"The Prussian flaw" Topic

As one of the victors in the SYW and emerging with considerable prestige, it's easy to appreciate Fred the Great's fine army.

I am interested in discussing if it had flaws.
If it's less stellar performance in the War of the Bavarian Succession & quite dismal effort in the Jena campaign had seeds planted in the early glorious epoch.

Any thoughts?

no…

Peter Paret recently published an interesting book on this topic called "The Cognitive Challenge of War." (It's a slim volume, really just a publication of his 2008 Knowles Lectures.) Basically he argues that the Prussians were not static; they did indeed move with the times and carried out constant experimentation and reform. But they tended to see all new developments as additions or modifications to an existing set of doctrines; not a fundamental re-thinking of those doctrines.

Indeed, the same can be said for every other Old Regime army.

But the French, who began in much the same way, with a set of incremental reforms, then went through a revolution that uprooted many of their old assumptions about the composition and use of armies, and thus weren't tied to any precedents. (Other than the obvious limitations of technology and communications.)

So, according to Paret anyway, the French Revolution beat the Prussian Evolution.

My own opinion is that the 1806 Campaign demonstrated such a drastic example of one command team out-thinking and out-fighting another command team, that we tend to exaggerate the reasons for the Prussian defeat, and go looking in places we probably don't have to. Thus, for instance, the old myths such as: The French won because they had skirmishers and the Prussians didn't… (not true). Or: the French won because they were all fired up on Le Feu Sacré, whereas the Prussians were a bunch of mercenaries… (impossible to prove and highly questionable in any event.)

It's easy to think this way, because the Prussians themselves thought this way after 1807. Since they couldn't just shelve the blame onto the King, they were convinced that their whole system must have been rotten from top to bottom (and even the social/political foundations beneath it), and thus convinced themselves that they were in the midst of their own "revolution."

(The degree to which the Prussian post-1807 reforms were in fact revolutionary, is a whole other topic, and one for which the historiography is absolutely immense).

Well they spoke german, that didn't make things any easier,

I agree with Katzenretter – Revolution beats Evolution – over-confidence doesn't help either, as I believe the Prussian officer corps prior to getting their butts handed to them thought they were better than the French – after all, it wasn't French officers sharpening their swords in front of the embassy!

An excellent army from the Ancien Regime meeting a new concept

An excellent army from the Ancien Regime meeting a new concept.

Yet the British beat the French without adopting the a Revolutionary model, they merely evolved.

Not intended as an excuse for a flame war gentle reader, but as a discussion point.

"Yet the British beat the French without adopting the a Revolutionary model, they merely evolved. "

Ah but the "new concept" was mainly on the grande tactical level (despite wargamers obsession with attack columns).

The british were fighting a much smaller war on very defensive terrain.

My basic point being the french excelled when monuvering massive armies in such a way that the battle was won before it started.

The britsh had learned the light infantry concept in the AWI, I don't think anybody used a bigger ratio of skirmishes to formed infantry then the Anglo Allied armies in Ibria

I think we should not overlook the fact that the French had been training and fighting for 2-3 years as a complete army, with every corps, division and brigade exercising as complete units. The Prussian army had not seen action for several years, rarely exercised together in large formations, and – most importantly – left skirmish training to individual regimental commanders.

Where the British succeeded was in small battles, where the lack of higher command skills, and large formation training, were not exposed; over time, these shortcomings were ironed out on the long campaigns in the Peninsula before they came up against larger French armies. In Wellington, they also had an exceptional commander who understood his business.

Gunfreak's point, that the British had an understanding of "petite guerre" tactics from the AWI that translated into good practice when confronting the skirmish screens of the French.

From what I could gather from D. Chandler a few years ago, the French whipped the Prussians at Jena-Auerstadt with more and better centralized operations.

From what I understand, Napoleon himself brought an operations revolution to military campaigns, in addition to the preceeding political-legal revolution of which he was also very cognizant. Sort of why he was where he was. It might be argued Napoleon waged the first successfull and at the same time unsuccessful "hearts and minds" campaigns in Europe… Perfidious Albion begging to differ.

Don't forget, Frederick the Great was inevidably going to lose the Eight Year's War when a miracle occurred and he won the Seven Year's War instead. The hierarchial command and skimisher tactics of the French allowed them to fully utilize their numerical advantage and negate the Prussian's training and discipline. Jena/Auderstadt was still a hard fight, the morale collapse of Prussia afterwards was something else again. Prussia's biggest mistake, though, was going to war without Austrian or Russian support. France was three times the size of Prussia in 1806.

