"Marshall Ney and Napoleon’s relationship" Topic

Marshall Ney and Napoleon's relationship,

I want to discuss Ney and his command ability at Waterloo, his state of mind and apparent loss of faculties as some might call it during this last episode of those days on 1815.

As you all know Ney started his career fighting the Austrians in the French army in the 1790's in Germany. His career there was meteoric and his rise through the ranks phenomenal. He performed brilliantly as a kind of Partisan Cavalry leader a lot like Confederate and Union cavalry raiders some 60 years later in the American Civil wars. His notoriety soon came to the attention of his superiors of the time and his career rise was set.

We also know he knocked back many independent offers of command and advancement because he felt not yet capable or confident enough to take on such responsible undertakings. He had his reasons and to his credit stuck to his own sense of worth which fell far short of those above him who knew he was capable of greater things.

Finally he did see his own light and began to rise prominently through the system to become a brilliant and popular general then Marshall of France. Each rise propelled him higher and higher into the lime light and central stage of the premier men of that age, something he was not altogether comfortable with.

Ney was a devoted husband and loving father to his children, for him going on leave and spending time with his family was foremost and the most important aspect of his life. He loved his military career but he was also a strong family man.

Ney led to prominence by his own brilliant actions and victories soon became one of the prominent figures of the central stage of Europe. His prestige and ability became known all over the continent and beyond. His brilliance shone for all to see by his deeds of valour on enumerable fields all over Europe. Napoleon made him a Marshall of France no less.

His career pushed on and although he missed such battles as Austerlitz amongst others his name was now etched into history as one of the great commanders on either side of the wars. A brilliant tactician and charismatic Ney led his forces with honour and great courage throughout the Napoleonic wars. Then came the Russian debacle…

During the retreat as we all know Ney became separated and cut off and his command was dwindling each day until he finally made it to safety after a harrowing retreat dodging Cossacks and regular Russian forces all trying desperately to stop him. Even after repeated requests to surrender Ney refused, he fought on and pushed his men or more importantly they followed him willingly looking up to Ney as their only hope. There is also the famous painting of Ney holding a musket in the snow with his exhausted men behind him all looking at him in the hope he would lead them to safety. Ney did not disappoint them.

On his return Napoleon embraced him and all were shocked to see he had survived and made it through the Russian lines. But Ney was livid, he blamed Marshall Davout for not sending him word of his own withdrawal which led to the gap between the two corps and the eventual cut off. Ney, out of great restraint did not lose his temper with Davout but instead said to him while pointing skyward, "I will not judge you for your actions but one day we will all meet our maker and be judged". One can only imagine the indignation Davout must have felt as this rebuke. Davout had made a mistake which caused Ney and his men much hardship and unnecessary loses but it was left there and both men moved on…

Then came the great battles of 1813 and 1814, Ney was in the thick of it and fought valiantly in those desperate battles and campaigns along with his fellow officers. The battle of Bautzen in particular became controversial as Ney failed to fully carry out Napoleon's orders as he had hoped. Without going into details orders were not fully understood nor carried out properly, orders were rescinded and counter orders given and received which made matters worse. In the end a great opportunity was lost to end the war there on that day and Ney was responsible for not fully understanding his master's desired strategy.

Now we come to 1815 and the return of Napoleon to the centre stage of Europe for a second time, he marched ever northwards growing stronger with fresh units every day as they threw down their white cockades for the tri-colour once more. Ney was in an unenviable position, he had thought the rein of Napoleon was now in the past and Europe could once more find peace. Or more importantly he could now enjoy his family. Napoleon's return put an end to this in a single day.

Ney, as we all know vowed to bring Napoleon back in an iron cage and this was not lost on Napoleon once he had heard it. Napoleon and Ney met in an awkward manor which resulted in Ney spending most of the nest few months forced out of Paris and the lime light. He retreated to his family estate and became nothing but a spectator to occurring events. He knew Napoleon was angry with him and this affected Ney greatly, he was dejected and felt uneasy at being apparently left out in the cold; Napoleon was teaching Ney a lesson in humility and obedience so it seemed and Ney was affected greatly by this. Their relationship had now turned to icy non-communication at best.

Ney had awaited events in the hope he would be recalled to Paris and given a command in the inevitable campaign that was coming up. The Anglo army and Prussians were in Belgium and events were now moving fast. Ney was worried he was going to be overlooked and Napoleon played on this to make Ney suffer. Napoleon was deliberately making life hard for Ney with silence, keeping Ney in the dark, apparently forgotten and ignored. The indignation felt by Ney must have been hard to take.

Napoleon, hurt by Ney's Iron cage statement had decided to return such an insult in a very personal manor. But then it happened, Ney received the communication he was waiting for on the eve of the start of the 1815 campaign to join the army immediately if he desired to partake in it. Ney flew into a frenzy of readiness but had no horses and eventually bought two of them from a sick fellow general just to get to the front. He marched with the army but as yet still had no command. Napoleon it seemed wanted to prolong his agony and suffering on a personal level.

Eventually Ney did receive a command, namely the left wing including two full corps on Infantry to face Wellington while Napoleon dealt with the Prussians. Napoleon it seemed had to put aside his personal hurt and anger at Ney to fight a campaign. Ney was trusted with taking the crossroads and in this he failed in Napoleon's eyes. Regardless of the reasons of which we all know only too well the relationship between these two men was at breaking point. Or was it?

Eventually at Mt Saint Jean Ney was given overall command on the battlefield to carry out Napoleon's orders during the day and oversee personally every attack and event. Ney was everywhere fighting and in danger, he fought like a lion and was apparently the same old Ney his men trusted in and looked up to with unflinching confidence. It seemed Ney was trying disparity to prove himself under his master's eyes that he was still worthy of his name and title.

Then came the command given by Wellington to retire his overextended line back over the brow of the ridge and the protection of its brow. This singular apparently insignificant act was going to cause such a response out of all proportion to what should have happened that no one could have foreseen it. Ney either heard of the retirement or was told about it and decided probably on remarks of those around him that the entire British army was in actual fact retreating. This conclusion of Ney was going to have fateful consequences and repercussions. Ney ordered the cavalry to advance and crush the British under the hooves of in the end over 10,000 Cavalrymen. Charge after brilliant charge was made but to no avail the British and Allied squares had held and the French cavalry was destroyed over a two hour period of repeated and unsupported rash charges.

Eventually the battle of Waterloo was lost when the intervention of Blucher and his Prussians sealed the issue from about 4pm onwards but the French army still took another 5 hours to finally overcome. The rest is history as they say…

Now, the question is, "why did Ney order the cavalry to attack in such a rash and unsupported manor"?

I feel this can be answered in one single word, "Redemption". Ney wanted desperately to be redeemed in Napoleon's eyes for his comments about the iron cage, his mistakes at Quatre Bras and his apparent lack of trust Napoleon now had for him. Ney was a lost soul in 1815 and Napoleon made him feel this way. Ney was in limbo and his self worth suffered, he was on the outer and lost I think much of his prestige through his actions and words. I don't think his fellow officers were also trustful of him and Ney felt it. Ney had promised the King what he wanted to do to Napoleon and had shown his current allegiances for everyone to see. When it became apparent that Napoleon was going to take back the throne Ney had finally understood his position and probably with melancholy new his relationship with Napoleon was tainted if not for ever at least for the present time.

