"French Staff" Topic

Guys

Everyone is aware that Napoleon had a comprehensive staff structure built around him. After reading a recent monograph on the failure of Oudinot, Macdonald and Ney as army leaders in 1813 I was surprised to find out that no staff structure existed for these independent armies.

In the cases of Macdonald and Oudinot they ran their armies through their own Corps' structure, leading to overwork as the Corps HQ was managing the corps and the army as well.

In Ney's case he arrived to take over from Oudinot with 3 staff officers. He had no corps to run the army which implies he was even worse off than the other two.

Have you guys any further examples of French Napoleonic armies, not lead by the great man himself, that were multi-Corps and how they were staffed. I was thinking in particular about Eugene in 1809 and 1813 and the Peninsular, but any examples would be useful.

K

I'm not a French connoisseur, but it sounds to me like higher officers had to set up staff to their own choosing so is it their own fault?

It is quite simply a myth that N had a staff built round him – as Elting said, he had a staff to suit his way of running a campaign, ie: where he did most of the work and the staff officers, most without any knowledge at all, did all the running about as a purely admin staff, despite the efforts of many authors to shoehorn it into the NATO G system. France had no staff corps from 1792 to 1818.

It is not whether or not Napoleon had a staff that I am really interested in (before this question goes off the rails) but rather about the staff capacity of other French army commanders.

K

It is not going to be any different. They would just do the jobs listed in Thiebault's manual, but it is admin. The commander was expected to do all the donkey work and that is why these guys failed on their own (Massena being about the only exception). I would think that Epstein's book on Eugene would help – my copy went missing many years ago, but I do remember the prodigious correspondence from N.

K, as I'm sure you realise after bricoles and the Guard at Marengo, staff is high up on the Napoleonic flamewar stakes.

As you know,the French army HQ had an extensive & effective staff under Bertier.
In 1812 the chief of staff had 9 aides , a General Staff with 5 generals, 11 adjutants and 50 supporting officers. There were also geographical engineers and cartographers, 19 officers of military administration, war commissioners, inspectors of reviews, and artillery staff.

This then asks what tasks were left for a Grande Armee Corps or auxilary army staff to do?
A chief of staff to co-ordinate reconnoissance & intelligence. Artillery & engineering officers to advise on these matters. A group of ADCs of different ranks to advise and send orders.

As the French used what is now called 'mission command' what more is needed? As R E Lee said, "I leave matters up to God and my subordinates."

I will be interested to hear of staff arrangements in Peninsular armies, well removed from the guidance of Bertier.

K,

One of the largest problems that Napoleon faced in 1813 was a shortage of trained and experienced staff officers because of losses in Russia in 1812. Further, Berthier himself was sick at times in 1813-1814 so that was another handicap. Fortunately, Bailly de Montholon was present and ably seconded Berthier and ran the staff when Berthier was either absent or ill.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Thiebault was the author, as everyone knows, of two staff manuals during the period. The first was done in 1800 and it lays out in detail how a staff was to be organized and run, as well as the duties of a chief of staff.

Interestingly, Thiebault details the de facto French staff corps that was created by the national government in the early 1790s-the adjutant generals, still employed by Napoleon and rechristened adjutant commandants. I have a copy of the 1800 manual and it is quite specific as t.o the creation of this staff corps.

Interestingly, this staff manual was translated into different languages and was improved upon by Thiebault in the 1813 edition. Both, I believe, are available on Google. I have a Google copy for the 1813 manual and the English translation of the 1800 manual that the British translated. These manuals were staff doctrine for the French during the period.

K

K,

As a brief footnote, the failings of Oudinot, Ney, and Macdonald were not to my mind staff failures, but command failures on the part of these three officers. Napoleon's choices for independent command in 1813 are very odd in central Europe, though sending Eugene to Italy and Soult to Spain were excellent.

Leaving Davout in Hamburg was a mistake in my opinion. Placing him in command either for Oudinot/Ney on the Berlin front or for Macdonald on Blucher's front probably would have resulted in major victories for the French. Davout undoubtedly have enjoyed being employed with the northern army against Berlin as Bernadotte was on that front, and it would have been a golden opportunity to get revenge on 'that miserable Ponte Corvo.'

Sincerely,
Kevin

@Khevenhuller
In 19th century works you find indeed the notion, that only Napoleon's army had an regular army staff, all other armies in the spring and autum campaingn had to work with corps staffs. A situation, that led to work overload and mistakes.

@Kevin
The basic problem for Napoleon in 1813 was, that he had more important tasks to solve than he had godd/talented army commanders. This situation was a results of Napoleonas leadership in the previous decade.

Loosing Hamburg was not an option for Napoleon, he would very likely not have gained anything with a transfer of Davout.

A good book covering this topic is :

Lechartier : Les Services de L'Arriere A La Grande Armιe en 1806 – 1807 , Paris 1910

also

De Philipp : Le Service D'Ιtat – Major Pendant Les Guerres Du Premier Empire, Re-print Teissedre, Paris 2002

So, basically, no-one knows?

Kevin, you cannot just lay it on the individual commander. If he has no staff support in terms of operations, intelligence etc he is pretty much left on his own. Take Ney and Blucher, two very similar personalities with similar command styles: nrave, leaders from the front, often rash and both very willing to bury themselves in tactical situations. But one is regarded as a successful army commander, the other is not. I would argue that Ney's failure is not a failing of him as an individual pe se. Blucher had the benefit of a staff that was effectively a life support system, burrowing down to division level, and that allowed him specifically to absent himself from the structure to act as a figurehead, driver, moving spirit or whatever you want to call him as his CoS could run the army.

If Ney had this structure maybe we would judge his abilities in command of a multi-corps force less harshly. His arrival at the army of Berlin with 3 aides seems crazy, as the army itself had no HQ staff at all for him to take up. You can see similar issues at Bautzen, and in the Hundred Days what was available to him to help him command his wing of the army.

Ochoin: Berthier is not the issue unless you are arguing that Berthier was staffing the Grande Armee along with the armies of Berlin and The Bober. That would support the argument that Napoleon was firing off massses of correspondence to Macdonald and Oudinot because he was concious of them not having staff support. The alternative arguments (distrust or desire for control) also stand, as it could be any combination of the three.

