
"Prussia 1806-Reasons for the Collapse" Topic
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Kevin Kiley | 21 Sep 2009 2:45 p.m. PST |
A new book on Prussia and 1806 by Peter Paret has just been published. Entitled The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806 Paret examines the reasons for the Prussian Army losing and their reaction to the defeat. In two other works Paret has discussed 1806 and this is his only one where that is the main topic. He gives the reasons for Prussia's defeat and also discusses Clausewitz and Jomini. I haven't read it all as I just received it today, but everything by Paret is interesting and I do recommend it. It's a small book, only 164 pages, but Paret quite clearly states the reasons why Prussia lost. Sincerely, K |
lebooge | 21 Sep 2009 2:54 p.m. PST |
Thanks for the tip. I'll put it on the list. Bart |
summerfield | 21 Sep 2009 3:23 p.m. PST |
Dear Kevin That sounds like essential reading. Thanks Stephen |
nsolomon99 | 21 Sep 2009 5:55 p.m. PST |
Thanks Kevin, I'm working my way through "Napoleon's Apogee" by Military History Press at the moment. It too makes for compelling reading and I am making notes on the causes for the Prussian failures as I read. Have to add the Paret to the shopping list. Nick |
13th Light Dragoons | 21 Sep 2009 6:16 p.m. PST |
Hello Kevin That's funny, my in-laws are here visiting so I wanted to get out of the house tonight so I went down to downtown to check out some book stores. And what did I see and thought about buying: The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806 give us a update cheers Edward |
Der Alte Fritz  | 21 Sep 2009 7:09 p.m. PST |
Kevin: That's right up my alley (current interest) so I will be sure to get a copy. Edward: which bookstore did you find it in? Was it a chain or local store? |
von Winterfeldt | 21 Sep 2009 9:19 p.m. PST |
Foucart will you provide you a very good idea – and without any German books you won't get a good picture, essential reading is : 1806 Das Preußische Offizierskorps und die Untersuchungen der Kriegsereignisse, Berlin 1906 Here you find a lot of reports of Prussian officers about their conduct in the 1806 campaign. |
raducci | 21 Sep 2009 10:44 p.m. PST |
Military collapse or the whole edfiace? I think the thing is inter related as it was a stagnating society. How far back does it go? The seeds were sown in Fregerick the Great's time I believe. Certainly I will seriously consider the book on your recommendation. |
Defiant | 22 Sep 2009 12:21 a.m. PST |
Thanks for the heads-up Kev, bookmarked it on Amazons now. |
Billy Bones | 22 Sep 2009 12:41 a.m. PST |
For anyone interested you could also try the following work: Capitulations militaire de la Prusse – Etude sur les disastres des Armees de Frederic II, d'Iena et Tilist d'apres les archives du depot de la guerre By M.E.Bonnal pub 1879 Wagram |
JeffsaysHi | 22 Sep 2009 3:08 a.m. PST |
Generally german is a good idea but Id urge caution with Goltz, whilst German his 1900s book on 1806-7 translated into English has from what I have seen been a major cause of distortion in later English works. Whilst easily accessed and claimed as 'authorative' it was written to press the case for a complete militarisation of German society shortly before WW1 and was very biased. Its main use in reading I think is to watch for key phrases and claims parrotted without deeper research in other works. I'll assume Paret is considerably beyond that level. |
13th Light Dragoons | 22 Sep 2009 4:40 a.m. PST |
Hello Der Alte Fritz It was actually a indpendent bookstore. I live in Kingston, ON which is the home of the Royal Military Collage (RMC). Kingston has the big chains for Canada like Chapters/Indigo but it also has a few good privately own bookstores. I have talked to the staff at this bookstore(called a Novel Idea – good name) and they do a lot of bussiness with the professors at RMC. So when a prof is looking for something that is not mainstream they order it for him/her and usually get a second copy for their History Section. I can usually find books of the Ancient/Med/18th Cent/Napoleonic periods that you would not find in the normal big chains. cheers Edward |
Steven H Smith | 22 Sep 2009 5:49 a.m. PST |
Bonnal de Ganges, Edmond (1839-1915). Capitulations militaires de la Prusse, études sur les désastres des armées de Frédéric II, d'Iéna à Tilsitt, d'après les archives du Dépôt de la guerre
par M. E. Bonnal,
. Paris: E. Dentu, 1879. VII-438 p.; In-8vo. |
Chouan | 22 Sep 2009 6:44 a.m. PST |
Paret is a good author as well. He did some very good stuff on the Vendee as his dissertation. |
Billy Bones | 22 Sep 2009 9:35 a.m. PST |
Steven, That's the one didn't think anyone would be interested in publication date and the number of pages thanks for posting it. Wagram |
von Winterfeldt | 22 Sep 2009 9:33 p.m. PST |
@JeffsaysHi Von der Goltz, in what kind did the translation distort his way the English works? The predominant view seems to be that a Prussian Army fighting as in the 7YW was beaten – had no skirmishers and not reforms as all, which is miles off the target. I did not come accross any competent English work looking into that complex topic. They seem just to repeat the out of date stereotype old views. |
Kevin Kiley | 23 Sep 2009 2:19 p.m. PST |
'The predominant view seems to be that a Prussian Army fighting as in the 7YW was beaten – had no skirmishers and not reforms as all, which is miles off the target.' The predominant view of whom? If you're going to make an accusation of this type you might want to either give examples or at the very least name authors. Regarding the use of German source material from the early 20th century, just using German sources for Prussia in 1806, such as Jany or other authors of the Staff Historical Section, can find material that is attempting to justify the Prussian disaster with excuses that are off the mark. As Paret dutifully notes, while at the same time praising the value of the General Staff histories, the authors were military politicians with an agenda. The same can be said for those of the French general staff, such as Vachee, who are writing with an agenda to justify certain viewpoints of the Napoleonic period. 'I did not come accross any competent English work looking into that complex topic. They seem just to repeat the out of date stereotype old views.' What is the 'complex' topic to which you are referring? Further, what are you reading? If you read Bressonet, for example, he states that Prussian and French tactics were similar, but not the same. He also states that the Prussians couldn't handle the flexible French tactics. It is also a fact that Grawert's division was shot to pieces by French infantry fighting under cover in open order. Grawert's troops stood in the open firing controlled volleys and suffered heavy casualties. Those are facts. An attempt to do nothing but offer excuses for the Prussian defeat and/or criticize unnamed authors and/or publications helps no one and nothing is accomplished. The Prussian army of 1806, in short, was out of date tactically, administratively, organizationally, and their leadership was lacking. Their training was limited tactically and their artillery and engineer arms were poor. That is well-documented by proven historians and scholars (Paret, Craig, White, Shanahan, and Elting), four of whom actually worked in Germany with archival material. I would suggest that if you have problems with English works on 1806 that you get it in gear and write one of your own. I certainly would purchase it. However, if you do nothing but complain without any substantive comments to support your argument then perhaps you are doing what you are complaining about. I certainly hope not. And if you are obliquely complaining about Paret's new work without first reading it, then that is a problem. Sincerely, Kevin |