Ney desperately desired to be given a command in 1815 but Napoleon had deliberately kept Ney in his estate, away from public life and in the dark. This was done as a reprimand to Ney and also to be seen as justified a response for all at court to see that Napoleon had defended his own personal honour against such a statement Ney had made. Ney simply could not be trusted and Napoleon had to do this to teach the Red head a lesson. But I also feel Napoleon had every intention to bring Ney back under his wing because Napoleon was pretty short on friends and Ney had been a good friend to him for many years regardless of the 1814 demand to abdicate or the Iron cage statement. Ney was simply a man who told it like it was and Napoleon probably greatly respected him for his bluntness even if it was at times hurtful.

Now back to the fateful decision to charge the cavalry into the British line. Even though Ney was taken back and finally given a command he knew he had to redeem himself under the eyes of his master. He had to perform some prodigy of valour out of all proportion to his previous mistakes and this he felt was his moment to mend it all. Ney gave the order to advance totally blinded by the realities of all conventions to prudent tactical advice and launched such an impulsive attack giving no time to consider the consequences. He desired to wash away all the hurt and coldness between himself and Napoleon in one single moment. What he actually did was to bring about the destruction of the French heavy cavalry and inevitably the loss of the battle.

Now you might think I am being harsh on Ney but if you think about it I am actually blaming both Ney and Napoleon, they had taken their petty personal fuel into a campaign and between the two of them lost the campaign. Ney sealed his own fate by the demand for abdication in 1814, the Iron Cage remarks and his subsequent rash cavalry attacks on 18th June. Napoleon for his stubbiness to fight on in 1814 when all was lost, his sulking for the Iron cage remarks and his childlike attitude of placing Ney out all alone as a mere spectator like some school yard bully to teach Ney a lesson. Calling him up on the eve of the campaign, keeping him from any command on the march into Belgium again like a spectator at best or like a hanger on at worst, walking along with the army without any purpose or direction on the march. All of this compounded to modify the campaign and its consequences resulted in the total destruction of the entire structure.

All the ills of the army and its mistakes discussed and bantered over by so many for countless years came down to a mere feud between two men. Napoleon desiring to hurt Ney in return for his actions and words but knowing his worth on the battlefield and Ney's only desire to redeem himself to not only his master but everyone else as well, Ney knew his words and actions were very questionable at best.

Napoleon should have done one of two things; he should have either forgiven Ney long before the start of the Campaign so they had time to heal and mend the feud between them or simply not employed Ney at all in the 1815 campaign in Belgium. Either one of these two alternate decisions could have totally changed to course of the campaign…

This is totally my take on the situation after my own reading and research, please feel free to refute or agree. I would dearly like to know if I am close to the mark or way off.

Regards,
Shane

Hmm. OK, leaving asside the line about Bautzen which has been debated, and I thought painteda very different picture than the commonly perceived failings of Ney.

You say Ney decided to launch the cavalry attack against the 'retreating' allies – I'm at work so can't check but isn't there evidence of Napoleon himself ordering the attacks????

Daryl

Am I right in thinking that Napoleon's "management team" was somewhat unsettled for the Waterloo campaign. I'm also at work, and far from expert, but IIRC

Normal chief of staff not available
Something about Grouchy being a late choice? or something?
Napoleon himself possibly being ill

The atmosphere would have been odd I'm thinking – almost but not quite like the "good old days", with both reminders of their successes and eventual defeats. Some familiar faces would have been missing or in unfamiliar roles. Possibly Ney just caught the general discontent and "misfiring" differently to some.

I wonder how much it mucked up command and communication for everyone to insert another tier of command – Ney and Grouchy – into the Armee du Nord at such a late stage. Could the corps commanders be sure who to take orders from?

imrael has a point; there were generals there who had never swerved from being ardent Bonapartists, now being asked to serve alongside or under men who had turned their coats more than once. Bourmont's defection at the start of the campaign can't have helped.

Was it a case of "keep your friends close and your enemies closer"?

Ney showed a tendency to get out of hand years earlier – see his performance at Jena.

I think his experiencs in Russia may have impaired his judgement. He was rash at Quatre Bras, when not under the direct eye of the Emperor.

He badgered Kellermann into making a charge but then failed to arrange for support, wasting the temporary success that was achieved. And then there's the foul-up with De La Bedoyere's note that resulted in D'Erlon marching back and forth betwen the two battles without fighting in either one.
When the end came at Waterloo, Ney led Brue's brigade in an insane attack and thus wasted the only remaining line unit still following orders.

Ney was brave and charismatic, but his judgement could be suspect, at least as far back as 1806.

This is kinda off the main track, but I recently noticed that Col. De La Bedoyere, who delivered the befuddling order re D'Erlon, had been the commander of the first regiment sent to stop Napoleon on the latter's advance on Paris after escaping from Elba, and thus he was the first to defect to him (thus his appointment as an ADC to N, I presume). And, of course, Ney was a late defector. Ironic?

More to your point, Shane: I agree that much hinged on the personal relationship between N and N. Ultimately, of course, the responsibility rests with Napoleon. As you say, he would no doubt have been better off had he either forgiven Ney sooner or not at all. Coming in at the last moment, without a proper staff of his own, Ney really didn't know what Napoleon wanted him to do, at either QB or WL.

Apart from anything else, was Ney simply promoted beyond his level of competence?
His background as a hussar trooper before the Revolution taught him the values of courage, personal example & leading from the front.
These estimable qualiteis are not great for a Corps or army commander.
How many (or few to be more exact) men were in the rearguard in 1812?
I think the gap between subordinate & independant commander is great & many who excell at the first, lack in the second.
donald

Hi don, yes, I agree,

Napoleon was far from infallible, sometimes people who admire him lose sight of the fact that he was just human after all, made up of flesh and blood like the rest of us.

We read history is a very black and white tone where personalities seldom come into the picture and when they do it suddenly makes you sit up and listen more carefully. Personalities can and do affect every aspect of our lives and people clash every day over personalities. Co-workers in companies can attest to this where certain people might not like each other and not get on, it affects the relationships that are important to run a company and ultimately their goals.

Equally important personalities and relationships in any facet of life can and do change. Adversaries can make up their differences and begin again anew with a fresh clean slate. Although this is rare it does happen and can be the start of a new working relationship that heals old wounds, but again, this is a rare event. Or on the other hand one or the other of the protagonists may leave for one reason or another and so on, this allows the other person to carry on with their own plan or agenda so to speak. It might not be the correct one and things might go wrong but it is much better than two people locking horns over a certain topic.

With Ney and Napoleon I feel both men were (on a personal level) deeply hurt by the other. Ney stood over Napoleon in 1814 to demand his abdication and Napoleon, in a very weak state at that time had no other choice. He might have been Emperor of France but the situation of that day all the pomp and prestige of titles meant very little as France was being overrun by the Allies. The word Emperor meant very little right at that moment.

Napoleon became simply a man at that point; he knew his title of Emperor at that point meant very little, his power was diminished to its lowest point. Ney would not have come out and said, "Mate, your not an emperor anymore, you finished, just sign here". Respect for a fallen man in a poor state would not allow it, however, he had to make Napoleon see sense one way or another and the other Marshals knew only Ney could do that.

