"Ney at Bautzen" Topic

Hi guys,

I wanted to start a threat regarding Ney and his famous flank/rear attack on the allies at Bautzen. Napoleon's far reaching plan was for Ney to look like he was going to threaten Berlin, the allies reacted by drawing forces north from Bautzen toward Ney whom they felt might swing south and attack them. The allies were correct and Ney swung south eventually pushing the flank forces back towards the main line. The flank forces were in actual fact ordered to fall back to the main line as well.

Ney's orders were to swing not only onto the flank of the allies but into their rear and cut their line of retreat off; effectively Napoleon desired to destroy the Allied forces there and then on that day and in one swoop crush the allies in one great battle. History shows us how close he came to achieve this but close is not good enough, Ney's attack failed to achieve the results it should have and he hesitated too long allowing Blucher to re-align and hold him off long enough for the retreat to be accomplished successfully.

Why did Ney fail? Why did he hesitate and was there something I have missed that could explain this failure. Some say he was not up to the task, some say he was not the same man as the previous year and I have even heard he might held back on purpose….

Regards,
Shane

Shane just to correct the summary of the lead up, Ney was initially ordered to send 3 of his 5 Corps towards Berlin (and Bulow) and move on Bautzen with the remainder (over some 120km away at this point). This was later corrected to moving on Bautzen with the 2 and using the 3 Corps 'as he saw appropriate', but despite Ney immediately aranging for all Corps to advance on Bautzen the switch caused some delay in the 3 Corps ability to close up on Neys leading Corps (at least 2 of the 3).

During the following approach march on bautzen the allies learned of neys approach, and what they thought was neys lead elements (but was in fact and a Division of Bertrands Corp which had been sent north beyond the French Armys left flank to establish communications with Ney).

Under the cover of Napoleons own actions with the main army the allies slipped some 25,000 men (roughly a 1/4 of their total force) north, and straight across Bertrand front to try and quickly hit what they thought were Neys lead elements still on their approach, and in fact smashed the Division of Bertrands and fought a bloody action with Neys lead elements.

The next day the large allied force withdrew to Bautzen, and Ney pushed on strongly onto the battlefield – eventualy bringing his force onto the field. It is perhaps best to describe the manner they came on the field in napoleons own words.

"These forces then moved on the clock towers of Hochkirch, and the VII Corps, one hour behind them, served as a reserve. Lauriston marched on Baruth and Belgern in the same direction. This manouver was perfect, its results should have been incalculable, however several unfortunate circumstances arose that minimized its success….." Nafzigers Lutz & Bautzen.

As best I can figure Napoleon thus describes Neys actions upto the point where Ney has secured the Galina heights and before souham moves on Preititz as 'perfect'.

Generaly I believe criticism of Ney has focused on 2 main areas.

The first being his choice to halt the IIIrd Corps main body on the Galina heights and send just Souham's Division on Preititz rather than imediately advancing on Preititz with the whole Corp.

The Second being later, when the allied army are largely broken and their withdrawal well under way Ney, rather than pushing across the Bloser-Wasser halts his forces for a period before later advancing, but in the meantime large allied forces made good their escape.

I have my views on the options available to Ney on both occasions, but I'd rather stop there and hear others views (and reasons why).

Daryl

I think what went wrong is 'Friction' as Clauswitz has it. Difficult to appreciate from our amchairs, but easy to lose sight of the tactical niceties once the smoke rises, the ground starts shaking, and the rounds are whizzing by.

I don't know the answer about his performance at Bautzen, but I've always wondered if Ney mentally "lost something" during the 1812 retreat, his forces being cut off, and being the last man (supposedly) to cross the river.

Is it possible that the Marshal had some form of mental break during the retreat and wasn't quite "right" afterwards? If one agrees with this, could that explain why he didn't do as well as he should when under semi-independent command?

Erik

I believe at Bautzen, Ney turned in too soon (toward the rear of Allied right wing) rather than continuing toward the center rear of their position and allowing the next command to attend to the Allied right.

Thus, each following formation (corps) needed to move beyond those first engaged rather than the entire force moving forward and each corps engaging their opposite number (to use naval terminology).

Ney's troops attacked and "fixed" the Allied right wing, which had to fight its way out of the trap.

Had Ney continued on with his leading formations before closely engaging the enemy the "net" would have been cast wider and the Allied right wing would have suffered more.

The timing of Napoleon's advance in the center may have been off, either because of the Emperor himself of by Ney turning when he did and engaging the Allied right wing.