Ulenspiegel: Well, the monograph I read on this subject was by a US army officer in the nineties, and I think we need to be aware that 'Great Man' theory does not wholly apply to military history as it is not a satisfactory explanation in other fields of historical study. I wonder if this is a 'systemic' as much as a succession of personal failures. In other words they are fine as corps commanders because they sit in a context of a corps staff with clear lines. Catapulted into army command, itself a massive leap, while being denied army staff and having to either rely on your corps staff to pull a double shift (a big leap for them too remember) or whatever ad-hoc group you managed to stitch together must have been a massive handicap.

BTW guys, this is the easy question…I also want to try to work out how Bernadotte's predominantly Swedish staff ran the army of the North: given the massive shift in terms of scale compared to what they were used to.

K

K,

I disagree-the commander is responsible for his command and what he does and doesn't do. Napoleon's picks were at fault in that there were competent French commanders capable of commanding independently. The commander also is responsible for how his staff is formed and operates-so the choice of a chief of staff is critical.

Desaix, as an example, operated in 1800 quite well using Boudet's division staff as his corps staff when the Army of the Reserve was reorganized to give Desaix a corps command in the Marengo campaign-the information is in de Cugnac/Lanza.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin,

of course there were competent French commanders, however, in the autum campaign of 1813 Napoleon had to play a defensive strategy which required that he was able to answer to quite different allied approaches. This meant the allies determined in autum 1813 where Napoleon got his chance for an decisive blow, this was quite different compared to former campaigns.
With more army commander slots to fill than high quality commanders available, there was always the problem that he may loose more at one front than he gains at the others

Successful offensive against Berlin could easily have produced a smaller version of Moscow 1812, i.e. occupation of an city with relatively small strategic relevance, while the loss of Hamburg would have triggered the loss of Denmark, whole northern Germany and would have allowed the allies to make better use of their reserves.

Napoleon's strategy in the autumn of 1813 was not defensive. Napoleon's objective in 1813, as it was in all of his campaigns, was the destruction of the enemy's army.

The strategy that he adopted was akin to what he did at Austerlitz, but on a strategic scale. He was attempting to lure the allies into attacking him to his advantage so that a strategic counterattack would lead to their defeat and perhaps another allied peace offering to Napoleon's advantage.

Napoleon did not want to occupy Berlin, per se, he wanted to defeat the allied armies covering Berlin. His chosen subordinates were not up to the task. On the Berlin front the fumblings of both Oudinot and Ney definitely changed Napoleon's plans and Macdonald's disobedience of orders and his placing of his army on the wrong side of a river in a rainstorm was nothing short of incompetence.

It should also be noted that Davout was to coordinate his operations with Oudinot, but Oudinot's fumblings left Davout isolated and he had to withdraw back into Hamburg. The victory at Dresden, great as it was, could not offset the French errors on the other fronts.

K

There is a lot of myth surrounding this subject, which has led to "the sudden uselessness" of previously able French commanders. Desaix is a good example – he had his "corps" for three days, but it was essentially only Boudet's div and it was called a "corps" as it had a separate role – moving south to face the Austrian force thought to be marching from Genoa.

Unfortunately, many 19th and 20th century authors have sought to find "the secret" of N (and wider French success) to try to draw the lessons. This is classic data mining and has seen such nonsense as the French being the only ones to skirmish and the 1807 Allied reaction. In the 19th century, there is a move to standing formations at higher level culminating in Moltke's corps system and staff arrangements. The 20th century has seen a need to try to trace this back to N, because otherwise it would mean adopting the methods of militarist Prussia. It also goes to the question of how N went from winning to losing – he is still the great captain, while everything about him fails, commanders and staff included.

Armies into the mid-18th century were quite small and provided that they were moving on a single axis of advance, forces as big as 60K could be managed quite easily using the old "monarch plus admin entourage" system. So, it is quite easy for a French corps commander to run a corps, especially when he has detailed instructions from Army HQ. Wellington could do the same thing. The problem that the French have is twofold – the Revolutionary chaos and management of ever larger armies. the solution is to try to run the 13 Armies from Paris, which is pretty unsuccessful, although individuals like Moreau and N do well with about 30K men, once they are far enough from Paris to be able to do their own thing. Moreau however does not have the authority to command Jourdan and the French get a good going over in Germany in 96.

For political reasons mostly, N has to centralise control of everything from late 99. This is one of the curious contradictions in what is written about N and the French army. One minute he is directing everything down to the last detail (politics, state finances and military promotions), yet in the next he is suddenly delegating authority to a bunch of people, on whose success his own continued power directly depends. It is of course a nonsense as none of us would show such an inconsistency in what we do. Mix it in with vague definitions of "staff" and "corps" and you produce the mythology.

N still ran his armoies like an 18th century monarch with an admin staff. Yes, they are very good at getting the orders out – helped by only having to send each subordinate commander what he needs to know – but it relies on one man with the prodigious energy to take in what is happening, issuing orders and even having time to write to other theatre commanders to "instruct" them (like Eugene). However, as the armies get bigger, the problems just get worse – Ulm is easy: you just get a map of the German road network out and direct your formations down it (neutral Bayreuth included). It also starts going wrong in 1806 and by 1809, it is a real muddle. Even in battle, N has to be on interior lines on pretty flat ground to direct 180K in a fairly static action like Wagram or Leipzig.

However, for a corps commander, life is straightforward – you get your orders from HQ, which you carry out by directing the components of your subformations of less than 40K men. All your staff has to do is send reports back to Army HQ and issue the orders, something the French staff gets increasing practice at. Thiebault's manual does tell us something – it shows that standardisation was required after the chaos of the 1790s and that the personnel required quite detailed instruction in what to do. then, if you look at Thiebault, it is an administrative manual – despite the best efforts of Paddy Griffiths and John Elting to shoehorn the four depts into the NATO G1-5 organisation. Elting gives up on p.88 of Swords and admits that N was his own G3 (operational planner).

Of course Ney shows up with 3 ADCs – all senior commanders had a small group of ADCs (often sons of their mates!), but that is not a staff. They were glorified messengers and tea boys. The workload does not involve double time, but 3-4 times, because now Ney has to direct several formations, work out his own plans and take in what is coming into HQ. Of course, he will not be up tob the job.

That is the answer to the question: Why was there no staff – because there was no staff.

K,
I thought that was the point: that Napoleon, through Berthier, was micromanaging the detached Corps (& even, to an extent, in Spain).

