"British in three ranks?" Topic

Does anyone know if there is any documentary evidence for British troops actually fighting in 3 ranks during the Napoleonic period?

They were mostly in 4 ranks at Waterloo.

Two ranks were adopted during the American Revolution.
Dundas preferred three ranks but two came back into use against the republican French. As noted above, the Duke specified reinforced line at Waterloo after seeing the French cavalry in action at Quatre Bras.

American officers reported the British fighting in three ranks at New Orleans.

The British fought in three ranks in Holland in @1798, but two ranks in Egypt in 1800. They fought in three ranks during the army's South American adventures. In 1808 Wellington issued a standing order that the infantry was to deploy in two ranks, and then repeated the order in 1809, so obviously the British at times deployed in more than two ranks as urged by Dundas [who was second in command in Holland], or such standing orders would not have been necessary. I have been told, but haven't seen any evidence, that the British Troops in Germany during the 1813/1814 campaign fought in three ranks. Certainly the British regulations provided for both three an two rank formations, and each regiment was required to demonstrate both during inspections.

Like the four rank formation, each had its purpose, strengths and weaknesses. They were simply the building blocks for whatever the commander deemed necessary. Dundas writes in the regulations why AND under what circumstances he urged the use of three ranks. Obviously, other generals felt differently about it.

Bill

Bill,

Please can you provide the source for the British use of 3 deep line in South America?

The information for the campaigns other than the Peninsula and Waterloo is somewhat sketchy, but 2 deep was used during the 1809 Walcharen expedition. This is described by Thomas Staunton St Clair in a manner that seems to indicate that it was already standard practice in the army.

There is little doubt that 2 deep was standard in the Peninsula, because of the complete lack of references to 3 deep and anecdotes and summaries written after the war by British officers. Wellington only issued one general order to form 2 deep during the Peninsular War and this applied to the troops at Lavos in 1808, the order was not repeated in 1809 and it had probably been unnecessary in the first place. The British officer Fonseca wrote:

"In the Peninsular War, the army under the Duke of Wellington fought constantly in 2 ranks; but this cannot be adduced against the inefficiency of a third, as his Grace found the troops so formed when he took the command."

Dundas, who wrote the 1792 regulations, thought that line troops should always be formed 3 deep unless fighting against irregulars or in extended covered positions. Most other influential officers obviously disagreed, one writing in the United Services Journal:

"But had the General [Dundas] seen this point, the necessity of the 3rd rank satisfactorily settled, – that the British infantry had gone through the glorious war of the Peninsula without the third rank, and that it had been repeatedly proved, that in two ranks our troops could either make or repel a charge of bayonets, he, too, would have preferred the two-deep formation. He would have seen that in the British infantry, the third rank was not essential. The experience that has satisfactorily proved that the British infantry may adopt the formation two deep as its fighting order, is not by the French deemed a sufficient test to justify its inclusion in that army. They are of the opinion that there are special reasons why we might so form our troops, which do not apply to their service. In our army, the question, however, has been set at rest, and almost forgotten."

Come to that, could Spiffy Iguana provide the source for British fighting in three ranks at New Orleans?

Major Short:

I'm not sure if you are asking me a question or not. [I'll get the source for South America/Carribean actions] There is no doubt that British infantry in the Peninsula fought in two ranks. Wellington's general orders of 1807 and 1808 made sure of that. I see that I wrote 1808 and 1809. Wrong years. Wellington was in a different command situation in 1808, which probably prompted the second general order.

I only pointed out that such a general order would have been unnecessary if there wasn't a practice of deploying in three ranks too. General orders were not something that commanders bothered with--particularly twice--if unnecessary.

I don't know much about the 1809 Walcharen expedition other than it was as disasterous as the earlier Holland expedition.

You wrote:

Dundas, who wrote the 1792 regulations, thought that line troops should always be formed 3 deep unless fighting against irregulars or in extended covered positions. Most other influential officers obviously disagreed.

I think you are laying opinions on British officers by quoting an American after The experience that has satisfactorily proved that the British infantry may adopt the formation two deep as its fighting order…

At the time, 1792-1809, two rank formations weren't 'proven' yet. Most all infantry regulations allowed for two rank formations, and most all nations had used them at one time or another. For instance, the Austrians and Prussians used them during the French Revolutionary wars. The Prussian Fusiliers regulations of 1788 and French Chasseur/Legere doctrine/regulations called for two rank line formations. Supposedly many legere regiments consistently deployed in two ranks during the entire war.

The French National Guard always deployed in two ranks, using a version of the French 1788 regulations that were never approved that called for all infantry to deploy in two ranks. [The French weren't willing to go that far, and stayed with three rank formations in the 1791 regulations, which also provided for two-rank variations.]

Dundas argued in his regulations that a three rank formation was preferred because it could sustain a firefight longer and had a better chance against cavalry. Obviously Wellington had doubts about the two rank formation holding against cavalry. He used 4 rank deployments at Waterloo and other Peninsular battles.

No doubt, that many British officers preferred the two rank formation, and certainly Wellington 'proved' that it worked. However other nations' officers did too.

Ney, in his instructions to his corps in 1803 called for the third rank being used as a reserve or skirmishers and not being deployed with the first two ranks. Foy and Marmont, along with Ney argued for two ranks around 1810.

There were enough British officers who wanted the three rank or Dundas' regulations would not have been accepted as the official regulations, nor would Wellington have felt it necessary to issue a general order about 2 rank formations.

It is just as obvious that Dundas' regulations allowed commanders options in the field as to how they used them. That is very much an attitude shared with other nations' regulations, or Ney couldn't have issued his instructions and the various nations wouldn't have used two ranks at all. Both the Prussians and the French left reports of regimetns deploying in two ranks at Waterloo and Ligny.

It is no more reasonable to insist that the British never used three rank formations than it is to insist the French or other nations never used two. Obviously the British army came to universally prefer two ranks, where the French and other nations generally stuck with three, but that is only a norm, not a monolithic 'always' in all combat situations over the twenty years of the Napoleonic wars.

Bill H.

Bill,

The request from the original poster was for documentary evidence of the British use of 3 deep line in the napoleonic period. Up to now there hasn't been any, although there have been opinions, hence my question to you for your source for South America.

I am baffled by your words: "I think you are laying opinions on British officers by quoting an American after The experience that has satisfactorily proved that the British infantry may adopt the formation two deep as its fighting order…"

Which American am I quoting?

Also, where can I find Wellington's 1807 General Order?

I have documentary evidence for 2 deep in India from before 1792 (the 1792 Regulations were adopted with the exception of the 3 rank line) Flanders in 1793-95, Egypt in 1801, Walcheren in 1809 and of course the Peninsula and Waterloo. Unfortunately I haven't been able to find similar evidence for 3 deep, although I admit that it might exist.

;-7 I really need to copy the entire passage from now on. I was thinking "United States" instead of "United Service" Journal when I typed that. Mea Culpa. Whichever, my point was that the opinion expressed is being stated 'post-Peninsular war'. No one is arguing that the 2 ranks did work or that Wellington didn't use that formation--or that by that time the formation wasn't the very special favorite of British officers everywhere.

So, you want three things:

1. The South American/Carribean evidence for the use of three ranks.
2. Where the 1807 general orders are found
3. Evidence of the third rank being used by the British.

I'm on it.

