY
SOJ-3
Section 1: Dolleczek – Austrian 15th to 19th Century Artillery Translated by Digby Smith (Mar 2011)
Anton Dolleczek, (1887)Geschichte der Österreichischen Artillerie von den frühesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart,
PDF link

Section 2: Austrian Artillery
Issue 3 (07) "Evolution of Austrian Field Ordnance (1753-1853)"
Issue 3 (08) "Austrian Garrison and Siege Guns (1753-1853)"
Issue 3 (09) "Austrian Mortars (1753-1853)"
PDF link

SOJ-1
"The Austrian Cavalry Gun in Comparison to the Horse Artillery of Other States by Smola in 1827"
Translated by Digby Smith, (Aug 2010) Smoothbore Ordnance Journal, 1 (01)
PDF link

SOJ-2 Section 3: Gribeauval on Austrian Artillery
"The 18 Questions on Austrian Artillery that Gribeauval Answered in his Report Dated March 1762,"
Translated by Digby Smith
PDF link

BRITISH ARTILLERY
Section 4: British Artillery in the Peninsular
Issue 3(14) "British Mountain Artillery (1809-14)"
Issue 3(15) "Sir Alexander Dickson's Answer to Questions on the Royal Artillery in 1823"
Issue 3(16) "British Naval Gun Locks"
PDF link

"Lecture IV: Artillery Carriages"
Owen C.H. and Tames T.L. (1861) Elementary Lectures on Artillery, 3rd Edition, John M. Boddy, Woolwich, pp39-47
PDF link

Section 3: British Artillery in the Netherlands, 1794
SOJ-4(13) Lieutenant Colonel John Stewart
SOJ-4(14) Lt. Col. John Stewart's Return of May 1794
SOJ-4(15) Embarkation return of Earl Moira's Force at Southampton 19th June 1794
SOJ-4(16) Lt. Col. John Stewart's Letter of October 1794
PDF link

Section 1 Artillery at Waterloo
SOJ 5(01) Overview of The Artillery at Waterloo
SOJ-5(02) The Board of Ordnance and Army Supply in 1815
SOJ 5(03) Wellington to Master General of Ordnance 12 June 1815
SOJ 5(04) Waterloo Dispatch 19 June 1815
SOJ 5(05) Wellington to Master General of Ordnance, 21 Dec 1815
SOJ 5(06) The Waterloo myth of Royal Artillery cowardice
SOJ-5(07) Commander of the Royal Artillery dispatch of 24 June 1815
SOJ 5(08) British Artillery at Waterloo
SOJ 5(09) Tactical Deployment of the Royal Horse Artillery at Waterloo, An analysis of the theory of Major-General B. P. Hughes
SOJ-5(10) Netherlands Artillery at Waterloo
SOJ 5 (11) Comparison of Austrian, British, French and Prussian Ordnance
PDF link

FRENCH ARTILLERY
"Extracts from the Memoir of Baron Alexander de Senarmont, Lieutenant of the French Army,"
Simpson, W.H.R. (1858),
Minutes of Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Volume I, 335-344
PDF link

SOJ-4 Section 2: French Ordnance (1550-1789)
SOJ-4(06) Calibres de France (1550-1625)
SOJ-4(07) The Six Calibre de France (1661-1731)
PDF link

SOJ-4(08) M1732 Vallière System (1732-65)
SOJ-4(09) Lightening of French Guns (1760-1761)
PDF link

SOJ 5(10) Gribeauval Cannon 1765-1791
SOJ-4(11) Discussions on the Gribeauval System
SOJ-4(12) Gribeauval Ordnance 1765-1827
PDF link

SOJ 5(19) French Guns in the Revolutionary Wars (1790-1802)
SOJ-4(20) Notes on Artillery Dictated by Napoleon at St. Helena to Baron Gourgaud
SOJ-5(21) Correction of Napoleon's Calculations
SOJ-5(22) On the Composition of the French Artillery Material
SOJ 5(23) AnXI System (1803-07)
SOJ 5(24) AnXI modified M1808 System
PDF link

PRUSSIAN ARTILLERY
Section 1: History of the Prussian Artillery
Translated by Digby Smith (2012)
SOJ-4(02) Friedrich II Artillery (r. 1740-86)
SOJ-4(03) Prussian Artillery Tactics
SOJ-4(04) Regulation Concerning the Employment of the Regimental Artillery Translated by Geert van Uythoven (2012)
SOJ-4(05) Instructions of Frederic the Great for the Artillery of his Army

Section 3: Prussian Horse Artillery
SOJ 5(16) Prussian Horse Artillery
SOJ 5(17) Prussian Artillery of the French Revolutionary Wars
SOJ 5(18) Reorganisation of the Prussian Army in 1809
PDF link

Here is the background information that may interest people upon various aspects of Artillery.
Stephen
Editor of the SOJ.
Stephen

"Both Wilson and Langeron were more than qualified to remark on the education level and technical proficiency of the Russian artillery arm through long service with the Russian army."

a. Well that would be remarkably anachronistic as Wilson at the time of the writing had served about a year. With the King of Prussia.

b. No one is disputing Langeron's observations about c. 1790, only that these shortcomings _were_ addressed in the following decade.

"I do not think the french artillery branch suffered near as bad as the others from the revolution."

Ah TMP, where the happy tendency tells us what they think. Read Lynne and then you can find out what we know.

Brechtel, I fear you are not too well informed about Russian artillery. I suppose the language barrier is a problem.