"France was three times the size of Prussia in 1806."

Indeed..

People often seem to forget just how small prussia was, especially after it was carved up after 1807 …

There was also a conceived arrogance in Prussia that their army was superior to that of the French. This perception extended beyond the borders of Prussia and into other super powers of the time such as Russia and Austria.

All of this came about through the perception that the Prussia of 1806 was still the Prussia of the 17060-80's. The hick-up of Valmy 1792 may have disappointed many but the army never fought as a whole other than an artillery exchange from memory. So the perception of Prussian power was not shattered as yet. When they did go to the field and fought with old traditional values, doctrine and training they were caught with their pants down. The world had moved on leaving the Prussians behind for almost 20 years…

This was such a shock to the Prussians that they could not handle it. The superiority of French number, their tactical revolutionary style of columnar warfare and emphasis on sharp and swift devastating attacks took the Prussians by surprise. It was like a prise fighter so sure of himself that he failed to watch his adversary before the fight and take note of his fighting style. When he got in the ring he was punched to the ground blow after blow with no chance of effective retaliation. I compare it to the German blitzkrieg style of warfare of 1939-42. The allies had no way to counter such advances.

This is why the Prussian army of 1812-15 was so superior to that of 1806. The higher the fall the greater the reforms had to be. This was directed by no one more so than the Prussian King himself. He oversaw everything and actually was innovative through his own thinking to not only emulate the French but do it better they they did. Luckily for them that by 1813 the French army was in decline after years of loss. The Prussian army was still going through its growing pains through its evolutionary process and came out very powerful indeed.

Their evolutionary measures undertaken were ruthless to say the least and they needed to be. They were still evolving (as all armies do anyway) but Prussia's evolutionary reforms had to be undertaken in an intense and short period of time. The learning curve was huge and they came out the other end a much more modern army. This is proven by their technological innovative advances from that point onwards for the next one hundred years.

so for me the flaws of Prussia were:

1 – A self belief that their 1806 army was still the same army of the 1760-80's

2 – The perception of other major powers that the 1806 army was still that of Frederick the Great's.

3 – Caught in a time warp induced by the self belief of their own previous reputation they felt no need to reform to counter the French style of warfare.

3 – Contempt for the French style of warfare.

4 – Inability to react to rapidly changing battlefield conditions and situations due to over reliance on outdated linear traditional style combat methods.

5 – Age of their general staff who fought alongside their old leader, Frederick the great from the previous century thus perpetuating the reliance on linear warfare which they felt was superior to the French ways.

6 – The King trusted his army's leaders too much on their advice and assurance that their army was superior.

7 – Lack of formal skirmisher training over the majority of the army

8 – Lack of artillery concentration as shown in the French method.

9 – Inability to recognise the advances made during the period and lack of foresight.

10 – Prussia was much smaller than France and incapable of sending into the field as many men.

11 – Failure to join the coalition the previous year (big mistake).

12 – Panic on the field once things went wrong exacerbated by the death of of leaders who charged into the fight with their men instead of staying back and using their command and control responsibilities to command the formations effectively.

Dear Shane
Certainly interesting comments. It is interesting to note that the Prussian Army in 1812-15 was officered by the same people as had been present in 1806. The emphasis had changed. Many of these themes have been explored in my books. I would recommend the writings of Paret and Clausewitz upon the 1806 campaign.

1. The Prussian army was not the same as had been left by Frederick the Great in 1786. There had been considerable changes and improvements as outlined in my book, Paret, Shanahan etc…. These were mainly lead by Scharnhorst. The problem was as ever finances.

2. The army was still working upon the basis of a limited war rather than a total war.

3. The writings of Scharnhorst, Muffling, Clausewitz etc.. pre-1806 certainly show a great understanding of the French form of war.

4. The Army performed well in the Bavarian War of Succession. It conquered the Netherlands in a few weeks in 1788.

5. There was considerable amount of innovation. The problem was the lack of standardisation. The Jagers outfought the French in most of the engagements under Yorck in 1806.

6. There are very interesting comparisons of the ages of the officers showing there was little difference except in the Duke of Brunswick.

7. Frederick William did everything in his power to avoid war. He was pushed their through Napoleon renaging on his promises. Prussia was given Hanover and so embroiled in war with England. Then to have that taken away upon hearing of negotiations of Napoleon with England. The Confederation of the Rhine was a great threat to Prussian influence upon the German states.