I do think you make a nice point about Blucher. Great figure head but a general whose tactical chestnuts were pulled out of the fire on several occasions by his CoS.

Kevin

It depends, regarding the overall responsibility of the formation commander, how responsible he is for the staff structure and, indeed, how much time he has to change it.

Also how much control an army commander has over his staff is dependent on the national culture and structure: Austria and Prussia, for example, had very different approaches to Napoleonic France.

IUf your argument runs that it is all the fault of the army commander, no matter the circumstances, I have to disagree. For a start, in an earlier post you mentioned the shortage of staff officers the French confronted in 1813, which implies that Ney could not have formed a staff even if he had wanted. The fact that no army staff existed in the first place is worrying to start with.

Equally, if you are saying Macdonald disobeyed orders by crossing the Katzbach that has other implications: how far Napoleon was trying to run these armies by remote control as opposed to leaving operational decisions to the army commander and giving them the tools to do it.

So are they armies? Or are we wrong in making this assumption just because they were called armies, should we see them as satellite forces of the Grande Armee.

On the shortage of officers front, that is why I am looking for examples from other than 1813 to see if any of the other armies, in Italy and Spain, had what we could term an army staff as opposed to an ad-hoc collection of individuals or one of the corps staffs doing that job as well as it's own. There should certainly be no issue regarding the availability of staff officers at that stage.

The problem with the 'blame the individual' approach is that, if Napoleon knew that his subordinates were not up to the task, then surely you provide them with as much support as you can in terms of a solid staff and a CoS who compensates for those individual failings. Why he did not implies either that he was not aware of those weaknesses or he felt able to rely on correspondence or, as you suggested, there simply was not the trained manpower.

Dave: Now that is a Tautology, you naughty man, and is unworthy of you! The 'we're here because we're here' argument does not really get us very far. But, if as Elting admits, Boney is his own Operations Officer then was his assumption that everyone else was going to do the same? I am fully conversant of the political desire since 1918 to avoid any comparison with the Prussian Higher General Staff structure as set out in the Prussian post-Jena reforms, or indeed any sources that smacked of 'German' militarism. Thankfully I think we are growing out of this!

K

K,

Good commanders are their own operations officers as they approve or disapprove of the plans a staff comes up with. That's my experience, anyways.

And it is the commander's responsibility if they fail-the Prussian system that evolved after the Napoleonic wars, the so-called dual command system, didn't work too well after 1871.

K

Kevin

I would say it worked far better than any alternative approach available while war was still mobile: look at the Prussian operation in 1914 in East Prussia, a plan concocted by a fairly junior staff officer that worked very well, in comparison to the Russian staff: read Solzhenitsyn's August 1914. Although fictional he was able to talk to a lot of the dramatis personae while in the gulag. The sense of creeping doom and gathering hopelessness is great.

Regarding 'your experience', unless you are incredibly old, this is based on staff experience in the US military in the late 20th century, and one would have hoped that things had moved on since then.

Then again, attemptsd to circumvent a CoS still happen. In the UK plan to take Basra in 2003, the brigadiers had so little confidence in 1DIV's CoS (described to me as an 'arrogant little )they came up with their own plan instead.

What nags at me address is that what a commander does when he has a plan imposed upon him, rather than put up by his staff, or indeed has no staff worthy of the name to add elasticity as and when things change? Also what if he is unable to remove his CoS or it proves very difficult (Charles with Prohaska in 1809)? Besides, as we saw in changing Oudinot for Ney, a change at the top is easy, but it is not necessarily going to make any difference if the problem really lies elsewhere.

K

Peter H flagged this up on p.8 of his Leipzig Osprey many years ago and Kevin has confirmed it. A good commander will set the general lines of strategy – his staff led by the CoS will do the detailed work – they then present the plan for approval by the commander. This is the moltke system, which has its origins in Austria, which developed it precisely because the early 7YW showed that the old system was not working without a "great brain". It was designed precisely to carry the load, allowing the commander time to think about strategy and deal with his political masters (this is why Schwarzenberg used this system in 1813).

Prochaska is a good example – why does Charles go from brilliant in 96 to poor in the opening stage of 09? Simple -Schmitt was dead and Mayer had been pushed out after hitting the bottle, replaced by a man way out of his depth.

The French commanders are used to being told what to do strategy-wise by N in his HQ, although they will get the blame if things go wrong. Once N is not there (Spain) or the army is too big to micromanage, they are not up to the job and there is no-one to help. In contrast to what happened with Ney, when Charles was ill in mid-99, Schmitt continued to run the staff and a new commander could take over for a while.

You have to look at what the staff does. There is no general staff as we know it in the French army, as the operational planning and intelligence work (G2) is done by the top man. N had to rely on these men, but they had no experience of independent command (Massena and Suchet aside, the latter of course getting plenty of plaudits in Spain) and had spent 8-17 years being directed.

KFK wrote: "Napoleon's strategy in the autumn of 1813 was not defensive. Napoleon's objective in 1813, as it was in all of his campaigns, was the destruction of the enemy's army.

The strategy that he adopted was akin to what he did at Austerlitz, but on a strategic scale. He was attempting to lure the allies into attacking him to his advantage so that a strategic counterattack would lead to their defeat and perhaps another allied peace offering to Napoleon's advantage."

To lure the enemy into attacking and perform a counterstrike is per se a defensive strategy – at least in chess :-)
Where the first attack of the enemy happened was still the decision of the enemy. Here the allies had some options and Napoleon did not know where they would strike, so a lack of good army commanders would hurt him very likely.

@Khevehhuller
The plan for East Prussia was developed by Schlieffen around 1892 and it was tested during some staff rides. However, in contrast to some of Napoleon's plans in 1813, the ideas were well communicated to and understood by the German army commanders (strictly speaking: at least by the B-team, after the A-team showed nerves :-))

I understand the question to be posed as:

What impact did the presence of a staff have on a general's independent command? To this point what evidence can be found in Spain and Italy – do these theaters support or disagree with the lack of independent generals' success in Germany during 1813?

Seems like a very good question.

So far the theories/answers thrown forward seem to be:

1) Staffs don't matter because generals are responsible for their commands.
2) Staffs make a fair difference due to the accuracy and efficiency that orders are issued and information is provided.

I guess the first one is a good way to look at the chain-of-command, but to say that the quality or presence of the staff does not directly influence the performance of the command seems counter-intuitive, certainly Napoleon's own command suffered in 1815 due to Berthier's absence.