Bill

The idea that a bunch of wargamers have volumes of official drill manuals, orders or action records for use at an instant is faulty.

Asking these sorts of questions on a Sunday when a person cannot get to the library is also not going to produce quick results.

At best you will get what was given by several posters. citations from secondary sources or even tericiary.

Rothenberg states that the British had 600 men deployed to defend and area of 175 yards. m in regardsto writing rule mechanics would be the frontage of operation and not so much whether it is a two0three or four deep line. All of which I have seen in books like the Napolreonic Source book and others for a specific area of coverage often similar to the 175 yards mentioned above.

The idea that a bunch of wargamers have volumes of official drill manuals, orders or action records for use at an instant is faulty.

True but wargamers often have extensive libraries of books in which such material might be quoted.

I asked the original question on Friday.

in regards to writing rule mechanics would be the frontage of operation and not so much whether it is a two, three or four deep line.

I quite agree, however the original question was triggered by a statement on another thread where a poster suggested that the British fought in three ranks when they had sufficient numbers. It is to do with history rather than rule mechanics.

Found it. "[the British] still kept up the old custom of firing three ranks deep; one row half kneeling, and the other two ranks firing over their shoulders. This style of firing, along with the darkness of the evening, explained to me why the enemy's balls, which we heard whistling by, mostly flew over our heads." Unfortunately this is only referenced as an 'American report from New Orleans', so there is no way to judge the accuracy of the observation without more research.

Where is that quote from Spiffy?

The quote was reprinted in Katcher's old osprey book "The American War 1812-1814." I believe the quote originally came from "A Contemporary Account of the Battle of New Orleans by a Soldier in the Rank." Louisiana Historical Quarterly 9, no.1, but I won't swear to it. I know the late Paddy Griffith discussed the tactics used in the battle in his book "Forward into Battle", so that might be a place to look if you wish to explore the topic further.

OK, thanks.
So far then we have one documentary reference to the British use of 3 ranks (although uncorroborated). Also this was at New Orleans, not in mainland Europe.

Any others?

Rudy wrote:
The idea that a bunch of wargamers have volumes of official drill manuals, orders or action records for use at an instant is faulty. Asking these sorts of questions on a Sunday when a person cannot get to the library is also not going to produce quick results. At best you will get what was given by several posters. citations from secondary sources or even tericiary.

Rudy:
I am not sure whose ideas you are calling faulty. I never promised I'd be quick about it, let alone producing anything in an instant. ;-j Who said that? Are quick results the only thing allowed here? OR maybe TMP stands for Temporally Marginal Perception. [I'm joking…]

I made the statements about the 3 ranks, so it is up to me to say where I got those ideas. Major S. certainly has the right to ask. Whether I can dig them up in a hurry isn't the issue--I think.

Rudy, when you say "The idea that a bunch of wargamers have volumes of official drill manuals, orders or action records for use at an instant is faulty", I think you might be selling wargamers short…

I know a bunch of wargamers. Collectively, we have over 10,000 volumes, most period manuals and action reports, as well as period histories, all in PDF form. I have such things as all the General Orders of both Wellington and the British Army, or Spanish memoirs of Albuera in Spanish. All downloaded free from Google and Gallia, Gayle and others.

Brent Nosworthy has traded sources with us. He makes an interesting point. He has thousands more volumes at his fingertips, open to him anytime he needs to do reseach than any ten historians before 1995.

What's more, I can get *rough* translations of foreign language books anytime I want.

So while I doubt a majority of wargamers are interested in putting together such electronic libraries, it isn't faulty to think wargamers can have all those regulations and manuals available. I think Steven Smith pulled up nearly a hundred Napoleonic manuals and posted their links on the TMP.

TMP link

Rothenberg was working with three ranks, as that was the norm for the British in the mid-1790s when he wrote his Rifle and Light Infantry manual--even though it was common for light infantry to form two ranks when in close formation.

Bill

What may be a good guide here is the orders issued by Beresford to the Portuguese army. The army used the same Dundas regulations as the British just in Portuguese.
The most pertinent order he issued was that the infantry who were disciplined and fit for service should be in 2 ranks at all times 'when in the presence of the enemy in the field'.

It is almost certain that he was following what had become normal practice – so yes, I would say British trained troops were in 2,3,4, or 6 ranks depending on circumstance; generally in combat you could expect them to be in two ranks. (partly because Dundas said they would be at certain levels of numbers regardless of local General orders)

Major Snort:

Okay, I'm going to do this in two posts. Let's set the scene here, the military culture and customary practices. This is particularly important when talking about 2 rank deployments were considered outside the customary.

First of all, the question of deploying in two or three ranks had been open to the decisions of the officers in the field, so that ANY process outside the norm or SOP of the army was commented on and specifically ordered by the particular general in command, usually, but not always through general orders. This means that whether fighting in the Americas, India, the Caribbean, or Europe, variants to the regulations or customary were allowed, such things as the number of ranks in a formed line. Such changes from the norm were seen as general orders from the commander, whether he be army level or a regimental colonel.

This practices was also the norm or customary practice for at least 150 years before the Napoleonic wars.

This customary procedure, as articulated in the Essay on the Art of War (p. 411), in 1761, in response to a similar debate over the unit depth:

‘There are different Opinions, with regard to the Form to be given a Battalion and a Squadron. The most universal Opinion is to form the Battalion in four or three Ranks, and the Squadron in three or two Ranks; but for the Uniformity and Facility of the Manœuvres, a General ought, at the Beginning of the Campaign, to regulate the Number of Ranks for Action.'

Fortescue points out that the number of ranks early in the 18th Century was unfixed, and that Marlborough made occasional use of as few as two ranks (British Army, vol. I, p.585), in a period commonly employing six. He discovers this because Marlborough issued orders to that effect. So we see this practice from the Seven Years' War on through the Napoleonic wars.

British use of two ranks had been authorized by Sir Jeffrey Amherst in his ‘General Orders for the 11th of July, 1759 in the Americas' (Hawks, Orderly Book, pp. 30-31). Most agree that two ranks had been commonly used in the American War of Independence, again such practices uniformly being ordered by commanding officers during the war, not just done at random.

Lord Moira had ordered the adoption of two ranks in 19 November 1793 (Glazebrook, ‘Campaign in Flanders', p. 4), and troops had been ordered to use it in the 1807 Danish Campaign (Gardyne, Life of a Regiment, vol. I, p. 129), among other instances. [This is where Wellington orders the use of 2 ranks for his Division, the only one engaged in combat for the campaign. The Danish campaign have the 1807 orders I was thinking of. I just remembered incorrectly as to where he had issued them.

So, the orders were not unusual, but normal procedure when an army or other British force were to deploy in 2 rank lines. Why? Because before and during the Napoleonic wars, while Dundas was the Army regulations, 3 ranks was considered the expected, required, normal deployment. It remained as such more than two decades after the Napoleonic wars…and the British regulations during that time state as much.

So there is no question that two rank formations were used by the British long before the Napoleonic wars. However, they all have one thing in common. Orders were always issued for the formation of 2-rank lines. No orders were needed for Three Rank lines because that was deemed the ‘norm.' Which means that whenever three rank lines were used, often what we have is an absence of orders, rather than a direct instruction to form them. Keep that in mind.