McLaddie | 23 Sep 2009 7:19 p.m. PST |
Kevin K.asked: 'The predominant view seems to be that a Prussian Army fighting as in the 7YW was beaten – had no skirmishers and not reforms as all, which is miles off the target.'The predominant view of whom? If you're going to make an accusation of this type you might want to either give examples or at the very least name authors. Kevin: I would think it would be self-evident with even a cursory reading. Here are 'some' of those authors--but I do agree with you: the conclusions stated below are wrong--none of the reasons given below have much to do with how the Prussians operated or why they lost in 1806: "It is clear then that the old and the new were already struggling with one another in Prussia before 1806, but in every important respect the old was unshaken, and the army, in its composition, was still completely of the old Frederican type." --Hans Delbrück, The Dawn of Modern Warfare. page 450 "That army marched away to Jena and Auerstadt, tried gallantly to fight its battle in Frederick's style: Stiff lines of musketeers trampling slowly forward or standing in the open while Lannes' scarce-seen skirmishers used them for target practice; yelling, disorderly squadrons crowding in through the morning fog to splinter against Davout's squares. The rest was an increasingly despairing retreat, and disaster piled upon defeat." --John Etling "Swords around the Throne" pp.517 F. L. Petre generally agreed with this scenario and provided a specific example when he stated unreservedly: "When, in 1806, the precise linear tactics of Frederick came into contact with the more mobile system of the French, they failed absolutely" and "The Prussian attacks on Vierzehnheiligen were a good example of the impossibility of succeeding with the parade ground tactics of the Seven Years' War against the new tactics of the French." F.L. Petre Campaign of 1806 p.22 "In doctrine, however, the Prussian army was hopelessly outdated in its concepts. Everything was related to the days of Frederick the Great, and deviations from the Master's precepts were not countenanced." --David Chandler Campaigns of Napoleon p.454 In First Empire #6, James Gaite wrote: "Again and again it was proved how impossible it was to carry out, under the fire of skirmishers adept in the art of utilizing cover, the solemn deployment and preparation of Frederick's days. Maude claims that, . . .‘due to the backward views of the Prussian command and the continued belief in the omnipotence of the main firing line, these [light infantry] reforms were not carried out with the thoroughness that was maybe required.'" "Ordered to deploy within musket range of the latter [the French], the former [Prussian infantry] dutifully went through the intricate manoeuvres of the Frederickian drill while being riddled with sniper fire
Seeking neither to retire nor to advance, they stood stoically before the French positions for perhaps 90 minutes
" --Gates, David. The British Light Infantry Arm. "Tactically, the Prussian Army was a museum piece." Fuller, J.F. C. The Decisive Battles of the Western World, Vol. II. p.418 I could go on with more
While I know it is fairly bald to state that all these scholars are wrong, it is the case--anyone reading the actual accounts and the explanations of the contemporaries would come to the same conclusions. Sincerely, Bill H. |
McLaddie | 23 Sep 2009 7:30 p.m. PST |
What is the 'complex' topic to which you are referring? Further, what are you reading? If you read Bressonet, for example, he states that Prussian and French tactics were similar, but not the same. He also states that the Prussians couldn't handle the flexible French tactics. It is also a fact that Grawert's division was shot to pieces by French infantry fighting under cover in open order. Grawert's troops stood in the open firing controlled volleys and suffered heavy casualties. Those are facts. Kevin: It isn't a 'fact'. Grawert's division didn't stand out in the open to be shot to pieces by French infantry under cover. In fact 'standing around' wasn't what the Prussians were doing. And the French artillery [a 30+ gun line] is mentioned far more than the skirmishers when speaking of Prussian casualties. That is from Prussian sources. The French skirmishers certainly did their part--no question--and they did cause the Prussians no end of trouble, but there was far more going on than Garwert's division of Prussians mindlessly volleying at French skirmishers under cover. Do read Bressonet and the actual progression of the battle as he lays it out--particularly once Garwert shows up--there isn't much standing around being done by the Prussians--a lot of dying, but no standing immobile relying on their volleys to win the day. Best Regards, Bill H. |
Defiant | 23 Sep 2009 8:51 p.m. PST |
I am wondering if "exhaustion" of the Prussian army at Jena contributed in part in their defeat and subsequent destruction? after all, they were outnumbered very heavily throughout the day, overall 2 to 1 in the end? If you think about it, a group only half the size of the other in a struggle is going to find it hard to gain an advantage in a battle no matter how antiquated or old their style of fighting is or even if the smaller group were the more modern it would still be the same. If you have no respite because you are outnumbered 2 to 1 you are going to suffer. I feel this is what happened to the Prussians at Jena and contributed to their defeat. I cannot so easily explain Auerstadt but I think it a case of eventual despair that overcame them there. Davout's ability to hold and fight outnumbered himself 2 to 1 was incredible. My feeling is, what happened to the Prussians at Jena is what should have happened to the French at Auerstadt
however, you have a different situation there, Prussian cavalry going in on unassisted mad charges into steady infantry ready to receive them is square. These cavalry exhausted themselves and lost, the Prussian infantry could not break them also. In saying all of this I also think the Prussians saw warfare very much differently than the French, they still saw the three arms, Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery as very much separate entities and consequently fought these battles with very little thought to combined arms tactics. Yes they had their light infantry and third rankers but this is not enough, there had to be unity of command with regards to combined arms attacks or they would lose and this is what happened. So my conclusions were, yes, they were still thinking and fighting in a very Linear style of battle tactics which allowed for little combination of arms to work together, this added to their downfall. Even if outnumbered and the battle was lost, a combined arms defensive posture could have averted the defeat from turning into a rout but this did not happen, coordination of arms was not given a moments thought in the Prussian high command. Whether this was because the staff were old, infirm, senile, proud or that they hung onto old and outdated practices or were outnumbered 2 to 1 or were exhausted is pretty mute. What is important I feel is that all of these factors combined to defeat them together, no single one factor can be blamed