Cheers,

The Bandit

In part, yes, although option (2) should include the provision of all staff functions, including detailed planning and intops.

Generals are responsible for their commands, but the failure lies in the ability of most Marshals to run independent commands (and/or too much interference from above). This of course undermines the claim that the corps system was developed to allow commanders to act independently. If there were others capable of independent command, why didn't N appoint them instead? Well, much like the missing staff, these mythological folk are missing too.

To blame an individual like Ney or Oudinot is simply another smokescreen to cover the failure of yet another myth.

Frederick the Great once made the comment that commanders capable of independent command are relatively few in any age. That being said, Ney's and Oudinot's relative abilities are quite evident. Ney was probably at his best with about 10,000 men. He tended not to see 'the big picture' which was one of the reasons his flanking maneuver at Bautzen failed (having Jomini as a chief of staff was undoubtedly another). His keeping d'Erlon out of action on 16 June 1815, along with his ordering the French cavalry attacks two days later is another.

Oudinot never mastered the employment of combined arms. Ney was a capable corps commander, Oudinot probably peaked at division command.

The staff exists to support the commander and the command itself. What the staff is there to do is to relieve the commander of the day to day running of his command and allow the commander to command. The chief of staff at division level and higher runs the staff and is responsible to the commander for that mission.

The French did have a general staff during the period and their staff model is still being used today. During the period the Prussian general staff was still in embryonic form and would not become the general staff of legend and ultimate failure until years after the Napoleonic period.

The Austrian staff system was behind the French developments, as late as 1809 Austrian divisions had no staffs and consequently the administrative burden that all levels of command have had to be done by the corps staffs, which slowed down staff work and led to delays.

Contrary to some opinions, the French general staff under Berthier did considerable planning-the movement of the Army of the Reserve, the movement of the Grande Armee from the Channel to Germany in 1805 as well as the concentration of the Grande Armee to go into Russia in 1812 were all done by Berthier's staff.

The French staff system was developed, organized, and functioned by Berthier's design. His notes on how to do this were developed by Thiebault into his two staff manuals, which were, as stated previously, copied by other armies and the manuals translated into other languages.

A commander's failure is not necessarily a staff failure. The commander, is however, responsible for everything his command does or does not do. That is a fundamental axiom.

K

All correct, but you still do not answer the question, why after a decade of wars with many French victories so few good army commanders exists in the French army, this points IMHO to a structural issue. One good commander with one staff did not longer win the campaign in autum 1813.

In contrast, the Prussians despite the devasting(?) defeat in 1806/7 and much less practical experience in the following six years had some good army commander/staff teams that were able to handle the problems their French counterparts create.

why after a decade of wars with many French victories so few good army commanders exists in the French army, this points IMHO to a structural issue. One good commander with one staff did not longer win the campaign in autum 1813.

I would have thought this was obvious. A decade is a short time militarily. Early on the clear French organisational advantage and strategic superiority made the victories. Probably anybody with a decent amount of senior command experience could have led one of the Grande Armee corps during this time. Such victories are not beneficial to what in the sporting world is called Progressive Practice. Experience teaches us that in any walk of life easy victories do not breed superiority, they merely encourage the victors to believe their own hype. Add to that being festooned with honours and I'd bet good mnoney most of the marshalate thought by 1809 that they could walk on water.

Meanwhile the rest of Europe was getting a handle on French modus operandi and began to work out ways to counter it. Nobody needs a history lesson on the results.

In short, history as ever comes down to the study of men themselves, first and foremost, and without an understanding of the human psyche and a willingness to accept the discoveries, any 'historian' is merely a bookworm with no grasp of reality.

Ulenspiegel – You have corrrected your own error at the start. Kevin is just spouting mythology about French staff work, which was purely administrative. How did Prussia recover and Austria direct the biggest army of the period at Leipzig? They could direct bigger forces, because they had the staffs to do so.

If Ney could command a small "independent" force of 10K well, why not an army? The truth is that they are different – as a corps commander, he gets his detailed instructions from on high and just administers them; as an army commander, he has to think for himself and needs help from his top staff officers. As I said above, there was no staff, because there was no staff.

The div staffs is just another red herring misusing words (much like corps). An Austrian GM or FML had a few AdCs, who were the staff attached to him; a French divisional general had a few AdCs attached to him. Both performed an admin task, taking orders from the corps staff. The Austrian staff had been delegated with power from the early 7YW and so, could cope with the taks involved, because they performed them. The fact, which the True Believers try to avoid, is that the French had no staff corps and their Theibault manual is just admin. They have to invent more myth with this div staff. The french div staffs were established in 1780 when France was divided into divisions for army admin purposes – most states went for established provinces. There was an admin staff in these peacetime divisions to administer the army units in its province. the diea that the French army had "permanent" divisions with staffs is simply a distortion of thios arrangement. It is rather typical of the cloppy mythmaking we hear from those unable to read the original materials.

French commanders cut great dash – but most were incapabale of independent command.

It is rather like a discussion I had with UK military staff in the late 80s as tensions rose just before the Soviet Union collapsed. I suggested that in the event of hostilities, NATO would probably have the edge in taking out Soviet comms. The staff guy replied that this would then require local Soviet commanders to use their own initiative, which he thought would help them. I took the view that if they had not use their initiative previously, but relied on central direction, they would flounder. Most of the French Marshals have confirmed my general idea.

Goerlitz, Walter History of the German General Staff 1657 – 1945 (Praeger 1954).

Well, there is one for this thread and the largest current one!

@Dave Hollins

We are discussing two different aspects:

1) Relatively low quality of the decisions of French army commanders in autum 1813, this issue is not necessarily caused by their staffs, but in some cases, as Kevin Kiley remarked, person related. So here the question is, why did they get an army command, esp. in case of Oudinot and Ney? Faulty decison of Napoleon? Or why were not better men available?

2) Nature and quality of staff work, here I suspect that Napoleon's talent/genius is in some cases sold as French staff system. A system is or should be per definitionem independent of individual persons. And a good system can to a certain extend compensate for deficiencies of individuals.

Unfortunately, what we observe as won/lost battles is a product of 1 and 2, so it is hard for me to buy some of your very absolute statements :-)

You have to understand the inexplicable contradictions thrown up by the mythology. Here we have Ney, who was a GB in 1796 and GD in 1799, leader of heroic rearguards and cavalry charges, winner of several battles in Spain, a corps commander in Russia, yet suddenly, he goes to pieces in 1813.