Napoleon walked away from the entire situation surely feeling hurt that all those men had given up on him and left him to suffer on his own. This is clear in Napoleon's own words about ingratitude that we have heard many times. It must have been a hard pill to swallow for Napoleon and one he must have stewed on for 10 months sitting on in Elba. This could have even made Napoleon on his return a much more callous person, halting and haughty towards those who he felt abandoned him in 1814…

The Iron Cage saga for me was such a stupid thing for Ney to say and promise to the King, not a very bright statement and probably said in an unthinking rash manor to make the King understand his loyalty to him. However, one must understand Ney is still only human no matter how many battles he had fought in and survived or how many men looked up to him and revered him. Ney, being human is just as susceptible to saying stupid statements like anybody else and he did. I honestly don't think Ney regretted saying it at all at first. I think Ney felt Napoleon could or would not get to Paris and so felt pretty secure.

When it became apparent Napoleon was increasing in strength with every mile he traversed north it soon became apparent to Ney his position was useless and by then the men under his command were on the verge of going over to Napoleon. Ney still held their respect but Ney knew it was useless to try to keep them loyal to the King even if he personally desired to stop Napoleon which I am sure he did want to do.

I think Napoleon being a very astute man saw this and knew what Ney could have done or tried to do but did not do. Napoleon at that point already knew about the Iron Cage statement and although I feel he probably was not that deeply hurt by it initially at least knew others around him were so Napoleon, to save his own face and maintain respect to all the court followers at the time eventually ignored Ney, kept him in the dark and sent him home to his estates. Napoleon wanted to make an example of Ney to all around him on a personal level, as if to say, "see, I took care of Ney and the way he insulted me".

Ney knew this and accepted his fate albeit indignantly, what else could he do?. If you step back and look at the situation you have firstly Napoleon hurt and insulted by Ney's words and actions in 1814, then the King is insulted by Ney's words and actions in 1815. Then again Napoleon is again insulted and hurt by Ney once more on his return with the iron cage statement etc…Ney by now did not have I think that many friends or people who trusted anything he did or said. Ney was poison to most ways of thinking and more and more turned to his wife and family for consoling, what else could he do?

While on his estates Ney had a good six weeks to think about his situation, his actions and words, his situation and how people might feel about him. At the end of this exile Ney desired nothing more than to fix the wrongs and right everything once more. He was anxious to get back into the army under Napoleon's eye and mend the bridges. He desired enthusiastically to become the man Napoleon and the soldiers could count on and when the day came on the eve of the campaign Ney was worried he would miss out on his chance to show his intentions.

When Ney was called back he could not get there quick enough, he didn't even have horses and rush in a buggy to get to the staging areas where he managed finally to procure two horses from a fellow general with a medical condition and unable to advance with the army. But even when he arrived at HQ he was not really received with any fanfare becoming of one of his rank. He marched with the army without any command at all. Napoleon it seemed had nothing for him to do and maybe Ney personally felt indignant over this. I am of the belief that Ney's procrastination at QB was due to this new hurt and anger Napoleon seemed to aim at him once more. Coupled with a sudden new command of formations he hardly knew commanded itself by some men who might not exactly trust Ney all that well.

For me it is interesting to try to understand the relationship between Ney and Napoleon at that time, how they felt about each other and if animosity had built to such a level that it made working together as a team impossible. Not only that but the relationships or possible lack of them between Ney and his own subordinates as a result of his previous words and actions against Napoleon. Did they really trust him or worse, did they look at him with distain? And then did Ney sense this? Did Ney feel he really did not belong here in this army if the air could be cut with a knife?

Obviously I am only speculating here but if the animosity and distrust between Ney and Napoleon and even the Army was at such a low point it could explain very easily the apparent poor showing of Ney between the days of 15th to 18th June 1815.

Like I said, Napoleon might have done much better to have left Ney at his Estates or made up with him over the three months before Waterloo. They could have gone hunting, taken a few pints at the pub and gotten ed together…But calling him back on the eve of the campaign after a two month cone of silence was the biggest mistake Napoleon could have made and I think cost him the battle of Waterloo…

Regards,
Shane

Not meaning this offensively but despite the volume you have written without siting references this seems to be little more than idle conjecture to me.

Hi,

Sure, I have recently read this book which goes deeply into the Life of Ney.

link

and …

link
link
link
link
link
link

Also countless book exist on the subject regarding the possible and at times apparent animosity between these two great men.

As I did say though, I am speculating that this animosity was enough to destroy any hope there was to gain success in the Campaign of Belgium.

Regards,
Shane

Why always look for scapegoats?
Napoleon did mostly win with a solid numerical superiority in the theater oft war, concentrating superior forces at the chosen point was part of his genius.
With inferior numbers his campaigns did usually fail.
In 1815 in Belgium he was outnumbered nearly 2 to 1 , there was a military miracle needed to win, it didn´t happen.
No reason to blame Ney or Grouchy or Soult, who did all just do what could be expected from them.

Those who consider the cavalry charges at Waterloo a big mistake by hothead Ney should rather ask what else could be done at that momment or simply if there are cases in which massed cavalry charges were more succesful then at Waterloo.
I think the french cavalry performance at Waterloo was more succesful than at Wagram, Borodino or Leipzig and arguably even more succesful then at Eylau.

Well thats just a list of reading material.

I meant more specific references to support some of your statements that to be honest seem to assume a detailed knowledge of exactly what Ney and Napoleon were thinking at the time.

I think before you could even begin to speculate whether any supposed animosity between Ney and Napoleon was suffecient to lose the 1815 campaign you would need to establish that it actually had any impact at all.

Just my 2cents

There is no question as to some level of animosity between the two men in 1814-15. It is real and it did happen. My point is to speculate that it was at a sufficient level as to of caused their working relationship during the campaign to fail.

That is why I put this thread up, to find out if others can see what I am saying might have any thruth to it. The book Marshal Ney, Bravest of the Brave is indeed reading material and goes very deeply into this question. If you do not own it then maybe you might want to before you dismiss what I am saying out of hand.

Regards,
Shane

I am not dismissing anything you say out of hand, just saying that to make your point you should site references to back up your statements.

Example:

Ney gave the order to advance totally blinded by the realities of all conventions to prudent tactical advice and launched such an impulsive attack giving no time to consider the consequences. He desired to wash away all the hurt and coldness between himself and Napoleon in one single moment.

Where are the sources to back up that Ney made the decision to attack because he wanted to wash away the hurt rather than basing his decision on the tactical situation as he saw it on the battlfield at that point in time.

Where are the sources to back up he gave no time to consider the consequences of his actions.

Where are the sources to back up that he was blinded to all realities or that this was against prudent tactical advice (advice from whom?)

As I said not dismissing your statement out of hand, but I am interested in seeing the specific references to support these statements.

ohh for gods sake, I am purely putting this thread up for discussion, I am not trying to prove anything other than the possiblility that the two men due to animosity between them fialed to work together in the 1815 campaign.

If you want sources then read a few books yourself. There are countless book that go into detail about the situation regarding these two men and their problems. I am not going to list them all simply for you. Most people here already know them selves there were problems between these two men, it is proven fact there was. Do I need to cite every book or piece of literiture about the Iron Cage statments? do I need to go into detail about the 1814 abdication and Ney's hand in it? do I need to go into detail and cite references about QB and the anger Ney had regarding the removel of an entire corps from his command? do I need to cite references as to how angry Napoleon was to learn Ney had failed to take the cross roads? do I need to cite references and go into detail regarding the premiture cavalry attacks at Waterloo?

all of us can find this data in countless books, all I am doing is passing speculation that combined all of this caused a high level of animosity between the two men and ulimately the loss of a campaign…is that too hard to understand?