8. The concentration of artillery was not new. It had been practiced by Frederick back in the 1740s.

9. Prussia had been mobilisied since 1805. She did not have the resources for this. The army was in a very poor state but September 1806.

10. Prussia had been very cleverly handled by Napoleon and isolated. Nobody trusted her. The withdrawal from the coalition in 1793 was to continue the dismembering of the Poland. The acquisition of New Prussia made the position less stable for Prussia.

11. The lines of responsibility were poorly defined.

12. They were fighting the master at the height of his game. Prussia was defeated before a shot had been fired by the French Corps advancingin all directions. The only course would have been to retire into Brandenburg. The position was too exposed.

for more insight:

Decline of the Army: defeats at Jena and Auerstadt[by 1806] The Prussian Army, however, remained rooted in the past: a fossil preserved in Baltic amber."

- Charles Summerville

In 1806 Napoleon was very interested in the Prussian army. Officer Chlapowski of Napoleon's Guard Lancers writes: "… the Emperor asked me about very many things. He fired questions at me as if I was sitting an exam. He already knew from our conversations … that I had served in the Prussian amry, so he asked about my studies there, about my military instructors, about the organization of the artillery and of the whole Prussian army, and finally he asked how many Poles were likely to be in the corps which was still in East Prussia beyond the Vistula under General Lestoq. I could not answer this question but pointed out that most of his corps must be Lithuanians, as it had been mainly recruited in Lithuania. At that time, since the last partition [of Poland] the whole district of Augustow belonged to Prussia. I also explained that in Lithuania only the gentry were Polish, and the people Lithuanians. He did not know anything about Lithuania … The Emperor listened patiently and carefully to all these details. … [he] asked me about the [Prussian] military academies. How far did they go in the study of mathematics ? He was surprised at the elementary level at which they stopped. Didn't they teach applied geometry ? I myself had not learned this, but only later studied it in Paris." (Chlapowski/Simmons – "Memoirs of a Polish Lancer" p 12-13) (…)

"At Jena, the Prussian army performed the finest and most spectacular maneuvers, but I soon put a stop to this tomfoolery and taught them that to fight and to execute dazzling maneuvers and wear splendid uniforms were very different matters."

- Napoleon

"Traditionally, Prussia was Soldaten und Beamtenstaat, a state of soldiers and bureaucracy, a state formed by and for war …"

– Alfred Turney

"By the time of his death, Frederick's army was the envy of Europe, and his concepts … much copied. [By 1806 ] however, it remained rooted in the past: a fossil preserved in Baltic amber."

– Charles Summerville

Dear Shane
Certainly interesting quotes but none by Prussian officers. The comment upon mathematics is certainly interesting as only artillerymen and engineers would normally be taught geometry.
Napoleon was an excellent mathematician.

Charles Summerville book is certainly interesting but uses in the main French sources.

Stephen

Quoted from Geert van Uythoven's website:

also from the same website:

link

Dear Shane
Certainly interesting quotes but none by Prussian officers.

Hi Stephen,

Please forgive me, I wish no offense but I would have thought that quoting from actual Prussian officers would have been the last thing you should do in analysing the reasons behind Prussian flaws.

To my way of thinking the pride of officers would prohibit an unbiased opinion on the reasons for defeat or flaw. The Prussians, like many others were proud of their nation and its achievements, especially in the military. For them to openly admit fault would go against their very nature. Making excuses would be more the norm here.

The only person in high places in Prussia at the time with any guts to admit why things went horribly wrong for the Prussian army was their King. It was he who openly admitted their faults, mistakes and reasoning for modernization. But I am sure there are many more that did not take to the field who also were just as impartial about the faults and flaws of the Prussian army.

Shane

TMP link

Ah there's a pleasant reminder…

here we go again…

right now you are doing exactly what you are accusing me of…

Der katzenretter summed it up nicely, the Prussian Army of 1792 to 1795 was regarded by some Prussian officers – better than that of the 7YW, the army of 1806 had one flaw, totaly incapable top leadership.
The Army of 1806 was a "peace" time army wheras the French Army was in very good fighting trim and had, needless to say good leadership.
And Shane – you should read German / Prussian sources on that – too much rubbish was published in English about that topic, exceptions proove the rule.

VW

I wish I could read German. Being Australian I have found little reason to read/speak German if you can understand that. But yes, it would be an advantage.

Shane

Thankyou for all the interesting & lengthy replies.
I clearly didn't make myself understood as I was primarily interested in the possible flaws in the Prussian SYW army.