I am gald you think Langeron is such a good source for the Russian artillery. Unlike Wilson, he did have ong active service in the Russian Army. You would do well to understand when he speaks of the problems of ca. 1790 and compare this to his priase of the Russian artillery in 1812-1815. But, somehow I think you will continue to cherry pick his comments, providing others with a confused view that the issues of 1790 had not be remedied at all in the next 25 years.

"The Prussian, Russian, and Austrian gun carriages were an older design, as was the rechtsmachine they all used."
- The Russians tested the French style elevating system and decided it was not robust and reliable enough. Similar to the question of metal axles, which were are tested and found lacking, I believe the Russians were more concerned about field repairability and operations in extreme cold temperature than were the French.
- The Russians made redesigns of the carriages from 1796 and again from 1805. The latter was fully in use for 1810-1815. They were thus not "older" than the French. As the were lighter than the French carriages, more standardized and exceedingly reliable, I do not know how one could think of them as not as useful, unless one just assumes "French=Better" and does not care to look further.

"Further, French gun sights were simpler, easier to use, and remained on the gun tube during firing."
- Russian guns 1810-1815 were equipped with 2 sights : a basic one that could remain on the gun when firing (essentially the same as the French, and in use since before 1800), the other for high-accuracy shots (introduced after 1807, it compensated for un-level ground beneath the piece). You could adapt from one to the other in about 90 seconds (3 rather large screws were used to bolt on the base of the more accurate sight – the mobile part of which was removed for firing). Both sights were stored in little compartments in the brackets of the carriage. You can tell pieces adapted for the pair of sights because the top the cascabel has been flattened to receive the bases of the sites and there are the three rather large screw holes above that flattened area, in back of the breech ring.

"A lack of Russian artillery generals was also a problem"
- There were about 60 billets for Russian general officers of artillery during the period 1812-1815. This corresponded to, in essence, 1 general officer for each brigade of Guard Artillery (2), Army Field Artillery (27), Reserve Field Artillery (10), Replacment Field Artillery (4) – a total of 43 artillery brigades – plus additional general officers for Seige artillery, major artillery Manufactures and Arsenals, serving on higher level staffs (Corps, Army, the Emperor's Suite), and the war Ministry.
- It is sometimes confusing since most of these general officer billets were ranked for colonels of artillery until 1811 (then with nobilary Class V, as per major generals in the Army infantry and cavalry) and then re-designated for major generals (still class V nobilary rank). So, if you look at the pre-war list of "artillery generals" it will be smaller. However, since 1807, the personal authority of these colonels had been expanded to be much the same as a French général de brigade d'artillerie, and the changes in 1811 were in some sense no more than administrative in nature.
See : history.scps.ru/cadet/061.htm and history.scps.ru/cadet/062.htm
- Looking at the État militarie d'artillerie for 1811, I see for the French a total of 24 actual active billets for généraux d'artillerie (page 52), and in the état nominatif (from page 91), a total of 31 general officers (including some in non-activité, some on assignment outside of the artillery, etc.).
- I do not undestand how the lack of general officers of artillerie could be a problem for the Russians when they had roughly 3 times as many such oficers as had the French.

I think we could all agree that the French of 1805 were in some ways superior to their opponents, whom they defeated. However, it is hard to argue with reference to facts about their continued superiority in 1812, when the French army was destroyed by the Russians.

Hew Johns,

"Well that would be remarkably anachronistic as Wilson at the time of the writing had served about a year. With the King of Prussia."

Well, yes. There is that small detail.

But if you already believe "French=Better", then any critique of any other Army cannot be ignored – no matter how anachronistic or how taken out of context or even how just plain wrong.

If you are biased and/or ill-informed, then you will just trot out these little snippets and tell people all about how "reliable" these "sources" are. No matter how many times you are shown that in broader context these little cherry-picked snippets really do not support your biased views very much (or at all) …. well, if you are biased, you will just continue to repeat them anyway. I suppose that you then hope to at least confuse other people and, if you are lucky, convince them of your biased and/or ill-informed views.

Just saying.

un ami – some people may remember him supplied already years ago excellent information about Russian Artillery totaly ignored by B.

Alas, I did not copy and past all what he supplied, here some points

Let us start with the 12-pounder, then go to the others.
Russian 12-pounder short barral
dia of the bore 120,9 mm, length overall 13 calibres
weight of the ball 5,78 kg, of the charge 1,03 kg, of the round 6,81 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1486 kg, per each of 6 horse 248 kg
total weight of the usual 3 caissons and 120 carried rounds 2477 kg, per each of 9 horse 275 kg
Russian 12-pounder long barral
dia of the bore 120,9 mm, length overall 16 calibres
weight of the ball 5,78 kg, of the charge 1,65 kg, of the round 7,43 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1849 kg, per each of 6 horse 308 kg
total weight of the usual 3 caissons and 120 carried rounds 2539 kg, per each of 9 horse 282 kg
French 12-pounder
dia of the bore 121,3 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 6,07 kg, of the charge 1,86 kg, of the round 9,23 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 9 carried rounds 1981 kg, per each of 6 horse 330 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 144 carried rounds 2411 kg, per each of 8 horse 301 kg
Some of my ideas:
1. There is one more Russian horse (15 vice 14), but he is with the systeme of caissons, not the pièce.
2. As @Kevin F Kiley will say, 1 caisson was often empty (going to and from the parc). If so, Russians have 92 rounds with the pièce and French have 81.
3. Russians did think that 250 to 275 kg = max. load for sustained trotting of an horse, and 300 to 325 kg = max. possible trotting, but wil kill an horse if sustained (in a day, or some times over many days). This was a good reason for the 12-pounder short barral. Russian will say that one cannot really trot the French 12-pounder pièce, other than to kill the horses very soon.
4. In comparing to Russian 12-pounder short barral, the horses on the pièce for the Russian 12-pounder long barral are 24% more loaded and the horses on the pièce for the French 12-pounder are 33% more loaded.
4. In comparing to Russian 12-pounder short barral, the horses on the caisson for the Russian 12-pounder long barral are 3% more loaded and the horses on the caisson for the French 12-pounder are 10% more loaded.
From these ideas, one may conclude that Russian systeme was more mobil on the battlefield and did have better endurance and mobility over a campagne, especially for the 12-pounder short barral. Russian systeme requires 7% more horses, but these may last longer and the total horses needed in a campagne might there by be the same or fewer.
- un ami

