"Guibert's so-called 'column of attack'" Topic

@Bill H,

>Isn't that deploying under fire one of the things the French kept trying to do in the Peninsula?<

It might be but there have been so many interpretations of eye witness reports that I hesitate to even peek into this jar of worms.

My view is that the French in the Peninsula only deployed under fire because they were surprised by a British line that they often couldn't see.

If you look at Maida in southern Italy where, I think, the British line was not obscured, the French columns did deploy before they came under musketry.

That is another jar of worms for which there have been different interpretations.

My view for what it is worth is that if columns needed to deploy they would do so out of effective range of musketry. When to deploy was a matter of tactical judgement I suppose.

Why make what is a pretty fraught activity even more so, if you can avoid it?

The other Bill H:-)

Bill H.

Hi Both Bills,

I think that Art will be able to tease out some of those worms for you if you ask him to explain the French counter-measure of forming "en bataille sans deployer".

Regards,

Mike.

@MCH,

Thanks.

I understand about columns en bataille sans deployer and the changes in tactical usage post 1808, ‘action' columns etc', intended to combine fire and manoeuvre by extending the third rank.

Maida was in 1806 though and British memoirists in the Peninsula frequently mention French columns doing what they interpret as attempting to deploy, but might well be examples of a battalion column attempting to convert from three to two ranks.

Even so, something to be avoid under musketry I would say.

Hopefully the worms are still in the jar as they will just FUBAR this thread:-)

Bardin's Dictionnaire de L'Armee de Terre is a wonderful resource for many of these arcane terms. Available on Google.

How could you convert a battlion column from three into two ranks in the middle of a battle?

ARTICLE 5.
Formez le Peleton sur deux rangs.
1. Sur deux rangs, formez le peleton.
At the word of command, repeated by the chef de peleton, the serre-files
step a pace backward, the guide is placed on the alignment and the chef de
section commands:
2. Troisieme rang par le flanc gauche.
3. A GAUCHE.
4. MARCHE.
At the second command, the third rank of the second section will take one
step to the rear. At the third command, the third rank will left turn. At
the fourth command, the third rank of the second section takes the ordinary
step, the third rank of the first section takes the accelerated step to form
a front rank in front of the third rank of the second section; when the last
men of the third rank have reached the left flank of the platoon, the chef
de peleton commands:
1. Troisieme rang. HALTE.
2. FRONT.
3. A droite = ALIGNEMENT.
4. FIXE.
At the first command, the third rank formed on two halts; at the second it
will front; at the third it will align to the right; at the fourth, the
guide will report to the flank of the platoon, and the serre-files will
close to two paces of the rear rank.
ARTICLE 6. Le peleton etant forme sur deux rangs, le remettre sur trois.
1. Sur trois rangs, formez le peleton.
At the command repeated by the chef de peleton, the serre-files step back a
pace; the chef de section commands:
2. Troisieme rang par le flanc droite.
3. A DROITE.
4 . MARCHE.
At the second command, the two ranks who form the third rank, take
two steps to the rear and on the third command turn to the right. At the
fourth command, the third rank of the first section takes the pas accelere;
that of the second section the pas ordinnaire; the third rank when reformed,
the chef de peleton:
1. Troisieme rang. HALTE.
2. FRONT.
3. FIXE.
At the first command, the third rank will halte; on the the second, it will
front; and in aligning each man takes his chef-de-file. At the command,
FIXE, the serre-files and the guide retake their place on their alignments.

TMP link

That one?

Regards

@von W,

>How could you convert a battlion column from three into two ranks in the middle of a battle?<

Good question, well phrased and put, and which deserves an answer:-)

Yet we are told that the third rank filed out and formed to the left of the column.

I have never seen this described in a primary source and have no eyewitness that I can deploy to substantiate it ever happening.

My own view is that a column might just as well deploy properly.

In any event, whatever the French columns were trying to do in the Peninsula, they were invariably unsuccessful.

G'Day Hans-Karl and William

We both seem quite spry today ;-)

Must be fishing a season with all those cans of worms being opened…or not opened ;-)

It sort of reminds me, how for years it was said that nowhere in the Reglement de 1971 doe it state that only the third rank is permitted to turn around and fire at cavalry to the rear.

Hence Coignet must be exaggerating, that it didn't happen…then someone opened up and read Neys Instruction. nevertheless it is true…you will not find those instruction in the Reglement de 1791.

For year we have been told that a battalion with an odd number of pelotons cannot form square. That this was the intent of ART. 7 in the Decree of 18 February 1808.

But why doesn't it mention in any documents, when in 1804 a battalion which now has a light peloton should form colonne par peloton when it has an odd number of pelotons?

Does this mean that in 1805 through 1807, when both the light peloton and grenadier peloton were detached, that the battalion with the remaining seven pelotons had to form colonne par peloton?