Anyway, Ney's chief of staff wrote about Bautzen in "The Art of War" (page 317) as follows:

"When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. It is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank and reverse. The moral
effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is nconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it. The fine movement of Ney on Preititz at Bautzen was neutralized by a few pieces of Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far overbalancing the risks run. "

Now, whether that is the entire story is another matter (Jomini – after another "tiff" with Bethier – left French service for Russian service just after the battle). – R

hmmm,

very interesting Ralpher, I did not know that little bit of information. I have Jomini's book. I might read that again. Your point about Ney not fully going round the enemy's flank is what I felt as well. I feel Ney closed in too quickly thus not getting fully into the reverse of the enemy line.

Napoleon ordered Ney to be in Preititz by 11am, which is what he did. Ney is criticized for making Preititz his objective rather than aligning on Weissenberg, several miles to the rear. Which in retrospect with a global view, might have devasted the Allied army. Or Barclay and the Russian cuirassiers might have stopped his infantry cold…
I recall an assertion that this was the first time Napoleon tried to concentrate during a battle, rather than before it, and delays of the III, V, and VII corps on the march were to be expected.

NSN

I'd look for little things that would colour Ney's perspective:

What could he see from his vantage? Could he have misread the situation?

If he was uncharacteristically cautious, the first place to look would be the events of the last few days. Had he been being chastized or had someone else been chastized?

Was he doubting Napoleon at this point and therefore being wary about orders? This would be particularly true if he was getting conflicting orders from his Emperor. Maybe he was waiting for the orders to change or trying to read through what Napoleon's missives were saying.

If all the evidence suggests that a competent and courageous commander behaved incompetently or cowardly, the first place to look for clues is at their perceptions. Assume that they acted courageously and competently but had some particular perspective.

The critical comments came primarily from Jomini. His position as Ney's chief of staff and his position as a theorist resulted in his views being given considerable historical weight. He expresses it "best" (if that is the word) in his work "Life of Napoleon" although he wrote it as if Napoleon is speaking.

"malcolmmccallum" points are very valid as to Ney's vantage point. It may be useful to consider Jomini's criticisms (it might also be useful to understand the "politics" between Jomini and individual French officers – Ney and Berthier – yet this is more difficult to address).

Anyway, Jomini cited four issues:

(1) Napoleon's order specified 11:00 as the time for Ney to be at Preitiz. Yet, Ney's leading corps (his own IIIrd Corps) marched more quickly than Napoleon seemed to have expected and the order arrives at 10:00. Ney decided to not change the Emperor's timing and held up his advance units to allow the next corps (Reynier) to join him. The manner in which Jomini wrote, it suggests that the IIIrd Corps was concentrated.

(2) When Ney did begin to advance he only advanced with Souham (as noted in the post by "hos459"). According to Jomini, Ney did this by "leaving" parts of his IIIrd and Vth Corps behind: three divisions a half league behind and another divisiom a full league behind (league as translated by Halleck or 2.4 and 4.8 kilometers, respectively). Soon, one division and the artillery moved to support Souham. As the Prussians counterattacked Souham this stabilized the front.

It is only when Reynier's corps arrived that Ney sent forward more troops.

All this sounds a bit off. Jomini's first criticism mentions Reynier. By his formulation, Jomini suggests (but does not say) the IIIrd Corps was fully concentrated. The comments here suggest a less optimal situation, so (1) could be a false accusation.

(3) By that time, Lauriston with two divisions of his Vth Corps is out on Ney's left and makes progess, but then sends word his force is facing superior numbers so he advances cautiously. Jomini says Lauriston faces "a feeble detachment of three thousand men under General Tschaplitz". (Chaplits).

According to Jomini, this message and situation causes unnecessary delay. There is still a chance, writes Jomini, but "Ney did not appreciate his position".

(4) When the French captured Preititz, it put them squarely in the rear of the Prussians holding the allied right wing. As a result, the Prussian right wing moved to escape. Blucher sent a force with twenty cannon against Ney's force and Ney turned in toward them (the matter noted in my earlier post).

Jomini did allow Ney the excuse that to continue on he would have done so with a weak cavalry force ("six feeble squardrons" per Jomini; they were Baden and Hessian regiments, making one wonder whether the "feeble" referred to strength or quality and capacity). These "feeble" 6 squadrons would have faced of a strong enemy cavalry (20 squadrons per Jomini -.I believe Uvarov had more like 40).

