"why is it that Senarmont's tactics didn't become universal ?" Topic

Dave,

While we're on the topic (sort of) of books and authors, perhaps you can answer a few questions on your artillery booklet?

-'His guns were modified slightly by Gribeauval into the Napoleonic French guns.' Caption under Lichtenstein's picture on page 4. Could you provide a source for this statement along with the similar one on page 15 (although you were ten years or so off on the time when Gribeauval developed and fielded his artillery system)?

-Could you provide the source quotation by Smola for the reference on page 7 about him talking about howitzers and their employment?

-'Contrary to popular belief, horse batteries did not charge with cavalry.'-page 7. Do you have a source for this?

-'Smola then noted that, sonce French guns had a range advantage, the Austrian gunners should try to close in to 500 Schritte, as experience had shown that the French guns were less accurate at that range.' Do you have a source that you can post for this statement? Is there anything that you have seen, primary source hopefully, that actually states that the French guns were less accurate at that range? Seems to me that Russians, Austrians, British, and assorted Germans would tend to disagree. Senarmont was knocking down Russians from 120 meters and further out quite accurately at Friedland in 1807 (by the way, that action is documented by three primary sources that I know of: Senarmont's after action report; the I Corps after action report as written in the corps journal (and that wasn't done by Senarmont, as the data is different on ammunition expenditure), and in Boulart's memoirs, as he was present and saw the action as a Guard artillery officer.) Drouot fired canister at short range at Lutzen and at Hanau in 1813, so it appears that the French guns were doing just fine within their range parameters on other fields.

-'The guns [Austrian] were not to move beyond infantry support.' -page 8. Then it would appear that Smola's action at Neerwinden wasn't the same as Senarmont's action at Friedland, as you have maintained in the past. Senarmont left his infantry support to the rear when he attacked, and on the next page you refer to Smola's Neerwinden action. Could you please explain how a reinforced artillery battery is a heavy artillery concentration?

-At the bottom of page 10, you state that by 1790 the Austrian artillery was considered the best in Europe. I would contend that was the case earlier, between the wars. I would submit to you that the French artillery was considered, if not the best by 1789, then in the top two. Do you have a primary source for your contention?

-On page 13 you give the duties of the different cannoneers on a gun crew. However, you don't mention whose job it was to point the gun. Could you do that, please?

-You have stated more than once that the Austrian 'system' of mounting cavalry battery gunners on the trail enabled them to get the piece into action quicker than an actual horse artillery battery whose gunners were individually mounted. In the text on page 20 you state that the cavalry batteries were '20 percent' slower than corresonding horse artillery companies in other armies. How did you come up with that figure.

Further, looking at the turning radius (you refer to it as a 'circle') required for the cavalry guns (which was over 4 meters greater for the cavalry 6-pounder than the foot artillery 6-pounder, and over three meters greater for the corresponding howitzers), it appears to me that it might take somewhat longer to emplace these guns that were just a little too long to me maneuverable into and out of position. The carriage appears to me to be too long and unwieldy, and I cannot see any advantage gained by the use of it, as well as having the gunners mounted on the trail, and the use of packhorses for ammunition. Your insight would be very useful here.

Thanks very much for your time and effort. And I do hope that I am not overstepping my bounds by quoting from your booklet. If I have, I apologize.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin, You will find all the material on Smola in the tactics sections of his book, the second edition of which I gather you own. Evan – Likewise, I do not own a copy myself, so that is my note is of what is written there – however you will find it in the text just after the part I quote on p.8 of NV72. If Kevin really can read German, it should be very easy for him to find it and indeed, all the other tables and bits that come from Smola (including the manufacturing process).

De Scheel is thus a secondary source on the Strassbourg tests. We might have expected some note on relatiove performance. This is simply a claim – unless he cites something in G's papers. There is omething rather obvious about G – there are an awful lot of claims being apossed off as unsubstantiated fact, which are not able to stand up to the briefest questioning. There is no mention of any data to substantiate the claim and so, it is not worth anything – well, except an addition to the "giant book of Kevin's unsubstantiated secondary claims, like the bricole!". As for Tousard, all he is saying is "I like French guns" as he never saw any others nor action in Europe. If an object is 50% heavier, it is going to be less manoeuvrable.