But in ART. 7 it doesn't say in French the following:

1) When the grenadiers or light infantry are absent from the battalion…

2) When the battalion only has an odd number of pelotons…

But what it does say is when the grenadier and voltigeurs are absent from the battalion…

So now its my turn to ask why…why would a battalion of four pelotons not be able to form square?

As a matter of fact it doesn't even mention anything about squares in Article 7…

If ART. 7 is so clear, what does it mean?

"When the six companies are present with the battalion it will always march and act by divisions. When the grenadiers and voltigeurs are absent from the battalion it will always manoeuvre and march by platoon. Two companies will form a division; each company will form a platoon; each half company a section."

Best Regards
Art

PS: William I do agree with your views

"My view for what it is worth is that if columns needed to deploy they would do so out of effective range of musketry. "

You're right…for what my opinion is worth… ;-)

For those who are fundamentalist of the Reglement de 1791, it is explained how two battalions in line assault the enemy line of battle by musketry. But there is no mention of any sort of column assaulting the enemy battle line, or states that it intentionally deploys under fire of the enemy battle line.

Of course we have plenty of 1st hand accounts from both the British and French on how officers would attempt to deploy the battalion in column when it was staggered…and how hard it was to get the soldiers to deploy…hmmm…sounds like a can of worms needs to be opened…

But for now I would be happy for you to explain why there is an ART. 7

While you are doing that…I'll continue typing on Part III…

Actually I have changed my mind…since you are fluent in French you will be able to answer this question as well.

what does this mean…?

"Cette colonne ne devant jamais avoir lieu que par bataillon,son peu de profondeur dispense de la faire serrer en masse pour la deployer"

Simple enough dont you think…but I do find it rather stanger…if the colonne d'attaque used the mechanics of the Reglement de 1776…whey isn't the same notification in the Reglement de 1776.

Therefore while I am typing on Part III, would you please explain both questions I have.

Therefore I would like to thank you in advance for answering both questions I have.

Best Regards Once More
Art

@Bottom Dollar,

>Yes, but it still has a premier division, and could deploy on the center/lead peleton or to either flank and could form a square quickly.<

No, if you are illustrating a colonnes par peletons, it has a peleton in front, not a division. I was wondering if you realise that a company and peleton were more or less the same thing.

Do you mind if I back-track?

At the risk of repetition, according to the 1791 Reglement a French regiment consisted of two battalions of eight fusilier peletons or companies, and a separate division of two grenadier peletons. The company was an administrative unit which formed a peleton in war.

A battalion comprised four divisions (pre-1808). A division consisted of two peletons. The first and second peletons formed the first division, the third and fourth peletons the second, the fifth and sixth peletons the third and the seventh and eighth peletons formed the fourth division.

A company consisted of two half-companies and formed a tactical peleton of two sections. The difference between the company and half-company and peleton and section is that the former are administrative and the latter tactical. Peletons were equalised on service by taking men other companies. The British Rules and Regs 1792 make much the same distinction.

The 1791 Reglement does allow the regiment's grenadier division or a single grenadier peleton to be attached to a battalion. When the grenadier division was attached it formed a ‘fifth' division.

When a single grenadier peleton was attached it was placed behind the interior sections of the last division of the column so that it was flanked by the exterior sections of the last division. One might infer that this option was available whenever a battalion had an odd number of peletons but I don't know if that was the case.

The 1791 Reglement was obsolescent by the Imperial period. It usually describes and illustrates an eight peleton battalion from which it may be inferred that the grenadiers were normally detached. The two battalion regiment with a grenadier division was, however, no longer the norm and a voltigeur peleton had been established.

Article 7 of the Decree of 18 February 1808, quoted above in English, describes the organisation of the six-company battalion.

"Quand les six compagnies seront présentes au bataillon, on défilera et l'on agira toujours par division. Quand les grenadiers et voltigeurs seront absents du bataillon, on manœuvrera et défilera toujours par peloton. Deux compagnies formeront une division; chaque compagnie formera un peloton; chaque demi-compagnie une section.

It states that when grenadiers and voltigeur peletons were detached the battalion manoeuvred by peleton, which is the most simple and logical solution when reduced to four peletons. What is less clear, and ambiguity is not unusual in any historical document, is what happened when only one elite company was detached which would be more and more the norm as the custom of grouping grenadiers into separate battalion was becoming ‘unfashionable'. I don't know for sure. The option of tagging the odd company on the end of a column of divisions remained but my preference would be a column of five peletons. There is no reason I can see why a battalion consisting of an odd number of peletons could not execute all the conversions, perpendicular or parallel, available to a battalion consisting of an even number of peletons.