So, it is Jomini's view that when the Marshal swung against the Prussians (to his right), Ney "forgot the direction of Hochkirch which he had indicated in the morning". (Hochkirch was behind the Russo-Prussian center.)

Jomini concluded: "This marshal had begun the battle in the rear of the allies' camp, and ended it almost in rear of columns of our centre."

Harsh judgements.

Those are the details. The summary is, all in all, Jomini wanted Ney to be bolder..

I doubt Jomini told the whole story (he told his own story, I am sure), as Barclay and the cuirassier were in the area as "nvrsaynver" points out. Then, according to Sir Robert Wilson, the Tsar ordered the grenadier division to the area, so they were available as well (24 battalions). Now Barclay's force was rather weak and Lauriston faced most of it with two divisions (each side was maybe 10,000 men).

Leaving Barclay off the list, it all makes one wonder how history would judge Ney had he pressed forward as Jomini said he should, using the numbers from above: (1) either right away at 10:00 with only about two divisions or (2) after waiting until 11:00, with taking forward five divisions (assuming the sixth one would have to be left out as it was a full league's distance behind). In either case, he would have met Kleist backed up by the 40 squadrons of cuirassier and 24 battalions of grenadiers.

Would that have been considered unduly rash?

(What if historian writes, "Imagine, Ney attacked with his infantry and only six ‘feeble' squadrons of Hessian and Baden light cavalry! Couldn't he see the enemy's elite grenadiers and cuirassier opposed his young infantrymen. It was bound to be a slaughter! Meanwhile, he put undue trust in Lauriston to meet Barclay de Tolly at one to one odds. Ney was brave. This shows him foolhardy.")

Ah, what if . . . – R

For french readers, below is a link to commandant Lanrezac´s brilliant essay on "le manouvre de Lutzen".
The title is a bit misleading, it covers actually the whole spring campaign, I´ve linked to the chapter on Bautzen.

stratisc.org/Lanrezac_5.html

The Ney question aside, Lanrezac mentions a few other things.
The main army, whose job it was to put pressure on the allies and fix them in place, didn´t apply much pressure. A large number of forces was not used properly, all this against an opponent who had an overstretched frontline (92000 men on 15km),fought in a position with serious weaknesses, notably on both flanks, and was outnumbered even without counting in Ney´s huge force.
The fact that the Allies could disengage so easy has a lot to do with the lack of pressure from the front.

so this you think might come down to a simple lack of cavalry to hold the allies in position ?

"Is it possible that the Marshal had some form of mental break during the retreat and wasn't quite "right" afterwards? If one agrees with this, could that explain why he didn't do as well as he should when under semi-independent command?"

Erik to even start answering that question it would have to be first clearly demonstrated Ney in fact 'didn't do so well', otherwise its a pointless exercise.

Daryl

Can I put in a general word in favour of Ney?
At Bautzen ( & indeed in most of his commands) he lead less-than-stellar troops.
He often got the disenchanted "foreigners", the ill-trained conscripts, the units who *weren't* Guard.
And he generally inspired them & knocked them into half-decent commands.
Could excuses be made for his failures on the basis of who he lead?
donald

To me, as I posted above there are 2 areas of 'contention' at Bautzen of Neys actions, as I outlined above.

On both he was faced with a difficult decision that had to be made quickly. On the first (as above) I believe he chose a poor but understandable option (note that is far from saying he acted incompetently) and on the second he chose corectly at the time, but in war even correct decisions can lead to poor results. I've seen this debate too many times to go into detail on each decision at this point, as I'd rather hear others views.

It should also be noted IMHO, particularly for those who would accuse Ney of being timid at Bautzen, that before, between and after each of these 2 'debateable' decisions Ney acted IMHO bodly, aggresively, and showing every indication to me of having an excellent tactical and strategic grasp, and repeatedly made 'the right call' in difficult and time sensitive moments (IMHO). All of which is so easily not even considered by manh who would rather leave the whole question of his actions to a simple throwaway line with no analysis.

Daryl

Here´s Nappy´s original orders for Ney´s attack delivered at may 21, 8 am and received about 2 hours later by Ney(according to Lanrezac):

« L'intention de l'Empereur est que vous soyez, ce matin, à onze heu­res, au village de Preititz . Nous attaquerons franchement sur tous les points. Faites marcher Lauriston sur votre gauche pour être en mesure de tourner l'ennemi si votre mouvement le décide à abandonner sa position ».

This doesn´t exactly sound like an order for a decisive attack to cut off the allied army.