We see this in the 1794 campaign, even before Dundas was accepted as the official regulations [in 1798] The Army's General Order of April 23, 1792 called for ‘the continued use of three ranks." That is why we see General Orders from Major-General Lake [1 June 1973] to form 2 ranks and then when the Duke of York assumes command, the reverting to three ranks. However, even his orders, following Dundas's recommendations[who was with him on campaign], later included in the official regulations, allowed that 2 ranks could be used when there was no expectation of cavalry attacks. What we see is both three and two ranks employed. On the Road to Waterloo Alan Guy p. 19 for all the orders mentioned in the paragraph.]

Dealing with the mass of French tirailleurs in the hedges and thickets of Flanders led to a new order from General Lake in 27, July 1794. Like the Prussians and Austrians fighting in the same theatre during the time, in combat the prescribed third rank was used as a reserve and did not contribute to the battalion's firepower.

Also at this time, because of the critical need for skirmishers, ‘Flankers' were created, usually 10 to 20 of the best marksmen from center companies. These were grouped into a single unit [whether from one battalion or many and used as skirmishers. This was a practice linked specifically to the 3-rank system in 1794. It was again used in Flanders in 1798. Sir James Sinclair in his Observations on the Military System of Great Britain, so far as respects the formation of Infantry, deals with this idea at great length, and proposes to have 160 skirmishers to each battalion of 640 men. [the last two paragraphs' info is from Wellington's Army Oman p. 74]

Oman also says that "the permission given by an order in 1801, that inspecting officers might allow regiments to Appear" even at reviews "in the two ranks, probably marked the practical end of the Prussian system." P.77

Which is a strange thing to say when the Duke of York issued a specific clarification of the Rules and Regulations in the 1804 General Orders and Observations on the Movement and Field Exercise of the Infantry:

"The established order for the infantry is in three ranks, which is not to be departed from except in light infantry battalions, or in small or detached corps acting as such, without the especial permission of the Commanding or Reviewing General." (para. 34, pp. 31-2).

This is exactly the exceptions/template of uses employed in the Americas, India, and in Europe from 1759 to 1808. And many orders for the 2 rank formation cited the lack of cavalry or other light infantry issues as the rationale for such orders. Because of this, it is not surprising to find Wellington's 3 Aug 1808 general order where he specifies the use of 2 ranks for the infantry. It is the very same SOP in 1807 Danish Campaign (Gardyne, Life of a Regiment, vol. i, p. 129)

E.M. Lloyd pointed to precisely this instruction[of 1808] as a noteworthy step in a general shift from deployment in three ranks to two ranks by British troops (History of Infantry, p. 217), while Willoughby Verner cited it as having ‘marked the definite adoption of a line two-deep in the British army, which hitherto had been usually formed in three ranks' (Verner, Rifle Brigade, vol. i, p.142).

So, to start with, some examples of what I mean by negative evidence concerning the SOP.

1. In 1807, more than ten years after the Flanders campaign where ‘flankers' are first used, they are seen at the Battle of Maida. Stewart takes the ‘flankers' from regiments in Sicily with him to Italy for the campaign. Even though Stewart gives orders for his infantry to deploy in 2 ranks, the practice of ‘flankers' is associated with three rank formations. It is not seen after Maida.

2. Bunbury in his memoirs, discusses Dundas's instructions and their positive effect on troops in the 1798 Holland Campaign. There are no general orders for forming 2 ranks that I can find for that campaign.

3. Abercrombie was a great supporter of Dundas and is seen as one of the generals to realize the improvement of the British infantry after the fiascos of 1798 and South America/Caribbean campaigns. His extensive training in Majorca and Turkey in 1800/1801 paid great dividends in Egypt. Again, there are no general orders that I can find calling for 2 rank formations…and of course, the infantry faced cavalry in the open ground of Holland.

Does this mean that 2 ranks were never seen in Holland or Egypt? Of course not. Because of the flexibility inherent and supported by the Duke of York…as stated in his 1804 instructions/general orders. The attitudes concerning 2 ranks vs 3 ranks were not as monolithic at the time as they appear today. Abercrombie repeatedly encouraged Dundas to publish his manual and then lobbied for its acceptance as the army official regulations. Yet Abercrombie championed the development of light infantry and cross-training line infantry. That would place him, with many generals squarely in the center of the American vs Prussian schools so often described.

This is hardly conclusive, but it does set the stage in trying to find evidence of the use of three ranks during the Napoleonic Wars. I'll post the second part of this.

Bill

Below is the best description I have found of what JeffsaysHi states above. The number of ranks was seen as mutable, depending on circumstances over the entire century, from 1759 to 1815.

"In America, it has been the practice to adopt the formation of two deep; but as troops may be employed in different countries and situations, we should have an establishment calculated accordingly ; whenever the depth of our Battalions is reduced, the extent must be increased, and the Column of March being lengthened considerably, the movement of great bodies becomes more difficult ; besides, in an open country, the fire of three ranks must give a manifest superiority over the feeble efforts of two ranks.

"The system of formation I have here established is three deep, conformably with the European School ; the hint is taken form the Memoirs Militaires de Guischardt, Preface du Traducteur sur la Tactique d'Arrien, Tom, 2de P. 111.

"It is calculated principally for an open country, and supposed to be the most perfect arrangement for troops armed as we are at present ; but to act in an inclosed, woody or mountainous country, it may be not only necessary to reduce the formation to two deep, or even to one rank, but to open the order considerably ; for as irregular fortification is to regular, so is this irregular kind of formation, to that of three deep, the primitive and supposed most perfect arrangement ; whenever the country permits the use of the primitive formations, it is to be preferred ; but in situations where a change may be necessary, it must be left to the genius and skill of those who command."

Tacticks. By Lieutenant Colonel William Dalrymple, of the Queen's Royal Regiment of Foot. Dublin, 1782;
pp.ix-x.

<<1. In 1807, more than ten years after the Flanders campaign where ‘flankers' are first used, they are seen at the Battle of Maida. Stewart takes the ‘flankers' from regiments in Sicily with him to Italy for the campaign. Even though Stewart gives orders for his infantry to deploy in 2 ranks, the practice of ‘flankers' is associated with three rank formations. It is not seen after Maida.>>

Flankers, or picked men, were seen long before Flanders; the Company of Select Marksmen in Burgoyne's Saratoga army – the two best shots from every battalion company in Canada – is one example, but at least two regiments (4th and 23rd) sent out designated "marksmen" at Lexington to deal with Rebel snipers. The original "picquet" companies of the SYW/F&IW were themselves "flankers" in the sense you mean, being drawn from the most active men and best shots of the centre companies.

So apart from this one minor indiscretion you agree with the other 3 pages.
Me too.

Supercilius Maximus:

The 'system' or procedure that created 'flankers' for the British army was created at the time of the Flanders operation.

I certainly wasn't suggesting that the general practice was totally new. As you say companies of selected marskmen or picquet companies had been used for a long time, and not just a British practice.

However, calling them 'flankers' as a specific term for those pulled out of the center companies was new, along with the specific numbers that could or would be collected. While I have seen the term 'flankers' applied to members of the flank companies when deployed later on in the Peninsula, this was a different, more specific use of the term--from what I understand.

Bill

Actually McLaddie, I was supprting you!
I felt the response to you of wanting documentary proof for your first couple of posts so quickly was abrupt. I had a feeling with time that you would respond as you did with more material.