A feature of all columns was the ability to ploy into square (or oblong) quickly, that is quite right. A column would usually be at half distance, which means that the distance between sub-units would be half their frontage. The battalion column of divisions, for example, would be at peleton distance, something like, le bataillon étant en colonne par division à distance de pelotons, or words to that effect. This spacing enabled the column to wheel up peletons of the internal divisions right and left to form square. If memory serves me right a column of peletons, which would be at section distance, would form square by wheeling up the sections of the internal peletons.

Another feature of columns was to enable deployment/polyment from column into line quickly, and line to column or square. None of the interim instructions or regulations, such as the Tableaux Synpotiques, Manuel d'Infanterie, 1808 Decree etc., change the essential methodology of battalion conversions that I can see.

The internal disposition of columns was important to these conversions the essence of which was simplicity and speed, while maintaining the structure of the battalion.

This is why speculative hypothetical organisations with grenadier peletons split, and distributed amongst the battalion, is a tactical equivalent of Rubik's Cube and does not reflect practicalities.

G'Day William

Then please explain it to me…in simple terms…because I only understand from you that it is most simple and logical…but why…

"It states that when grenadiers and voltigeur peletons were detached the battalion manoeuvred by peleton, which is the most simple and logical solution when reduced to four peletons."

But if the principles for all columns are the same…"deploiement en colonne en masse…"…then what is the difference between a bataillon formed en colonne par division in 9 pelotons, 8 pelotons, 7 pelotons, 6 pelotons, 5 pelotons, or 4 pelotons when deploying in line?

Why does ART. 7 expect a battalion of 4 pelotons to form a colonne par peloton?

As for the Tableaux Synpotiques, Manuel d'Infanterie de 1810…I have always wondered if it was supposed to be an addition reference like the Tableaux Synpotiques, Manuel d'Infanterie de 1791…if so…is there another manual out there that is suppose to go with it…or did it simply replace the Tableaux Synpotiques, Manuel d'Infanterie de 1791…

Best Regards
Art

Was it not French doctrine to deploy outside the 'zone de balles'? In other words, outside small arms range? If so, why is Napoleon issuing instructions that appear to accept battalions deploying within the 'zone de balles', or small arms range?

Great discussion, btw, but for the fantasy grenadier escuades ;-)

- Allan

XV Brigade wrote…."my preference would be a column of five peletons. There is no reason I can see why a battalion consisting of an odd number of peletons could not execute all the conversions, perpendicular or parallel, available to a battalion consisting of an even number of peletons."

And a column of 5 peletons is unnecessary if you only have 4 on hand to include the grenadiers.

Art wrote: "Why does ART. 7 expect a battalion of 4 pelotons to form a colonne par peloton?"

Art, I think it was b/c a two division column doesn't form a square or oblong very easily. Every peleton would've been required to move in part or in whole in order to complete it quickly and that might get messy or result in something not quite desired. I'm sure it could've been done when necessary, but from what I can tell the armies of the time preferred to form square with at least one FULL SIDE remaining stationary while the other 3 sides conformed.

@artpdn,

>Then please explain it to me…in simple terms…because I only understand from you that it is most simple and logical…but why…<

Condescension does you no credit.

I think I explained what I believe the various options to be based on the 'menu' available in the 1791 regs. I don't pretend to have all the answers. Do you?

I also don't really know why Article 7 expected a battalion of 4 pelotons to form a colonne par peloton. Why do you expect that I should?

But, since you ask it seems to me that a column of two peletons wide and six ranks ranks deep, is a bit on the 'slim' side and neither fish nor fowl.

I also struggle to understand how it formed a square without an interior division to wheel up peletons left and right.

If you do, then let's be having it.

When you do, can you amplify some of the arcane language, because without explanation it is ofetn meaningless.

Thanks

VonWinterfeldt: "Again my recommendations of Eric Dauriacs work – who looked recently into the efficiency of musketry. Seemingly nobody is prepared to read this worthwhile publication, either of desinterest of lack of language skill."

Did Dauriacs take into account the efficiency of British musketry?

McLaddie wrote:

"I am not sure how 'risky' forming line under fire was, but I do know that the fire from the center companies while the others deployed was one of the arguments for the attack column. "

Good point. And the fire of the center companies while deploying back into attack column could've been one of the arguments too.

I don't understand the concentration on square, the chef de bataillon would decide how to form it, it could be a colonne serrez, or closed square.

Also I don't see a problem forming square from a divsional column made only of two divisions, in case those two divisions have a peloton distance then they could do it.

@Bottom Dollare
"but from what I can tell the armies of the time preferred to form square with at least one FULL SIDE remaining stationary while the other 3 sides conformed."

Can you validate this by a source or is it again wild speculation?

G'Day Allen

Why does Napoleon have to be issuing instructions that are for battalions deploying in front of an enemy line of battle…what is to say it is not meant to be instructions for a colonne d'attaque par bataillon breaking through the enemy line of battle?