Iglo while I agree, to be fair, earlier orders from memory spoke of Neys role as a flanking envelopment to the main army's pinning manouvre, with the decisive stroke delivered on Neys right (the main army's left) once Neys forces were engaged. So the case could be put that even if such a deep strike role wasn't specifically stated in later orders, the fact that Ney was operating semi-independantly along with this over-arching principle Ney should have placed a priority on such an opportunity.

For myself I would tend to disagree, but can definately see the point.

The full orders are given in Berthiers Orders Journal which I think is stil on Google Books.

I kind of get the feeling that Ney was not adaquetly told of the importance of his position and thus did not really know the true situation. I think at Bautzen he realised what was, or more importantly, "what could happen" if he acted quickly. But it might have been too late by the time he truly understood what was going on and what he might have been able to achieve if made full aware of Napoleon's intentions in the first place.

I am thinking Napoleon is to blame for not really being specific enough…but Nappy did order him to be at Preititz at 11am so one might think that is adequate enough, I dunno ?

Shane

Thanks for your link Cptn Iglo! While browsing the website I also found Clausewitz own account of Bautzen still in French: link

Not available on Google, but available on Gallica:

Registre d'ordres du maréchal Berthier pendant la campagne de 1813. 1, Du 29 mars au 31 juillet. 1909. 306 pages:

link

Also from Gallica:

Bautzen, une bataille de deux jours, 20-21 mai 1813 / par le commandant Foucart:

link

Bautzen, la poursuite jusqu'à l'armistice, 22 mai-4 juin 1813 / par le lieutenant-colonel Foucart:

link

"Iglo while I agree, to be fair, earlier orders from memory spoke of Neys role as a flanking envelopment to the main army's pinning manouvre, with the decisive stroke delivered on Neys right (the main army's left) once Neys forces were engaged. So the case could be put that even if such a deep strike role wasn't specifically stated in later orders, the fact that Ney was operating semi-independantly along with this over-arching principle Ney should have placed a priority on such an opportunity."

This sounds to me like the classic deconstruction of Napoleon's method. Pin the enemy battle line. Make the enemy commit their reserves to an attack on a different axis. Rupture the line with an attack on the "hinge". If these were Ney's instructions, I would think there would be even less incentive for him to move to his left and lose contact with French forces on his right. Furthermore, he is to boldly attack everywhere, tieing down the enemy, rather than skirting them with maneuver.

NSN

I think I mentioned the troops under Ney's command above.
Add to this his attitude to the Campaignof 1813:
"The machine no longer has strength or cohesion. We need peace to reorganise everything."
BTW does everyone know Jomini was only appointed as Ney's C-o-S after Lautzen, where Baron Gaure the former Chief was mortally wounded?
So the picture we have at Bautzen is a less than enthusiastic commander, with green troops & a cipher for a Chief of Staff. Is there no wonder his battlefield performance was hesitant?
donald

I have a memory of Napoleon sending a semi-legible note to Ney at Bautzen, ordering him to push on & cut off the enemies' retreat.
And Ney (Jomini?) misunderstood it.
I've been looking for this snippet but so far, no luck.
Can anyone help me out?
Is it significant that Berthier ordered the arrest of Jomini in August on obviously trumped up charges?
donald

The links are great, thanks. Mr Smith is a great help to us all. Thanks (just wish I could get more of the Google links from here in Switzerland).

Just a few observations:

- To the post to "ochin" about Ney having poor troops: Although French, Ney's "mother tongue" was German (most likely a dialect); thus, the tendency to place foreign forces under his command (Lefebvre was from Alsace so he knew enough German via their dialect from Rouffach; it could be that their German was better than just their dialects, although a Baden officer's account of Lefebvre's spoken German suggests this was not so in his case).

- This is a personal view on Ney as I have a "Northern European" side to my family, Ney's "swings" remind me of some of my family members (a sort of overly strict logic) rather than a more flexible Latin style from other family members (French or Italian). I believe Ney is a complex fellow from social background as well as from his family's makeup. The precision of Ney's tactical instructions and his handling of troops in difficult situations such as Guttstadt in 1807 or on the retreat from Moscow seem to follow on from that logical, precise side. (This shows up often in my daily life as well as I live in Switzerland with German, French and Italian speakers.)

- To the post from "nvrsaynvr": I believe you are correct.

- Then, did Ney or Napoleon "get it wrong" ?