Now my comment was not even directly specifically to Maj Snort. I meant for all those guys who post similar questions and expect expert answers with primary sources. You may have only 1000 books, I have several times that many on military history just not one area. I can also get many more through my local inter-library loan program but that does take time.

However my collection is mainly seconday sources. I have less than 100 truely primary sources. For example I have dozens of copies of newspapers from the American Civil War and the American Revolution. They are still reports and are secondary sources if not recountly a personal observation.

So my library may be larger but my primary source collection is likely smaller. LOL!

Good discussion by all.

Bill wrote:

"This is hardly conclusive, but it does set the stage in trying to find evidence of the use of three ranks during the Napoleonic Wars."

Bill,

I agree that it sets the stage, but we still have no believable reference to 3 deep and there is a big problem when we start assuming that in the absence of a general order to form 2 deep, the troops followed regulations and deployed in 3 ranks.

In the Peninsula, where it seems that 2 deep was used exclusively throughout the war, there is only one published general order from Wellington that calls for 2 deep deployment. This is the famous Lavos order of August 3rd 1808.

It must be pointed out that some think that the "2 deep" specified by Wellington is not a reference to the depth of files within a battalion at all, but that it refers to the amount of separate lines deployed one behind the other. I completely disagree with this idea because the word "deep" was invariably used by British officers to signify depth of files.

However, the order applied only to the three brigades present at the time:

"The order of battle of the army is to be two deep, and as follows, beginning with the right:-
Major-General Ferguson's brigade.
Brigadier Catlin Craufurd's ditto.
Brigadier-General Fane's ditto on the left.."

When Spencer's troops joined the army, another general order was issued on the 7th August specifying the positioning of the brigades, but the only reference to the formation was:

"The foregoing will be the general formation of brigades in one line."

The depth of files is not specified and as the order of battle had now changed completely, the general order of 3rd August had been superceded. Three of the brigades now present had not been included in the original Lavos order. By applying the rule that in the absence of a general order stating otherwise, the troops reverted to 3 deep, then we would have to assume the troops at Vimeiro were deployed in 3 ranks but this is not supported by any evidence at all and references that do exist refer to 2 deep.

When Wellington took command of the army in 1809, no orders (or at least none that have been published) were issued regarding the depth of files, but it is almost indisputable that the army was employing 2 deep as a standard. This must indicate that 2 deep had become a standard for combat prior to the Peninsular War, despite the regulations, and the Lavos order cannot be viewed as the watershed.

Bill,

With regard to a couple of sources that you mentioned above:

Gardyne's Life of a Regiment is a secondary source dealing with the history of the 92nd Regiment. Do you have a copy so that we can see exactly what he is referring to? Presumably he is quoting a participant, but it would be interesting to see if this is a primary reference to a general order, a reference to the 92nd forming 2 deep, or if it is the author's assumption.

I'm not certain whether Lord Moira actually ordered his army to form 2 deep in 1793 or not. The relevant passage can be found in: "The Campaign in Flanders of 1793-1795 Journal of Lieutenant Charles Stewart, 28th Foot". Steven H Smith (sadly no longer a participant here) very kindly sent me a copy of this memoir and the relevant section is a diary entry by Charles Stewart, not a general order from Lord Moira:

"During the Service on which the troops are now Embarked, the Regiment are to form two deep with close files."

It is quite possible that this applied to the whole brigade or the whole army, but it is only certain that it applied to the 28th foot. It must be recalled that this was at a time when although the Dundas Regulations had been published, they were not apparently in general use and Colonels were noted for having their own systems in place making coordinated actions very difficult. Dundas explained this practice:

"Nor do these irregularities operate only in the field, and in great bodies. They equally take place in the internal composition and management of our battalions; each has its singular mode of discipline, unknown to the other, and often as opposite as those of two distinct services."

Actually, the regiment would not be told by the colonel of the 28th to form two deep for the campaign [during the service on which the troops are now embarked]. It is simply the regimental notation of that general order. Or do you believe that every regimental Colonel got to decide how many ranks to form on for a campaign?

The same is true of the 92nd reference. Simply an acknowledgement [wich was SOP] of the general order. It is quite true that individual regiments did practice their own systems, which is a major reason for Dundas and York's drive for uniformity. That is why I quoted those references from the early and middle seventeen hundreds. Whatever else was going on, the customary and accepted practice was for the commanding general of whatever independent command to order such uniform practices as what ranks the infantry were to deploy in at the start of a campaign etc. With the problems in uniform practice before 1798 and Dundas becoming the official 'way to do it' for the British army, such orders were all the more important.

And of course, all nations' military had the same problems with multiple manuals and a lack of real uniformity in practices during this time and later.

Bill

<<However, calling them 'flankers' as a specific term for those pulled out of the center companies was new, along with the specific numbers that could or would be collected.>>

In the summer of 1776, the newly arrived Hesse Cassel units on Staten Island each formed a platoon of "flanquers" from their main ranks to lead any attack (after 1778, these morphed into ad hoc light companies for the length of the campaign season). I have certainly not encountered its use by any British diarist from the AWI, so you may be right about the Low Countries; however, the practices of the Hessians were undoubtedly where the British first came into contact with the term and was probably the genesis of its use in British military circles. After 1778, it was common for British line infantry elements of small expeditionary forces to be composed of largish detachments from several regiments, of a size that were clearly "picked men".

With regard to the "flankers" in the Maida campaign, most must have been operating with the battalions they were drawn from, not taken along as an ad hoc unit. The light battalion was composed mainly of light companies, not flankers, although 120 flankers of the 35th regiment, the main body of which did not accompany the expedition, were incorporated.

The flankers of the other battalions were presumably present with their own units, still under the system initiated by Sir James Craig in 1805:

"These soldiers (flankers) were taken from the battalion companies in each regiment, and placed under the command of picked officers. They were trained to act as sharpshooters; were not told off in line with their battalions (except at reviews, parades etc) and in the field were kept in rear of the flanks of their respective battalions or brigades, ready to act either to front or flank as occasion might require….It was discontinued when Sir John Moore took command of the army."

There is no primary source that I am aware of that confirms the depth of formation used, or how the flankers (I'm not referring to the light battalion) were employed by the army at Maida, although secondary sources all state that 2 deep was employed.

Abercrombie may well have been an advocate of the Dundas Regulations, but in combat in Egypt it seems that he adopted 2 deep, despite the regulations and despite the presence of a dangerous French cavalry force. An officer of the 97th Regiment wrote:

"An instance of this kind (enemy cavalry breaking through the line) happened in the memorable action of 21st March 1801, between the British and French forces in Egypt – The enemy's cavalry succeeded in penetrating part of our line, where a brigade of infantry were posted; consisting of De Roll's, Dillon's and Stuart's (now the 97th or Quenn's Own Regiment), under the command of Sir John Stuart, when the General ordered the rear rank to face about, and to direct its fire upon the enemy cavalry in our rear, the front rank continuing to fire on the enemy in its front; the result was, by thus bringing immediately a fire to bear upon those in the rear, that no time was lost by tedious formation or countermarches to allow them to form regularly; but they [the French cavalry] were obliged to look for their safety in flight, by endeavouring to get back to their former ground, wherein but few succeeded, for most of them were either killed, wounded or taken – OUR INFANTRY WAS FORMED TWO DEEP."