Regards
Shane

"I am of the belief that Ney's procrastination at QB was due to this new hurt and anger Napoleon seemed to aim at him once more."

Ok, I'll bite again….whats the 'procrastination' and whats your basis for saying there was any?

As for the comments above, when throwaway lines like these are given, and then used as the basis for another discussion, then yes…the conversation does have to stop, back up, and substantiate such sweeping statements first IMHO.

Daryl

Guys,

You're missing the point; you are reading my words like they are fact. They are not and I stated that already several times. My words are pure speculation and conjecture based on what I have read over the years regarding these two men.

My latest book I have read is this one : link

Atteridge himself believes there is much to the story that the animosity between the two men was deep and I fully believe it. I am not going to quote every passage in the book but instead suggest if you want proof to go out and purchase it yourselves.

Again, my purpose here is to place an opinion based on what I have read; I do believe there was a problem and feel it had a lot to do with the conduct of both men towards each other. My statements are sweeping and they are broad but that was done on purpose, I desire to know if others feel the same way as I do, not to prove myself, you cannot prove gut feelings because the historians cannot write about what was going on in the minds of these men can they? You can only speculate as I am…do you understand where I am coming from now?

Regards,
Shane

I have no doubt Shane that Ney would want to have performed better at Waterloo after QB-but what doesnt stack up is why if he felt such animosity to Napoleon he would have cared particularly much what Nappy thought about him.
I think that his caution at QB was more to do with having faced Wellington previously at places like Busaco-something Napoleon had never done. And seeing how steaming in was quite easily defeated by Welly must have made him be a bit more circumspect.
I think throughout all of the war Napoleon considered Ney his best Marshal-he consistently picked him to command often poorer quality troops ( as he thought he would be able to get the best out of them),gave him many more indpendent commands ,including an independent army command I think( which I dont believe he ever did for any other Marshal)
I cant see him doing that for someone who he didnt like and respect.
The 100 days was a bit of weird situation for both of them I think.
So you may be right about "redemption"
Ney wanted to help manufacture a victory for his friend.
I also think that the cavalry charges were more about Ney realising he needed to win quickly and tried his luck against what he thought were an ill disciplined amalgam of allied troops than about whether he had battle fatigue
Just my musings

My take on Ney at Waterloo is that he was swept up in a desperate struggle and too much was expected of him.

When Napoleon launched the attack on the right, Ney went forward with that. Then he wanted La Haye Saint taken and sent forward Ney to take it. Cavalry charge? Ney leads it. Old Guard advance? Ney leads it, or is at least front and center. He was playing the part of super-aide-de-camp and expected to be everywhere and accomplish everything.

He was never given a proper headquarters and never given a definite area of responsibility. He was just supposed to be Napoleon's sword arm. It is an unfair position to put a commander in but as a motivator of men and someone who would show courage in the face of adversity, Ney was exactly the man to do it.

I don't think Ney's loyalty was ever entirely to Louis XVIII or Napoleon, or even to France. I believe that Michel Ney's loyalty was to the army and the soldiers that made it what it was. He took his courage from knowing that the soldiers trusted him and depended upon him.

There's no real basis for it or account of it, but in my imagination, Marshal Ney has tears in his eyes as he leads his cavalry charges at Waterloo.

S,

Intrigued by this section of your essay:

"Then came the command given by Wellington to retire his overextended line back over the brow of the ridge and the protection of its brow. This singular apparently insignificant act was going to cause such a response out of all proportion to what should have happened that no one could have foreseen it. Ney either heard of the retirement or was told about it and decided probably on remarks of those around him that the entire British army was in actual fact retreating"

What evidence do you have to support this assertion that the cavalry charges were prompted by Wellington's withdrawal order?

DB

My words are pure speculation and conjecture

I would dearly like to know if I am close to the mark or way off.

Your way off.

*Please note my comments are also pure speculation and conjecture so don't ask me to back them up with anyhting like proof its just my gut feeling.

Ney stuck his neck out for Napoleon, he was executed for that, so why the bad feeling against Ney, who surley did his best in the days of June 1815.

He was very good in 1805 and in 1812 – at Borodino he also knew more about the situation of the battle than Napoleon, his request for the Guard was denied.

Again, no need to buy this book it is available to all as a free download from Internet Archive:

The bravest of the brave, Michel Ney, marshal of France, duke of Elchingen, prince of the Moskowa 1769-1815. Atteridge, A. Hilliard. 1912:

link

There are several other Ney books on the same site – just input ‘Ney'!

Steve

Marshal or Maréchal not Marshall. Marshall is a name, not a title.

Just me nitpicking, never mind.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I guess speaking your mind is not considered allowable by some people.

/shrug nevermind, I will conform and tow the line from now on, I promise.

"I guess speaking your mind is not considered allowable by some people."

I guess disagreeing with people that speak their mind is not considered allowable by some people.

<;^}

IMHO Speaking your mind is fine, but if you aren't interested in letting us know how you arrived at these conclusions the discussion becomes a bit pointless.

We all will simply state our own different conclusions and have no objective way to evaluate each others conclusions.

Are you right? I have no way to know what info you may have uncovered.
Am I right? No way for you to know what info I may have uncovered.

Your potted history of the life (and death) of Ney was interesting but irrelevant/unecessary given the subject.

You were stating that the Ney <> Nap relationship had sunk the Waterloo Campaign and you focused on two main incidents QB and Waterloo as evidence of the consequences and then asked us to tell you whether you were right or not.

So quite rightly we first want to discuss these "consequences", becuase if they are not valid then your whole argument doesn't have anything to stand on.

Now we could just come out and say, sorry thats just BS, instead believing in giving everyone the benefit of the doubt, we ask how did you get this information about these "consequences" i.e. how did you know that Ney's ordering of the Cavlary attack was due to how he felt about Nap's treatment of him, and you reply "well, its just my gut telling me".
So in light of that what can we say, how can we tell you whether your right or wrong, we can only go on the evidence which we each already had as you gave us nothing, so the answer is no your wrong….

What other conclusion could anyone make?

Hope you you follow this and take it as it was meant.

>>>>I guess disagreeing with people that speak their mind is not considered allowable by some people.<<<<

correct steven, that is exactly what I did, speak my mind…and my comments were aimed at blackmamba only, but it seems voicing opinions or views is not allowed.

okie, I will go through the book I have, Marshal Ney, Bravest of the Brave and quote the parts which I feel are valid for my points and post them here tonight. I do feel strongly that their relationship was on the rocks and in no small way helped fail the entire campaign. I might have worded my esay poorly, for which I am sorry but I do feel strongly about this none the less.

I will post all this soon but it will take some time to research it all and gather together.

Regards,
Shane

In reflection I am sorry, I should have backed up my points with the relevant evidence but failed to do so. I will endeavour to do so over this weekend. I realise now. Then you guys can dispute it to your hearts content or agree…

Shane

Shane IMHO its one thing to state a "gut feel" and ask others opinion on it. I have done so many times.

But that isn't ALL you did.

In the passages where you explained what your opinion was, you gave a couple of judgements on Neys actions at specific times (Bautzen, Waterloo, QB) and either tangentialy or directly considered your assesment of his actions in these instances.

Therefore, questioning how you arrive at your opinions on the mentioned specific actions is in no way questioning, or even discussing, your 'gut feel'.

Seperate issues.

You could have given just the gut feeling and thrown it open for discussion, but thats not what happened.