If Napoleon, he should have "pinned" the allied forces more (not wait until 12:00 when he "heard Ney's cannon" (why wait for the cannon – ammo issues ? – until 12:00 if Ney was to be at Preititz at 11:00 ?) It would make sense to wait for the actual infantry attacks not the artillery bombardment.

When Napoleon sends forward the infantry attack starts it is Soult with Bertrand against Blücher. So, Napoleon is sending troops in left to right.

- My focus on Jomini as "leading critic" of Ney at Bautzen, especially in driving the view of him in English: Lecomte published a number of Jomini's writings on the campaigns (Lecomte wrote a biography of Jomini and had access to his correspondence). The same account as in "Life of Napoleon" is recorded with some differences: Jomini's discussion with Ney at Klix when the order is received and the movements of Jomini himself are outlined.

Ney told Jomini that to advance more quickly than the 1100 timing for Preititz would disrupt the Emperor's timing. Ney had suffered many times when he did not follow Napoleon's orders.

After some discussion, Ney sent Jomini to Lauriston to find out why the general had not advanced further. It is when Jomini is gone that Ney begins his advance. Jomini's version in Lecomte suggests that it was during Jomini's absence that Ney made his error of only sending Souham forward.

Recall, Jomini in "Life of Napoleon" wrote (as he does for the Lecomte version) that Lauriston faced only Chaplitz with a feeble 3,000-man force.

Now, this is interesting because Baclay de Tolly's force is there and more like 10,000 men. It may well be that Jomini formulated his account to obfuscate his incomplete observation of the forces faced by Lausiton.

Note that the Commandant Lanrezac suggests Ney should have sent more than two divisions with Lauriston (he writes Lauriston had 12,000 and Barclay de Tolly had 12,000 – I typed 10,000 for both in an earlier post, in any event 1 to 1 odds – and Lanrezac suggests 30,000 should have been sent).

Lanrezac's reasoning is based on Napoleon's instruction:
« L'intention de l'Empereur est que vous soyez à Preititz à onze heu­res. Nous attaquerons franchement sur tous les points. Faites marcher Lauriston sur votre gauche pour être en mesure de tourner l'ennemi si votre mouvement le décide à abandonner sa po­sition ».

Roughly translated this is : "The intention of the Emperor is that you are at Preititz at eleven o'clock. We shall make all out attacks on all points. Have Lauriston march on your left in order to turn the enemy so your movement forces them to leave their position.

With such orders, it suggests Ney's movements at Bautzen were more in line with Napoleon's intentions than Jomini's proposals. Perhaps, had Jomini's suggestions been followed a different result could have been achieved.

From Ney's perspective, to implemment Jomini's movement seem to risk failure both in carrying in terms of achieving Napoleon's overall intention (recall many of Ney's troops were not "up") and the local tactical situation at Preititz.

- It seems if there is any "error" on Ney's part, he advanced too quickly earlier in the day with his lead elements and, thus, it did not fully match with Napoleon's plan. As a result, the allies had more warning of something on their right flank. Ney units could have been more concentrated before he moved closer to the allied position. This is all from "helicopter" view with "20/20" hindsight and not intended for debate. It is intended to show the marshal more as the Ney "we all know" : aggressive.

Once on the battlefield, Ney could have sent more troops with Lauriston as Commandant Lanrezac suggets. Jomini could have made this point, yet he did not because pointing at Ney he would have had "three finger" pointing back at himself.

You are all tired of the my word about the Jomini by now, so I shall close. – R

Ralpher,
on the contrary: I am not tired about your remarks.
If Jomini is culpable for Ney's failure, why did Ney recommend him for promotion to General d'Division after the battle?
donald

For "ochoin": your post crossed mine. I think the order question is addressed partially. I do not recall the legibility aspect. If it was so, I bet the story is from Jomini.

As to Berthier and Jomini, the story seems long. My "take" is that when Jomini joined Berthier's staff he had a bit of a reputation with Napoleon by that famous story in 1806 about Jomini knowing where to join Napoleon on the march (told by Jomini). Jomini had just published his first part his multi-volume "Traité de grande tactique" in 1805.

I believe Jomini was "active" yet had a "lazy" streak (not so attentive to details – this shows in some of his works). Further, he seems to be a bit of a "smarty pants". For example, in 1807 he wished out loud (in the hearing of the staff) to be the Archduke Karl after the battle of Eylau to show off his knowledge of the dangerous strategic situation the French were in (as we know Austria did not join the fray until 1809).