I always three ranks was regulation, but two ranks due to necessity?

I have always understood it was because of deployment zones. During deployment the frontage of a battalion was very important, battalions were expected to defend a set area, if your battalion had 350 ffectives it was expected to defend a area the same size as a battalion of 500 effectives, hence two ranks for the smaller battlion, three for the larger.

The brigade commander was expected to hold his ground between certain points and this would be passed down to the regt commanders. The division commander would have the same challenge.

my two cents

Major Snort wrote:

The flankers of the other battalions were presumably present with their own units, still under the system initiated by Sir James Craig in 1805

Major:
Craig could not have 'initiated' the practice in 1805 if it was being used as described in Holland in 1799 as Oman states were in the General Orders.

As for Stewart's command in Egypt and the battle of Alexandria where the 28th Foot turned about to repel attacks front and back--thus earning the shakos with brass plates on both front and back. Here is an account from a soldier of the 28th:

Sergeant Joseph Coates of the 28th described the action in his memoir of the Egyptian campaign. (It should be noted that Coates ascribes the famous order to Colonel Paget, although, since Paget had been wounded in the throat, it is perhaps more likely that it was his second in command, Lieutenant Colonel William Chambers, who gave the order).

"… The French charged in three columns, the left of which came round the left flank of our regiment, over the ground which the 42d regiment had left, to charge it in the rear, whilst it was warmly assailed by the infantry in front, and just as this column was making the turn to come upon our rear, they overtook me.

At that time Colonel Paget ordered the regiment to the right about, and firing a volley as the enemy came within a few horse lengths, occasioned a most dreadful carnage; such a quantity of horses falling from the fire, occasioned many others to stumble, and fall upon them, the others were thrown into complete disorder, and made all speed to return. In joining my regiment I had to jump over several of the enemy's dead horses and men, and turning around, was astonished at the execution which had so instantaneously been done. After the volley the 28th faced about again and resumed their fire on their assailants in front, such as had ammunition; but many having now expended it all, resulted to throwing of stones, and, indeed, some of the enemy had recourse to the same weapons."

For such a famous event, the Sargeant seems to remember it quite differently from the officer of the 97th.

[It wasn't 97th, let alone an entire brigade that volleyed in both directions from what I understand]

The end of the quote given by the 97th author is:

"…that no time was lost by tedious formation or ountermarches to allow them to form regularly;"

It should be noted here that the British had no regulations for forming square in two ranks. They needed to 'countermarch' and double lines to four before going to square--which was time consuming--and one reason why Wellington went to four ranks during the Battle of Waterloo.

what do you think he means by 'to form regularly'? And why would that even be an issue? [Because they were facing cavalry.] The officer just might have an agenda in his description, yes? He then says:

but they [the French cavalry] were obliged to look for their safety in flight, by endeavouring to get back to their former ground, wherein but few succeeded, for most of them were either killed, wounded or taken – OUR INFANTRY WAS FORMED TWO DEEP."

Again, if all British infantry formed for combat in two ranks in all cases during the Napoleonic wars, why does the Officer you quote bother to say "our infantry was formed two deep"--particularly when that fact would seem very clear in the previous description of the engagement AND the event proved to be so famous?

This is a good place to start. Was Stewart's command following the General Orders from Abercrombie and in 'regular' formation? Where they in two ranks?

Why did Stewart feel for many years afterward that he had not been given the credit for winning the battle of Akibar?

I do agree with Bluewillow that the various number of ranks each had their benefits and weaknesses. It could well be that a brigade commander would opt for the formation he felt was best. That might be the case at Alexandria with Stewart, or the whole army.

Two caveats:
1. This was a line of battle with several brigades, so the decision wasn't necessarily up to Stewart or the other brigade commanders individually, and
2. The army was facing a stronger army with far more cavalry in the open, so the 'norm' and often repeated expectation, would be to go with the stronger formation against cavalry, 3 ranks.

So the question is did they? And who decided whether the 2 or 3 rank line was used--and when?

Bill

I forgot to mention that the 28th was in John Moore's Reserve Division and no other regiment [or brigade] at the battle was given the distinction of two shako plates.

Bill

Bluewillow wrote:

"I have always understood it was because of deployment zones. During deployment the frontage of a battalion was very important, battalions were expected to defend a set area, if your battalion had 350 ffectives it was expected to defend a area the same size as a battalion of 500 effectives, hence two ranks for the smaller battlion, three for the larger."

Bluewillow,

Battalions weren't expected to defend a set area. A small battalion occupied a small frontage and a large battalion occupied a large frontage. It was obviously possible for a commander to extend his front by thinning from 3 to 2 ranks, but there was no requirement in the 1792 regulations to do this, apart from a suggestion that in peacetime, when the battalions were maintained at an extremely low level (around 300 men), as a means of accustoming the commanders to normal wartime establishment frontages.

If a battalion's strength fell, the regulations state that the amount of sections within a company was to be reduced, not that the amount of ranks should be reduced. A battalion of 300 rank and file could form 3 ranks and comply with the regulations by reducing to 2 sections per company.

Abercromby, who was killed at Alexandria in 1801, had, most recently, been campaigning with the British forces commanded in the field by the Duke of York. The Duke of York, commander in chief of the army and the brother to the King, was one of the strongest proponents for the use of three ranks within the British Army. It was the Duke, as the commander in chief, that had required that the Rules and Regulations be formulated and written down, and Dundas was the officer responsible for this document. In 1809, due to a domestic scandal the Duke of York was forced to step down as commander in chief of the British Army, and his position was taken by Dundas, who held the position from 1809 through 1811. Dundas was selected principally because he was a close friend to the Duke and was intimate with the Dukes tactical preferences, and had written the Rules and Regulations. It should be noted that the Rules and Regulations were meant for the non-commissioned officers, not necessarily for the officers [they had another book], and it was the sergeants that were supposed to understand the niceties of how the platoon should form. The officers had the responsibility for orchestrating the battalions, brigades and divisions.

There is definite reference to the use of two rank formation in the regulations, specifically light infantry were to adopt two ranks, and light companies and grenadier companies when detached from the battalion could form two ranks. There are instructions on how to change from two to three, and three to two ranks, so obviously it was permitted by the regulations, but the regulations, including those published in 1816, refer to three ranks for both the company/platoon and battalion when formed in close or open order. It should be noted that open order does not refer to spacing between the files, but between the ranks, and seems to be more for parade and review purposes.

What was stressed in the regulations was the need to ensure that the platoons [as differentiated from the companies] were regularized in the number of men and files they fielded. It was expected that each platoon would present the same frontage as those to their left and right, and so on within the battalion. It then stresses, that as much as the platoons within a battalion should have equal frontages, then so should the battalions within the same brigade.

The Regulation standard was that each platoon should form in four sections, with the minimum number of files set at five. When at full establishment, the number of files per section [per Regulation] would have been eight [96 men, in three ranks, and four sections, results in eight files per section]. The reference to forming two or three sections per platoon, is specific to 'purposes of march', and was only permitted when the battalion was 'weak in number'. So the Regulations permitted flexibility in the number of files per section, not necessarily the number of sections, when formed in line of battle.
Therefore a battalion of 480 men, could form in two ranks, with each section having close to six files [48 men per platoon, 24 men per rank, and four sections each of 6 files], whilst a larger battalion of 720 men, could form in three ranks, with each section having six files [72 men per platoon, 24 men per rank, and four sections of 6 files]. In this fashion the two battalions would each occupy the same frontage, and therefore conform to Regulations.