Now, you still not told us about the YrXI metallurgy nor indeed explained Tousard's quote on windage – he says that the windage is proportionate to the ball size (well, he got one thing correct), but then you say G had single windage. Which is it?
French gunners the best in Europe in 1789? Do tell us where they had shown this prowess in the period since 1765 – well, other than a few sieges in the US? Austrian gunners had played key parts in the 7YW with the L guns, the Bavarian Succession war and against the Turks.

On pointing the gun, you should read the section again – the Vormeister directed the Handlanger, who moved it. However, if you can read German, I would also refer you to the 1809 regs, which are in your possession. Why do you ask these questions if you have these works and mention them in your book?

The Cavalry gun speed is an approximation based on weight – however, I would probably adjust that view in the light of Carl Smola's essay on the subject. Given the "horsepower", it seemed a reasonable stab at a muich answered question. I try my best in my work to answer the questions that the average enthusiast wants to know about.

Now I see Kevin claims to own a copy of Hennebert's biog of Gribeauval – so no doubt, Kevin, you will now explain to us why when that contains the full text of the 1762 report, you made up a fantasy piece about it? Why did you not tell readers that all the claims made by Graves, Lauerma and others about this report are entirely false? Could it be the same reason that you did not include an illustration of a Yr XI piece – this was the key French weapon from 1803-15, yet you say "it was not worth repeating it". You will find that Osprey published a wide range of pictures of G, UK and Austrian guns, yet you included several of those. Why did you ignore the Year XI. Oh and the proof is quite simple – the guns were captured piees originally (hence the decree of March 1803) and they were taken by Allix in 1800. He captured a range of calibres, but they were not Piedmontese as the Piedmontese used the French calibres. I expect you can work out the rest for yourself.

On Gribeauval, perhaps we should start with getting the carriage design right. The G carriage is simply the existing 1740 French design – the proof includes the 1747 Austrian gun. All G did was shave them down in L style and make some adjustments with the sight and elevating mechanism to produce his guns. You cannot claim it was a new carriage as the design already existed. He went for 18 calibres on the "bigger dog" reasoning of a siege engineer, who like your claism about "weight of shot" forgot the weight trade-off – why stop at 8 when he could go to 12pdr? You and others have made many claims about G originality – the bricole, the double position on the 12pdr, the standardisation of kit, the lighteneing of the pieces and the bagging of ammo to name a few. Yet there they all are in service already – see Duffy for the bricole in 1757.

For charging horse artillery, check the weights.

I would refer you to Smola for the comments on range, which starts with "experience has taught us". This comes froma bunch of men, who saw this happen – unlike Tousard, who saw nothing. I think you fail to understand the difference between canister and ball, the latter being what Smola is talking about.

I really think you should get over your blindness on Senarmont – otherwise we would have to assume that Titans is yet more fiction. The Corps journal and Boulart are not primary sources – as the text in the journal uses S as its source and Boulart is rather typical of your belief that the multiple copying of a single source equated to evidence. Senarmont made his claims – YET read Girod de l'Ain and you will see that the infantry were right behind him. It is not how you have presented his action in the past – it was simple an artillery led infantry advance – a standrad tactic of the day, although granted he got in closer. Smola trotted off with a cavalry escort – and his action was independently witnessed by the two witnesses required for an MTO (the papers are still in the KA now). The Austrian requirements are somewhat stricter than single person claims!

That brings us back to the original question – S's tactics were not universally adopted – because a) they were already in use (a French 1800 manual shows it I gather) and b) his only difference wagetting in very close, who proved too costly in expensive gunners.

On the infantry support – what is about you and my NV72? Why do you not read the whole sentence – note the clause starting "UNLESS".

You will find the turning circles in Smola (I see you struggle with geometry too). In fact, the lengthening of the trails and the positioning of the pintle on the limber made these guns more easy to turn than the G weapons, as their wheels came together very quickly in the turn. To turn a longer vehicle as a horse team is is always more difficult than a shorter one like a two horse foot team. I am not sure that your grasp of Napoleonic artillery is really all that good.

As for Chartrand, he does not substantiate his claims, any more than you or Nafziger do. Sure, there were arguments at the time, but so were there over G's system – claims do not prove anything. Let us have a few examples of problems with the carriages – or indeed, their sisters in Austria.