Shane |
von Winterfeldt | 23 Sep 2009 9:13 p.m. PST |
Recent research also changes the view of the Prussian Army of the 7YW Möbius, Sascha: Mehr Angst vor dem Offizier als vor dem Feind?. Eine mentalitätsgeschichtliche Studie zur preußischen Taktik im Siebenjährigen Krieg, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller 2007, 160 S., ISBN 978-3-8364-4860-4 Jürgen Kloosterhuis / Sönke Neitzel (Hrsg.), Krise, Reformen – und Militär. Preußen vor und nach der Katastrophe von 1806 (= Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte. Neue Folge, 10), Berlin 2009. |
Keraunos | 24 Sep 2009 1:33 a.m. PST |
Shane has something with exhaustion, I think. The readings I made years ago made much of the fact that the Prussians had largely abandoned lengthy field manoevers and large formation training – something Frederick insisted on. Essentially, by the time they had 'marched up and then back down the hill', the horses were in a poor state of health, and the troops were no better. The cavalry particularly suffered from this, IIRC. I think it easy to overstate the connection with the tactics of Frederick. He would never have recognised what went on under Prussian colours in the Revolutionary wars, let alone 1806 as being following his methods. I view it as an unfit army which did not know how to work in a large body, against a highly fit army which did know how to work together. I look forward to reading Paret's view of this, as his work on Yorck is great. |
JeffsaysHi | 24 Sep 2009 1:57 a.m. PST |
Von Winterfeld, thanks for the Quotes from English works; they illustrate what I was trying to say about Goltz – the fact his, and only his, German staff work was available in English, offered authors in English a single ready baked description of the Prussian Army they apparently felt no need to investigate further. "Good discipline as then understood in Prussia, meant the abandonment of all initiative. Radical reform was required, but the necessity was overlooked largely through a false respect for Frederick the Great and the past. Instead of slavishly adhering to the methods of the 7YW, Prussia should have considered
." Jena to Eylau: the disgrace and the redemption of the old-Prussian army,Goltz Of course it could be that Petre, Chandler, Gates, Gaite, & Fuller each made independent in depth research, or at least consulted the neutrality of combat reports and orders such as found in Foucart – but the evidence suggests not. |
Keraunos | 24 Sep 2009 2:23 a.m. PST |
There is an english language review of one of the books Von W meentions: Möbius, Sascha at link very interesting summation. |
Supercilius Maximus | 24 Sep 2009 5:40 a.m. PST |
<<In saying all of this I also think the Prussians saw warfare very much differently than the French, they still saw the three arms, Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery as very much separate entities and consequently fought these battles with very little thought to combined arms tactics. Yes they had their light infantry and third rankers but this is not enough, there had to be unity of command with regards to combined arms attacks or they would lose and this is what happened.>> This is a very interesting analysis; it could equally well be applied to the British Army of this period – I suspect that only the different conditions/terrain found in Spain made similar inadequacies less important. |
50 Dylan CDs and an Icepick | 24 Sep 2009 6:01 a.m. PST |
[Goltz – the fact his, and only his, German staff work was available in English, offered authors in English a single ready baked description of the Prussian Army they apparently felt no need to investigate further.] Not only that, but it's an attractive narrative, too. Consider his famous subtitle: "The disgrace and the redemption of the old-Prussian army." Everybody loves a good old fashioned teleological redemption tale! That became the standard narrative because it flattered everybody's ego: It flatters the Francophiles because they can spin it to argue that in order to beat Napoleon, people had to copy him. (i.e., Napoleon's the only real innovator.) It flatters the Germanophiles because they can spin it as a great fall-and-rise heroic story: Prussia the Phoenix. |
Der Alte Fritz  | 24 Sep 2009 6:24 a.m. PST |
Kevin: I think that the term "accusation" is a bit too strong in response to Winterfeld't casual throw away comment. Perception is reality, or at least it is conventional wisdom, especially in this forum. And the "conventional wisdom" seems to be that the Prussians lost because their SYW style linear tactics failed against the modern, advanced French tactics in 1806. If you asked the casual Napoleonic history reader for his assessment, he would probably regurgitate this conventional wisdom. Whether that CV is true or false, is an entirely different question. |
Musketier | 24 Sep 2009 6:34 a.m. PST |
Shane has a very valid point: the real question of 1806 is not about Jena (2:1 wins the day – big deal), but about Auerstedt and, one might add, about the swift and total collapse of resistance afterwards (when senior officers' age really comes into the picture). Could one argue that the instrument Frederick the Great had created was too far tailored to his own gifted captaincy? By 1806 the shoe was on the other foot, and the Prussian high command just didn't think fast enough, largely wasting what was still a respectable army. Fascinating "what if": Would Napoleon have found it so easy to outmanoeuvre Frederick himself? As for Prussian/German 19th century writers on the subject, the problem with most of them, starting with the reformers themselves, is that they have a clear interest in talking down the "before" in order to justify and talk up the "after"
|
von Winterfeldt | 24 Sep 2009 11:19 a.m. PST |
Some people like easy answers to complex topics, I am afraid I am not one of them. Auerstedt was a failure of command, the CiC was mortally wounded and then all structure of command broke down. Fredericks instrument was not tailored to him, what about his brother and Brunswick doing well in the forgotten "Western" theater of war in the 7YW. Also the Prussians, Valmy apart – did quite well in the French Revoluionary War – especially in the war of attrition in the Palatinate. In 1806 they just were helpless, the leadership was abysmal and the French Army was much better. Still the army as such – and especially the tactics – were much better as commonly believed. And no – the Prussians did not collapse, they fought on till 1807 and L'Estoq did play a vital part at Eylau. Der Alte Fritz summed up very well the conventional view, but in case one scratches a bit on the surface – it is evident that the Army of 1806 was not a linear Army as in the 7YW. |
ArchiducCharles | 24 Sep 2009 11:33 a.m. PST |
What does it take for you to consider an army collapsed? Complete and total annihilation? |
Kevin Kiley | 24 Sep 2009 11:52 a.m. PST |