We continue with the smaller guns :
For a foot artillerie
Russian 6-pounder
dia of the bore 95,5 mm, length overall 17 calibres
weight of the ball 2,89 kg, of the charge 0,83 kg, of the round 3,72 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 20 carried rounds 1156 kg, per each of 4 horse 289 kg
total weight of the usual 2 caissons and 154 carried rounds 1486 kg, per each of 6 horse 248 kg
total horses 10
rounds available with one caisson empty 97
French 6-pounder
dia of the bore 99,1 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 2,69 kg, of the charge 1,03 kg, of the round 3,72 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1486 kg, per each of 4 horse 372 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 280 carried rounds 2312 kg, per each of 8 horse 289 kg
total horses 12
rounds available with one caisson empty 152
French 8-pounder
dia of the bore 105,7 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 4,04 kg, of the charge 1,14 kg, of the round 5,18 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1817 kg, per each of 4 horse 454 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 184 carried rounds 2411 kg, per each of 8 horse 301 kg
total horses 12
rounds available with one caisson empty 104
For an horse artillerie
Russian 6-pounder
dia of the bore 95,5 mm, length overall 17 calibres
weight of the ball 2,89 kg, of the charge 0,83 kg, of the round 3,72 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 20 carried rounds 1156 kg, per each of 6 horse 193 kg
total weight of the usual 2 caissons and 100 carried rounds 1288 kg, per each of 6 horse 215 kg
total horses 12
rounds available with one caisson empty 70
French 6-pounder
dia of the bore 99,1 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 2,69 kg, of the charge 1,03 kg, of the round 3,72 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1486 kg, per each of 6 horse 248 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 280 carried rounds 2312 kg, per each of 12 horse 193 kg
total horses 18
rounds available with one caisson empty 152
French 8-pounder
dia of the bore 105,7 mm, length overall 18 calibres
weight of the ball 4,04 kg, of the charge 1,14 kg, of the round 5,18 kg
total weight of the pièce, the front/limber and 12 carried rounds 1817 kg, per each of 6 horse 303 kg
total weight of the 2 caissons and 184 carried rounds 2411 kg, per each of 12 horse 201 kg
total horses 18
rounds available with one caisson empty 104
Some of my ideas:
1. It is in effect the situation that the French systeme uses more horses than the Russian systeme, 33% more in the case of an horse artillerie.
2. The French systeme will provide more rounds near to the pièce, many more in the case of an horse artillerie. This may be can create a better endurance and mobility in a campagne for the French pièces, especially for an horse artillerie.
3. The French 8-pounder pièce drawn by 6 horses for an horse artillerie would lie above the Russian ideal for an horse artillerie, but will likely be OK except in a very long campagne.
4. For the foot artillerie, the French 6-pounder weighs upon each horse 29% more than for the Russian 6-pounder, and in their caissons 17% more. The horses for the French 8-pounder are much more loaded than would be allowed under the Russian systeme, and they could only trot the pièce smaller distances. Still more horses are used (12 vice 10) for the French systeme for either gun, but the overall mobility advantage and advantage of endurance clearly lies with the Russian systeme for the foot artillerie.
- un ami

@Bagration1812
This is all just copy/paste from the Colonel Nilus, a standard work on the artllerie in Russian.
«История материальной части артиллерии»
The relevant parts is on line :
link
You will find the comparisons for Prussians and Austrians aslo, bit I did not make a check of these to see if the numbers are OK. For Frenches (my régiments for "mini's") and Russians, the infos seem very very good.
You see, no magicks ! But I thnak you for your kind comments.
:-)
- votre ami

Then for the early years, some detailes of the artillerie of systeme of 1797 year :
Field artillerie in reign of the TSAR Paul.
(Implementing experiments among the Gatchina force and at the arsenaux and artillerie schools from before his reign)
Foot Artillerie
50 compagnies in the Army + 3 compagnies in the Guard
Horse Artillerie
5 horse compagnies in the Army + 1 horse compagnie in the Guard
12 pièces per compagnie in the Army
Foot compagnie : 4x 12-pounder long * + 4x 12-pounder short + 4x 20-pounder unicorn *
Horse compagnie : 6x 6-pounder + 6x 10-pounder unicorns
* team of 8 horses for the pièce and the front/limber, others of 6 horses
guns
12-pounder long – overal length 16,5 calibres – weight of the pièce 167x the round
12-pounder short – overal length 13 calibres – weight of the pièce 97x the round
6-pounder – overal length 17 calibres – weight of the pièce typ. 133x the round
unicorns
20-pounder – overal length 9 & 10 calibres* – weight of the pièce 64x & 70x the round
10-pounder – overal length 9 & 11 calibres* – weight of the pièce 68x & 80x the round
* the lighter pièces actually from the project of the General Möller under the reign of the TSARITSA Catherine, and based on designs of the General Shuvalov era.
carraiges
new designs per the General Euler
caissons
traditional 2-wheel design, pulled in troika by 3 horses
3 caissons per pièce in the foot artillerie
2 caissons per pièce in the horse artillerie
some 4-wheeled also attempted, but not a success
Note – more few older pièces did lurk in the inventory of the Army, especially in the final years of the reign of the TSAR Paul, and there was some variation in the making of these designes, in comparison to the new system of 1805 year.
These must be the one that @Kevin F Kiley does tell to us had to left in abandon in great numbers in the bad weather during the Eylau campagne.
I am sorry , but I can find no mention of such leaving (and the pièces look rather mobile and light), so one remains very eager for more infos about this suject.
- votre ami

And that is what the Prussians had to say about the Russian Artillery in 1805 / 06

Der Russische Soldat im Felde 1806.