Or what to do when a bataillon is staggered or checked…

I am not saying it is one of these possibilities…just asking…

But there seems to be quite a bit of assumption made on just one document…

I say the instruction was done…or expected to be done…I just do not know why…not with just one document anyway.

Best Regards
Art

What efficiency of British musketry??
The efficiency was fire control and counter attack.
British musketry at 300 paces was as inefficient as French or Prussian or Spanish ones, it wouldn't mow down a complete front rank of a colonne de division at that distance.
As can be guessed by Dauriacs work, he concentrates on French arms, but there is much more in this work.
When a colonne d'attaque did deploy into line and opened fire, they certainly would not ploy under fire back into a column again, this would be tactical suicide and the soldiers wouldn't obey anyway, once they opened fire, they were usually out of control and kept on firing.

A British officer wrote about the 1st Foots Guards at Dettingen,

They were under no command by way of Hide Park firing, but the whole three ranks made a running fire of their own accord. … The French fired the same manner, without waiting for words of command and Lord Sinclair [the allied commander] did often say he had never seen many a battle, and never saw the infantry engage in any other manner."
Muir page 77

"Inexperienced officers have repeatedly given orders to commence a fire, without either judgement or consideration as to whether or not it was proper time to open a fusillade. This was their fault and not the men's. However, the mischief to which it tended was, that after the first command was given, the soldiers of themselves, taking out a sort of carte blanche, blazed away, in the most independent manner, in all directions, until at length the utmost skill and energy of the most active officers was baffled, in their efforts to controul [sic] them; and when the ammunition was most required they found it was expended to little purpose, beyond that of raising noise and smoke."

Muir page 79 (28)
(Major Patterson quoted in Griffith, Forward into Battle, pp. 26-7.)

G'Day William

You are quite right…

But my attempt in using military terms was genuine enough. I thought it was a way to expose everyone to the military terms…

But my profession has taught me better…

So I am attempting to correct that problem of mine…

But I give you full credit for the right answer…it was masse…it did not have the masse needed to be a column…

Six ranks is nothing more than a doubled line for the French…just like the colonne d'attaque was lacking masse to deploy in two colonnes and assault par le flanc…which also had other problems as well.

And Hans-Karl you are right about two pelotons forming square…

Best Regards
Art

G'Day Hans-Karl

I totally agree with you about musketry…it was the efficiency of fire control (which includes the commander using early or late fire) and the counter attack.

Best Regards
Art

von Winterfeld, there was nothing wild about it.

"Also I don't see a problem forming square from a divsional column made only of two divisions, in case those two divisions have a peloton distance then they could do it."

Which would be faster to form square ? A column of 4 peletons or a divisional column of two divisions? Indeed, a column of 3 divisions might form a square faster than a column of two divisions. So, where would you validate your source from ? Eric Dauriacs arguing that 18th Century musketry was wild and out-of-control ? Show me a drill manual that has all 4 sides moving at the same time to form a square. Or show me a drill manual which doesn't have 1 side stationary, while the other 3 sides conform. Or show me a drill manual which would accept a slower, more time consuming technique to the faster? Slower is a problem.

I can see the argument in terms of mass, but 3 lines at ½ distance as compared to 2?

>Also I don't see a problem forming square from a divsional column made only of two divisions, in case those two divisions have a peloton distance then they could do it.<

How?

I'm sitting here at 04:10 with insomnia, a bottle of red and some pieces of card and can't see how two divisions forms square from column.

Anyway, four peletons would be in colonnes par peletons, would it not? I can see how that forms square.

So, no more questions, just answers, please.

XV Brigada

You have one division front – then behind the other division, distance one peloton, a half open column.

To make it easy, the first pelton in the first division at the right is 1, that on the left 2, in the second division respectivly 3 and 4

One option,
peloton 1 remains stationary, pelton 3 does a conversion to the right and would form the right side of the square.
Peloton 2 makes a demi tour then makes also a conversion to the left and a demi tour again when they are in the square – the left flank, peloton 4 just turns right and makes a file march to the right, till they form the back of the square, in case they have time they do a conversion

About the colnne par pelotons – they would have to be in section distance as well, a half open column.

@von W,

Ugh! Don't like that very much! It seems another good reason for a battalion of four peletons to manouevre by peletons, not divisions.

Column of peletons – no problem. Yes, half distance.

I don't see the problem – one peloton wheels to the right, the other to the rear and the last one just makes a file march ( the last one is the only one which has to march instead to wheel.

When you have a colonne par pelotons then please explain – do you wheel by sections? and then the second peloton first section right, second section left and so on?
so you would split the peloton aside 1 and 4 into sections so that on the right and left flank two sections form different pelotons would form a new ad hoc peloton.