Bill, 'Do read Bressonet and the actual progression of the battle as he lays it out--particularly once Garwert shows up--there isn't much standing around being done by the Prussians--a lot of dying, but no standing immobile relying on their volleys to win the day.' Read Bressonet on pages 165-168 (in Scott Bowden's translation) and that is exactly what is being said that Grawert's troops did. They were literally shot to pieces by the French who had taken cover. The Prussian infantry was in the open in ranks firing volleys. They lost so many that they were unable to advance towards the end of the firefight. Of the other historians on 1806 listed, Elting, Gates and Petre were correct. Petre, if you check, did use German source material. Chandler and Delbruck aren't too far off either. The bottom line is that the Prussians could not and did not coordinate the operations of their light troops with the line. Their artillery was not trained to cooperate with their infantry. The failure of the Prussians in 1806 was not only a leadership failure, but a failure at all levels, including tactically. Sincerely, Kevin |
Kevin Kiley | 24 Sep 2009 11:59 a.m. PST |
The only reason the units in East Prussia survived the collapse of Prussia in 1806 was that they were not immediately in reach of the Grande Armee and not involved at Jena and Auerstadt nor in the pursuit that followed. Not only was the Prussian army destroyed except for the units in East Prussia, the entire state collapsed-the most complete defeat during the Napoleonic period. Regarding Frederick, he lost about half of the battles he fought and yes, his army was tailored to what he wanted by 1756. He interfered and ruined the Prussian artillery arm and didn't help the engineer arm any, mainly because he understood neither. I submit that Frederick would have recognized the army of 1806, but I doubt that he would have let the nonsense that had gone on since 1786 be there in the first place. I would also suggest that Frederick would have pushed for more reform than his successors did. Frederick could learn as he went where it took the Prussians of 1806 to get their ears beaten down around their socks to figure out that something was terribly wrong. Sincerely, Kevin |
McLaddie | 24 Sep 2009 8:07 p.m. PST |
I agree with von Winterfeldt--there are magic bullet answers. Here are just some of the reasons that the Prussians collapsed: A. After the Seven Years War, Frederick the Great made several changes to the army. 1. He reduced the size of the army 2. Got rid of all gentry and non-noble officers, going from a 60-40 split between nobles and middle class officers to 90-10, with the middle class officers isolated in the Fusiliers and artillery. Because the noble class could not possibly supply the officers needed by the army,foreigners were recruited, like Scharnhorst. In 1806, one out of every four officers of general grade were foreigners. 3. Frederick wanted Prussian Tax payers, not Prussian soldiers, so after the SYW, he granted extensive reprieves from the annual draft, and recruited foreigners. By the time of his death less than half of the army were Prussian nationals. While there were attempts to correct this later, the army was still made up of 30-40 percent foreigners. 4. Frederick divided up his country into military inspectorates and gave independent oversight to the inspector generals. By 1795, every inspectorate was pretty much doing as it pleased, neither the 1787 or 1788 regulations being uniformly adhered to. Frederick the Great's doctrine had become a balkanized hash of regulations and manuals. In 1798 the new King attempted to correct this with his own instructions, but with little success. 5. Frederick the Great and his successors reduced training from 12 weeks a year, to ten, then finally eight. Cavalry, Infantry and artillery rarely trained together, and infantry seldom trained in anything larger than a regiment. For instance, Prussian Officer Marwitz wrote in his diary that because of the short training period, of a troop of 66 privates, only seven could be expected to be well-trained, while thirty-three, on furlough most of the year, only mounted their horses once each day for a month each year. The other twenty-six rode even less, being "Freiwächter" or out recruiting. In considering the results of the decades of neglect, Maude in his book on the 1806 campaign concluded that: "It is
a certainty that not a single squadron that took the field in 1806 could have come up to the great King's requirements in 1754, when he sent the celebrated Baireuth Dragoons, the heroes of Hohenfriedberg, to three months extra drill for failing to reach his standard at the camp at Neisse." In a letter from an American in 1801 who related what he saw at the Pottsdam summer maneuvers. This was the showcase of the Prussian summer training season. The writer relates that he saw a limited number of maneuvers repeated several times, a mock infantry attack and a cavalry charge. The entire force was brigade sized, but the writer ends it by say 'if the full complement for each regiment had been present, there would have been more than 30,000. But that isn't all. B. Frederick William II took the Prussian throne in 1786 and by 1797 had generated a huge debt. Prussia was broke. The only reason they participated in the French Revolution was that Britain paid the entire cost of fielding their army. When the money stopped, the Prussians left. C. Because of this debt, the military was starved. Training was curtailed, large maneuvers were avoided, and any reforms attempted were never financed. For instance, the effort in 1801 to increase the Schutzen to 20 to a company and the Fusiliers from 24 to 27 battalions could not be carried out. D. When Frederick the Great died, his nephew took the throne. A weak king in an absolute monarchy. Things began to unravel. The civil administration, once the servant of the army and king, flowed into the power vacuum and political turf wars were the result. The army found itself unable to counter the power the civil bureaucracy developed. Shanahan documents this in detail in his book. E. Finally, the Prussian had not seen a war for a decade. It was a peacetime army marching off to fight an army with a decade of wartime experience. The average Prussian soldier had been in uniform two years in 1806. The French soldier averaged six years of campaigning
Whatever Prussian forces marched on the battlefields of Jena and Auerstadt, they were not the army of Frederick the Great in doctrine, training, experience, manpower or leadership. The tactics and maneuvers they used in both battles were not Frederick's--at all. In the 43 years between the end of the SYW and Jena, a great deal had changed in Prussia, and its army. A little book written by a Captain Donaldson entitled: Military history applied to modern warfare: A guide to the study of military history exemplified by studies of the campaigns of Austerlitz, Jena, Vimiero, Corunna, Salamanca, Waterloo, and the Shenandoah Valley (1907) said this: Page 74 For men are trained in peace to perform what is required of them in war. If they then perform what they have been taught in peace, that is the utmost that can be expected. If the instruction is faulty, the Government hesitating, the nation at large unpatriotic, and unprepared to make peace-time sacrifices to provide an efficient weapon for war; then the badly trained, ill-organized and undermanned machine will suffer in war. When war is declared the time of preparation, the time for training, is past; the day of action has come. War is indeed the harvest of peace; the seed sown in peace is then reaped." We haven't even gotten to the actual generalship and tactics used. The Prussians didn't have a chance