Zu Beginn des Jahres 1806 erstatteten mehrere preußische Offiziere Berichte über russische Truppen, denen sie bei ihrem Durchmarsch durch preußisches Gebiet als Kolonnenführer beigegeben gewesen waren.

„Stabscapitain v. Kyckpusch schreibt :

Fußartillerie. Die Vorzüge der Russischen Artillerie sind: 1. dass sie ganz vortrefflich gedrungene, nicht zu große Pferde hat, welche sehr gut und reichlich gefüttert werden. Auch scheint die Art Anspannens, welche von unserer Art wesentlich abweicht, sehr gut; das Sielenzeug ist vortrefflich.

2. Sind die Canoniers ein sehr robuster, starker, ziemlich großer junger vortrefflicher Schlag Leute und sie scheinen wie in der französischen Armee den Kern derselben auszumachen, und von den einzustellenden Recruten des Gouvernements werden die vorzüglichsten für die Artillerie ausgewählt.

3. Haben sie gar keine Knechte, sondern der Chef der Compagnie sucht diejenigen Canoniers aus, welche am besten fahren und am besten mit Pferden umzugehen verstehen, und diese fahren Canons und Vorrathswagen. Diese Einrichtung scheint unendlich vorteilhaft zu sein, denn wie schwer hält es, zumal bei schnellen Märschen und rasch ausbrechenden Kriegen, die Knechte gehörig zu dressieren und die Manöver der Batterie beizubringen. Auch sind die Knechte nicht so discipliniert wie die Canoniers, jagen vielleicht gar des Feuers ungewöhnt davon.

4. Wird eine Batterie von einer Compagnie bedient, welche also nie zerissen wird. Officiers und Leute kennen sich schon genau in Friedenszeiten. In Friedenszeiten bleiben sämtliche Canons, Einhörner und ein Pulverkarren bespannt, sodaß eine schwere Batterie 121 Pferde und eine 6 pfündige Batterie ungefähr 80 Pferde auch in Friedenszeiten behält. Auch ist dies ein sehr großer Vorzug, jedoch sehr kostspielig.

Die Lafetten sind von sehr guten Holz gebaut, sind leicht und hellgrün angestrichen. Das Metall zu deren Geschützen ist sehr schön.

Die Russen haben gar keine Regts. Artilleristen. Wird ein Inf. Bat. Detachiert, so bekommt es einige leichte Piecen von einer 6 pfündigen Batterie unter Commando eines Artillerie-Officiers mit, im Fall, wenn man nämlich glaubt, dass es dem bedürftig ist. Die leichten Einhörner (3 pfündige Haubitzen) werden von deren Batterie zu deren Jäger – Regt. detachiert.
(…)
Reitende Artillerie. Jede Compagnie bedient 12 Canons. Die Canons sind leichte 6 pfünder, jedes hat 2 Pulverkarren mit 3 Pferden bespannt. Die Kanone selbst ist nur mit 4 Pferden bespannt, welches für reitende Artillerie zu wenig scheint. Die Zugpferde sind klein und gedrungen. Die Pferde, worauf die Artilleristen reiten, sind groß. Auch hier fahren Artilleristen, und sind keine Knechte da.

Das Kasket, Heft 5, 6, 7, Jahrgang 1925

Von Winterfelt,

Thank you for that. Wilson also wrote with similar praise about the Russians' horses and the integrated train personel. It was in the "…." from my quote of him above.

Interesting that the 3-lber unicorns "werden von deren Batterie zu deren Jäger – Regt. detachiert."
I would take it from this that the unicorns actually being deployed with the Russian jäger was fairly typical in 1807, enough to be included in the summary remarks of v. Kyckpusch.

Indeed, as the staf captain notes, the Russin approach was quite expensive, especially given its scale and the number of times the system of artillery was upgraded from 1790-1810. But, as the economy was essentailly feudal in nature, the concept of "cost" was somewhat different in Rusia compared to western Europe.

Thank you again!

Dear Seroga
The 3-pdr unicorn should be considered a mountain gun. It saw extensive use in teh Bulkans and in the Russo-Swedish War where its small size and portability was important. Note I have used the English translation rather than the French Licorne.

Some authors have eroneously attached the 3-pdr unicorn to the position battery. It may have been alocated to the reserve and attached in suitable circumstances.

It seems that it was developed due to the experience of the Russian Armies in the Swiss Campaigns of 1799 under Suvorov who had to employ Piedmont 3-pdr mountain guns. These were also used by the French and Austrians later by the Kingdom of Italy. The AnXI Mountain 3-pdr is a French version design c1803.

This is what I have pieced together. Again corrections and observations are very welcome.
Stephen

In another forum B again dosed the reader with this and got the deserved reply by Alexander Zhmodikov

"Officer education was lacking, and both French emigre General Langeron and Sir Robert Wilson agreed on that point."

