"Wartenburg 3 October 1813" Topic

I'm reading the online version of "Napoleon's Last Campaign" and I'm a bit confused about a series of events following the Prussian crossing of the Elbe river at Wartenburg. Bertrand is at Wartenburg across from the Prussian bridgehead on 2 October. Yorck's corps crosses the Elbe at Wartemburg and defeats Bertrand on the 3rd. Blucher finishes crossing on the 4th. Ney, who is in command of what was at one point called the Army of Berlin, was at Wartenburg on the 25th of September with Bertrand (IV Corps) and Renier (VII Corps), but falls back behind the forest Southwest of Wartenburg to Delitzsch on the 5th opening the way for Blucher to link up with Bernadotte who crossed the Elbe to the northwest. III corps (Souham), VI corps (Marmont), and 1st cavalry (Latour-Maubourg) are at Meissen at the end of September with orders to support Ney if the Elbe was crossed. On the 5th, Napoleon learned that Blucher crossed the Elbe, and not from Ney, he learned it from Marmont. Finally, on the 7th of October, Napoleon orders Ney, who has retreated to just east of Leipzig, to countermarch and attack. The French finally advance on the 9th. Blucher and Bernadotte unite on the 10th.

Hells bells, what the heck were the French doing for a solid week while Blucher was alone and tied to his bridgeheads? The bridge at Wartenburg was his only line of communications with Berlin. Ney has orders to attack any force crossing the Elbe and he has five corps at his disposal. Looking at the Google map, if Blucher heads west along the bank of the Elbe to link up with Bernadotte, III corps, VI corps, and I Cav are coming right up his tailpipe if they march along the left bank of the Elbe. If Ney blocks Blucher from marching west around the forest, Blucher's has to retreat to Wartenburg or he's caught between two forces with his back to the river. ‘Very uncharacteristic of Ney not to concentrate and attack given how aggressively the French reacted to previous attempts by Bernadotte to cross the Elbe. Also, a good "what if" scenario assuming the French corps come in for the kill from two different directions.

Any insight as to what the heck was going on?

God bless Google maps, BTW.

Lack of information because of poor reconnaisance? The French were very short of cavalry weren't they?

Maybe Ney was standing around wondering what the heck was going on!

Ney had just had is bottom smacked at Dennewitz three weeks earlier.

I think his force was unfit to re engage against a fresh opponent (Blucher wasn't the one who smacked him, it was Bulow – who had a 'fresh' Swedish reinforcement join him also).

So essentially, I think Ney was attempting to retain a threat in being, while rebuilding the morale of his force.

Leggiere 'Napoleon and Berlin' is very good on this theater.

link

"Ney's shattered and decimated army reached Torgau on 7th September "after making a 40 km march without halting." Ney wrote that when the XII Corps ran into a few Cossacks; the troops gave into such a panic-stricken terror that it was very difficult to rally them. He also informed Berthier about 6,000 deserters who threw away their muskets in order to run faster"

"Bulow (III and IV Corps) probably lost 7,000-10,000 men at Dennewitz.
Ney's losses amounted to 21,500 (8,000 dead and wounded, and 13,500 prisoners) 53 guns, and 412 supply wagons"

It's curious that back in the spring Napoleon ripped Prince Eugene for his failure to properly defend the Oder from the farthest bank, and half a year later, Bertrand deploys on the near bank, and Burnadotte crosses the Elbe unopposed. It's been a month since Dennewitz and what was the Army of Berlin is still mucking around.

Well, tangentially relevant is this Monograph is stumbled over while I was hard at work today.

It may help explain some of the issues you raise surrounding Ney as Army Commander.

PDF link

K

Thanks for the help as always K.

I think the options are a) Napoleon's corps commanders are licking their wounds and initiative has passed over to the allies, b) the troops are demoralized and in no condition to fight, c) they've lost contact with the allies and do not have sufficient cavalry to scout with in a countryside crawling with cossacks, d) the cavalry is being detailed to escort food wagons and barges once again (on ongoing problem), or e) failure of command-the Army of Berlin is gone and for all practical purposes there's no one in charge in northern Saxony.

what a great link!

a shame it doesn't cover the next month's correspondence too in this context.

charitably, its worth suggesting that this was some sort of 'trap' to get Blucher, Bulow and Bernadotte across the Elbe, and into a zone where they could not retreat from Napoleon's main army.

I base this on the broad thrust of Napoleon's strategy in 1813 – which seems to have been to knock Prusia out of the war by any means available – two failed attempts to sieze the otherwise worthless Berlin (Oudinot, Gross Beeren; Ney, Denewitz; and IIRC Legierre argues Napoleon had planned a drive himself until pulled back by a more pressing need elsewhere).

Similarly, Napoleon seems to take any chance he can get to leap after Blucher – who always pulls back, forcing N to retire again – with the Austrians now crossing into the theatre, I doubt he would shoose risk another week chasing and retreating against a ghost, so why not tether a goat for them?

If the three B's have united and are across the Elbe, then those scattered 5 French corp would be able to march to cut off retreats, while the main army leaps onto the Prussians and this time achieves what should have happened at Bautzen – destroying the Prussian army and forcing them out of the war.

That's being charitable, though
- If pushed, I'd now vote for a failure of command authority by Ney in seeing and commanding the authority to order such an opportunist attack.
Having just been defeated, why would any Marshall take Ney's word on an attack without the approval of Napoleon?

Interesting.

The topography looks like the perfect place to spring a trap. Wartenburg is located at a bend in the Elbe. It runs south to Dresden and West through Wittenberg, Rosslau, and past Dessau before heading northwest. By crossing there, Blucher puts himself in a corner. He can't breakout from the corner by going southwest because he's blocked by what is now the Dubener Heide Naturepark, which is a very substantial forest. To get out of the corner, he has to either go south towards Dresden and Napoleon or West. Either direction he chooses, Blucher is marching with his back against an unfordable river.

Well, as that monograph makes clear, neither Ney or Macdonald were particularly adventurous with cavalry and suffered poor intelligence in consequence. Beyond this personal failing the structural problem surrounding staff to filter reports and form an operational picture of what was going on adds to the blindness.

New advancing on Berlin was a straightforward thing: in a column up a single road towards a fixed objective. wartenburg was of a very different order: with a General not great on using cavalry to scout, the army battered and in need of RandR with a small staff to service it?

K

Maybe Blucher got away with it because it was the least probable crossing point? The French may have assumed it was a diversion to draw them into a bottleneck.