In case I like full felxibility of manoeuvre, then why not an open column, but then is this any longer a colonne d'action?

G'Day Allen

Why does Napoleon have to be issuing instructions that are for battalions deploying in front of an enemy line of battle…what is to say it is not meant to be instructions for a colonne d'attaque par bataillon breaking through the enemy line of battle?

Or what to do when a bataillon is staggered or checked…

I am not saying it is one of these possibilities…just asking…

But there seems to be quite a bit of assumption made on just one document…

I say the instruction was done…or expected to be done…I just do not know why…not with just one document anyway.

Best Regards
Art

Hi Art

Second attempt ;-)

I had not thought of that so thanks for the heads up.

Thinking on, since one of the functions of a colonne d'attaque was to divide into two demi-colonnes and separately assault the exposed flanks and rear of an enemy line after breaking through the enemy's first line, it makes sense that a clear, unambiguous procedure for defence against cavalry was understood, considering the exposed situation these two demi-colonnes would be in.

You might recall we discussed this some years ago when discussing similar French actions during the battle of Pultusk.

- Allan

@AllanFMountford

"You might recall we discussed this some years ago when discussing similar French actions during the battle of Pultusk"

Interesting – where can I read more about those French actions?

@von W,

It seems complicated and I don't remember seeing it documented anywhere. Have you?

I'm not saying it couldn't be done. A battalion could of course, be trained to execute the conversion. You can train soldiers to do most things.

Anyway, the 1808 decree tells us that the battalion of four peletons manoeuvred by peletons, not divisions.

Forming square from colonne par peletons was a well established part of the repertorie which just required the internal sections to wheel up left and right, and the last to close up on the rear.

G'Day Allan

Yes I still have those notes buried with all the others. It is one of those battles that no one seems to find of interest ;-)

I'm glad you understand the two functions of a colonne de'attaque…

"since one of the functions of a colonne d'attaque was to divide into two demi-colonnes and separately assault the exposed flanks and rear of an enemy line after breaking through the enemy's first line, it makes sense that a clear, unambiguous procedure for defence against cavalry was understood, considering the exposed situation these two demi-colonnes would be in."

One day I would like to read all that you have researched…I have read some of your postings…you are a good researcher…

Since I explained why there was an ART.7 and the meaning of the notification for the colonne d'attaque…that should constitute as part III… ;-)

There is another forum that I want to visit before I leave for Africa again.

Best Regards
Art

Further back in this thread, I thought it was established that the ‘classic' colonne de ‘attaque with a deployment on center by the wings unfolding to either flank was replaced by a column of peletons perhaps leading with a flank in front. My question is, how would the column of peletons deploy assuming ½ or section distance ?

To break it down with 2 sections per peleton and this is not "drill manual" stuff, but to give each section a letter designation:

Would:

AABB

CCDD

EEFF

GGHH

Deploy as:

DDCC AABB FFEE HHGG

Or

GGHH DDCC AABB FFEE

Would they deploy full peletons to either side of the lead, allowing the nearest section to the chosen side to deploy first with the following section deploying second ? In short, flipping the sections, but keeping them together as well. Wouldn't that allow for faster, easier deployment ? Of course, they probably could've just turned to a flank and marched out the full distance, but if you're at the head of that little deployment column and under fire, that might be long way to go ?

Or do people think they deployed the folded wings and split the peletons by section on either side ? If so, wouldn't that have left one peleton entirely split, creating either 3 or 5 combat commands ?

BD

Read again the mail by Oliver where he explained the different columns.
Your figures don't fit at all – I suggest to read at least some rudimenatry sections of how units did deploy before wildy speculating again.

It a column was formed the 1st peloton leading, it would have deploy to the left
or if a column was formed the 4th peloton leading it had to deploy to the right.

BD, your column of 4 pelotons with your AABB peloton leading in the front:

AABB

CCDD

EEFF

GGHH

would always deploy as:

GGHH EEFF CCDD AABB

Within every peloton, the second section would always be and remain to the left of the first section.

Also, the order of the pelotons within the battalion would not be changed, the grenadiers and then the first peloton of fusiliers being always at the right, voltigeurs on the left:

V 4 3 2 1 G

In extremely rare cases, inversion would occur, but also here every subunit maintained its neighbours:

G 1 2 3 4 V

Of course, we can imagine faster methods, without the restriction of maintaining the order of subunits within the battalion, but these were simply not used in the Napoleonic period.

So, if they HAD to deploy to the flank they either would've been either at full distance-a peleton—or with a deployment at ½ distance-a section—the following peletons would've turned to the flank and marched out the full distance ?

As so, if right in front:

AABB
CCDD
EEFF
GGHH

To:

GGHH EEFF CCDD AABB

That's a long way to go under fire, don't you think? Not very versatile either if you have to do it by the book, let alone a book written in 1791 that doesn't even address the formation you are in.