Both these gentlemen wrote about the Russian officers in general, not specifically about the artillery officers. And both these gentlemen were quite ingnorant in artillery: in 1796, when he was writing his notes on the Russian army, Langeron commanded an infantry regiment – Malorossiskii (Little Russia) Grenadier Regiment. Any nobleman who was able to read and write in Russian could become an infantry or cavalry officer in the Russian army after a short period of service as a NCO. But to become an artillery officer in was necessary to pass an exam at the special commission later called the Artillery Committee. Most commanders of artillery companies in 1805-1814 were graduated from the Land Cadet Corps (later called the First Cadet Corps) or Artillery and Engineer Cadet Corps (later called the Second Cadet Corps), and many of them were among the best cadets.

Dear von Winterfeldt
I think the renaming of the cadet schools has confused people. They would need to look at the corriculum. The Artillery and Engineer School I remember was set up by Peter the Great under General Munnich.
Stephen

I have read quite a few first hand accounts from the French & their allies during the 1812 campaign that suggests one of the major failings of the Russian artillery was that they usually shot too high. I can dig them out and provide the quotes later this week if anyone is interested.
If that was the case, then the number & quality of their guns is a slight distraction. Guns are only as good as their gunners.

Dr. Summerfield,

I think we are most interested in the senior years' classes in the Cadet Corps, especially the 2nd Cadet Corps, which accounted for about 70% of the cadet corps graduates that entered the artillery. The senior classes were 3 years of study, commencing upon successful examination and personal reccomedations, beginning at age 17, 18 or 19. Some students had been either 2 or 4 years in junior classes at these schools. Others entered only for the senior years.

The senior years' course of study was 12 months per year, 6 days per week and 12 hours per day. Of the 12 hours, 8 were devoted to academic study and 4 to military drill and practice. After Divine Serivces, the cadets were given "free time" on Sundays. The classes were small, typically about 8 cadets in each, to allow personal attention to each student. Note that the cadet graduate needed also to serve for 2 years as a non-commissioned officer before gaining his officers' commission.

For the academic instruction's details, I found a beakdown of the curriculum from after the peace, but it seems representative. For the 3 years of higher education :
-- religion : 3 units
-- French : 7 units
-- German : 7 units
-- Russian language & literature : 7 units
-- mathematics : 9 units
-- physical science : 6 units
-- geography & statistics : 6 units
-- political history : 9 units
-- law & jurisprudence : 3 units
-- engineering drawing : 3 units
-- military science & theory : 15 units
Total : 76 units

The textbooks were usually in their original language, so that in the "Fortifications" unit, the students were required to read Vauban in German. The "Artillery Practise" textbook from 1806 was actually as compilation of design information from Graf Arakcheev's design team, numerical look-up tables tables, and practical notes from recent battlefield experience.

Of course, there was also the addtional 4 hours/day of practical military activities while in school, not to mention the 2 years' service as an artillery NCO, and then passing the commissioning examination with the Artillery Committee.

Overall, the whole thing looks alot like the course of study at the US Military Academy at West Point, where the specific unit to which the students are assigned is also called the Corps of Cadets.

The AIShKK/2nd KK sent an average of about 55 graduates/year to the artillery and engineers over the years 1797-1825. The peak years were 1811 and 1812 with 75-80 graduates to the artillery and engineers, when selected students were graduated 1 year early. Because of this, there were no graduates in 1813. The other Cadet Coprs sent and average of about 25 graduates/year inot hte atillery and engineers.

Counting graduates of the other Cadet Corps, at the beginning of 1812 some artillery brigades had only about 55% of their officers having graduated from a Cadet Corps (incidentally, this included the Guard brigades). In some brigades, all the officers were Cadet Corps graduates. Overall, about 75% of artillery officers were Cadet Corps graduates. The remaining 25% were composed mostly of long-service officers that gained their commissions before the reign of Emperor Pavel and the wave of artillery reform in 1797 plus a tranche of long-service non-noble NCO's that had been granted commissions (and hence personal nobility) in the years 1808-1811.

history.scps.ru/cadet/04.htm
history.scps.ru/cadet/063.htm

If you look at the guns and armor of the germans vs the russians in 1941, and only focus on the technical aspects, the russians had superior tanks – the effectiveness of that weaponry depended on the tactics and operational use. In my view the extreme focus on technical analysis of material as opposed to deployment and tactics leads to faulty conclusions. It is astonishing that all the works on artillery published the last 20 years has so little to say on that compared to the amount spend on analyzing technicalities. It is similar to the discussion of infantry tactics that boils down to the Charleville vs the brown bess – it misses the point.

In my view the interesting discussion of artillery efficiency has to do with analysis of aggressiveness of deployment, command structure, tactical objectives, doctrines for reserves and ammo resupply and willingness to stay and fight vs preserving the guns.

If I offended anyone with this, it is unintentional, and I apologize beforehand.

Dear Telestic,

"I can dig them out and provide the quotes later this week if anyone is interested."

Sure I am interested. Let's take a look at exactly who said what among the contemporary sources.

But you know, if artillery shoots short and the ground is not soaking wet, the rounds carry into the target. So, the targets not hit (and thus alive and able to give a report about not getting hit) will just about always report that the enemy artillery shot over their heads.
So you get really two reports :
1. The enemy artillery hit our formed unit and did substantial damage.
- OR -
2. The enemy artillery shot over our heads.

Sparta,

I am not at all offended. Who would be ?

But, let us at least try for some greater accuracy than quoting snippets about Russian artillery in 1790 and retailing them as applicable 25 years later!