As for manufacturing, I made the points above. Horiontal boring began in Austria in 1739 and the barrels were shortened by L in 1753. The balls were cast in graphite moulds and no doubt measured at the time, but as Muller notes, they were very precisely manufactured by this method, which rendered the field rings redundant. G was out of date all over – his carriage is a 1740 design, he had no grasp of mobile warfare (the whole claim is ha, ha, that he lightened artillery) and he could not grasp the weight/punch trade off. If you want an idea of ineffective French artillery, give us a manoeuvre that won a battle – oh and before you quote Marengo, the guns were lined up and 5 of them were captured Austrian piece anyway! The Austrian artillery won or played a key part in battles like Neerwinden, Wurzburg and Messkirch. The key to N's success in 1805-12 to massed artillery moved quickly – oh what a surprise, the Yr XI is in use and the G guns are in the depot/Spain.

Evan – I see my error on velocity vs acceleration, but as you show, the ball could not carry to the point blank/zero elevation. Your suggested degree of elevation for this range is 1/2 of the Ausrian dispart and 1/4 of the French dispart – and hence cannot be due to the line of metal.

C'mon, dave. "your Titans is yet more fiction" Whilst not agreeing that this yet unpublished book has any errors, does an error make a book fiction? Your Marengo would seem to qualify then.It would be very rude of me to assert this but by your definition….
I *do*think you should try harder to be civil.It doesn't hurt much.
regards etc, donald

Donald – much of the fiction in the subject emanates from the copying and recopying of a single claim, whether it be Senarmont, the Guard at Marengo, Gribeauval's "innovations", Graz and the like. If Kevin has done this with Senarmont – he has been told enough times about Girod de l'Ain and that many memoires will include secondary material, then it will be rerun of his artilelry book and postings on the Net, ie: sinmgle claims unchecked against other material being presented as fact, when they are simply claims. It is why the hobby rules are full of so much fiction.

Dave :

Thank you very much for your polite, frank and helpful admission of both your tiny calc error and that you currently possess only notes about what Smola said with regard to the accuracy of the French at 300 paces. Truely – much appreciated. I will see what Kevin has on the Smola, and then look for it myself if needed. Thank you again.

I am a little confused about what you mean by :
"Your suggested degree of elevation for this range is 1/2 of the Ausrian dispart and 1/4 of the French dispart"

I had thought that dispart was the difference between the thickness of the metal at the mouth vs. at the breech of the weapon. It would not thus be an angle, per se, but one could compute the implied angle of elevation if one knew the dispart and the length between the breech and the mouth, if you thinking that "zero elevation" meant lining up the top of the metal horizontal to the ground. Such a scenario or calculation also, of course, requires the centerline of the bore to centered relative to the exterior of the tube and that the bore be of constant diameter.

But if you are referring to such an implied angle (and stating that such would be 0.5 degress for the Austrians or 1 degree for the French) , then aiming along the line of metal, unless someone corrected for it, would be elevating the centerline of the bore to the given angle. This would be plenty of elevation angle to lob a round out to 300 m, as previously calculated. In fact, a 450 m/sec muzzle velocity would put the round further downrange.

You are using the phrase "point-blank/zero elevation" – does this indicate that you are indeed describing placing the piece so that the line of metal is parallel to the ground and calling this "zero elevation" ? For a truely levelled piece (the centerline of the bore parallel to the ground) , the second point-blank does not exist (the line of sight propogated from the line of metal buries itself into the ground before reaching the distance down range where the round hits the earth – and thus the round only crosses such a line of sight but once). So the nomenclature "point-blank/zero elevation" is curious to me.

In any case, the easy quick way to get true zero elevation for certain and for sure is with a plomb bob dangling from the corner of a right angled mount. Put one leg of the mount in the bore and elevate or depress the piece until the plomb bob hangs parallel to the other leg. I think I have even seen these illustrated, with graduations for degrees in between the extremes, but I am sure someone one think of this general approach, especially for range testing.