I am sure he simply irritated Berthier who sinply wanted him off his staff.

To close: Jomini has positive points that are not coming out in these posts. Napoleon was a "fan" after all. – R

PS – As Jomini was from Payerne in Switzerland, with the above, I would even bet that Jomini made some comment with respect to Neuchâtel (they are across the lake from each other). I have no evidence for this, but Payerne is higher than Neuchâtel and from the outskirts of Payerne one can "look down" on Neuchâtel. Pure speculation this. – R

Ralpher, fascinating speculation as to the reasons behind the antagonism that existed between Jomini & Berthier.
I think this underlies that we will never know more than a fraction of the realities we discuss.
To change the discussion a little, how do you view Jomini's defection?
IMO it's self-indulgent & speaks volumes for the man's ego.
donald

As to Jomini being "culpable": one needs to make distinctions as to timing. I am not sure anyone would have known if Jomini had been at fault (what I wrote is speculative). I may have written too much like Jomini himself in my post. The main point was to try and put his words into a context.

I believe him to be "capable" yet his history needs to be looked at critically. I am not sure how much criticsm was leveled in 1813. They may have had their discussions (as at Klix) and Ney appreciated his advice.

It is later the "charges" are leveled. By the time of writing in 1827, Jomini had been in the service of the Tsar. Further, he had continued his writing career. He needed to keep and build his own repuation.

The "Life of Napoleon" as Halleck translated the title for the English version is too simply rendered.

The actual title when it appeared in 1827 was more fully: "VIE POLITIQUE ET MILITAIRE DE NAPOLEON, RACONTEE PAR LUI-MEME, AU TRIBUNAL DE CESAR, D'ALEXANDRE ET DE FREDERIC" or "Political and Military Life of Napoleon, recited by himself at the tribuanl of Cesaer, Alexander the Great, and Frederick the Great" (I added "the Greats" – it was not Tsar Alexander).

Nice way to get one's sales up, no ? – R

Am replying too fast or too slow.

For Jomini's "defection" I take Napoleon's view: there was no defection as Jomini was not a French officer, but on the Swiss establishment (if I recall correctly).

He had been offered a postiion by Alexander when France and Russia were "allies" and it was Napoleon who stopped it.

Then, Jomini did not betray any French plans to the allies (in true Swiss style), so was no traitor to his office.

This, roughly, Napoleon's view of Jomini at St Helena. – R

"Am replying too fast or too slow"
Ralpher, your problem is you think before replying :)
Thanks for the insights.
donald

Thanks. Will have plenty of time to think before the next reply – am away until next week. – R

Bautzen is covered in the chapter, "Spring campaign of 1813" in Jomini's Life of Napoleon, tr., with notes by H.W. Halleck. Vol 4, 1864, p 65ff:

link

Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon …, vol 4 (1827):

link

Bautzen is covered in Chapter 19: Première période de la campagne de l8l3, p 248ff:

link

Lanrezac, Colonel Louis-Marie (1852-1925). La Manœuvre de Lützen, 1813, par le colonel LANRE/AC, professeur à l'École supérieure de guerre. Paris, Berger- Levrault, 1904. In-8, 279 pages. [285 p. av. 18 croquis.]. Note: Includes nine maps, eight of which are folding, a folding chart, and numerous maps throughout the text:

link

The Bautzen portion is at

stratisc.org/Lanrezac_5.html

The same site also has

La campagne de 1813 jusqu'à l'Armistice by Carl von Clausewitz:

link

Also:

Hinterlassene Werke über Krieg und Kriegführung des Generals Carl v. Clausewitz:

Vol 7 (1835): Der Feldzug von 1812 in Russland (pp 1-248); Der Feldzug von 1813 bis zum Waffenstillstand (pp 249-316); Uber den Feldzug von 1813 (pp 317-324); Der Feldzug von 1814 in Frankreich (pp. 325-356); etc:

link

Note: This entire set is downloadable from Gallica.

thank you very much guys, this thread has really opened up some very interesting information and debate. FYI, Ralpher, ty for the information and also Steven for the links, it is a great service you guys have done for the rest of us interested parties here.

Regards,
Shane

Great post Gents, I have nothing to add aside from a thanks to Shane for getting it started and for all of the posters for their contributions.

We need to see more discussions of this sort on the Napoleonics boards!

Dan

Every discussion should be like this one.
donald

here´s the order from the 20th for Ney, one day before the main action took place.