Let's look at what the contemporary sources say verbatim (more or less in full), in context, and (if possible) in the original language.

And I am 100% with you that the equipment is only a (minor?) part of the discussion. I wrote above about equipment only because another poster had given us just plain wrong information (that Russian carriages were some older design, that thier sights had to be removed for firing). I also have tried to correct other errors (that the Russians lacked general officers of artillery, that they had poor formal military education).

I supposed that the members here would rather form their opinions with correct information, rather than base thier opinions on mis-information. I was trying to help.

Dear Seroga
Thank you for the clarification on the education. It is very interesting the ability of the artillery officer in other languages (French and German). This education looks more extensive than the Royal Military Academy for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers in Woolwich. I wrote about this in the introduction to the reprint of Adye (1813) Bombardier and Pocket Gunner.

The comments about shots going over their heads could simply be that the Russians were shooting at what was behind them. Also the bature of direct fire with a slow muzzle velocity does not give a flat tragetory. Firing upon targets and plunging fire was diffult in the period of gunpowder when often the fall of shot is obscured by smoke and the round does not explode. A skipping roundshot that is only 120mm diameter is very difficult to see at 200m let alone 1000m.

The cutting of fuses on shells was a difficult thing to obtain the precision. Note the French set Hugoumont alight trying to hit the ridgeline as shown by the many shells that did not explode immediately and had 2-3 second delay or more.

Stephen

@Sparta

Yes a valid comment, I agree – but one has to see both sides – to get some good ideas how artillery worked, one has to read memoires – Mikaberidze did translate some Russian memoires, one of them an artillery officer, also those of Yermolov give a good idea how Russian artillery could be employed as well.

One of the big problems of people like B are – to ignore completly and utterly all non English sources.
How can you asses Russian artillery without reading Russian?

Fortunatly there are some Russian speakers amongst us with admirable knowledge and they share it – so the interested reader is able to learn.

Dr. Summerfield,

"Some authors have eroneously attached the 3-pdr unicorn to the position battery."

There was provision in wartime for 2x 3-lber unicorns in each battery company for use by the Jäger per PSZ 20.672 (19.iii.1803), of which one was converted to the peacetime establishment in the Guard (only) per PSZ 21.081 (17.xii.1803). They were not in the establihment of the artillery companies of 1797. I really do not know of any regulation that actually removed these from the battery company establishment during the reign of Emperor Aleksandr.

But, outside of the Kavkaz, I also have seen no evidence of their actual use with the Jäger either in Holland/Austria in 1805, nor in 1812-1814. I have seen them mentioned (as noted above in the post from our excellent colleague v. Winterfedlt) in 1806/1807, and in the Finnish campaign in 1808. I am not sure that there has been enough detailed work done on the campaigns to the south or the Ionian Islands to really know if they were used in these regions.

I have no reason not to take on board your suggestion of the example of Suvarov's use of the Peidmont 3- (or 4-) lber mountain guns. I think that this was an important precedent.

But, the concept of the 3-lber unicorns seems to have been more generalized (without regard to terrain type) – and focused on the Jäger. Perhaps in this context it is worth noting that a very rapid expansion of the Jäger arm of service was taking place exactly in the years 1803-1808. Of particular note is that the establishment of Jâger battalions was about 33% smaller than Musketeer or Grenadier battalions until late 1806. Overall the total establishment for the Jäger moved from less than 25,000 all ranks at the start of 1803 to over 61,000 by the end of 1806. Pehaps the allocation of the 3-lber unicorns was intended to increase the firepower of the Jäger while they filled out their numbers?

Dear Seroga
Thank you for your comments. The place for the Unicorn 3-pdr still does not fit.

I like the suggestion over supplimenting the Jager Bns. This may be more of a reason than the one that I have suggested. Alas I have seen no discussion of its merits etc… Also I do not know how many were made.

Possibly the abolition of battalion guns c1806/7 left many of these then they were employed as mountain guns. I am trying to understand the rationale.

Thank you as ever for your comments.
Stephen

Some of the following excerpts clearly outline the deficiencies of the education level of Russian officers, artillery officers in particular and some of the difficulties in education the Russian officer corps faced during and before the period.

Langeron remarks on it in 1796; from 1800-1806 or 1808 there was little if any formal artillery instruction for officers, and Wilson remarks upon it in 1806-1807. So, there is a definite pattern to that lack of education, and it was very inferior to that of the French, British, and Austrian artillery officers.

Some material on French artillery schools has been added at the end of the posting.

Some artillery employment and command and control information has been added.

B

From Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars, Volume I, by Alexander Zhmodikov and Yurii Zhmodikov:

‘The Count de Langeron, a French émigré in the Russian service since 1790, wrote in 1796 that…the Russian artillery pieces were too heavy, and the artillerymen were not well-trained in aimed fire, although they fired rapidly.'

‘Langeron also wrote that most officers were not well educated and trained: there were three cadet corps preparing young men to be officers in the army, but the number of men in these establishments was limited, too small for the army, and the usual way for young nobles to become officers was to enlist in the army as NCOs and wait for commission.'-2.

‘…[Tsar] Paul reorganized the Artillery and Engineer Cadet Corps into the Second Cadet Corps, which now gave no special artillery education; its program of education became similar to that of the Land Cadet Corps (renamed into the First Cadet Corps).-26.

‘The military educational establishments in 1800-1808 did not provide any special artillery training. There was a class in the Guard Artillery, where NCOs of the Guard Artillery could obtain some theoretical education and practiced skills in artillery firing prior to being promoted to the officer's ranks. To be commissioned as an officer of artillery, cadets graduated from the Cadet Corps could select service in the artillery. Artillery NCOs seeking commissions as officers had to pass additional exams in the Artillery Department (later in the Artillery Committee). The artillerymen were mainly trained in their companies.'-62.