What if the unit get's caught by enemy cavalry in this formation:
--------------------CCDD-AABB
------------------EEFF
------------------GGHH

Easier to form square than if:
----------------------------AABB
----------------------CCDD----EEFF
-------------------------
----------------------GGHH

Thanks, Oliver… just saw your post.

My question then is, as previously stated, if the column of peletons was at ½ distance—section, wouldn't that mean the following peletons would've just turned to the flank and marched out the full distance from behind the lead peleton in order to maintain their "proper" section order ?

I've been poking around on the links provided in this thread—thank you—those are great, but I haven't seen too much material dealing with how the French were handling ‘attack columns' post-1808. Just two letters from Napoleon, posted above—thanks again for those ! However, Napoleon himself clearly seems to be thinking outside the box tactically speaking, meaning he didn't want his commanders commanding as if robots or slaves to the drill manual….

Two quotes from both March 1813 letters…

"Le carré se forme indistinctement sur toutes les divisions d'une troupe en ligne, parallèlement ou perpendiculairement à cette ligne, et selon les circonstances et la nature du terrain"

"La charge ne doit jamais se battre qu'en présence de l'ennemi ou à la manœuvre, et toujours de la manière la plus simple, c'est la plus imposante."

I don't get the sense from either of these that Napoleon thought his commanders were necessarily following a strict order of deployment…or if they were he may have been trying to shake them out of it. Following the same train of thought that Napoleon wanted his commanders to get into the desired formation as quickly as possible with as little fuss or disorder as possible…. I think the charge that I'm speculating wildly is pretty much BS. Napoleon himself is detailing instructions for RAPID DEPLOYMENT and formation changes UNDER FIRE…saying things like form INDISCRIMATELY. Do what you think is best and most practical ! If a chef de peleton flipped flopped his sections under fire and it worked to get the men in rapidly and easily and they were still a well ordered sub-unit ….. ??

IMHO, the four peleton column was probably more versatile than the old attack column, or they wouldn't have gone to it. Isn't that what Chambray was talking about when he said the reason the old attack column went out of use was due to the marching order? Whatever the order of the march was now if they needed to deploy quickly into the new attack column of 4 peletons they could, and after they did, they could deploy it into line to the right, to the left, or to either side of the lead, though the last may have been the preference. Assuming a proper line formation would've looked like this:

4Pel 3Pel 2Pel 1Pel

Maybe a typical advance in column by peletons would've looked like this--and which would be why they were still calling it a "colonne de attaque"--possibly:

3PEL
2PEL
4PEL
1PEL

Of course, that would probably be very difficult to document no matter what the order was or how they actually did it. But as we're interested in modeling wargames and not publishing history books there's nothing wrong with a little speculation in my opinion :)

G'Day Hans – Karl

Before I head off to another forum, I forgot to mention one last thing.

Your example on how to convert a battalion from three into two ranks…

It came from the Instruction provisoire, arrêtée par le roi, concernant le service et les manoeuvres de l'Infanterie – 1788…page 115

I admit it took me awhile to remember where you took your source from…but you are nearly 10 years too early….and wrong instructions…I'll send them to you…

…as for my source…it ended with:

…"dans une colonne sur deux rang, serre en masse…"

As for Williams response…

"…Good question, well phrased and put, and which deserves an answer :-)…"

As for a deserved answer…hmmm…a few months ago…one of my five company commanders told me that he deserved an answer…he did…you dont…

Best Regards
Art

To be precise

AABB is wrong – it would be

BBAA (2nd section at the left of the 1st section)

@Bottom Dollar
Show me your wild speculations in the drill regulations or any other source (except Meunier who just also only wrote an essay – you can get a translation of it from Nafziger Press)
You miss one point in Napoleons recommendations, he states clearly according to the regulations.

@artpdn,

Why the attitude? I hope you will be more helpful at "another" forum.

But as we're interested in modeling wargames and not publishing history books there's nothing wrong with a little speculation in my opinion :)

You are perfectiy right, but then there is no point in trying to explain you how manouevering mechanics really worked in the Napoleonic period.

Also – it is very easy to push wargaming figures around – but not real men who are trained to do certain manoeuvres in a specific way, not to forget the NCOs and officers as well.
Some wargamers may be interested how it worked in reality and find a way to represent that in the rules.

I have to agree. Everything a soldier knows and does is taught him. The key to all successful armies is training in preparation for war. I am certain that nothing much has changed, as far as the fundamental importance of training is concerned, in the last 200 years and more.

Modern ceremonial foot and arms drill, which is the ‘successor' to Napoleonic drill, is taught today much as it always was. The progression from individual drill to that with sub-units and battalion is evident in every drill regulation of the period.