Bill H. |
McLaddie | 25 Sep 2009 9:24 p.m. PST |
Kevin wrote:
Read Bressonet on pages 165-168 (in Scott Bowden's translation) and that is exactly what is being said that Grawert's troops did. They were literally shot to pieces by the French who had taken cover. The Prussian infantry was in the open in ranks firing volleys. They lost so many that they were unable to advance towards the end of the firefight.Of the other historians on 1806 listed, Elting, Gates and Petre were correct. Petre, if you check, did use German source material. Chandler and Delbruck aren't too far off either. The bottom line is that the Prussians could not and did not coordinate the operations of their light troops with the line. Their artillery was not trained to cooperate with their infantry. The failure of the Prussians in 1806 was not only a leadership failure, but a failure at all levels, including tactically. Kevin:
You've done just what many historians have done. You have focused on a couple of comments about a particular moment and place on the battlefield and ignored the entire engagement. The Prussians couldn't have completely failed tactically. They held off twice their numbers for eight hours, inflicting @6,500 casualties on the French for 10,000 of their own. In this case, you have focused on a couple of comments on pages 165-168 of Bressonet's description, while ignoring Garwert's entire engagement which is detailed starting on page 151, Part VII "Ney Attacks Garwert's Division". It goes through Part VIII "Garwert Pushes Back Ney" and Part IX "Arrival of Desjardin's Division", Part X "Combat in Front of Vierzehnheiligen" to page 173 "Napoleon Takes the Offensive the Attack of Desjardins' Division." In other words, three pages and four sentences out of 22 pages documenting the fighting between @10:00 and 12:00. Lets go through Bressonet, starting with the arrive of Garwert's division, just to see how much tactical failure is demonstrated, as well as standing around as targets for the French tirailleurs--who supposedly won the battle: Around 10:00 Garwert's and Holtzendorf's cavalry gets into a prolonged fight with Ney's Cavalry at the head of his advanced guard. It ends around 10:30 with both sides retiring and Ney's infantry taking up positions from Vierzehnheiligen, through Altenburg woods and beyond. Garwert advances his infantry. The following happens [starting on page 158]: Hohenlohe gives Garwert's division the attack signal and it advances in echelon of two battalions, the left flank leading against Vierzehnheiligen. Two interesting points. The Prussians deployed into lines 1,000 paces before ever advancing, so they never deployed under fire. The other is that earlier Suchet advanced his division against Vierzehnheiligen in echelon leading with the right, a mirror of the Prussian advance. In that advance p. 161 In front of Vierzehnheiligen, the 6th Corps avant-garde, and the tirailleurs 'avoid the shock of the Prussian infantry." In other words, they retreat into the village and the woods. Fusiliers of Rosen and Erichsen's battalions, jagers, volunteers, and schutzen push the French out fo Issersedt and chase [Bessonet's word is 'follow'] a battalion of the 25th Legere to the eastern edge of the forest where they stop. The Prussians do this because to go further brings them deep within the French lines. A battalion of grenadiers and the rest of the 25th Legere in Altenburg woods "had stayed with great difficulty in front of Grawert's right flank battalions but finally began to retreat." In other words, again, the schutzen and volunteers of the Hohenlohe battalions facing the Altenburg Woods pushed the French out of the woods. The report of Colonel von Kalckreuth, commander of infantry Regiment Prince of Hohenlohe (No. 32) at Jena (printed in Jany's "Gefechtausbildung", pp. 123ff.): "The skirmishers of the regiment spurred on by those officers commanding them stopped the enemy light troops from advancing for a very long time although they were better protected everywhere by terrain which was most advantageous to them. It could not be otherwise, for in this standing battle which we had to endure for several hours, we had heavy losses of men due not only to the far more numerous enemy artillery but also due to the skirmish fire." First Prussian Tactical Success Prussian artillery forces the Grenadiers and 25th Legere and Ney's artillery to make a further retrograde movement. Bressonet concludes "whatever the case, the avant-garde of Ney's 6th Corps had been forced to evacuate Issertstadt's forest and village as well as the small wood of Altenburg." Page 162. Napoleon orders Desjardins' 1st Brigade, 16th Legere, to "run off the tirailleurs that were controlling the wood to the left of the division and take over the line evacuated by Ney. The 14th Ligne is also ordered to enter Issertadt forest. Four French battalions enter the woods after 10:30 and do not reclaim it until @11:30 Page 165 Meanwhile the remaining infantry of Garwert's infanty march on the offensive to Vierzehnheiligen. Garwert advances on the village and the French grand battery, more than 30 guns is masked between Altenburg Woods and the village by the slopes until the Stanitz regiment comes with view. The artillery fire, combined with the fire of the French tirailleurs in the plain and village cause Stanitz's regiment to recoil. Hohenloe halts the division to reform it. Throws out skirmishers before the village, too few to make any impression. A Prussian 12lb battery is now "inflicting serious damage on the French artillery." A 12 lb battery is brought up to shell the village. Page 166.Here is where "The French tirailleurs were shooting on the Prussian battalions standing still in front of them as if it were target practice." This is localized around the village. However, Hohenlohe resumes his advance on Vierzehnheiligen, the volley fire of the Prussians "more intense and terrible, and the critical moment was at hand— 'the most critical of the day, ' said the report of the 5th Corps. [written by Lannes] 2nd Prussian Tactical Success Lannes orders a spoiling attack with the 100th and 103th regiments on the Prussian left flank. With difficulty the French attack is repulsed and 'the intensity of the fire from the French holding Vierzehnheiligen seemed to diminish, partly because Prussian artillery starts fires in portions of the village. 3rd Prussian Tactical Success The second line of Cerrini's new brigade reinforces the main line between the Hohenlohe regiment and Hahn and Sack's Grenadiers. Page 168: Hohenlohe once again resumes the advance on Vierzehnheiligen, intent on having several battalions take the village with the bayonet. Garwert congratulates Hohenlohe on his victory. Bressonet say 'for his last success.' Massenbach and Marwitz say that Garwert congratulated him for winning the battle. Garwert, hearing of Hohenlohe's intentions to attack, begs him to wait for Ruchel. He does, which at this point probably makes little difference