Daryl

shane sorry, just re-read that and the tone was way to abrupt. I wasn't trying to cause an argument, just point it out :-).

For Ney at Bautzen

TMP link

no problem at all hos459 I totally understand. I did word my essay incorrectly or in the wrong way. I wanted to open it for discussion and debate based on many things over the years I had read. The latest book by Atteridge, Marshal Ney. Bravest of the Brave goes very deeply into these questions about Ney and paints a picture of a man who militarily was brilliant but on a social and personal level was rude, arrogant, haughty and argumentative. He mostly directed all this at his superiors right up to 1812 and it caused problems for many around him but never really affected his relationship with Napoleon all that much because he was not with him all that much.

However, from 1813 onwards Ney spent alot of time close to Napoleon and as a result started to show the same insubordination, argumentative side and other sides of his character which I feel affected his relationship with Napoleon as it had for him with Soult, Massena, Jourdan and many others. Napoleon began to get really annoyed at Ney and his personality failings but knew he could not afford to lose him and put up with it. When Ney stood over Napoleon at the 1814 abdication things went downhill from there.

I am currently going through all my books and quoting entire passages relating to all this in the hope that I can paint a clearer picture of what I think was happening that some might not yet see. I honestly believe Ney was a brilliant man and he is still one of my heroes but he did have failings and I thought it not that harsh to show them.

I have no agenda to crush Ney's reputation or slander him but merely to point out he did have issues with authority and anger management and in the end it caught up with him. Noe do I wish to make excuses for the loss of Waterloo or demean Welington's and Blucher's victory there, I merely want to point out that I believe alot of the poor disicions made in that campaign were due to Ney's and Napoleon's fued and also Ney's seemingly poor use of his troops which may or may not have been directly related to this problem…

Regards,
Shane

Shane,

It has always struck me as odd how Ney has something of a reputation as a bit of a dunce for the Waterloo thing, but the same guy wrote Military Studies. I have found this work to be extremel useful in helping me understand French higher unit maneuvers. To me, it is a very thorough and thoughtful work, especially when one considers that Ney is more widely regarded as a man of action and not as much a skilled tactician or thinker.

Anyway, I just downloaded The Bravest of the Brave so I am interested in your citations.

One of the things that would need to be considered in pondering the rationale of the grand charge is that it was a tactical choice unlike anything on a wargame table in that it was not a 'Oh, what the Hell' moment where everything turned on a single decision.

Is it not said that Ney personally led seven charges? He'd been at (or near) the front. Maybe a misunderstanding of the situation might have resulted in a first order to press an attack but over the course of the hour or more that the numerous charges were carried out, a very clear idea of the situation must have been assessed.

It wasn't 'all in' on the first bid. He made informed decisions over and over again to continue raising the stakes.

I'm not saying that this vantage point negates Shane's theory but I do believe that we armchair generals/psychologists must remind ourselves of this sort of appreciation of time and perceptions when considering such issues.

The fact that a cavalry force of less than 10000 men was able to paralyze an army of 70000 for nearly 2 hours is actually quite an achivement, shortly afterwards La Haye Sainte was taken and the most critical moment for Wellington´s force had come. Wellington was even unable to launch a counter attack and take it back, his army was obviously at this stage, at least temporarily, in a state of a standing KO .

Wellington has called the battle a "near run thing".
Why? because of D´Erlons attack at the beginning,which was a failure and did last not more than 15 minutes? Because of Hougoumont, which was a side show with only a handful of bataillons involved at any given time? Because of the final guard attack, which was made by just 5 bataillons?

perhaps people are just to much focussed on broken squares.
Other massed cavalry attacks were not more succesful in breaking squares.
In other battles massed cavalry was actually mostly even unable to break into the opponents line of battle.
Perhaps the attacks at Waterloo were sustained and reinforced just because this time it was doable.
Wellingtons cavalry of equal strength(!)was incredible passive. 40000 muskets, 200 guns and one of the densiest troop concentrations on any napoleonic battlefield was obviously unable to stop them.
They did more than at Borodino, Wagram or Leipzig.

Never interrupt your enemy in the middle of a mistake.

@Bagration1812
@malcolmmccallum
@CPTN IGLO
Completely agree with your comments.
Even though its only 200 years ago not 2000, and its the most written about battle in history there is so much we dont really and never will know about the battle.

We dont really know what the tactical situations was as Ney saw it at a moment in time somewhere south of LHS, we dont even know for sure what orders were given and by whom and to which units, and indeed it is very doubtful if LHS would have fallen without the charges, so can you really argue he was wrong let alone that the decision were made because of some hurt he felt.

It has always struck me as odd that…
the attack on Hougomont was a waste, d'Erlons attack was smashed, the cavalry were totally ineffective, the GrandBattery was too far away and anyway all Welly troops were on the reverse slope, the Guard was destroyed and most of the troops were off trying to hold off the Prussian….
and yet…
Wellington thinks it was close, the army had a several wobbly moments.

>>>>the attack on Hougomont was a waste<<<<

The attack on Hougomnt was only a waste due to the number of men sucked into the vacuum. It was never meant to draw so many men into it but due to those in high command (Jerome Bonaparte) desiring to be the one responsible for its capture and frustrated in almost doing so only to be driven back time and again the temptation became too much. He ordered more and more formations into the meat grinder and Reille really had his hands tied to an extent.

>>>>d'Erlons attack was smashed<<<<

Only because they were surprised by the British well timed cavalry counter charges and the lack of supporting cavalry to fend them off.

>>>>cavalry were totally ineffective,<<<<

Yup, because they went in unsupported and no Horse artillery to speak of, they were not going to do much against an enemy covered by terrain, artillery support and skirmisher fire let alone their own defensive fire from countless squares. The Cavalry charges were doomed to fail. However, I do feel that if just one square broke it would have domino-ed, especially amongst the allied squares and a major catastrophe could have occured. But that is another what if…

>>>>the Grand Battery was too far away and anyway all Welly troops were on the reverse slope<<<<

Correct, usually in past Grand batteries Napoleon set up the enemy was fully visible and suffered immense casualties before Infantry and or Cavalry attacks went in. At Waterloo this was not the case. That ridge saved the British forces from annihilation.

>>>>the Guard was destroyed<<<<

Incorrect, the guard was not destroyed, 5 battalions marched up the ridge and broke, yes but this was between 7:30pm to 8:30pm – there were much more than 5 btlns of guard at Waterloo.

>>>>and most of the troops were off trying to hold off the Prussian….<<<<

Incorrect once again, Lobou's corps never faced the British all day. It sat in reserve near the guard until the Prussians appaeared on the right. The Young Guard also was in reserve all day in this secotr and did not face the Brits. Lobou's 15,000 men and the 4,000 men of the Young Guard is a total of 19,000 men. Add to that the two btlns of Old Guard that attacked the Prussians later on in the day and you reach 20,000 men total facing the Prussians. This, out of a total of 72,000 is only under 28% of the total forces the French had on the field. A far cry from "most of the troops" as you state.

Regards,
Shane

Man you completely misunderstood my post!!!

Off target by a country mile….