Our Napoleonic recruit started learning his drill in the ‘school of the soldier', he was taught how to carry his musket, turn right and left, and so on, as an individual. He and his mates were then brought together to do what they had learned as groups, in the ‘school of platoon'. Here they were ‘sized', their rank and file was identified and their place in it. They were taught how to convert from three ranks to two, how to wheel on stationary and moving pivots, and so on, and move together generally as a platoon.

They then went on to the ‘school of the battalion' where in their platoons they were taught how platoons deployed from column into line, formed column from line, formed squares from column and from line, and all the other the conversions required of the battalion. The platoons would be ‘conducted' to and from one place in the previous formation, to the new one in the next, by their NCOs and officers, without which the platoon was little more than a rudderless ship.

In the same way that individual soldiers knew where their place was in the ranks and files, so the command element of the platoon knew its platoon's place in the battalion, and what was required of it when conversions took place, in relation to all the other platoons, when and where it was to move.

It is perfectly possible to ‘invent' a different way of forming a column, forming a square or any other conversion. But, and this is key, if it has not been taught, they cannot do it. Evidence that it was taught needs to exist in some period document, regulations, instructions or whatever, before it becomes anything more than speculation and not very useful, to be honest, whether it is for re-enacting or wargaming.

If this were the Napoleonic 'Apprentice', right about now he'd be saying all of you were fired :)

Prior to the introduction of the voltigeur company, each battalion was composed of nine pelotons, eight fusilier/chasseur and one grenadier/carabinier. The fusilier/chasseur companies would be equalized, and could be grouped in divisions, each of two pelotons. The grenadier/carabinier peloton could also be grouped with a second peloton to form an ‘elite' division. Sometimes this division would operate with the first battalion, other times independently. If the elite division or peloton was absent the battalion would be composed of eight pelotons, and the elements of the 1791 Reglement made sense. The skirmish element would be most commonly composed of third-rankers. With eight pelotons, the colonne d'attaque was a practical and sensible formation to ensure the battalions could maneuver and deploy quickly and efficiently. The formation of separate ‘elite' grenadier/carabinier reunis battalions at division level would have been very possible.

In 1804/05 with the introduction of the voltigeur company/peloton, the structure of the battalions altered. The skirmish element was primarily sourced from the voltigeur company and not the third-rank of the fusilier/chasseur pelotons. Now, should the grenadier/carabinier peloton be absent, instead of there being eight pelotons there would be only seven. This would suggest that the grenadier/carabinier element would operate more closely with the parent battalion. The battalion, with the voltigeurs detached, would field eight pelotons, and be capable of forming the colonne d'attaque as required. The formation of separate ‘elite;' battalions would be made from combining/concentrating elite companies from depot battalions, rather than detaching them from the field battalions. This was seen in the formation of Oudinot's Grenadier division.

In 1808 everything changed, and in my opinion, I see it as no coincidence that it also heralded the slow decline in fortune of the Empire. The battalion would now be formed with six companies/pelotons. The 1791 Reglement was not replaced, but was clearly at odds with the internal organization of the individual battalions. Article 7 of the Decree authorizing the changes to the regimental structure, doesn't describe what was to happen to the battalion when only the voltigeur company/peloton was detached, it only proposes that in the absence of both elite companies, the remaining companies would operate in colonne par pelotons. So we are left to speculate on whether it was appropriate for the fifth company to form on the right-rear of the two divisions of the fusiliers/chasseurs, or that the battalion would only form in colonne par pelotons, with the elite peloton leading or pushing the column. Another possibility would be that the grenadier/carabinier companies could be combined into an elite division, similar to the practice seen prior to 1804/05. But this still wouldn't facilitate the formation of a classic colonne d'attaque, which formed on the center. That would only really be practical if the voltigeur company/peloton was still operating directly in line/column with the parent battalion, something that would be seen rarely, other than in waiting columns, prior to their being brought into the line of battle. Nowhere in this new organization does there appear to be room for the colonne d'attaque, unless the voltigeur company is still operating with the battalion. Due to the 1808 Decree, elite battalions could not be created by concentrating elite companies from the depot battalions, because the depot battalions were composed of only four fusilier/chasseur companies. The recourse was to expand the guard, and especially the Young Guard with the creation of the Tirailleur and Voltigeur regiments.

The instructions Napoleon gave to Bertrand, in 1813, strongly suggest that the colonne d'attaque, forming on the center, was still an operational option. However, it is also possible that Napoleon was not telling Bertrand what to do in actual combat, merely how the men should be drilled and exercised by battalion, in a manner that Napoleon would see them in review. Perhaps it is only reasonable that we jump to the conclusion that he expected them to use these tactics in the field of battle, but that might not be the case. If it was some of the instructions make very little sense. But it does show the rudiments of tactical understanding, forming line on the center, delivering fire, and maintaining cohesion during a charge.

npm

XV Brigadea wrote: "But, and this is key, if it has not been taught, they cannot do it. Evidence that it was taught needs to exist in some period document, regulations, instructions or whatever, before it becomes anything more than speculation and not very useful, to be honest, whether it is for re-enacting or wargaming."