During the Peninsula, very few battalions fielded more than 600, and the norm would have been two ranks. The light battalions would also have formed in two ranks, per Regulation, and the really big battalions, such as the Guards, could have formed in two ranks, by forming two platoons per company, and adopting five files per section [as permitted by Regulation]. The minimum size for this formation of two platoons per company would have been 800 men, below that, and above 640 men, and the battalion would have, according to regulation been, in three ranks – this is a fairly narrow window, and hence the idea that all the British infantry formed in two ranks. General Foy who fought the British in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, stated that they 'frequently' formed in two ranks, and four ranks for the attack, and defense against cavalry. His choice of the word 'frequently' is interesting, as it's certainly not 'exclusively'.

Interestingly the account of the 29th at Vimeiro being in two ranks, was from a diarist whose battalion had suffered grievous losses at Rolica, and whose establishment was so reduced that two ranks was the only practical formation to ensure that they could field between five and eight files per section. The 29th fielded 616 men [probably close to 558 rank and file], and in two ranks [56 men per platoon, 28 men per rank, 7 files per section] would have occupied approximately 170 yards of frontage. The other battalion in their brigade [1/82nd] fielded 904 men [probably close to 844 rank and file], and in three ranks [84 men per platoon, 28 men per rank, 7 files per section] would have occupied approximately 170 yards of frontage. So in this case, both battalions would have been formed as per regulation, both would have occupied the exact same frontage, and one would have been in two ranks, and one in three. The diarist of the 29th was actually motivated enough to note in his diary that they had formed in two ranks. If you run the same math for the other units at Vimeiro, you find that six battalions would have formed in two ranks [including the 2/43rd and 2/52nd], and potentially twelve in three ranks. All platoons would have have four sections, and three battalions with six files per section, fourteen battalions with seven files per section and one with eight files – all as per regulation.

npm

Ligniere wrote:

"It then stresses, that as much as the platoons within a battalion should have equal frontages, then so should the battalions within the same brigade."

The regulations actually state:

The companies must be equalised in point of numbers, at all times when the battalion is formed for field movement, and could the battalions of a line also be equalised, the greatest advantages would arise; but though from the different strengths of battalions this cannot take place, yet the first requisite [equalised companies] always must, and is indispensible."

So the regulations actually say that it is not possible to equalise the size of battalions.

Ligniere wrote:

"It should be noted that the Rules and Regulations were meant for the non-commissioned officers, not necessarily for the officers"

Both books were very similar, the original version aimed more at the officers was:

"Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field-Exercise and Movements of His Majesty's Forces".

The later additional NCO's version was entitled:

"Rules and Regulations for the Manual and Platoon Exercise, Formation, Field Exercise and Movements of His Majesty's Forces for the use of Non Commissioned Officers of the British Army".

So the Rules and Regulations were intended to be used by both officers and NCOs, as confirmed in the introduction to the latter work.

We have discussed the files per section and sections per company before, and I actually provided a quote from a serving officer describing use of 10 files per company, in 2 sections. I have also provided a quote from another officer refuting the idea that low battalion strength was the reason for 2 deep deployment and insisting that is was impossible to find an example of 3 deep being used in the Peninsula. I could provide much more info on 2 deep in the Peninsula, but none on 3 deep. What you provide above is again opinion, with no actual proof of 3 deep line being employed in that war.

Bill,

Regarding the battle of Alexandria, I'm not really surprised that a sergeant of the 28th regiment described the action in a different manner, as he wouldn't have been aware of much apart from his own battalion.

The account that I provided above is from Captain Olferman of the 97th regiment and I see no reason to dispute the gist of his story. The fact that the French cavalry broke through the reserve area and were eventually defeated by Stuart's brigade, which included the 97th, is also mentioned in Bunbury's "Narratives of Some Passages in the Great War with France".

The reason that he emphasises 2 deep, is because this passage appears as a footnote to a series of proposed manoeuvres tabled by Olferman, which include sometimes forming 3 deep, but often in an irregular manner. These ideas were not official British practice, but simply Olferman's suggestions. Olferman served as a staff officer in the Peninsular War and began this particular passage, written in 1813, with the phrase:

"The forming of three deep an army in the field is at present quite abolished".

What he is referring to by saying: "no time was lost by tedious formation or countermarches to allow them to form regularly" is that the battalion did not waste time by trying to face to the rear in the regular manner, putting all the companies in the correct order and having the proper front rank facing the enemy in the rear. Instead the men simply faced about on the spot.

Major Snort,
The Regulations I was reading; dated 1807, Page 84, Part III, Companies equalized, simply states:
"The companies may be equalized in point of numbers, at all times when the battalion is formed for field movement; and could the battalions of a line also be equalized, the greatest advantage would arise."
The last sentence in your quote, isn't in the copy from 1807 that I was reading.

I have no problem that British battalions formed in two ranks, of course they did, and you've provided references to when and where they did. However, in our previous debate, I pointed out that it's easy to prove the use of two ranks, because that was deemed noteworthy enough to be written in the diaries of numerous veterans.

I also used the same mathematical model, I presented in my earlier post, to analyze five Peninsula battles, with the following possible results:

Vimiero: 12 battalions in 3 ranks, 6 in two

Talavera: 4 battalions in 3 ranks, 10 in two. Ten other battalions could have been in either two or three ranks [7/3 split between three and two ranks].

Bussaco:2 battalions in 3 ranks, 22 in two. Twelve other battalions in either two or three ranks [5/7 split between three and two ranks].

Albuera: 2 battalions in 3 ranks, 9 in two. Two other battalions in either two or three ranks.

Salamanca: 2 battalions in 3 ranks, 20 in two. Twelve other battalions in either two or three ranks [4/8 split between three and two ranks].

You can see that the mathematical model does support the contention that there was a shift from three to two rank formations. And a majority of the 'other' battalions could most definitely be put into the two rank column. Does this prove anything, no it doesn't – but I find it interesting, none the less.

You're right, this is all conjecture, and it's my opinion. And no, I haven't found the 'holy grail' of an officer specifically stating that his regiment was formed three deep. But that doesn't mean it wasn't possible. It's not as if the idea that the British might have fought in three ranks as well as two undermines the performance of the British Army. They were successful and there record will forever stand, but it was for many reasons, and not merely because they were in two-ranks.

npm

Ligniere,

Please can you tell me if this thought (the calculations above) entered your head before reading the work of Nafziger?

Although I have posted this before on another thread, I think the following is of interest here:

In "The History and Actual State of the Military Force of Great Britain", written by the French officer Charles Dupin and translated by an anonymous British officer in 1822, Dupin wrote:

"Notwithstanding the precision of the orders here quoted [the 1792 Regulations], the British Infantry in many circumstances*, manoeuvre and engage in two ranks. So slight an order of formation, which appears demanded by the numerical weakness of English regiments can only be justified by the excellence of their fire. This excellence may be ascribed to three causes; the frequency and the perfection of their exercise, and the goodness of their ammunition."