It is now nearly 12 pm and Napoleon orders a general advance, and in the span of an hour the Prussians are overwhelmed, by skirmishers and the rest. Now, to describe this engagement as the Prussians standing around, to be shot by French tirailleurs is as silly as describing the battle as Ney being pushed out of Altenburg Woods. French skirmishers certainly did do serious damage, but the Prussians weren't standing around being targets except for two specific instances, after the Recoil of Stanitz's regiment and waiting to fight off Lannes spoiling attack later. Nowhere was it the intent of the Prussians to stand around and volley, and they did far more than that, for all the tactical errors and general lack of decisiveness. The Prussians didn't lose the battle because of the casualties caused by the skirmishers, anymore than they lost the battle because of the French artillery. Garwert cleared the woods to their front of French tirailleurs, fought off two attacks by the French, and in the end, they blinked more than once, which Bressonet notes, quoting similar opinions of Hopfner and von der Goltz. And of course, Garwert was only one of six divisions fighting the battle
Best Regards, Bill |
10th Marines | 26 Sep 2009 6:05 a.m. PST |
Bill, I've read the book. The Prussians lost because they were outfought. Their tactics were out of date. The numbers of skirmishers they employed were (1) not sufficienta nd (2) not coordinated with their troops in formation, which was usually if not always, in line. They also deployed their infantry in echelon of battalions, but they were still in line. Further, they did not coordinate their artillery with their infantry. Gaining a momentary local success does not negate those facts. It's in Bressonet and other pubications. You cannot historically equate the Prussian tactical methods with those of the French. It is a mistake to do so. Combined arms, along with the versatility of the French infantry, both line and light, to operate in line, columns, open or skirmisher order, or in a mixture of the above, will trump even the most well-trained army that only fights one way. Making excuses for the Prussians and stating that the tactics of the two armies were the same (which Bressonet does not) doesn't help the study of the battles on 14 October. If the Prussian tactical system of 1806 were efficient, it would not have been changed during the reform period. The Prussians did fight hard. They did cause French casualties. They were still outmaneuvered and outfought. Ruchel was late coming into action, taking hours to march a few miles to the fighting. He came onto the battlefield to fight but when stopped, fought in lines firing volleys. He, too, was outfought and routed. Scharnhorst and the other reformers who studied French combat methods recommended that the Prussians convert to that system or something similar. Scharnhorst went so far as to say, before 1806, that if they didn't they would lose. Lastly, while the French did outnumber the Prussians at Jena, abotu 40,000 did not participate in the fighting. Regarding Frederick's army of 1756-1763 just as a side note, the flower of his officer corps died during the war. The best of his infantry had also been destroyed. And he only survived because the Russian Empress died. The British had already pulled out and left him sitting high and dry and very much in trouble. Sincerely, Kevin |
Defiant | 26 Sep 2009 6:10 a.m. PST |
I got to agree with Kevin completely here, you cannot compare the Prussian style of warfare in 1806 with the French, that would be making a mistake that many other authors have "not" made who have done very good, detailed research into over the years. |
50 Dylan CDs and an Icepick | 26 Sep 2009 6:18 a.m. PST |
[Scharnhorst and the other reformers who studied French combat methods recommended that the Prussians convert to that system or something similar. Scharnhorst went so far as to say, before 1806, that if they didn't they would lose] Would love to see the precise quotation from Scharnhorst to that effect. (i.e., that the Prussians specifically wanted to convert to the French system.) Plenty of Prussians before and after 1806 were advocating change, and some even *in response* to developments in France, but I have yet to see any Prussian who specifically said, "Let's convert to the French system." But I would be happy to be corrected. So if you can point me to the precise references, that would be great. I'm in Berlin for the next three weeks doing work in the archives, so if it's an original reference to correspondence, all the better. (Please, not just: "It's in Elting
or White
" or whatever. A precise citation of a source is needed, rather than vague reference to a general text. Thanks in advance.) Mit wissenschaftlichen Grüße, Milo das blähungende Gnuchen |
MichaelCollinsHimself | 26 Sep 2009 8:28 a.m. PST |
I couldn`t help myself, I cut straight to Bressonnet`s conclusions Gents
Bressonnet does say that it was the French usage of terrain, combined with the Prussian`s reluctance to use it themselves that marked the difference in the two sides tactical methods. This being noted in the particular manner that the French used villages as "hinges" for defense of positions, or for attacking the Prussians (those French skirmishers at Vierzehnheiligen). Also he notes a lack of depth of the Prussian`s battle lines, and it is this that we see remedied in the reforms and brigade formations of the 1812 regulations. True, they do still underplay the mounted arm`s role in a brigade formation; limiting it to being mainly defensive, but those arms are about to be better co-ordinated. Perhaps the Prussians manoeuvred in lines at a longer distances than the French, but the point to be made is that while they were not the same, their fighting methods were not really so disimlar when engaged as people may once believed; the Prussians skirmished in larger numbers and the French were obliged to engage them in lines because the shock of the column alone was not enough. |
McLaddie | 26 Sep 2009 8:52 a.m. PST |
Kevin wrote:
I've read the book. The Prussians lost because they were outfought. Their tactics were out of date. The numbers of skirmishers they employed were (1) not sufficienta nd (2) not coordinated with their troops in formation, which was usually if not always, in line. They also deployed their infantry in echelon of battalions, but they were still in line.Further, they did not coordinate their artillery with their infantry. Gaining a momentary local success does not negate those facts. It's in Bressonet and other pubications. You cannot historically equate the Prussian tactical methods with those of the French. Kevin: I don't remember ever saying anything different than above. Where did I? As for equating the Prussian Tactical methods to those of the French--I didn't at all except in one specific case: The Prussian advance in echelon compared to Sachet's. That does equate exactly, down to the two battalion fronts on the echelon. It is obvious that: 1. The Prussians didn't deploy sufficient skirmishers [They couldn't have if they'd wanted to--they were outnumbered.] However they did deploy about 25% of their entire infantry force as skirmishers. 2. Yes, their three arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery basically fought separate battles. The coordination was definitely lacking. Never said anything different. 3. The Prussians were outfought--who said they weren't? They did, however, fight it out for eight hours while outnumbered 2-1 at every point--more proof of superior French tactics--so they were outfought, but they weren't run over either. 4. And the Prussian tactics don't equate to the French. There is no doubt that the French tactics were superior to the French. However, when you say "