Regarding : the flatness of the ground. All of these calculations require that the point of impact be at the same height (above the center of the earth) as the ground underneath the piece.
For our example [450 m/sec muzzle velocity, 1.5 m height for the mouth of the tube, including air resistance], the prior calculation showed that to land at 300m, the piece would need to be (intentionally or unintentionally) elevated 0.24 degrees. This would ALOS be equivalent to truely leveling the piece, but having the zone of impact be 1.25 lower in height than the ground on which the piece stood. I am pretty sure that this small difference could be measured (and the reported distance of flight arithmetically corrected) in the era. But was it in the case of the test(s) that led to the number 300m ?

Regarding : muzzle velocity. As previously noted, increasing the muzzle velocity in our example [0 elevation, 1.5 m height for the mouth of the tube, including air resisitance] to 585 m/sec will also make the ball land at 300 m down range.
Variables are those that drive a higher pressure developed by the decomposition of the powder. This would of course extend to the fineness of the powder grans and the specific recipe or misture of powder components. In addition, as I am sure you are aware, the rate of decomposition of blackpowder is essentially constant (not accelerating as with nitrocelluose). Hence the "seal" below the round will have a substantial impact on resulting muzzle velocity.
Thus, a carefully loaded test on the test range might result in a 135 m/sec increase in muzzle velocity.
If you have any detailed information on the pressure curve(s) for the decomposition of black powder cannon charges, I could develop a model of the effect of the degree of "seal" on the resulting muzzle velocity. the only ones I have seen are modern mixes, in much smaller size of charge and in a much smaller bore, for black powder firearms enthusiasts.

With so many variables, if one had the details of how the number "300 m" was arrived at , it would help alot.

- Evan

PS – Kevin :
Am i getting this all correct and explaining it even vaguely coherently ?
Do I pass a sous-lieutenant d'artillerie yet ?
:-))

Evan,

You're doing great. Keep going I am enjoying this immensely. You'll be a capitaine d'artillerie with your own company before long if you keep it up at this pace. ;-)

Sincerely,
Kevin

Evan,

To dispart is to set a mark on the muzzle ring so that a sight line taken from the top of the base ring by the mark set on or near the muzzle may be parallel to the axis of the bore.

The term 'point blank/zero elevation' has no meaning. Zero elevation is one thing (the line of the bore parallel to the ground with the trunnions level) and point blank another (which has already been explained).

Sincerely,
Kevin

Dave,

Why you haven't supplied any primary source material to back up your opinions and conclusions is a mystery to me.

And I beg to differ with you-both DeScheel and Tousard are primary source material for the artillery of the period. They are two of the best references that one can use. Why you cannot accept that is beyond me.

If you don't think I have Hennebert or any other refernece that I have stated I own, send me your email address and I'll scan the cover of the book with some excerpts from the text and email them to you.

You still haven't demonstrated any of your opinions and conclusions are based on solid research from either primary source material or credible secondary sources. You have not shown that

-Gribeauval was an engineer and not an artilleryman.

-Austrian production measures were superior to the French methods.

-That the Austrian casting methods were up to date in the 1750s.

-That Austrian field pieces were superior to those of Gribeauval.

-That any of the Gribeauval or AN XI field pieces were copies of the Lichtenstein tubes.

-Gribeauval was incompetent.

-That the Gribeauval field pieces were too heavy.

-That the Austrian artillery system was superior to that of the French.

-That the Austrian artillery arm was superior to the French in 1789/1790 (if they were, why did Maria Theresa ask the French to furnish qualified artillerymen to be seconded to the Austrian artillery, as Gribeauval was, in 1756?).

Those will do for a starter. I am looking forward, still, to your supporting evidence. I do hope you provide it so we can end this discussion and continue on to something else. If you cannot or will not supply the supporting evidence the only conclusion I can draw is that you either don't know or you don't have the information, and that all you have is your own opinion and your derived conclusions from that opinion.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin :

I am familiar with the verb "to dispart" …. thanks to your book, I should think.
But, Dave used the word as a noun. Combined with the odd nomenclature of "point-blank/zero elevation" and the complete lack of context for his use of the figure of 300 m …. well, it is hard to know what exactly I should model for him with the ballistic equations. Hence my request for some more details.

By the way, this is ALL in your book, absent some of the equations – but none of the ones I have used here require anything more than about 3 days of calculus, and most not even that much math. Your book really is an excellent introduction to this somewhat complicated and technical material.