« L'Empereur veut que vous vous dirigiez sur Dresa (c'est la Brösa de la carte au 1/100 000 è), chassant l'ennemi de ses positions, vous liant avec nous et que, de là, vous vous dirigiez sur Weissemberg de manière à trouver l'ennemi ».

So Ney has to align with the main army the next day and then the general direction will be Weissenberg to find the enemy.
Until this moment Ney as army commander did indeed have the option to move his force into the rear of the opponent.
With this order such a move was forbidden, one might even argue that the order was sent for that very reason.

More restrictions came next day, the tactical orders for the main actions were the following(already posted):

« L'intention de l'Empereur est que vous soyez à Preititz à onze heu­res. Nous attaquerons franchement sur tous les points. Faites marcher Lauriston sur votre gauche pour être en mesure de tourner l'ennemi si votre mouvement le décide à abandonner sa po­sition ».

so Ney has to move his forces to Preititz to threaten not the rear of the allied army, just the flank Blüchers position on the right center.
Only Lauristons force of less than 20000 men can be used as a tactical wild card on the left to turn the enemy "if" the movement with the main body forces him to abandon his position.
Until this moment Ney might indeed still have had the tactical option to use the bulk of his forces for outflanking, now his main body becomes an important element in Nappy´s plan for a frontal battle and Lauriston alone cannot do much.
As events did unfold, Lauriston did have nothing to turn, instead he had to face Barclay.

Lanrezac develops an alternative scenario in which the bulk of Ney´s force supports Lauriston, crushes Barclay and moves into the rear of the allies. Thats interesting armchair general reasoning, but defintly would have been against orders, which were essentially to directly support a frontal attack.

Even if succesful, Ney would have not earned laurels for this, but very likely joined some of his colleages on the unemployable list. And its easy to imagine what would have happened in case of a failure.

very interesting Ctpn Iglo, thank you

Besides Ney's shortcomings as a master strategist, I think there were two important factors in his failure to completely envelop the enemy right.

1. Napoleon's vague instructions. Napoleon was never one to reveal his secrets to his subordinates, and often sent rather cryptic instructions. This was partly a neccessity, as situations on a battlefield are fluid. However, if more specific strategic plans were revealed, Ney might have been in a better position to adapt. Also, Napoleon's successes were often a matter of some luck. This time, not so much. It should be noted that the very same miscommunication took place between Napoleon and Ney at Quatre Bras/Ligny. Napoleon did NOT instruct Ney to send I Corps around the Prussian flank until it was far too late for Ney to have incorporated this into his battle plan, such as it was, for Quatre Bras.

2. Lack of cavalry. With the extreme cavalry shortages of the 1813 campaign, Ney was essentially marching blind. That cuts down on flexibility.

"Besides Ney's shortcomings as a master strategist, "

Sighs heavily….de ja vu all over again………….OK Widowson….just where do you see Neys failings as a strategist?????

hos,

It's not like I have anything against Ney, but beyond Corps command level he was often out of his depth.

He can be excused, in my opinion, for not crushing the allies at Bautzen because his instructions were vague and he lacked cavalry. He received equally vague instructions leading up to Quatre Bras, for which he can also be excused, aside from his apparent lack of activity in the morning.

But that's just it--he needs to be excused.

In his place (again, just my opinion), Davout would have done much better in both circumstances. Davout would not have waited to be instructed. He would have gathered information, consulted maps, made sure he got what cavalry he had well out to scout for enemy locations. Then, with the entire problem in mind, he would have been in a much better position to interperet Napoleon's cryptic orders, cross index the Emperor's intent with the situation before him, and acted in a STRATEGIC manner.

Quatre Bras and Ligny are not so far apart that a light cavalry squadron could not have dispatched so that Ney could have kept his own tabs on what was happening. A good look at a map would have revealed the strategic significance of detaching I Corps to catch the Prussians in the rear. Once he became aware that I Corps had been hijacked by Napoleon for this purpose, a strategic thinker would have let them go, with the knowledge that they could not return to Quatre Bras in time to affect the outcome.

But what did Ney do? He saw only what was before him, and his need for more troops in order to overcome the AA reinformcements flowing in. So he flew into a rage and sent a completely silly order to d'Erlon, ordering I Corps to return. The hapless d'Erlon, apparently suffering from the same thoughtlessness, attempted to do that, and thus denied both battlefields the use of his 25,000 men. But that would not have happened if Ney was a STRATEGIC thinker.