Maybe it would have been easier for you if I had put quotes round that but I assumed that if you read the CPTN IGLO and malcolmmccallum posts who I was agreeing totaly with you would have figured that out but no…

Oh well…. to spell it out for you the point I was making was that these are common perceptions about what happened that day and statements you will find in some so called "books" and yet the difficulty that Welly had in just holding on and that he was only saved by the Prussian doesnt stack up with arguing that these were failures

So you can forget the "A far cry from…" statement 'cos I wasn't stating that…..

and takes me back to not understanding how you are going to blame the "failed cavalry attacks" on a tiff between Ney and Nappy without first establishing that they were a failure, that Ney even ordered them, and that they werent just sound decisions take based on the tactical situation as seen from a few hundereds yards south of LHS on a smoke covered battle field by a man who had faced Welly before so was aware of the british preference for the reverse slope.

Lobou's corps …. sat in reserve near the guard

I thought it was now accepted now that this was a fiction of Nappy at St. Helena and that Lobau was way out to the right from the very start.

But thats maybe another topic lol

actually blackmamba you are off by a country mile, the purpose of my entire threat was to establish the fact that there "was" a relationship between Ney and Napoleon but you somehow have aimed there entire picture towards waterloo.

1815 is only a very small part of the overall picture I am painting and I assure you when I am finished my research and have posted it you will get a very clear understanding of where I am coming from.

I do not for one minute feel the failure of the cavalry attacks were as a result of what you call, a "tif" between Nappy and Ney. I am making the point that Ney was prone to making impulsive, ill thought out decisions that became mistakes that cost Napoleon dearly more than once and other superiors of Ney over the previous years as well.

As I said, my previous post might not have explained it clearly as I never said I was a wiz at writing but I know I have the evidence.

Meanwhile I suggest you download Atteridge's book, Marshal Ney, Bravest of the Brave to see my points. Bagration has already done so…

As for Lobou, his corps actually did start its positions behind De Erlon and near the guard on the right rear of the French army. This was done on purpose by Napoleon as a reserve for a very valid reason. Napoleon and the general staff were not that trusting of their right flank as it was and Lobau was placed there as a precaution which proved a very wise decision indeed. This allowed him to turn to his right and advance to attack the on coming Prussians easily. I suggest you do some research of your own.

Shane

thread*

proof reading is a good idea.

Meanwhile I suggest you download Atteridge's book, Marshal Ney, Bravest of the Brave to see my points.

Bin there, done that….

From what I understand Lobau corp only appeared in that postion after the 3 revision of Nappy memoirs on St Helena, the bulletin issued on the 20th had them in a different position as does the accounts of some of the 6corps officers

Recommended historical reading for Shane: the first post in this thread.

Nobody, I trust, is going to argue against the idea that Napoleon and Ney had a relationship. Obviously they had a long history and it involved something close to friendship, at least. Also, I expect that we all recognize that Napoleon had streaks of petulance that carried over from personal slights to European Grand Politics.

His decisions about who would take command on the left wing in 1815 certainly had alot to his personal trust of the available people, his personal beliefs about their ability and motivations, and general assessments of them as people. The same was true of his choice for who would command in Paris and who would take the right and who would be his chief of staff.

We would also, I trust, all recognize that every soldier was also a living person and is that hero in their own life's story. Yes, their individual moods, ambitions, and personal feelings toward one another would colour all of their actions.

The only aspect of the theory that is being questioned, I believe, is the *extent* to which Ney's personal feelings coloured his professional decisions.

There might only be a small portion of us that believes that Ney's problems in the late wars was that he had become stupid. We know that people don't work that way.

Are the Vancouver Canucks starting to fall apart this season because Roberto Luongo is angry at Markus Naslund? Yes, analyzing every failed save over the past month is not going to help much in solving that mystery and there might be something to the theory but even the players themselves would be unable to point to anything resembling a truth. It is one factor among hundreds and nobody will ever know if it ever decisively affected a single moment on the ice.

People are funny.

I was just about to try and take it down a notch but I think malcolmmccallum has hit the nail on the head in terms of what I would have said.

That Ney was not the same guy that marched into Russia in 1812 no one would deny, that Nappy and they guy would made the "cage" statement werent bosom buddies no one would have issue with.

But to take that and end up with this statement:

Now, the question is, "why did Ney order the cavalry to attack in such a rash and unsupported manor"?

I feel this can be answered in one single word, "Redemption".

This is something there is no evidence for that I can see, and thats what you asked.

As to the book, it makes exciting reading but the style makes it hard to seperate fact from fantasy and that makes it hard to rely on what it says IMHO.

Hi all,

This is my attempt to show evidence that may or may not prove my point that Ney and Napoleon were on low personal terms with each other which may have began as far back as 1813 at Bautzen with Ney's failed outflanking manoeuvre.

The following are direct quotes from various sources I have which I feel paint a vivid picture as to the deteriorated personal relationship between these two great men. Napoleon was hurt by Ney's actions and words and revenged him with stony silence for 6 weeks before the crucial Waterloo campaign only to recall him once he realized he needed charismatic leaders to lead the easily impressionable men of the army. Napoleon knew Ney's charisma and love from the men and his leadership style bravery was second to none.

Despite his better judgment Napoleon took him back even after his actions and words not knowing what was to unfold. Ney, desired to redeem himself under his old master and show him just as he desired to show the King his loyalty and devotion however, Napoleon still kept the animosity going on the march into Belgium. Napoleon did not give Ney any command and as a result he was nothing more than a mere Aide d camp, Ney found this hard to swallow but honor and respect for himself forced him to bite his tongue. Eventually he was given command and the rest is history.

What I am trying to portray is by no means meant to put Ney in a bad light whatsoever, Ney was a brilliant field commander, it cannot be denied. Ney's problem was his lack of ability to use tact during non war situations, he readily said and did things that offended others and usually spoke before thinking. This is what I feel caused him trouble off the battlefield and created problems for all those around him. Ney simply could not help himself, he said it like it was, he was blunt and at times could be hurtful. Some might see that as a flaw and Ney himself said he had no interest in politics whatsoever which is probably a good idea seeing he had very limited restraint, tact and diplomacy.

I want to make it clear that personally to me Ney is one of my favorite Marshal's his qualities and leadership are second to none, his tactical skill and ability are brilliant and his tenacity on the battlefield are superb, it was his mouth and blunt way of speaking his mind which got him into trouble. This might do him well on the battlefield but in a social setting it leads to trouble and eventually enemies of which in the end it was proven he had many. Some of whom presided over his trial and subsequent death sentence.

Firstly it must be understood my feelings on this stem from the books I have read, the statements by authors of these books and their own opinions and conclusions drawn from the evidence they themselves present. I only add that based on this evidence I conclude that personally the two men at that point in time, 1814-1815 were on low personal terms with each other and this emanated down into the army and the actions, non-actions and decisions that were made in that crucial time.

I do not make excuses for the army's performance against the British or Prussians whatsoever, the battles fought and the decisions made, strategies used and tactics employed were directly as a result and consequence of high command namely Napoleon and Ney. Both men are to blame for what happened along with many other situations and problems which arose.

The following quotes will be punctuated with "……." To show that some test is not needed to be typed simply because it may be long winded and irrelevant to my points throughout the passages shown.

1st Book: Ney, Bravest of the Brave – A.H. Atteridge

Page 93 Authors comments Jena 1806 – "An incident of this day related by De Fezensac, who was then attached to Ney's staff, throws a strange light on his methods of command, and the whole machinery of the Imperial army. As a soldier of the Republic Ney had lived on terms of familiar friendship with those who were associated with him in the work of command. As a Marshal of the Empire he kept aloof from them. According to one account his confidence had been betrayed by an officer, who served with him at the Boulogne camps, and henceforth he protected himself by trusting no one"(Haughty and Aloof)….."Then Ney, eager for the fight, and regardless of the strict letter of his orders from the Emperor, brought his small force into action on the left of Lannes". – (Insubordination)

Page 95 – Jena 1806 – "Ney was anything but pleased at finding himself thus once more associated with Murat and under his orders, for as second on the list of Marshals and an Imperial Prince younger soldier was his senior in rank".