‘After the 1806-07 campaign, Major General Sievers, commander of an artillery brigade, wrote a report on artillery tactics and equipment. He wrote that the French artillery equipment as not better than the Russians, but French commanders used their artillery more skillfully; they chose better positions for artillery batteries, and the actions of their whole army helped their artillery to be more effective. This was because they usually outflanked the Russian army, so that their artillery fire was concentrated at the Russian lines, and the Russian reserves were under a crossfire (though, at the same time, Sievers noticed that the French liked to fire at a long range, elevated the barrels of their pieces too high in order to do that, and so their fire was not very effective). Comparing the ways of selecting artillery positions, Sievers wrote that the Russians usually placed their artillery on every hill in the position, so that the enemy could count almost all Russian guns. In contrast, the French placed their batteries of howitzers in depressions or behind hillocks, so that their artillery pieces could not be observed by the Russians. He also wrote that Russian artillerymen often fired at enemy batteries, and that senior commanders were partly responsible for that, because some of them liked to give orders to ‘silence the enemy battery'. In order to perform this counter-battery fire, the Russian artillery expended too much ammunition and time.'-71.

Zhmodikovs', Volume II:

‘…in 1800-06 [08?], there was no military educational establishment in Russia that provided any special artillery education, except a class at the Guard Artillery. In 1806 a training company was organized for the rank and file…in the Guard Artillery and, in 1811, an officer class…was added to it. In 1812 another artillery training company of the same strength was organized…The rank and file, who completed the training program in the companies were promoted to the rank of NCO; the men from officer classes who had passed exams in the Artillery Committee became officers.'-63.

‘…Russian artillery had a significant disadvantage: the unicorn was not well-adapted to plunging fire, because its barrel could not be elevated at such a high angle as the barrel of the howitzer, and Russian artillerymen were not well-trained in plunging fire. Ermelov wrote that, at Borodino, the enemy placed eighty howitzers in the ravines of the Kolotcha River and Semenovskii Brook, so that only the heads of the enemy artillerists were seen, and Russian artillery was unable to silence or dislodge them. The maximum range of French howitzers was longer than that of the Russian unicorns. IS Zhirkevich, an officer in the 2d Guard Light Artillery Company, writes that, at Bautzen, French howitzers fired at his battery at such a range that he was not able to reply to them.'-73-74.

‘The main purpose of artillery was to defend other troops…This is in marked contrast with Napoleon's practice of using artillery offensively and as the principal weapon for the destruction of the enemy's army, preparing the way for the final blow that would decide the battle.'-58.

‘In 1813, after Kutusov had died and command of the army changed, the light artillery was again separated from the infantry.'-67.

In 1812-1814'…the Russian artillery became a very effective arm able to cooperate effectively with the other arms. Unfortunately, the organization and higher-level command of the artillery were still not very effective. Artillery had its own higher command structure: commanders of artillery brigades, commanders of corps artillery, commanders of army artillery, but the artillery was still distributed among the troops of other arms and attached to them.'-75.

From Wilson's Campaigns in Poland 1806 and 1807:

‘…but the [Russian] artillery officers of inferior rank have not the same title to estimation as in the other European services, for their education is not formed with the same care, and their service does not receive the same encouragement. To them is the toil and responsibility, but the honor is by no means assured them. Some favorite officer, completely ignorant of the science and practice of artillery, is frequently in the day of action appointed for the day to the command of their batteries, and the credit is in the dispatches given to him for a service which depended on long previous systematic arrangements and laborious attention, with which he never was acquainted: an injustice mortifying to the corps, injurious to the individual artillery officer, and gravely detrimental to the general interests.'

From Duffy's Russia's Military Way to the West:

‘Another monument to Munnich's care was the military academy (Noble Land Cadet Corps), which he founded in July 1731 to provide a systematic military education for at least an element of the body of native officers.'-45.
‘As evidence of the impressive quality of Shuvalov's military thought, we may cite his projects for a Higher Military Department or School, which he advanced in various forms in 1753, in 1755 and finally, with the help of Lomonosiv, in 1758. Shuvalov was convinced that a sound knowledge of the mechanics and principles of war must go towards the formation of the young officer, and that ‘leadership is not enough.' To provide this foundation, his Higher Military Department was to instruct the students in military writing, the paths of the transmission of orders, the means by which ammunition, clothing, pay and provisions reached the army, the laying-out of camps, and the conduct of marches and movements in the field. However, Shuvalov appreciated the dangers of a narrow professionalism. He believed it important ‘to consider all the well-known battles and encounters, evaluating the mistakes which caused them to be lost, and exploring the action of artillery and its employment in battles and sieges.' Likewise, on Saturdays a professor was to discuss ‘the present political affairs of Europe and the armed forces of the European powers.' These excellent proposals were put before the Senate, but they were lost to view in the turmoil of the Seven Years' War.'-60.

‘Throughout our period, only a small proportion of the leaders of the army followed a formal course in military education. Things had promised well in the early years of the new army, when Peter [the Great] was inspired to set up a number of useful establishments on the Western model. Such were the School of Mathematics and Navigation (1701), the two Moscow artillery schools (1701 and 1712) and the two engineering academies (Moscow, 1712-1724 and St. Petersburg, 1719).'