So far, everyone seems to accept it was beyond reproach & the rot only crept in later.

Shane,

Being Australian, it must be hard to refrain from cursing every third word and adding a smiley to show a rising inflection at the end of every sentence.

(ducks)

Keraunos,

You are a wise man. It is hard to resist I must say.

Ochoin, far from it. The Prussian army of Fred II had flaws. It also had the ability and leadership to overcome those flaws more often than its enemies were able to overcome theirs. For example (and hopefully someone with more knowledge than me will chime in):

The system of Inspector-Generals, which worked to make sure the army trained to the same regulations and standards under Fred II, seems to have had the opposite effect prior to 1806. Inspector-Generals apparently got away with imposing their own views on what training would be carried out and which parts of the regulations should be followed, something Fred would never have allowed.

The Freikorps, with a couple of exceptions, were unreliable and often ill-disciplined- "freebooters" is a term commonly used for them- but Frederick lacked many light infantry with which to challenge the Austrian Croats and Russian Pandours, so had little choice but use them.

Not all the infantry was of good quality, Frederick disbanding a couple of regiments at the end of the war and replacing them based on his perception of their fighting record. This uneveness of quality could be blamed on a number of things- the unwillingness of recruits from some areas of Silesia to fight for the Prussians was one factor, I think. The Prussian willingness to accept deserters and impress PoW, rather than draw more heavily on the Cantons, was another. The Saxon regiments impressed after Pirna had mostly managed to desert within a year, for example. Also, the heavy losses suffered by the Prussian infantry could rarely be replaced by troops of the same quality, so the overall quality gradually declined.

The cavalry was much improved from 1740-41, yet three kuerassiere regiments were still trapped captured at Maxen. Generally, though, the cavalry seemed to be the most consistently good combat arm.

Lastly the army struggled to match the Austrians in the numbers, and early on the quality, of guns they fielded. Artillery tended to be disliked by Fred and artillery officers didn't have much chance of reaching high rank. Fred himself wrote that he hated the way artillery was dominating the later SYW battlefields. Those attitudes and practices aren't likely to hone artillery to its full potential.

What the Prussians did have in the SYW was a lot of good general officers and well trained troops, which usually made them capable of overcoming the problems they did have.

Saying the army was a SYW one that was confounded by a modern army under Napoleon is the simplistic answer for those wondering what happened in 1806. After all, if columnar tactics were so much superior to "SYW" (ie linear) tactics, what happened at Maida, in the Peninsula and Southern France and in Belgium?

The Prussian ineffectiveness in the "Potato War" was probably a reflection of Fred II's lack of clear direction and, I think, his ambivalence towards going to war again.

Sam, Hans-Karl and Stephen, who have read the German authors, have given good overviews of what happened in 1806.

(Just for Keraunos) @#$%&*! cheers $-*+.

Dal.

Dear Dal
Great to hear from you. I have lost contact and do not know which e-mail is live. Just finishing my book on the 7YW Austrian Army. You may wish to have a look at a draft. Comments welcome. Please contact me at the lboro e-mail account. Thanks.
Stephen

Samll point Shane, but I think the idea of Geert's site is you post a link, instead of mass copy/paste into a tmp thread, any of your own words got totally drowned.

Dear Dal
It is interesting how much the Austrians struggled after 1759. Their finances were cripled. In 1760, the army was cut by 20000 men. In 1760-1763 was mainly on the defensive. The change of sides of the Russians was a significant problem for the Austrians who were so short of Artillery that they borrowed them from the Russians in 1758-59.

The Prussians lost three times their number of men under arms at the start of the war. That should say something about the quality at the start and the end of the war.

The War went on too long for both Austria and Prussia. Frederick vowed never to fight a war again. The War of Bavarian Succession is much misunderstood. Frederick obtained what he wanted with some sabre rattling.

The Prussian Hussars were superior in most aspects to those of the Austrian Hussars by this period. There are some very interesting Austrian Hussar raids though.

It is interesting the number of Prussian Squares that were destroyed by Austrian Cuirassier and Dragoons. There are probably more examples than in the Napoleonic Wars. I would consider 7YW Cavalry to be superior to Napoleonic reading their feats of arms.

I had not realised the huge casualties of the regiments in this war. This is something that few really have commented upon. It is upon the rise of the Napoleonic Wars that such casualties are discussed. The Armies were smaller but some lost over 25% of their force in a battle.

Stephen

Thankyou Mr Gavan.
Your reply gives me several places to start.