Page 98 – Poland 1807 – "Jomini was carrying a letter to Ney from Napoleon written in a tone of severe censure, and was also charged with a verbal message for the marshal, and during the northward journey he told De Fezensas its purport. The Emperor had been seriously displeased at the news from Ney. "What is the meaning, he had asked, of these movements that I never ordered, which fatigue the troops and may even endanger them? To obtain supplies? To extend the occupation of the country and enter Konigsberg? But it is my business to direct the movements of the army and to provide for its needs. And who authorized Marshal Ney to conclude an armistice – a right that belongs to the Emperor alone as commander-in-chief? Generals have been brought before a court of inquiry for acts like this. Napoleon was angry, and Jomini was to express his displeasure to Ney". (Insubordination)

Pages 107-08 Spain 1808 – "Ney found himself isolated among enemies…..For the first time in his life Ney hesitated to advance, though his orders told him to do so……had he blindly obeyed Napoleon's orders and marched at once to Agreda he probably would have cut off Castanos" ……The Emperor was very disappointed at the news that Ney had failed to carry out his orders. He wrote blaming him for the halt at Soria though at the same time, he admitted that he had some cause for prudent hesitation". (Insubordination)

Page 110 Spain 1809 – "Ney curtly rejected a plan of campaign sent him by Marshal Jourdan. "This order, he wrote to Jourdan, is drawn up by someone who knows nothing of our business. The Emperor has given me an army to conquer with and not to capitulate. You may tell the King (Joseph) that I have not come here to play the part of Dupont". The state of mind manifested in such an utterance , the contempt for the puppet king and his major-general, the independence resulting from the difficulty of communications, all helped to produce a tendency to insubordination towards authority,……Ney's action in the crisis that later on brought to an abrupt end his command in the Peninsula". (Insubordination)

Page 111 Spain – "The Emperor was very angry with Marchand, and ordered Marshal Ney to return post-haste to Slamanca. Ney arrived there in very bad humour. He had a quarrel with Jomini whom he blamed for the mischance that had so abruptly cut short his leave of absence. The Switzer resigned his place as chief of the staff,……" (Anger and Short Temper)

Page 111 Spain – "Then came Ney's first open quarrel with Massena. Massena sent a letter to Ney directing him to assign Junot's engineer officer Lt.-Col. Valaze as head of the siege operations of Cuidad-Rodrigo. Ney was indignant at what he regarded as a plan for giving to a protégé of Junot the credit for taking the fortress, after his own officer had done the hardest part of the work…..Massena was furious, and talked of removing Ney from his command and sending him back to France….Massena – "You will see that this proud fellow will upset all our plans with his stubborn self-will and foolish vanity". (Insubordination)

Valaze was sent back to Massena only two days later with a letter from Ney to Massena – The contents of this letter are long winded but include words like, "your title is of no importance outside the Tuileries" and "I will no more listen to your orders than I fear your threats". The letter goes on and is pretty scathing and insulting to say the least. (Insubordination)

Massena replies to Junot – "You see it is impossible to do anything with that man".

Page 113 Spain – "Ney's resentment of Massena still rankled in his mind"…..Ney, who had had from the first been on the point of a quarrel with Massena, refused to obey, and declared that he would lead 6th corps by Almeida into Spain. Massena's patience was now exhausted….." Ney was sacked. Napoleon sent Ney a strong censure and told him to go home to Coudreaux". (Insubordination)

Page 132-133 – Russia 1812 – "Ney was excited and angry. Davout, he said, should have held on at Krasnoi until the 3rd Corps could reach the place, or if he could not do that he should have sent him a timely warning, instead of allowing him to march into a trap. He continued speaking in this strain during the night march back to Orsza. There he met Davout. The Marshal tried to explain his retirement from Krasnoi and his failure to warn him. Ney gave him an angry look and replied, "As for me, Monsieur Le Marechal, I do not reproach you. God sees us and will judge us". (Anger and Short Temper)

Page 147 – Bauetzen 1813 – "From Ney's failure to carry out Napoleon's plan at Bautzen dates the beginning of the final stage of the Emperor's downfall". (Failure to carry out orders)

Page 148 – 1813 "His mistake at Bautzen was not allowed to count against him, but he did not escape the ill fortune that was now linking with defeat so many names that hitherto had been held to mean unfailing success". (Noticed for his failures now)

Book: – Memoirs of an Aid-de-Camp of Napoleon – General Count Philippe de Segur

Page 175 – Ulm – Marshal Lannes words – "Sire! What are you thinking of" You are sleeping, while Ney, single-handed, is fighting against the whole of the Austrian army? – Why has he engaged them? Answered the Emperor. I told him to wait; but it is just like him; he cannot see the enemy without falling upon them! – That is very well, retorted Lannes, but one of his brigades has been repulsed". (Insubordination)

Page 182 – Ulm – Segur again – "On this General Mack complained of Marshal Ney's rudeness towards the bearer of a flag of truce to whom he would not listen. I took advantage to say that this Marshal was indeed of a most hot-headed and impetuous disposition and incapable of self-restraint". (Anger and Short Temper)

Book: Napoleon's Marshals – David Chandler

Page 362 – Spain 1808 – "….a period of misfortune for the French arms and one that revealed Ney in a bad light: thoroughly insubordinate to any commander but the Emperor himself, besides being unreasonably touchy, quarrelsome, and uncooperative". (Insubordinate and Quarrelsome)

Page 362 – Spain 1808 – A letter from Napoleon to Joseph – "Ney has allowed himself to be imposed upon by the Spaniards, and rested for the 22nd and 23rd at Soria, because he chose to imagine that the enemy had 80,000 men and other follies. If he had reached Agreda on the 23rd, according to my orders not a man would have escaped……" (Insubordinate)

Page 364 – Spain – Authors words – "But if the marshal was a generous foe, he could be the most uncooperative of colleagues. Both Soult and Massena were to discover this to their cost….." (Uncooperative)

Page 368 – 1813 – Ney's own words were that he could not believe that the Emperor could be so mad as to recommence hostilities when he no longer had an army: "the machine no longer has either strength or cohesion: we need peace to reorganize everything…It would be folly to ensconce ourselves in Germany" Ney's views could not be faulted from a strategic point of view". (Critical of Napoleon)

Page 368 – 1813 words of General Van Dedem van der Gelder – "Ney was a man of much courage and energy on the battlefield; otherwise he was was feeble and indecisive, permitting himself to be led by other's councel. Deeply detesting Napoleon, on bad terms with the Prince of Neuchatel, jealous of other Marshals, he was on good terms only with Macdonald. Uncommunicative, reserved, he saw little of the generals who served under him". Gelder goes on to say, "….Ney was tormented with jealousy over his wife and had a poor opinion of the ladies with whom she was intimate, particularly Queen Hortense. In addition, Ney foresaw early on the unfortunate end of the 1813 campaign". (Very damming evidence from one close to him)

Page 369 – Battle of Bautzen – "….All went well at first but one of Napoleon's hastily scribbled pencil notes was misunderstood by Ney, who halted when, by pushing on, he might have cut the allies line of retreat. Once again the Emperor had won, but it was a fruitless victory. Ney had clearly demonstrated that he was not really capable of commanding more than a single corps. There were those who said that Ney had taken a village (Prostitz) – and had lost an empire".