The translating officer corrected Dupin in a footnote:

"*The author might have stated not only ‘in many circumstances', but, under all circumstances: For we believe it would be difficult to give an exception to the custom of forming two deep in our service during the Peninsula War. Yet it is incorrect to ascribe it, as he proceeds to do as arising from the numerical weakness of battalions, which had very commonly (actually in the field) from 600 to 800 bayonets, a strength quite sufficient for a formation in three ranks, had such been thought desirable."

Major Snort,

Please can you tell me if this thought (the calculations above) entered your head before reading the work of Nafziger?

Good question – but it wasn't merely Nafziger that opened my eyes to the possibility. It was other specific references to European armies having options to form in two-ranks when at depleted strength, and references to the British Army in North America during the American War of Independence, and how the adoption of three or two rank close order was based upon the number of files available to the battalion. These seemed to me to be precursors to the Rules and Regulations.

The adoption of two-rank open order by the British Army in North America in the late 19th Century was very influential amongst the field officers, but the European theorists argued that two rank was more prevalent to the American theater and simply wouldn't work in Europe. Bottom line, what I rightly or wrongly drew from this was that the British did have a process and tradition of forming in three ranks when at full establishment, and two ranks when at lower or campaign establishment. I saw no reason to doubt that this wasn't also true during the Peninsula wars. The mathematical model simply seems to support this, and offers a reason why some units fought in two ranks – which would them be documented by diarists. As the wars continued two ranks became the norm, and the notion of seeing a battalion in three ranks rare in the extreme. This ultimately lead to the possibility of officers making statements such as 'The forming of three deep an army in the field is at present quite abolished'. Of course that very statement seems to suggest that at some time, some of the army would have formed in three ranks. At least that's how it reads to me.

So, no it's not simply Nafziger's Imperial Bayonets that led me down this interesting path.

npm

Ligniere wrote:

"Of course that very statement seems to suggest that at some time, some of the army would have formed in three ranks. At least that's how it reads to me".

I agree, but finding a definitive answer as to when this change became final would seem to be impossible.

There are some photos located at Terragenesis of the game put on by Bob and Herb. Great looking stuff!
link

Bob, out of curiosity what changes would you make to Song of Drums and Shakos?

Major Snort:

The quote you gave from the officer of the 97th factually has several flaws in it.

1. General Stewart's "Foreign Brigade" was in the second line, and never had any enemy cavalry behind it and was never ordered to face the rear.

2. All accounts agree that only the 28th regiment carried out the facing rearward and firing, the one regiment the author does not mention. It would be highly unlikely that Stewart would have commanded the 28th to do anything because not only was his brigade in the second line, but the 28th belonged to Moore's division which was in the front line.

3. Stewart's brigade was called upon to to advance and drive the cavalry away, which it did with volleys to the front only.

4. Sergeant Joseph Coates of the 28th was an eyewitness, which the officer of the 97th wasn't. I am not even sure that the 97th was a regiment in 1801, but it wasn't in Egypt on March 21st during the battle.

His account is coorberated by Robert Thomas Wilson in his account The History of the British Expedition to Egypt, published in 1802. It is available on Google books.

link

Wilson served with the Hussars during the expedition. The book also contains in the appendix all the general orders given by Abercrombie during the campaign. Unlike Wellington, Stewart in Italy, or the commander of the Danish campaign, to name a few, Abercrombie never did not issue any general orders calling for the army to form in two ranks, and this six or more years earlier than Wellington, Stewart etc.

The author from the 97th got his facts wrong defending a practice sometime after 1815 [the 97th Highlanders were disbanded in 1796 and the 97th foot was formed in 1816]. You provide evidence was 2 ranks was the norm across the army in 1813. "The forming of three deep an army in the field is at present quite abolished". So why did the 97th author push the utility of 2 ranks with such an erroneous example if it was already universally accepted. Who was he trying to convince?

Does that make sense to you?

I am rather surprised by your interpretation of the author's "that no time was lost by tedious formation or ountermarches to allow them to form regularly". Exactly what is the officer saying was avoided? Why countermarch to 'form regularly'? According to you they were already formed regularly in 2 ranks. In what way would a counter march have made them more regular? [Even in Egypt… ;-j] You're suggesting that the author thought what? How could a counter march have achieved anything regularly, tedious or otherwise if he isn't taking about either forming square [which would have been the logical thing to say 'form square'] unless he meant three ranks? If carried out as what I *think* you are suggesting, half the regiment [the rear line would have been clubbed] OR he was advancing the silly notion that the alternative to about-facing was to counter march the entire line of infantry in combat so that they all could faced backwards still right in front.

The sergeant of the 28th states that the entire line faced backwards, volleyed, and then faced front again. Do you think he got it wrong and Mr. 97th got it right?

Major S. wrote:

It must be pointed out that some think that the "2 deep" specified by Wellington is not a reference to the depth of files within a battalion at all, but that it refers to the amount of separate lines deployed one behind the other. I completely disagree with this idea because the word "deep" was invariably used by British officers to signify depth of files.

However, the order applied only to the three brigades present at the time:

"The order of battle of the army is to be two deep, and as follows, beginning with the right:-
Major-General Ferguson's brigade.
Brigadier Catlin Craufurd's ditto.
Brigadier-General Fane's ditto on the left.."

First off, I have italized the part of your analysis that seems to contradict the thrust of your argument before it. Second, your statement "amount of separate lines deployed one behind the other" doesn't play that way.

The brigades are formed right, center and left, not one behind the other. And during this time the brigades never deploy with half the battalions behind there other half, but rather in one single line of battalions…So it is difficult to assume that is what Wellington meant if there is no second line.

Third, it was a general order and applied to his entire command, whatever size it was at the moment or grew to be later, it was still "the army."

When Spencer's troops joined the army, another general order was issued on the 7th August specifying the positioning of the brigades, but the only reference to the formation was:

"The foregoing will be the general formation of brigades in one line."

This is an expected clarification under the circumstances, and has to do with the battle array. With FOUR brigades, there isn't a right, center, left brigade configuration anymore. Wellington has to now state whether it will be two up, two back, one in reserve etc. OR in a 'single line.' That determines the battle array. In otherwords, with a new brigade he has to reconfigure the order of battle.

Just as Lt. Stewart of the 28th says his regiment "During the Service on which the troops are now Embarked, the Regiment are to form two deep with close files", the phrase two deep does apply to the depth of files. If Wellington had required the brigades to each form two LINES of battalions, he would have said lines, just as he said "one line" later. If he had actually meant two lines of battalions with his 'two deep' requirement, he would have had to indicate how many battalions up and how many back because the brigades did not have even numbers of battalions. You see him do when it is a matter of uneven brigades. Do you have any examples of Wellington actually deploying his army with brigades using two lines of battalions?

Bill

Bill,

Olfermans wrote:

"The enemy's cavalry succeeded in penetrating part of our line, where a brigade of infantry were posted; consisting of De Roll's, Dillon's and Stuart's (now the 97th or Queen's Own Regiment)"

Stuart's regiment, the 97th foot, were present, as was Olferman. I cannot understand why you are putting in so much effort to rubbish this quote.

Regarding the Lavos order, I am convinced that this is a reference to 2 deep line and cannot see how it can be interpreted otherwise, so there is no need to try and convince me. I have been rudely insulted on this forum for making this suggestion, and for pointing out the difference in Wellington's orders specifying "lines", so I was merely offering the alternative explanation.