(although I would tend to say, in passing, that the "manoeuvre a la bricole" was more the tactical/technical innovation or application of Gribeauval, than the mere sling+rope set-up)

;-)

====================================

Dave :

The repeated whine "Gribeauval was a miner", quite frankly and I hope not too bluntly, is as unscholarly as it is jejeune.

In Gribeauval's youth, ALL engineering operations were led by officers of the artillery. Engineering and seiges were a/the critical part of warfare in Gribeauval's youth. It would be a sign of his excellence or talent, compared to other artillery officiers, that he was given a position as a commander of engineering or seige operations (in his case after 20 years regimental service with the guns).
The creation of a formal engineering career path for officers would not occur until 1776, by which time Gribeauval (age 61) was a lieutenant g'al d'artillerie and that arm's first inspector, as well as having been awarded the Grand Cross of the Ordre de Saint-Louis.

The assigned artillery officers started a fine tradition of service in both war and even in peace that extended to the genie as an arme of service as the century progressed …..

"The military engineers of the 18th century mediated between the French state and the world of commerce. Trained by the state in the first formal techno-scientific schools in Europe, they were enjoined to partake of neither the routine and secret practices of the artisanal corporations, nor the abstract and purposeless speculations of the savant. Instead, these engineers were to combine theory and practice in a programme of institutionalized innovation. Their school curriculum focused on mechanical drawing, rational mechanics and the practical details of their trade. This cognitive programme was meant to carry particular social lessons: engineers were not to be venal and collusive like the artisans, nor aloof and asocial like the savant. Instead, they were to vie in meritocratic competition (an identity consonant with their dignity as notables), even as they acquired an ethos of hierarchy and subordination. They were to be both technically competent and loyal servants of the state. In short, they were to be professionals. "
Ken Alder
"Representation, Tolerance and the End of the Ancien Regime in France"
Social Studies of Science
Volume 28, Issue 4
Aug. 1998

From the French government ….

[E]n 1678, VAUBAN organise le corps des ingénieurs militaires
Devenu ingénieur militaire, l'ingénieur du Roi cesse d'être un autodidacte bénévole pour devenir un conseiller technique militaire rémunéré, appartenant à une hiérarchie et soumis à une discipline, formé à la connaissance inter-armes mais aussi à l'éthique voulue par VAUBAN, véritable déontologie de l'officier du Génie de tous les temps.
En 1748, LOUIS XV ouvre une École à Méziéres, dans l'actuelle préfecture des Ardennes, pour former les ingénieurs militaires du Génie, le terme « Génie » ayant été officialisé par l'ordonnance du 7 février 1744.
Le 31 décembre 1776, par ordonnance royale, LOUIS XVI crée le Corps Royal du Génie; c'est un corps d'officiers-ingénieurs, de conseillers techniques. Les ingénieurs militaires du Génie deviennent des officiers, avec les prérogatives attachées aux grades.
Dés sa création, le Corps Royal du Génie joue un rôle primordial pour le rayonnement de la France.
Selon NAPOLÉON, à la fin de l'Ancien Régime, le Corps Royal du Génie est « un des corps les plus estimés de l'Europe » !
Pendant la Révolution, c'est le Capitaine du Génie Lazare CARNOT, ministre de la Guerre …. en 1794 donne au Génie sa dimension d'Arme.
C'est en effet l'arrêté du 10 octobre 1801 qui donne aux officiers du Génie des unités spécifiques, encadrées par un corps de sous-officiers: 36 compagnies de sapeurs qui, enfin, remplacent avantageusement les fantassins, les paysans requis et les prisonniers de guerre qui constituaient la main-d'œuvre jusque-là, et 6 compagnies de mineurs antérieurement à l'Artillerie.
L'Arme est commandée par un état-major particulier ayant à sa tète un « Premier Inspecteur Général du Génie», le Général de MARESCOT, assisté de 6 inspecteurs généraux.

link

Perhaps also amusing :
LE "CHARIOT A FEU" DE CUGNOT

link

- Evan

Evan,

Have you seen Conserving the Enlightenment by Janis Langis. It is an excellent resource for the development of French engineering.

The article I wrote on Gribeauval for First Empire last year contained a lot of material on how the engineers and artillery in France were intertwined.