Page 369 – Promotion of Jomini – "Ney chose this moment to recommend Jomini for promotion to general of division, but the jealous Berthier managed to prevent this by arresting the Swiss pundit for not submitting his strength returns on time. On August 15 the wily Swiss went over to the Tzar…." (Ongoing conflict with Berthier – tit for tat between the both of them)

Page 369-370 – Dennewitz saga – "Ney's dislike of Napoleon, which, in view of his changeable nature, should not be exaggerated, dates from the days following the disaster at Dennewitz. The Emperor's Corsican suspicions were aroused when he learned that Bernadotte had corresponded with Murat, Berthier, Ney, Oudinot, and Macdonald. There was a furious row. Ney spoke for them all, but the others came to his support. Napoleon called his brother-in-law a traitor, whereupon Murat laid his hand on the hilt of his saber. Berthier tried to speak of his duty as a French prince, and Napoleon turned on him savagely: You too, old imbecile, what are you meddling in? Be quiet! To such a pass had things come".

Page 370 – Abdication 1814 – "When the last of the corps commanders found that they could no longer hold the allies with the few thousand exhausted men that remained, it was Ney who spoke for the other Marshals at Fontainbleau, demanding the Emperor's abdication".

Okie, as I stated at the very beginning, I am not on a crusade to destroy Ney's reputation. However, I have noticed over many years of reading about the Napoleonic period a constant theme regarding Ney. His apparent habitual habit of fighting against authority from the period of 1804 onwards is very noticeable. Before this time Ney was a hard working tough fighting man who was both loyal to the cause and subservient to those he respected above him in rank. But after his inclusion to the new rank of Marshal of the Empire in 1804 he changed. He no longer bowed to those above him but instead questioned them at every turn. He felt no other man had the right to have any authority over him with the exception of the Emperor and even then he began to show a mind of his own which over the years became more and more prevalent.

On the battlefield and amongst the men he commanded he was as brave as could be, he was at home when the guns began to roar but away from the actual battlefield he was totally insubordinate, haughty, rude, arrogant and totally disrespectful to all those around him. This is plainly obvious. He answered to no one, or so he felt and only one person would he bow to. But even then he showed signs over the years of disliking taking orders from Napoleon so much so that he became blatantly insubordinate to the Emperor himself. It is a wonder Napoleon suffered his tantrums and total lack of respect for his authority for so long and we can see many cases of Napoleon becoming more than a little annoyed with Ney's behavior. Yes they were friends from time to time, yes they had a relationship and yes there were many times of cooperation to get the job done but the occurrence of this insubordination increased as the years progressed especially in the late empire when Ney worked under Napoleon's eye from 1813 onwards.

There were times when Napoleon showered Ney with accolades, there were times when Napoleon embraced Ney and even times when Napoleon exclaimed him the Bravest of the brave. Napoleon once called him a Lion, but these occurrences were but small windows in time and for fortunes of war come and go and with them the attitudes and moods of those involved also change.

When a relationship that starts off great begins to decline it is seldom that it will be retrieved. A person may perform 100 acts of valor or positive actions etc but he will be remembered more so for a single act or deed against those in positions of authority. A single negative act or mistake or misdeed is often what is remembered and becomes a thorn in the side of a relationship especially one involving war and with Ney there were plenty. He showed a consistency for producing negativity for those around him and the only reason he was so tolerated was due to his on field performances. If he was not as brave or charismatic or tactically gifted as he was Napoleon would have long ago gotten rid of him. Even in 1811 when dismissed from Spain Napoleon put him in semi-retirement until he was called back to fight in Russia.

Of all the major leaders and generals of the French army between 1804 to 1815 there is only one who shines out above all others for his negative attitude towards others around him and that is Ney. I feel he was an anti-social type and distained people at first meetings. He, I feel was the kind of person who not give you the time of day and it showed in his personality. His aloofness, haughty attitude was prevalent with his dealing with many of the other Marshals and only Macdonald did he share any great friendship. Even his own staff and subordinate generals under him felt this; Ney often remained distant towards them and took advice or remarks from no one it seemed bar Jomini.

I feel Ney suffered from an inferiority complex and probably had a mental problem dealing with others. He was anti-social and felt insults or slights easily. He tended to over react to others around him and coupled with his short temper made him angry way to quickly to give sound and considered instructions. He often for example sent Aide-de-camps off with messages to other commanders without aid of maps or even instructions as to where the recipient may be. He was once quoted as saying is such an episode, "no remarks, I hate them" to one such aide. He had zero patience and those who pressed him on matters he did not wish to get into felt the fire of his personality severely.

Ney, as I stated had an inferiority complex and a very low respect for others and probably himself also. This is very noticeable in his early career in Germany in the 1790's. He knocked back 5 promotions because he felt he was not up to or worthy of the honor of the promotion. He might have had a kind of self loathing for some reason which coupled with his anger and short temper manifested itself in distain for others around him. He was definitely the kind of person who, at first glance at others felt either nothing or at worst total distain, history proves this. People like this in social settings often are gifted in one way or another as they focus on one aspect of their lives and try to shut down or turn a blind eye to their failings. Ney would have been acutely aware of his personality failings but felt after his baton that he no longer had to hide it or be ashamed of it. He was becoming open about it without admitting it.

He was a jealous man as is clearly recorded and even towards his wife. He did not like his wife's lady companions she consorted with back at home and probably gave her a hard time about it. It is also documented clearly that in the restoration he roared into the royal court and lost his temper at apparent insults which made his wife cry. Ney was a very passionate man I feel towards his wife and was very family orientated. He often raced home for leave every chance he could get. Being passionate he would have shown great love and feelings towards his wife probably because he felt life at home was a sanctuary. No one to judge him or take orders from, he was his own lord at home and desired nothing more than to remain home and do nothing more than inspect troop garrisons from time to time.

Ney loved action and being in the thick of the fighting. To command and fight battles where he was master of all and subordinate to no one. He bucked when placed under other marshals and genuinely felt insulted to be placed under orders of fellow marshals. He longed to be in command as commander-in-chief but failed in those rolls as he was not up to the task. This is proven on several occasions and I think Ney, in the end, knew it. This goes a long way to explain his innate and impulsive style of command on the battlefield but his lack of decision, frustration, lack of focus and focus in semi-independent command.

As for Napoleon, he was supreme leader and in total command, Ney had no choice but to bow to Napoleon like any other Marshal during those long years but it was obvious that while other marshals were following orders from Napoleon to a tee, Ney at times did not and either acted on his own or disregarded blatantly orders given to him from Napoleon at times. He was lucky to remain a marshal at times and napoleon reminded him of that on at least one occasion. Ney was a lose cannon not only in the eyes of most of the other Marshals but to Napoleon as well.

Ney, deep down probably knew his personality faults and how people reacted to his short temper and abrupt manor but eventually thought to himself, "oohh well, if everyone knows my personality faults why continue to hide it? I don't care anymore; they can think of me what they like. I am Marshal Ney!!"

Regards,
Shane

That was only part one of my research, I will attempt to add 1815 to the next post once I have gathered enough evidence.

Regards,
Shane