Of course this was all Napoleon's fault, as well. Ney was not even summoned to the Army of the North at the last minute, met Napoleon on the 15th of June, and had no staff. If it were not for Mortier succuming to his back problems, Ney would not even have had horses!

Then Napoleon assigns him almost half the army, with instructions to be in Brussels in two days!

Of course, Napoleon had no way of knowing that the Prussians would make a stand at Ligny. But once he found them there, his summoning of d'Erlon and I corps should have resulted in the most glorious victory since Austerlitz. I've seen the positions of the armies, d'Erlon was in position to sweep entirely across the rear of two Prussian army corps, with Napoleon pinning their front. Half the Prussian army SHOULD have been destroyed that day, IF NEY WAS A STRATEGIST.

What Davout could or would have done, besides being irelevent to Neys situation, is entirely debateable. Who's to say Davout would have done anything different.

You've not actually shown anything for which Ney needs to be 'excused', you've stated your opinions on results but not looked at what options were or were not available.

More of the same statement of Neys 'lack of ability' as an end point, without actually analysing the situation.

Ok, have it your way -

1. Being lazy on 16 June, without accounting for the urgency of the STRATEGIC situation.

2. Launching a frontal attack on Quatre Bras without even considering a flanking move.

3. Recalling I Corps when he should have known it was too late.

4. Launching the SECOND series of cavalry attacks at Waterloo, after discovering the British were NOT retiring.

5. Stopping short at Bautzen, when he should have known his mission was to envelop the Prussian army.

Ney was a very good tactician. Stategist? Not so much.

Again, whats above are not substantiations of an opinion on Ney, just stating the opinion.

#5 is an interesting statement after the lengthy debate above.

Let's try going about this another way.

hos, why don't you illuminate us with some examples of Ney's strategic brilliance? Let's hear all about Ney's strategic thinking at, . . . wherever.

Ah….thank you Widowson for making exactly my point……I'm NOT saying Ney was brilliant. So far as far as I can recall my part in this has only been to ask those who state a value judgement what the basis of that judgement is. I also dislike armchair generalship judgements made with the benefit of hindsight – hindsight not available to commanders at the time.

To me, in an army such as the French Napoleonic it is somewhat safe to assume that a man who holds the title Marshall of France for a long period involving many commands has at least a basic level of understanding of military practice.

You, on the other hand, have specificaly expressed the opinion that Ney was "out of his depth", "lazy", and "not a strategist". Very strong words – do you made ANY analysis to come up with these viewpoints, or are they made with no analysis at all and merely something you've heard someone else say???

My position, if you like, is that the vast majority of people who criticise any historic commander, not just Ney, do so without having actually looked at the options available to them at the time – literally 20/20 hindsight armchair generalship.

Have you a basis for your statements?

I've clearly expressed my reasons for believing that Ney was not a great strategist. For whatever reasons, you chose not to accept those analyses. In the end, you offer nothing of what you demand, and cannot refute the original statement that Ney was not a great strategist.

I'm not here to satisfy you. I have troops to paint. You offer nothing and demand everything. So this discussion becomes a waste of my time.

adieu

What you've given isn't an analysis – its stating a conclusion, with no suppoirting analysis to back it up.

You're the one stating the position – why would I go out of my way to create analysis to support/disprove a position not my own?

Analysis would be somethi9ng along the lines of to have considered the options available to the commander at the time (within what was known at the time), and the disadvantages and advantages of each.

9 times out of 10, a statement such as "X was wrong", in all its variations, is made with no analysis, and nothing to back it up, and with 20/20 hinsight armchair generalship of the worst sort, yet when questioned the response is "well show us YOUR analysis".

Either you looked at the historical situation and THEN formed your strong opinion, or the opinion came first and there is nothing to back it up.

I don't know how you can fail to understand me, but I'll give it one more try and then give up. To summarize:

1. It is my OPINION that Ney had shortcomings as a strategist. As it happens, every published author on the subject agrees with me. I have "looked at the historical situation"--a number of them--over almost 40 years of studying the subject.

2. When asked for an example of Ney's strategic shortcomings, I pointed first to Bautzen (remember? this is a discussion about Bautzen?). If Ney had a better appreciation of the strategic situation, he would not have attacked the first enemy units he came across, but would have swung further into the enemy's rear, destroying half his army. It's my opinion. Most authors and historians agree. What's your problem with that?

If that doesn't serve, I can't help it.

Now I have a battery of DB HA to paint, and I'm through playing this silly game.

Shane, thanks for starting it. It was a good thread while it lasted.

Bill