Regarding the 97th Regiment:

This unit was originally raised as Stuart's Minorca Regiment and was formed from Germans and Swiss. It became known as the Queens Own Germans and was taken into the line as the 97th Regiment in 1805. It was disbanded shortly after the Napoleonic Wars.

Olferman wrote his account of the unit's action at Alexandria in 1813, while he was still an officer of the same regiment.

Major:
Well, I am not trying to trash the account, though I have serious doubts about it [Is that the same thing?].

I was not aware that the Minorca Regiment went on to be the 97th. The British roll of regiments on-line has the 97th disappearing in 1796, reappearing in 1816 to disappear again in 1818.

I was aware that the Minorca Regiment was made up of Germans and Swiss, one of the three regiments in Stewart's "Foreign Brigade".

There are several problems with Olferman's account.

Wilson's account, written in 1802, a year after the event, makes no mention of cavalry penetrating Stewart's brigade, only General Moore's, made up of 40th flank company, 23rd, 28th, 42nd, 58th, Corsican Rangers and a detachment of the 11th Hussars, as well as Hompesch's Hussars, where Wilson was stationed.

Now, Olferman states: "The enemy's cavalry succeeded in penetrating part of our line, where a brigade of infantry were posted."

Stewart's Foreign Brigade was in the second line, in back of Moore. Wilson specifically states that Stewart was moved up from that position to support Moore. Wilson, on page 42, in analyzing the battle, points out that the French cavalry, if they had advanced into the flat between the right and center, and in his words "pressed on through the second line, the confusion would have been almost irretrievable."

He is saying that the French cavalry made a "fatal mistake" [his words] by not doing exactly what Olferman claims did happen.

Then Wilson describes the fight of the 42nd, 28th, and 58th against the cavalry, stating specifically:

"The 28th had presented, as well as the 58th, the extrodinary spectacle of troops fighting at the same time to the front, flank and rear. Although thus surrounded, the 28th remained fixed to the platform of the parapet, and preserving its order continued a contest unexampled before this day." p.32

Then in describing Stewart's actions, he says that the first line would have eventually been overpowered,

"If at this critical moment, General Stewart with the Foreign Brigade from the second line, had not advanced in the most perfect order, and poured such a heavy and well-directed fire that nothing could withstand it, and the enemy perished or fled." page 32

So, when Olferman says "The enemy's cavalry succeeded in penetrating part of our line, where a brigade of infantry were posted", the ONLY brigade posted where the cavalry penetrated the line was Moore's, not Stewarts. Stewart had to advance his brigade to reach that 'post.'

Another question involves the recognition that the 28th and even the 58th of Moore's brigade receives for fighting facing in two directions. Olferman states Stewart's entire brigade did the same thing, but none of those troops are ever mentioned, not in Wilson's account a year after the battle, nor subsequent accounts of the battle. Does that strike you as strange?

The last issue is why Olferman is writing his comments in 1813. Who could he possibly be writing to, insisting that Stewart's brigade was in two ranks when as you say, that was the only formation the British deployed in or had since the begining of the wars?

That is why I doubt Olferman's account 12 years after the fact. It doesn't prove anything conclusively, and Olferman may still have given an accurate account. It could even be the British propensity for ignoring 'foreign' troops and their accomplishments, though Wilson praises their actions during the campaign several times.

However, there are several reasons to question Olferman's account on its own merits. It is also obvious that he had specific issues in writing it, and who the audience was, is not clear.

Major Snort wrote:

Regarding the Lavos order, I am convinced that this is a reference to 2 deep line and cannot see how it can be interpreted otherwise, so there is no need to try and convince me. I have been rudely insulted on this forum for making this suggestion, and for pointing out the difference in Wellington's orders specifying "lines", so I was merely offering the alternative explanation.

Okay, I know what it's like trying to dodge postal bullets on the TMP. I have a great respect for you and your historical knowledge. You know I have had to change my positions on more than one issue in the past after you have laid out the evidence.

So, we can agree that he was speaking of 2 ranks? Or not?

Bill

Bill,

I certainly agree with you over the Lavos order.

I always enjoy our discussions and although we sometimes disagree over what many perhaps see as irrelevant detail, I think this has been extremely beneficial to me as I have learned a great deal about the tactics of the period from your insights, so the respect is mutual.

Regarding Olferman's account, I don't know enough about the Battle of Alexandria to confidently say that it is 100% accurate, so more research is required here, but I also won't dismiss it. The strength of the cavalry in the rear of Stuart's brigade isn't stated, but even a handful of troopers galloping about in the rear could have caused confusion and resulted in an order for the rear rank to face about, in a similar manner to the 44th at Quatre Bras.

I believe that Stuart was disappointed by the lack of recognition his brigade received after Alexandria, but it does seem that they saved the day.

Here is another quote from Thomas Staunton St Clair describing the French surrender at Flushing in 1809. It's not definitive, but the impression given is that by 1809, 2 deep was regarded as normal:

"They (the French) were halted and formed into line three deep. This formation, I afterwards found, was the general practice of the French army, whilst we continued at two deep; and Wellington afterwards proved to them that ours was the most convenient method, and consequently the best."

Major Snort:

Good, I certainly do agree that two rank deployment formations was the British formation of choice, particularly after the major part of the army was engaged under Wellington successfully in two ranks.

Howeve, I think there are several things to keep in mind while considering where, when, and how much the 2 rank formation was used by the British.

1.Quotes like Thomas Staunton St. Clair [I like his artwork] indicate several things, including that he didn't have much experience fighting the French by 1809 if he only learned later that the French generally fought in three ranks, and couldn't have been in the army long. It could be that all he knew were two ranks simply from his short time and limited experience in the army. By 1809 Wellington and the British had already won several battles.

2. There is a tendency to look back on Wellington's campaign, and the fact he 'proved' two ranks worked as the filter through which all British actions are viewed from 1792 on, particularly when he commanded the major British
army in the field, and his successes were seen as 'how to do it."

3. There is also the odd belief that while York enforced Dundas's regulations and that in doing so produced a more effective army between 1798 and 1807, at the same time the British officer corps simply ignored York and Dundas when it came to three ranks vs two, regardless of past practices, general orders, battlefield conditions, regulations, etc.

4. There is also the coattail effect. Once Wellington proved de rigor for all British officers, using three ranks was actually seen as backward, stuffy, [like Olferman's quote suggests] and downright cowardly as though the manly British would really need to depend on three ranks to remain steady.

Besides it set them apart from Jacque Crapaud and all the rest who lost to the French. Who would admit to it? Maybe that was what Olferman was arguing against…The suggestion of cowardice at even suggesting 3 ranks could be useful.

5. And of course, looking back after 10, 20 or 30 years of glorifying "2 ranks", memories can be easily persuaded that all instances were the same, particularly if other British Memoirs are saying it, erroneously or not.

6. There are twenty times as many works written about the Peninsular war than all of the other British campaigns during the Napoleonic wars put together, which also creates a serious lensing effect when looking at what the British did and how often.

For instance, the quoted order at Alexandria "Front rank stay as you are, rear rank about turn" has been credited to both Stewart and Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers of the 28th, and several different quotes have been reported including "rear Rank, 28th ! Right About Face !" which is the more reasonable order in a battle.

It takes some detective work to ferret out these issues at times. But I know both of us enjoy the hunt, and it often proves important/enlightening in wargame design, if only because we are asking 'How did they do it?

Bill