the versatility of the French infantry, both line and light
will trump even the most well-trained army that only fights one way"--that is what I take exception to. The Prussians, for all their faults, didn't fight 'one way', nor did they stand around for the entire day out in the open being decimated by French skirmishers. Lets be clear here, Kevin. I am not questioning the superior tactics of the French, or that the Prussians weren't their equals. I am pointing out that the 'johnny one-note' descriptions of what the Prussians actually did aren't accurate. I am saying the facile explanations for their failures, that the Prussians tried to fight the battle with Frederick the Great's tactics, or that they stupidly stood around unable to even think of ways to counter French skirmishers is hogwash--from just reading Bressonet. They did have local successes, and in each case they were successes using very 'unFrederickian' tactics. In fact, the Prussians would have probably done better if they had used Freddy's tactics--they certainly would have taken Vierzehnheiligen, for all the good it would have done them. This isn't about your pet insistence that the French tactics were superior. I never disagreed with you. This isn't about your big concern, that folks claim the Prussians used French tactics. They didn't and I never said they did. This is about what the Prussians actually did at Jena, which doesn't match the simplistic, wholly inaccurate descriptions of why the Prussians lost, as explained by well-known historians and writers that I quoted earlier--including Etling. Even Bressonet [Or Bowden translation] seems to be pro-French in the descriptions. Whenever the French are forced to retreat or any other tactical negative, words like 'seems to retreat', the Prussians 'followed' the French retrograde movement etc. are used. Issertadt isn't recaptured by the Prussians from the French, it is simply 're-occupied'. However, the French do 'capture' and 'recapture' it. Are we on the same page now? Best Regards, Bill H. |
McLaddie | 26 Sep 2009 9:16 a.m. PST |
Milo TFW wrote: [Scharnhorst and the other reformers who studied French combat methods recommended that the Prussians convert to that system or something similar. Scharnhorst went so far as to say, before 1806, that if they didn't they would lose]Would love to see the precise quotation from Scharnhorst to that effect. (i.e., that the Prussians specifically wanted to convert to the French system.) Plenty of Prussians before and after 1806 were advocating change, and some even *in response* to developments in France, but I have yet to see any Prussian who specifically said, "Let's convert to the French system." Milo: The Prussian leadership knew their army was not equal to the French. Last minute attempts were made, in the words of the King, to "make our army more like the French." [Rothenberg, Gunther E. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon: p.189] That's hardly the statement of an over-confident military leader held in thrall by the 'Frederickian' way of war. "Even on the eve of war, Scharnhorst demanded an extensive reform of the Prussian Army" White, "Enlightened Soldier" p.123 Paret simply ignores much of what when on between 1803 and the staff reorganization and 1806. However, the last minute efforts of the Prussians to reorganize their army certainly emulate the French organization--all of which are advocated by Scharnhorst: In October of 1805, the Prussians initiated last minute changes to reduce army baggage to increase army mobility and help make more horses available for the artillery. In an effort to copy the French, the Prussians formed permanent divisions, but they attempted this only after the campaign had begun. The army wasn't ready for the change [or have the divisional commanders available] and it created serious problems. The King also sanctioned the abolition of the third rank in the musketeer battalions, forming a light battalion for each line regiment, but the chaos of the mobilization—along with the army's fractured organization--prevented the general implementation of this last minute fix. If you like I can provide more specific references, but they aren't hard to find. Bill |
50 Dylan CDs and an Icepick | 26 Sep 2009 1:35 p.m. PST |
[If you like I can provide more specific references, but they aren't hard to find.] Well, that might be nice, since none of your quotations addressed the point, and none are citations from a contemporary Prussian. I'll repeat. Kevin asserted: "Scharnhorst and the other reformers who studied French combat methods recommended that the Prussians convert to that system or something similar. Scharnhorst went so far as to say, before 1806, that if they didn't they would lose." * * * * My response (CAPITALS added for emphasis): "Would love to see the precise quotation from Scharnhorst to that effect. (i.e., that THE PRUSSIANS SPECIFICALLY WANTED TO CONVERT TO THE FRENCH SYSTEM.) Plenty of Prussians before and after 1806 were advocating change, and some even *in response* to developments in France, but I have yet to see any Prussian who specifically said, "Let's convert to the French system." But I would be happy to be corrected. So if you can point me to the precise references, that would be great. I'm in Berlin for the next three weeks doing work in the archives, so if it's an original reference to correspondence, all the better. (Please, not just: "It's in Elting
or White
" or whatever. A precise citation of a source is needed, rather than vague reference to a general text. Thanks in advance.)" * * * * So for instance, if you could show me the primary citation for that quote from King FW3, that would be great. Or, again, if Scharnhorst specifically says/writes to somebody, "I want us to copy the French way of doing X," that's even better. I've seen plenty of secondary sources make the assertion or suggest or imply it, and I know that it's conventional wisdom, based on people having read the same six books over and over again
But I'm reasonably handy with the Prussian original sources in this period, and I've never read it anywhere in the originals. That's not to say it ain't there; just that I haven't seen it, and would like to, before I'm willing to buy it. "Responding to" is one thing. "Converting to" is another. Alles klar jetzt? |
Defiant | 26 Sep 2009 3:15 p.m. PST |
I do feel topics can be overly analysed, and this topic is one of them. |
McLaddie | 26 Sep 2009 3:28 p.m. PST |
Shane: I don't think so, not if going beyond the simplistic and inaccurate conclusions is 'overly analyzing' the topic. Bill H. |
Defiant | 26 Sep 2009 3:45 p.m. PST |
I do think so, it becomes nothing more than chest beating to prove points instead of pure analytical debate in the end. |
13th Light Dragoons | 26 Sep 2009 4:28 p.m. PST |