These corps are supposed to be "little armies" with permanent staffs, supported by permanent staffs at div level, guided only by mission-orientated orders. Suddenly, Ney cannot cope with army command and his staff has gone AWOL. It makes no sense.

While battle results are a combination of the two factors, the outcomes should not change so dramatically, so we must look at the initial underlying claims to see if they stand up. is this skilled, permanent staff there and what is it actually doing? What was Ney capable of – and indeed, why was he chosen, if as claimed, he was so useless?

Once you appreciate how the myths have been built – and this permanent div staff is a good example of how the data mining ahs gone on and how a word has been misused – you can get to the root of what went wrong. If you swallow the mythology, you are left with a very capable commander suddenly becoming useless and an efficient modern staff suddenly vanishing.

Ney's chief of staff during the spring campaign had been Jomini – Jomini had served in this capacity, with Ney, from 1806 through 1810, and been reinstated to the position in 1813 by Napoleon. Jomini's resignation and transfer to the Russian staff in August 1813 undoubtedly would have had an effect upon the staff operations in Ney's command. Jomini was a, more than, competent theoretician and able staff officer – both he and Ney, although they'd had issues, remained good friends, Jomini attempting to save him from execution in 1815. Ney's performance in the autumn campaign, may have been as a direct result of the loss of his valued chief of staff – we lay a similar claim to Napoleon's performance during 1815 without Berthier, so why not Ney's performance in autumn 1813.

npm

The only problem I have with that material is that Jomini was not an able staff officer. He failed in Russia twice as a military governor and played no effective part in the crossing of the Berezina. His foul up, along with Ney, at Bautzen ruined one of Napoleon's best-planned battles. In short, Jomini was an incompetent staff officer (he was never a line officer), as well as a deserter and a renegade. He did not resign from the French army and then 'transfer' to the Russian staff.

K

I have a question for the forum: If the French general staff did nothing but administrative work, who did the necessary ancillary operational planning as well as the logistical planning to move and support the Grande Armee on campaign?

The comments made on the French general staff and staff system from other posters contain some errors and it might be helpful to straighten them out.

In short, Berthier designed and established not only the French staff system, but he also established the protocols by how it would operate. That being the case, again, who did the ancillary logistical and operational planning for the Grande Armee. It wasn't Napoleon, so who did it?

Sincerely,
Kevin

Possible worth a study of the "correspondances" to see or maybe infer how these issues were addressed.

I expect we would see some issues included almost all the time with no autonomy for the corps commander. Other issues would get special mention, some not at all presumably because once the objective is set the corps commander is expected to work out the detail.

It would probably be interesting to cross reference this to the staff manuals.

Jomini would be rather odd then – he is useless and had proved this, yet N reinstated him in 1813. I suppose it was a cunning way to shift the blame for the failure of Bautzen on to someone other than himself. Indeed, it seems we have a situation reminiscent of the blame game for Jena-Auerstadt and Eylau. In this case, as Peter H so interestingly says on p.11 of his Osprey "Ney is often the scapegoat of N's apologists. As we shall see, N was aware that Ney had not sent patrols out to screen his camp at Grossgorschen. Furthermore, it was understandable for Ney to enquire of N as to his next move at Bautzen, once he had heard sounds of gunfire. The Emperor had not shared the details of his plan of action for Bautzen with ney. As such, it was difficult for Ney to assess the best course of action."

Peter can be incisive at times and he has flagged up two lots of myth in one go here. First, we have the mythology of "marching to guns", which only pops up when it didn't happen (Grouchy in 1815) or the general had received orders already (desaix in 1800).

More importantly, we have the myth of mission-orientated orders, executed by the corps command. The reality was that N did not even share his strategic concept with his corps commanders, but it came in handy (as at Jena) when things went wrong.

So, jomini's alleged uselessness at bautzen is actually simply a case of neither he or his boss having the slightest clue about what N intended.

It is another example where the mythology throws up strange contradictions, but a closer examination reveals that the mythology is not how it was.

So, there we have N as his G3 (operational planner) and no role in it for the CoS. Who did the logistics – easy really. Logistics (G4 in NATO parlance) was always a concern of any army command from ancient times. It had been a responsibility of the "head of entourage" right up to the early 18th century, but was already delegated. It is a staff function, but an administrative department – under its modern staff design, the Austrian commands placed logistics into the administrative Service Dept (mostly the Adjutant staff). The UK Army has the Royal Logistics Corps, which is only part of the staff at the top level.

Jomini's main crime for the N devotees was to point out that Berthier was a chief clerk.

To address Mike's point, the French staff system is nicely laid out by Paddy Griffiths in The Art of War in Revolutionary France, pp.167-9, based on Berthier's fabled 1796 instructions, setting out the duties of the 4 Adjutant-generaux: 1) records and unit strengths, 2) journal, ammo supply, tech branches including artillery, 3) reconnaissance, maintenance of "the Table" by d'Albe, comms, guides, 4) Admin of HQ. Supply and logistics comes under dept 2 apparently. There is no sign of any staff role in planning and directing ops, merely sending out N's orders.

Then the question still remains: Who did the necessary ancillary planning for both operations and logistics for the Grande Armee? It undoubtedly was done, so who did it?

For an outline of how the staff was organized, the primary source is Thiebault and the 1800 staff manual is the place to start. I believe both it and the 1813 staff manual are on Google.

K

Berthier as the chief administrative clerk at the head of the equivalent of G4. It is a task allocated to austrian chiefs of Staff under the 1716 regs, but delegated out to others from 1757 onwards. It is not the direct responsibility of any modern CoS, but of the head of G4.

Berthier took no part in intelligence gathering (G2) or planning (G3 – see Elting). The corps commandersw ere not told about N's strategic concept and so, could not respond to unexpected events. it is interesting that we have double attempts to scapegoats commanders N was happy to employ and continue to employ, despite their alleged uselessness – Bernadotte in 06 and 07, Ney in 1813 and 1815. That is why the mythology and claims of uselessness need checking.