BTW I haven't abandoned Naps but I am expanding towards the SYW.

The Prussian SYW army was excellent in comparison to its opponents of the time, surely.
It had faults certainly, but not necessarily faults that would also be the major faults versus the French in 1806.

There is, I think, mainly the shift over the 50 odd years in complexity and competence of command at all levels from platoon through to national armed forces HQ that enables more flexible grand strategy, strategy and tactics; some nations moved at a faster pace in these areas than others.

Personally I think all the egalite,liberte stuff is so utterly 60s the books that mention it need seriously culling.

Stephen, when is your book going to be published? quite surprised you have gone that route, a) didn't think that was your interest, b)You are competing with Duffy.

look forward to it, the Austrians of the SYW have always been interesting to me (note my TMP name)can you tell us anything about the book.

Dear Mark
If you wish to critically comment upon a draft that would be very helpful. It is planned to be out for Christmas which means that I need a first draft finished in the next couple of weeks. Central Europe and its history has always been of great interest. I was approached by Richard Brown of Ken Trotman Books to write this book after a conversation with him back in February. I have been writing full time at present as work is rather hard to find.

You could say that it is the illustrated compliment to the wonderful work of Duffy. As ever it is a vast and complex subject especially the Hussar Uniforms and the changes due to the Inhaber.

All regiments are illustrated with one plate from Brauer suitably corrected and another from a contemporary set produced in 1762. It is so far 250 pages with over 300 illustrations at the last count, 15 tables so far and growing and a dozen OOBs. It focusses upon the 7YW army. The changes before and after that date are too complex. Each regiment has a regimental history as best that I can find. Again this is hard to find even in German.

There are still bits and pieces that I am unclear about from the conflicting literature.

My publishing is very varied with chemistry, chemical education, dyslexia, colour chemistry, artillery, Prussians, reprints of Adye, Dupin, edited a translation of a Russian Hussar etc… and hopefully in the Spring a book on the Spanish Army of 1808 with Gerard Cronin.

Stephen

Stephen

Sounds excellent, I would be very happy to comment on the draft, let me know what I can do.

Mark

Sorry Ochoin, didn't mean to hijack the thread.

Dear Mark
Please contact me on s.summerfield"at"lboro.ac.uk

Comments from outside when you have been so close to the subject are essential to see whether you have missed something. It is now 50000 words and 250+ pages.

Stephen

I think a complete lack of strategic Depth on the part of Both Prussia AND Austrian certainly contributed(in additions to other more obivious flaws) to their losses against France in the napoleonic wars..

about a year ago a gentlemen posted a new translation of a 1810 Memo form a Russian officer by the name of Gorchakov made some interesting observations. the contents of the memo were posted here but my search fu failed. I'll paraphrase to the best of my ability.

1: Napoleon sought to maeuver his enemy into finting one large battle which would cripple them both militarily and and moral-wise in one blow.

2: that in situations when he was denied this large battle early in a campaign, his tactics became less decisive.

He came to the conclusion that using strategic depth to draw out a conflict seemed to dull Napoleon's edge, and recommended the strategy that was used in 1812.

Assuming Gorchakov was accurate, could it be that Austrian and Prussia simply lacked strategic depth? Certainly both nations had many strategic and economic assets close to their borders with France. These assets forced both countries into large decisive battles early in the campaigns. some have mentioned that Napoleon and the french had better manuvering and tactics at the higher level of combat( division, corps, army) so maneuvering to force a large decisive battle early on makes a lot of sense.

also, in the cases when the French were forced to fight a long drawn out conflict that degenerated into Guerrilla style fighting( le petit Guerre as someone mentioned) the french seemed to not do as well.

Just a thought. not sure how accurate gorchakov was.

"Sorry Ochoin, didn't mean to hijack the thread."

Not at all. The Nap stuff was still of interest.

I don't think any of the other Allied powers would have fared better than the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt.

Jena: Prussians 38,000 plus 15,000 arriving when the battle was already lost against French 54,000 rising to 96,000 after it was won.

Auerstadt: After the repulse of the Prussian cavalry roughly even numbers throughout and no-one was likely to beat Davout and III Corps in a one-on-one fight anyway.

I think there is too much Prussian introspection and too little focus on the numbers engaged at the critical points.

- Allan

I think a Prussian exerting command at Auerstandt – even after Blucher wasted all of 'the best heavy cavalry in europe' in the morning – could still have beaten Davout (but to no end come the next morning).