‘However, the life in the technical schools was of an exacting kind, which of itself was calculated to limit the interest of the nobility. Clothing came to the pupils free, but most of them had to lodge in private houses, where they lived in conditions of near-starvation. These wretches had to turn out of bed at six in the morning, and they pursued courses of instruction until six in the evening…The quality of instruction was extraordinarily diverse: ‘The director of the school was Captain Gunter, an obliging and quiet sort of man, who was one of the foremost experts of the time, and who brought good proportion to the design of the whole artillery [ca 1740]. At the other end of the scale stood brutes like the drunken and quarrelsome Styk-Yunker Alabushev, who committed no less than three murders before he was finally disgraced.'

‘At the end of three or so years of study, the products of the technical schools became variously NCOs, tradesmen or clerks in the corps of gunners or engineers, from where a few ultimately rose to become senior generals.'

‘…technical education formed one of the first objects of attention for Petr Shuvalov, after he became Master General of the Ordnance in 1756. He combined the artillery and engineering academies, with an establishment of 135 pupils…Shuvalov selected the instructing staff, and he often attended the teaching periods in person.'

‘At the beginning of her reign Catherine the Great approved a code for the management of the Shuvalov establishment, and renamed it the ‘Artillery and Engineering Noble Cadet Corps.' The year 1783 saw some important developments. The engineer and artillery elements once more went their way as independent schools, but in compensation the reorganized artillery academy was increased to admit 400 pupils, and it entered one of the most prosperous periods of its existence under a new director, General PI Melissino. This ingenious Greek maintained the broad educational ideals of Shuvalov, and his pupils were to be largely responsible for carrying through the important artillery reforms of the Napoleonic era.'-142.

‘Finally in 1800 [Tsar] Paul renamed the establishment the First Cadet Corps, and reconstituted the engineer academy as a corresponding Second Cadet Corps. Military education as a whole lay in the hands of Grand Prince Constantine, who appointed German instructors who could be relied upon to inculcate high standards of drill and bearing. Everything else was neglected, and the products of the corps arrived at their regiments as fourteen or fifteen year-old ignoramuses.'144-145.

In contrast, technical education in France were developing almost all of the basic forms of technical education, both civil and military.

From The Development of Technical Education in France 1500-1850 by Frederick Artz:

‘The earliest artillery school in France' was ‘started at Douai in 1689…'-96.

‘In the artillery schools instruction was given in artillery theory and practice, in mathematics, fortification, methods of siege, drawing…'-96.

‘After reforms instituted in 1720 there were good artillery schools at Metz, Strasbourg, La Fere, Perpignan, and Grenoble. All these were in army garrisons where on three days of practical exercises were given in the uses of artillery, in fortification, bridge building, and mining. This alternated with three days a wekk of theoretical work in geometry, algerbra, conic sections, trigonometry, mechanics, fortification, the methods of defense and attack, and especially in the use of artillery pieces; for all the courses there was a good deal of work in freehand and mechanical drawing. In 1756 an advanced artillery school was opened at La Fere; it was transferred to Bapaume in 1766 but later returned to La Fere; it offered the first comprehensive training in artillery practice in Europe.-97.

‘The most advanced type of technical education offered in France and indeed in the whole of Europe was that given by the famous Ecole du corps royal du genie at Mezieres'-98
This school was established in 1749 for the first twenty students. The course work was rigorous, heavy in the sciences and mathematics, as well as in the drawing of plans and in solving engineering problems. Generally speaking, the students worked in the classroom during the fall and winter, and in the field for practical experience. The ‘well-equipped laboratories for chemistry and physics' were ‘the best in Europe.'-99.

Cherry-picked, out-of-context, and often anarchronistic quotes from modern English-language sources. No interest in accuracy or balance. Just a biased "argument" constructed to confuse people, ignoring any information that might disturb your perosnal opinions.
Same old, same old.
OK "French=Best", if you want it that way. Enjoy.

Sorry, but the material isn't 'cherry picked' nor out of context.

If you don't agree with it, then counter it with a reasoned argument. Apparently, you cannot do that.

The bottom line is the Russian artillery officers were not well-educated and examples have been given to you.

And the Zhmodikov's material, as well as that of Duffy and Artz is well-documented with Russian material.

B

"Cherry-picked, out-of-context, and often anarchronistic quotes from modern English-language sources. No interest in accuracy or balance. Just a biased "argument" constructed to confuse people, ignoring any information that might disturb your perosnal opinions.
Same old, same old.
OK "French=Best", if you want it that way. Enjoy."

dito

It is interesting to see these quotes propogating the misunderstandings. As I have explained the Artillery School was renamed it to the Second Cadet Corps. The curriculum was more extensive than the RMA in Woolwich. The cadets were expected to be able to work in three languages.

The comments upon the ignorance of the Russian officer corps was directed toward infantry and cavalry officers. See Alexander Miberidze book on Russian Officers.

Duffy has misunderstood many of the technical subjects as he has admitted. I can discuss at length the Prussian and Austrian Artillery of the 18th Century.

So I agree with out learned von Winterfeldt and Seroga that you have picked what is currently available in English but have not considered the writings or translation in SOJ let alone in German or Russian.
Stephen

Then you are mistaken. And you have not supported your viewpoint here with anything approaching serious documentation.

And I have seen the material in your Ordnance Journal.

When and where did Christopher Duffy admit that he 'misunderstood many of the technical subjects'?

Further, the lack of education of Russian officers of the period is well-documented both in English and in Russian.

Russian artillery officers were not trained as well as the British artillery officers, and the French and Austrian artillery schools were more advanced than what was available in Russia.

The problem with the Cadet Corps from 1800-1806 or 1808 was that no specialized artillery instruction was given. And that has been shown.

B