Perhaps this will help. It is taken from Chapter V, Grand Quartier-General, of Swords Around A Throne, 81-101:

'The Napoleonic staff-indeed, much of modern staff organization-came from Pierre-Joseph Bourcet's work on staff organization and functioning…Bourcet wanted a permanent staff corps of select, specially trained officers…in 1783 Minister of War de Segur finally formed a Corps d'Etat Major. Officers chosen for it were to be trained in topography, history, geography, preparation of unit histories, reconnaissance, and the science of the art of war…Along with much else, this promising organization was abolished by the Revolution. Certain of its members, Bertheir and Guillaume Mathier-Dumas included, continued to serve France.'

'…in 1790 the government set up a system of adjutants-generaux, supposedly picked officers capable of handling basic staff functions. Their number was repeatedly increased, reaching 110 during 1799-1800. Also, in 1792 each army was given a chef d'etat-major (chief of staff); he was to have four adjutants-generaux as assistants, each of whom was to be aided by several officiers-adjoints (attached officers) of his own choice, taken from combat units. Every division, advance guard, and large reserve was to have an adjutant general as its chief of staff.'

The Royal Army had no written regulations covering staff organization and operations. A draft set begun in 1788 vanished with the staff corps. A sketchy provisional instruction may have been issued in 1791, but most staff officers found no other schooling than the advice of older officers and the expensive lessons of their own experience…Thiebault…managed to produce an outstanding work. Building on Berthier's simple instructions to the Army of the Alps in 1795 and to the Army of Italy in 1796 (apparently derived from the 'lost' 1788regulations, on which Berthier may have worked), he published an excellent Manuel des Adjutants-Generaux in 1800. In 1810, after service as chief of staff to Junot's corps in Spain, he expanded this into his Manuel General du Service des Etats Majors…a well-written, detailed work, including sample forms for various reports. The French Army used it for more than twenty years.'

'Berthier's operational instructions were simple and should be engraved inside every modern staff officer's skull. The chief of staff is the headquarters pivot. He must see everything that comes in and sign (or at least approve) everything that goes out. The assistant chiefs of staff must keep abreast of the general situation in addition to running their own sections. Speed and accuracy are the most important factors in staff work. The staff exists only for the good of the army and so has no regular office hours. It works as long as may be necessary, rests when it has nothing left to do, takes care of the troops before consulting its own comfort, and is always ready to move out, regardless of the hour or 'pain' involved. Up-to-the-minute intelligence on enemy forces and actions must always be available; therefore reconnaissance must be continuous to the front and flanks, and its results reported promptly…Finally the commander-in-chief must always be told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing else-no matter how unpleasant the results may be.'

'The actual staffs themselves took their parent form and functionings from that of the Army of the Alps, which Bertheir organized in 1795, becoming larger and more elaborate as the armies increased in size and as Napoleon became First Consul and then Emperor.'

This description of Berthier is from In the Wake of Napoleon, the memoirs of Ferdinand von Funck, edited by Oakley Williams, 111-113:

All the problems connected with the needs of the army and their transport…were thrown on him…The armies were scattered from Bayonne to the Bug, from Calabria to the Helder, and as far as Stralsund; they were shifting their positions incessantly, had to be supplied and directed, and the whole of it passed through [Berthier's] hands…He always was the clearing house through which all business was transacted…the infallible day book to whcih Napoleon was referring every minute of the day to amke sure how his balance stood. For this reason he had to be in attendance on him on every battlefield, on reconnaissance, at every review…without fail on every study of terrain.'

Chief clerk's don't perform these type of duties, don't go on reconnaissances, get shot at and sometimes wounded, and 'go into the fire' with the troops. At Friedland Berthier coordinated the final assaults as the Russian army fell apart.

Jomini held a grudge against Berthier because Jomini had an ego the size of a small planet, and Berthier had taught him some of the finer points of military etiquette and staff procedures, which Jomini resented. Berthier was the preeminent chief of staff of the period and organized and ran the most up-to-date staff of the period. In addition, he was also French Minister of War from 1800-1807.

'Because he worked in the Emperor's shadow, Berthier's accomplishments seemed matters of routine. In 1800 he organized the Army of the Reserve and moved it across the St. Bernard Pass into Italy; in 1805 he planned the Grande Armee's march from the English Channel into Austria; in 1809 set up the assault crossing of the Danube before Wagram; and in 1812 handled the unprecedented concentration for the invasion of Russia.'
Swords, 129.

'Napoleon, after Waterloo, uttered the fitting epitaph for the man he had once named his 'companion in arms'-'If Berthier had been there, I would not have met this misfortune.'
Swords, 130, taken from Le Marechal Berthier by Vicrot Derrecagaix, II, 604.

In short and in conclusion, anyonen who actually believes that Berthier was nothing but a 'chief clerk' and that the French general staff was only involved in administrative matters knows little or nothing of staff operations and planning or what the duties of a chief of staff are.

K

For anyone interested in reading a biography of Jomini, here's a link
link
In my opinion, Jomini, was the Gneisnau to Ney as Blucher. Jomini was a theoretician who balanced Ney's impetuousness – the two were a team. There were only so many marshal d'Empire and only so many chief of staff linked to those marshals. Jomini held his post for many years in various theaters of war with Ney – perhaps a less able man would have lost his position in favor of someone more competent. And Kevin, you're correct, he didn't resign in 1813 [my bad], he had attempted to do that in 1810, when first approached by the Russians – however, Napoleon interceded and gave him a promotion to keep him within the French ranks. Berthier had Jomini arrested in 1813, citing failure to submit strength reports – that, for Jomini, was the final straw, who then approached Langeron and the Czar during the Armistice and defected [a better description than transferred] to the Allies.

npm

I have had a look at Bourcet on the internet and these books. The results are rather typical.

"The Napoleonic staff-indeed, much of modern staff organization-came from Pierre-Joseph Bourcet's work on staff organization and functioning…Bourcet wanted a permanent staff corps of select, specially trained officers". In fact, Elting does not mention any work by Bourcet – he lists Thiebault, de Philipp (1900) and Gromiard "Service de l'etat" (1809). His complimentary remarks about de Philipp suggest this claim is drawn from there.

The only major work by Bourcet is Principes de La Guerre de Montagnes, apparently published in 1775 for private circulation and only generally published in 1880, a century after his death. It apparently includes a comment that Rivoli is a good position to defend with a small fporce against a considerably larger one, which might suggest Napoleon read it. Beyond that, there is only a work on military reconnaissance allegedly by him, published by a relative in the 1880s. This does not stop further claims: Griffiths, quoting Hittle (1961, heavily using de Philipp), says that Bourcet took French staff work to a higher level in the late 1760s, followed by Segur's actions in the early 1780s and Guibert with his Higher War Council in the late 1780s.