"Le carré se forme indistinctement sur toutes les divisions d'une troupe en ligne, parallèlement ou perpendiculairement à cette ligne, et selon les circonstances et la nature du terrain; il y a, à la suite .de l'Ordonnance, une instruction sur ce point, donnée, je crois, en 1805, qui ne laisse rien à désirer; MAIS IL IMPORTE DE LA RENDRE FAMILIERE AUX TROUPES et de faire serrer les serre-files sur le troisième rang, le carré étant formé et la cavalerie cherchant à l'enfoncer, Il convient qu'une compagnie de voltigeurs ait toujours une réserve sur laquelle elle se ralliera, quand elle ne pourra résister à une charge étant en en tirailleurs"

Napoleon is saying it himself. Teach the peletons versatility in deployment & forming and probably also interchangeability or how to do the job regardless of where the peleton happens to be in a given formation and also how to form the same formation but on different peletons… in this case square. Being interchangeable and versatile would've been the mark of extremely well-trained and/or veteran troops.

Now couldn't a corps commander have said, "You know what, let's drill the two sections in a peleton to operate interchangeably" ?

Ligniere wrote: "In 1808 everything changed, and in my opinion I see it as no coincidence that it also heralded the slow decline in fortune of the Empire."

I agree to the extent that part of the versatility of the ‘new' attack column lay in the speed at which conscripts could begin using it as viable battlefield formation with only limited or basic training. Which is where "right flank face" or "left flank face" followed by "march" would've come in handy as the peletons behind the lead could've simply changed facing and marched out from behind the lead. Of course, if they survived their first battle, there probably would've been an expectation of further training and refinement to bring out the formations full versatility… perhaps such as deployment at full distance, splitting interior sections to form square rather than closing en masse, and doing all the extra drilling for interchangeability as per the Emperor's Instructions, et al.

von Winterfeld wrote: "You miss one point in Napoleons recommendations, he states clearly according to the regulations."

Yes because the regulations were… too make a wild guess… already 90 percent of what the troops were already doing.

Oliver wrote: "You are perfectiy right, but then there is no point in trying to explain you how manouevering mechanics really worked in the Napoleonic period."

Correction: It is not necessary to understand every micro-drill and manouever from the school of the soldier on up to have a solid grasp of how manouevering mechanics really worked during the Napoleonic period. Moreover, the school of thought which states that the study of every scrap of micro-drill and manouever is an absolute prerequisite to the understanding and the extrapolation of the tactics of the period quite misses the point.

Art translated: "This column should never take place but by battalion, its little depth keeps it from closing in mass in order to deploy"

Art,

Well, I think I'm beginning to understand what you've been talking about. Not 100% certain, but moderately so.

Despite what I think was the purpose for its original conception, did the French between 1805-1807 still use it deploy into line on the center? And would that formation have given the French advantages in deploying to the firing line, as well, allowing them to 'punch' through a position if desired ? Perhaps there are no provisions for the attack column to attack/charge b/c it was assumed that some kind of inherent disorder would have ensued if resistence was met even if it were successfull ? Admittedly, I may have missed some of those points somewhere after re-reading your posts.

Also, isn't it possible that the French and British sources are potentially atypical which show the ‘attack column' being difficult deploy once staggered or checked ?

Jim

Art wrote: "Why does Napoleon have to be issuing instructions that are for battalions deploying in front of an enemy line of battle…what is to say it is not meant to be instructions for a colonne d'attaque par bataillon breaking through the enemy line of battle?"

Art,

Possibly b/c it was understood that once a colonne d'attaque par battaillon was ordered to charge an enemy line, just about all semblance of drill manual order probably would've been lost ? Napoleon does issue instructions, if my translator is working correctly, for a line of battle to reform to a colonne d'attaque while under fire, but then he doesn't detail the instructions for what they are standing in column under fire for? Or was it so obvious he didn't need to mention it? Either way, I don't think he would've given those instructions for deployment into line and back again under fire unless he thought it could be done under most circumstances with a further purpose in mind.

Jim

@Bottom Dollar

"Correction: It is not necessary to understand every micro-drill and manouever from the school of the soldier on up to have a solid grasp of how manouevering mechanics really worked during the Napoleonic period. Moreover, the school of thought which states that the study of every scrap of micro-drill and manouever is an absolute prerequisite to the understanding and the extrapolation of the tactics of the period quite misses the point.
"

Now I understand from where you derived your wild speculations – by that philosophy you are just not interested to gain knowledge the hard way.