The bigger problem on the day, was that Brunswick got shot early on, and the King felt duty bound to take command, but then had no idea what to do, and so allowed Davout to dictate the terms of the engagement as his command arrived on the field.

@Dal

>The Prussian willingness to accept deserters and impress PoW, rather than draw more heavily on the Cantons, was another.<

to add another point to what you said a major problem was that many cantons were not available to the prussians during the war. The western regiments cantons were in french hands, east prussia in russian hand, at least for some times part of pommerania in swedish.

about the cavalry at maxen. if i remember correctly (long time ago i read it) the cavalry was about to escape but the austrians only accepted a capitulation that includes the cavalry, so it was called back (Großer Generalstab, 7-jähriger Krieg).

Herbert

@Herbert.
Interesting. I had read terroitorial gains were not a significant factor in the SYW (cf East Prussia) compared to mauling the enemy's army.

This puts a different complexion on things.

Just re-read it, it´s in Book 11, Page 209/210 (the whole fight is Pages 199-212), prussian general staff, 7-years war.
The cavalry was beaten on the 1. day of the fight. in the night it was decided (on request of general Wunsch) that the 20 squadrons of husars and dragoons should try to escape. Their departure was delayed because the horses had to be lead by hand because of the bad terrain, so they were not "out of reach" when Fink finally had to surrender. Lacy demanded that the cavalry has to be included in the capitulation or Fink´s corps would be driven into the Elbe ("Im Weigerungsfalle habe das Corps zu gewaertigen, das es in die Elbe gesprengt werde")
The austrians knew that Frederik´s biggest problem was the replacement of the soldiers losses. There was also no exchange of prisoners in the last years.
PS: sorry, my english is´nt at it´s best

Herbert

@ochoin deach
i think you are right with what you say about territorial gains.
But in losing east prussia and the western regions to the enemy the regiments IR 2, 4, 11, 14 and 16 for east prussia and 9, 10 and 41 for Westfalen had lost their recruitment area for the "core" troops, the cantonists. That´s a high percentage out of 49 Regiments, and one has to keep in mind that this regiments with the exception of IR 41 were counted on as core Regiments at the beginning of the war,

Herbert

@ Herbert.
Yes, it puts Fred the Great's use of deserters & forced impressment into perspective. I'd thought it was just bloody-mindedness. I think it must have been more like desperation.

G'day.

Ochoin, why so formal, mate? I understand what you mean by moving to the SYW, mate. I'm enjoying reading about a new period, learning about new parts of history. Herbert's made some good points and yes, Fred was desperate. He had to balance the needs of the army with the needs of his people- if he took too many from the Cantons then there wasn't enough labour available for farming, building, etc. So he couldn't make up the shortfall of one Canton from another.

Stephen, some very good points. I've sent you an e-mail.

JeffsaysHi, definitely the changes made over the 50 years would have made a big difference. And I agree, I think the major changes were in the command and control spheres. Armies were getting far too large for the old methods of command.

Crucible Orc, I admit to not having read Gorchakov, but that's an interesting theory he puts forward. It does fit the circumstances of 1805-6 very well, too. Do you have a link, or reference, to where the translation was made available?

Allan and Keraunos, the numerical superiority of the French at Jena gets glossed over, doesn't it? Auerstaedt was another matter, though. Yes, losing Brunswick early on didn't help, but the ineffectiveness of the cavalry probably lost the battle for them. Used effectively the cavalry could have been used to pin Davoust until the Prussians had shaken out and prepared a coordinated attack. Instead the cavalry was wasted in ill-prepared and piece-meal attacks and the army lost the initiative. One on one Davoust would have been hard for anyone to beat, I agree. The problem was that the Prussians didn't have to fight one on one, but ended up doing so.

Herbert, thanks for some very interesting points- I didn't realise how badly effected the western regiments were by French occupation. By the same token, then, the cantons in Upper Silesia would have been unavailable for much of the war as well- especially as the Austrians recruited heavily in the areas when they had control. Did the Austrians ever conscript people from these provinces, do you know?

I wish I could read German better, there's a lot of information that I just can't make good use of. I can struggle through works such as Fiebig, Bleckwenn or Redlin, but Jany and similar are beyond me- I can get the gist, but none of the nuances of what they write.

It's interesting that while much is made of the surrender of the kürassiere regimenter, there's little written about the dragoons who were captured (DR12). Did the kürassiere (KR 6, KR 7 and KR9) also try to escape, or were they still with the main body at the surrender?

Cheers.

Dal.