Interesting then that no-one can actually pin Bourcet down, yet all apparently lifting material from de Philipp.

Griffiths is quite interesting – on pp.156-7 he sets out what actually happened with the alleged "permanent" divisions. It seems they were just for peacetime admin and after a 1789-91 gap, just ensured that their constituent brigades were in the field together. Nothing about div staffs! He notes that France had no formal staff corps between 1791 and 1818 and sets out the skills of junior staff officers (p.166) – riding, cartography, penmanship – as Elting does, although a similar list in Rothenberg for junior Austrian staff officers is often treated in a rather derisory fashion! (and hardly what Bourcet is claimed to have wanted). Griffiths is drawing on de Philipp and a quote from Thiebault, who said: "Headquarters staff encompass the whole mechanism of war".

So, the question is: Did the French staff do so? Griffiths sets out the Berthier 1795 arrangement as above – again from Hittle drawing on de Philipp. However, as ELting notes on p.87, it was down to three divisions by 1805: 1) troop movements, orders, correspondence, 2) supply, HQ admin police and hospitals, 3) PoWs, recruitment and military justice. A 4th div is added in 1806 to deal with the lengthening comms lines and a few small depts are added in 1807, until the whole lot collapses in 1812, as this staff cannot handle the lines of comms in Russia.

The list is quite comparable with an "administrative" Austrian CoS's jobs in 1716: cartography, camps, specialist units and hospitals, military justice and issuing orders. Even then, an Austrian Cos had responsibility for spies and intelligence gathering (G2). from 1757, these admin tasks are delegated down, so the CoS can direct intelligence and operational planning, somthing bertheor never did. Indeed, we can see Berthier was not the HQ pivot, because he knew little of the operational activities and nothing of the strategic concept! His supposed skills are nnot that great – in 1800, the army was on half rations soon after passing Bard, in 1809 the Danube crossing was delayed by units marching through each other and 1812 speaks for itself. He had no ops authority – hence the muddle of April 1809.

In contrast, there he is collecting and designing forms, so that he could perform the important, but admninistrative task, of keeping N fully advised of current unit strengths and positions. He is a typical Beamte (German for a minor public official, who loves the bureaucracy).

NPM,

If you would like a much more accurate biography on Jomini, the study by John Elting is the definitive one. It is summarized in his book The Superstrategists on pages 148-161, which is shortened from the much longer article done by Col Elting while still teaching at West Point in the 1960s.
Jomini started by being apprenticed to a banker in Basel, Switzerland, by his father. By 1798, after being a business failure in both Switzerland and Paris, he found a job in the Swiss war ministry as a secretary. He was granted a Swiss major's commission, but was forced to resign by 1802 because of his attitude and because of becoming involved in Swiss politics. He went back to Paris.
There, the French army was not interested in him. Jomini met Ney, mentioned that he would dedicate the first volume of his new book, Traite de Grande Tactic, and Ney loaned him the money to get his book published and had him join his staff as a volunteer ADC. Jomini served competently in that position during the Ulm campaign, but Jomini would later credit himself with being Ney's chief of staff (the VI Corps chief of staff was General Adrien Dutaillis in 1805-1806).
After Ulm Ney and the VI Corps was sent into the Tyrol. Jomini was sent to imperial headquarters with Ney's reports, a typical ADC duty. When he arrived he apparently 'demanded' 'immediate access to the Emperor himself. Berthier, somewhat 'astounded' 'administered a brusque lesson on military courtesy; Jomini departed, a flea in each ear and a hatred flaming up inside him.'
'From then on Jomini would cherish Berthier as his special, malevolent personal enemy. His hatred grew pathological. Unable to conceive any fault himself, he developed the quaint theory (which, unfortunately, a number of semihistorians would believe) that Bertheir was jealous of his great talents and very much afraid that Napoleon might make Jomini his chief of staff in Berthier's place. His revenge was overwhelming; thereafter, he never missed a chance to blacken Berthier's reputation as a man and a soldier, not scrupling at an occasional lie.'
After Austerlitz, Jomini was promoted to Adjutant-Commandant, the staff equivalent of colonel in the line. For the 1806 campaign, Jomini was attached to imperial headquarters, not the VI Corps. He was sent with orders to Ney at the battle of Jena and 'obviously spent a rough afternoon at the marshal's heels.'
Present at Eylau, Jomini was on sick leave for Friedland. Upon his return he did 'demand' a definite assignment and wanted to be Ney's chief of staff. Dutaillis had been seriously wounded and had lost an arm. Berthier wanted him to be Dutaillis' assistant (Dutaillis considered himself to be fit for duty), but Jomini 'Instead of accepting this as an opportunity to learn staff procedures from a competent senior, Jomini threw a tantrum-he had rendered 'great services,' he 'was Swiss,' he absolutely refused to be 'the subordinate of an invalid,' he would resign if not given what he considered his just dues.'