My two cents (in which it is not because I use CAD (lol) ) The French defeated the Prussians in 1806 because; 1) The French Army was battle harden from 1805. The Prussians had not fought a campaign in sometime. 2) Having fought in 1805 the French had a more flexiable (and younger) officer corps with battle experience. At the operational level the French had better command, control and comms. 3) The Prussians – although trying to modernized – were still behind the French. 4) Napoleon/Davout and the corps d armee system. cheers Edward |
nvrsaynvr | 26 Sep 2009 4:33 p.m. PST |
"I do think so, it becomes nothing more than chest beating to prove points instead of pure analytical debate in the end." Then why don't you stop posting here, and leave it those interested. |
Defiant | 26 Sep 2009 4:43 p.m. PST |
oh, I am interested, believe me. However, these debates always degenerate at about this point when one side does not agree with the other sides analysis. In the end it gets nasty. p.s. Edward summed the reasons for the defeat pretty simply and succinctly
|
McLaddie | 26 Sep 2009 7:41 p.m. PST |
Kevin asserted: "Scharnhorst and the other reformers who studied French combat methods recommended that the Prussians convert to that system or something similar. Scharnhorst went so far as to say, before 1806, that if they didn't they would lose."* * * * My response (CAPITALS added for emphasis): "Would love to see the precise quotation from Scharnhorst to that effect. (i.e., that THE PRUSSIANS SPECIFICALLY WANTED TO CONVERT TO THE FRENCH SYSTEM.) Plenty of Prussians before and after 1806 were advocating change, and some even *in response* to developments in France, but I have yet to see any Prussian who specifically said, "Let's convert to the French system." "Responding to" is one thing. "Converting to" is another. Milo: Yes, it is different. Thanks for repeating that--I didn't realize what you were looking for
I can imagine if Scharnhorst before 1806 said "Let's convert to the French system", not only would he have been pillared by the Prussians, but probably didn't know what the entire 'the French system was.' As it was, he and other officers were accused of 'revolutionary sentiments' [i.e. French] for just doing the following: He suggested in writing and through his work in the Army rather forcibly between 1801 and 1806: 1. Creating a militia system along the lines of the French universal conscription. 2. Developing the use of columns for movement on the battlefield, much as the French did. 3. Increasing the Prussian light infantry force and training line troops to skirmish too to 'counter' the French. One reason for the last minute order to form the third rank in line regiments into light battalions. 4. Adopting the Divisional and Corps system, which the Prussians attempted last minute in 1806. As the French were the only nation with divisions and corps at the time, it would seem to be adopting 'French ways' after a fashion 5. Advocating, with others, an trained army staff, which was actually begun in 1801. And of course, he was in charge of the officer schools during this time. So, Scharnhorst certainly advocated changing to many of more apparent French methods before 1806, he also appreciated that the Prussian way of war was not wholly compatible with the French, just as the French had concluded in the 1770s
So for instance, if you could show me the primary citation for that quote from King FW3, that would be great. Or, again, if Scharnhorst specifically says/writes to somebody, "I want us to copy the French way of doing X," that's even better. Nope, I can't show you the primary citation because Rothenberg, while he says "in the King's words", and places "our army more like the French" in quotes, he doesn't footnote it. Sooo
And as I said, I agree, I really don't think Scharhorst before 1806 would have ever said "I want us to copy the French way of doing X" if he ever wanted Prussians to actually do X, army politics being what they were. Even so, the Prussians before 1806 did attmpt to do several things 'the French way' as they understood it
Bill H. |
McLaddie | 26 Sep 2009 8:11 p.m. PST |
Shane wrote:
oh, I am interested, believe me. However, these debates always degenerate at about this point when one side does not agree with the other sides analysis. In the end it gets nasty.p.s. Edward summed the reasons for the defeat pretty simply and succinctly
Shane: Have we degenerated to that point? For instance, I didn't disagree with Kevin's analysis of French superiority--I didn't--but I did get frustrated when he kept writing as though I did--and ignored the rest. I would say that Edward summed up several reasons for the French victory, but not all of them--from a pure analytical point of view--and certainly not the primary ones on a tactical level. Certainly the French had a lot more experience and a history of success. Certainly that experience had developed an efficient command system. Their officer corps was younger. And they did have Napoleon's corps d'armee system. Those are definite advantages, ones the Prussians couldn't match. But does that 'explain' the battlefield victories? Why they happened? All those advantages didn't keep Napoleon from allowing Davout to run into the main Prussian army alone, or stop Ney from charging onto the battlefield at Jena without orders with only a portion of his corps, nor did all those advantages compared to the Russians lead to equal success at Eylau a year later. Granting the very real advantages mentioned by Edward, one would have to say that there is far more to the French victory and the Prussian collapse than just those 4 points. I am certainly interested in exploring that--analytically. Best Regards, Bill H. |
10th Marines | 26 Sep 2009 8:17 p.m. PST |
Bill, See Chuck White's The Enlightened Soldier on Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft from 1801-1805. On page 37 White writes 'Because of the French Revolution, the art of war had taken ''a step toward greater perfection''; and as Scharnhorst told his readers, ''we might be unworthy successors'' if the Prussian officer corps did not use the French model as a foundation upon which ''to build a doctrine.''(43) Significantly, Frederick the Great ''has the reputation of imitating the methods of others.''(44) 43: Nachlass Scharnhorst Number 145, Sheets 6-7. 44: Nachlass Scharnhorst Number 118, Sheet 4. On page 64 White writes 'Although he greatly admired Frederick, Scharnhorst understood that without changes in organization and administration, tactics and strategy, discipline and training, Prussia could never counter the French threat.'(31) 31: 'This was the conclusion of Scharnhorst's ''Betrachtungen uber die Fortschritte in der Kriegkunst,'' Nachlass Scharnhorst, Number 118. I've added in the footnotes to show the reference material that Chuck White used in the preparation of this volume. Chuck did archival work in Germany and translated the material himself. He's also an excellent speaker and understands the problems the Prussians had and certainly understands Scharnhorst and what he said and wrote. So the conclusion that can be drawn from Chuck White's work is that not only did Scharnhorst say these things, he also wrote them for the record. Sincerely, Kevin |
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