Napoleon decided to give Jomini the chance to 'prove himself' and named Jomini as Ney's chief of staff. Transferred with the VI Corps to Spain, he was 'rebuked' for minor infractions while Ney had been on leave, and Ney became somewhat disenchanted with his new chief of staff. He sent him with dispatches to Austria for Napoleon, Jomini arriving there just after Wagram. He bad-mouthed Ney to Napoleon, Ney heard about it and Ney picked a new chief of staff, leaving Jomini without an assignment and killing his promotion to general of brigade which was proper to his former assignment.
Minor intrigues took up some of Jomini's time in the next few years, such as the search for a Russian commission as well as seeking employment in Bavaria.
With the invasion of Russia looming, Jomini was attached to the imperial headquarters as the official historian. He was given the meaningful assignment as military governor of Vilna, but provoked problems with his immediate superior, General Hogendorp, the governor-general of Lithuania. Transferred to Smolensk as military governor, 'he did nothing noteworthy.'
After the retreat, during which he again 'did nothing noteworthy' he was ordered to Paris and promptly 'reported himself too sick for duty.' He rejoined the Grande Armee in May 1813 and was again assigned as Ney's chief of staff 'replacing an officer killed in action.' Then he and Ney botched the envelopment at Bautzen.
'Shortly thereafter, an armistice brought a pause in the fighting. Ney recommended, as seems to have been his custom, many of his subordinates for decoration, cash bonuses, and promotions. Napoleon went through thte list with a heavy hand. Jomini, recommneded for a bonus and a decoration, got the decoration only. Ney also recommended him for promotion to major general, possibly as much in hope of getting rid of him as to reward him. Elated over this anticipated advancement, Jomini suddenly found himself under arrest for allowing his administrative paperwork to lapse into arrears. Jomini and his admiring biographers have insisted that this was a trivial incident, blown up of all reason by Berthier's jealousy. Quite the contrary, Napoleon considered such status reports essential to his operational and logistic planning…Concurrently, Jomini managed to infuriate Ney by contradicting him in front of his divison commanders.'
On 13 August 1813 Jomini deserted. In a letter to his archchancellor in Paris on 16 August, Napoleon mentioned Jomini: 'Jomini, chief of staff to [Ney] has deserted…He is not worth much as a soldier; however, as a writer, he has gotten hold of some sound ideas on war.'
Once with the allies, Jomini was assigned to Schwarzenberg's staff and the English representative at Schwarzenberg's headquarters 'considered Jomini an unnecessary nuisance; a Russian officer considered Jomini 'not fit to serve in war.'
'Jomini never served with troops. He did well enough as a freelance ADC in 1805 but was a flat failure as a chief of staff in 1808-1809 and in 1813. As an official historian, he produced complaints but no books. He was not accept a subordinate position, a rebuke, or an uncongenial assignment for the good of the service, or even to gain experience and good will for his own future career. Thoroughly convinced of the magnitude of his own genius, he was certainl that any opposition to his wishes was stupid and unjust. This vanity and arrogance, coupled with his chronic inability to keep his mouth shut, made him generally disliked…in an army where uncommon bravery was a very common thing, Jomini seems to have hazarded himself as little as possible. Only a belief that Jomini had some potential practical talent can explain Napoleon's patience and generosity toward him, but the Emperor failed in every effort to bring it out.'

'Through the Napoleonic Wars Jomini was a very minor figure…Never really a soldier, a failure as a staff officer, frequently a careless or dishonest historian…Basically, he was an observer and a critic.'

To compare Jomini favorably with Gneisenau (who definitely was a soldier and a very competent chief of staff) does Gneisenau great injustice. Jomini was a deserter and a renegade, and not much else. He certainly was no soldier.

K

If you would like a much more accurate biography on Jomini, the study by John Elting is the definitive one.

Who defines what is definitive?

Arteis,

Read both that have been offered and determine yourself who has done the better job. Further, take a look at the references both offer for their different articles and then after that is done, research the source material.

Col Elting's The Superstrategists came out in 1985. His earlier article on Jomini came out in 1964. The instructors at West Point have access to a world-class library, and if they are not fluent or conversant in certain foreign languages, the foreign language department there has both fluent instructors as well as native-speakers.

And definitive is an historian's judgment. I've seen nothing better on Jomini, including the linked reference (and I don't, at least not a first glance), trust most home-grown historic material on the internet, as anyone can put anything up. That's the reason I only allow one internet reference when my students write term papers.

Have you read the book?

Sincerely,
Kevin

The problem I have with that argument is the much-mentioned saying that every ACW officer went into battle with a copy of Jomini in his pocket. If he was so incompetent, why use his writinsg?

Elting was pro-N and Berthier, so his judgement on Jomini is less than objective. It is ELting's opinion – it is not "the truth".

Dave,

Can you tell if did Burnside didn't get his copy until after he was promoted?

(thats a joke, BTW)

Dave Hollins wrote: "These corps are supposed to be "little armies" with permanent staffs, supported by permanent staffs at div level, guided only by mission-orientated orders. Suddenly, Ney cannot cope with army command and his staff has gone AWOL. It makes no sense."

But in contrast to Ney's operations in the spring campaingn, nobody claims that Neys performance at Dennewitz was a staff problem, Ney is correctly critsized for being at a location, where he did not have an overview of the battlefield and could not direct his (in-)subordinate corps commanders properly.

And keep in mind that Petre in his "N's last campaign in Germany" not only calls Berthier a clerk running an office but is also highly critical when it comes to the military planning of the Austrians ("they were still in the 18th century …."), he attributes the positive aspects of the pre-Leipzig campaigns ususally to Russian and Prusssian staff work.

No staff can cover for basic failings in a commander, but it was N, who had selected him for the job.

With Petre, you must bear in mind that when he was writing, everyone was in awe of Moltke and the Prussian army of the 1860s, albeit the French did persist with N's staff system in 1870. Petre uses Angeli, who bigs up Charles, while saying the Austrian army was behind the times – as it had shown itself to be in 1866 – and while they were writing after Petre, the Austrian staff histories say the same thing (not least as Angeli is among the authors).

I cleaerly see the influence of the 1870/71 war in many of the late 19th/ early 20th century works and, therefore, some of Petre's remarks assessments are obvioulsly caused by this historical background – no problem on my side.
However, in the case of Leipzig Petre simply askes which results the battle would likely have produced with N. at the allies helm :-) Here we do not need 1870/71 but only the results of earlier Napoleonic campaigns in central Europe. Or sometimes Petre compares Schwarzenberg's actions with Blόcher's, so he stays in these cases in the correct framework.

ulenspeigel,

I'm going to relink the paper which Kelvenhuller refered to when he started this thread

PDF link

its a neat little read, and the author clearly lays the blame for the three french defeats (at Gross Beeren, Katzbach, and
Dennewitz) with a failure of staff and command.

"As with Oudinot and Macdonald, Ney failed because
… He had little to no staff to support his operations and could
not assume the role of army commander
…

Ney's action at Dennewitz and his
attempted concentration was tactically sound and
indicative of Napoleonic warfare. …

The creation of armies by combining corps in an
ad-hoc manner presented the commander with an additional
challenge. This was because there was no mechanization
in place for communications or control. Napoleon had an
elaborate system of control through the use of aides,
messengers, adjutants, as well as his entire staff.
These new army commanders had no such system with which
to control their forces. Anything they did create had to
be done in a haphazard manner. Ney arrived with two or
three aides, while Oudinot commanded his own corps and
that of his army using the same staff. What system, if
any, Macdonald implemented is unknown."

it came from this thread
TMP link

its one guys interpretation, but its one promoted professional guy, so its worth a look.

HTH