The first time the engineers became a combat branch in the French army with actual troops to command was in 1793. Miner companies, belonging to the artillery in Gribeuaval's time, were usually commanded by artillery officers.

When Gribeauval was promoted to lieutenant colonel, he was designated a lieutenant colonel of infantry, though he was still an artilleryman. It must have had something to do with vacancies for promotion in his own unit and he was promoted on merit and they found a loophole or place for him so he could be promoted.

There is also a book by Frederic Naulet that you might enjoy if you haven't already seen it: L'Artillerie Francais (1665-1765) Naissance d'Une Arme. It is quite good and gives the background for the Gribeaucal System and how it developed including the light artillery system the French fielded before 1720 that was undoubtedly one of Gribeauval's motivators, though that is only supposition on my part. The only real 'link' I could establish between the two was that the weights of the gun tubes were almost identical.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Just some notes from the Amateur peanut gallery
Or
Daring to go where Giants tread
With great thanks to Gandalf and MR Hollins.

Thank you Kevin for the extra effort on civility.

The only Bright spot for the French at Neerwinden ( 18 March, 1793) was the brand new horse gun company (battery). This impressed the artillery arm in such a good way that a 2nd company was order. Now in the short articles that I read on the battle some statements I did not understand until this discussion. Notable that the Austrians Avantegarde aggressive use of the 3 pdr Cavalry battery really lead the attack on one of the French columns. This impressed the French and was one of the arguments to increasing the Horse gun strength. The Austrians Cavalry batteries were not "horse guns" but a battery assign to work with a Cav force. With out further research I believe that the 6 pdr battery with the Avantegarde also was used aggressively with the cav battery.
Note things do not change –French General to committee "their guns where highly moble leading to the destruction of one of our columns {leaving out their well lead, very aggressive use and their size (3 pdr easier to move) } we need to have more moble guns we need a 2nd 8pdr Horse gun company. Please give us the money to . . .".

It is intresting to note that all artillery had to become horsed in some fashion, what slow this down to a 50 plus year adaptation was the cost in horse flesh. A Horse gun battery took more that twice the number of horsed to equipt a regular battery in most services. Since for example the Gettysburg campaign resulted in over a 100,000 horse being used up, that is like two horses for every horse in the army.

Now on the note of tactics.

The point of having artillery on the field of battle (1490 – French king gets credit) was to use them to pound the enemy into a bloody mass. You did this by figuring out where to get them to use them to good effect. Some times it is how – like lets put wheels on the guns to get them to the battlefield or lets give our infantry a small gun which can keep up with them and it can pop the enemy from the front line (Swedish 1630 thirty years war). Sometime it is tactis like lets dig a fort and put our guns in it and that way the English have to come to use and we can pound them (the Bureau brothers, French 1450? Sometimes it is simple leadership – the Austrians at Neerwinden, the French at Friedland. Sometimes you try: Napoleon at waterloo and fail.

So back to the start.

If Senarmont's artillery tactics were so effective at Friedland (1807), why is it that they did not become universal ?
In Answer : They where the universal Tactic.

Senarmont had the knowledge, training, experince, timing, support, weapons and luck to make it work as close to perfect on the battlefield.
Everyone try it, wanted to do it and just about all did it at one time or other.

The fact that it was not done during a battle was the result of it being a battle.

Thanks Lord Ghee

Dave :

Thanks to a colleague who was kind and generous enough to forward the Smola quotation, please allow me to direct your attention to the following :

"Oft gewinnt man, auf 700 Schritte wirksam beschossen, durch ein näheres Anfahren auf 500 Schritte gegen die Wirkung einer Artillerie, welche wie die französische auf 700 Schritte Metallschussweite eingerichtet ist, weil letztere nach häufiger Erfahrung auf nähere Weiten unsicherer richtet."
One often succeeds, when effectively fired upon at 700 paces, by starting closer in at 500 paces versus the effect of an artillery which is delivered as do the French at 700 paces, because, from frequent experience, these last aim more uncertainly at shorter range.

This says nothing about the guns or ballistics, nicht war? Actually, it is just one of several tactical "tips and tricks", as one can see from the extended quote below. The whole passage has no bearing on gun design at all as far as I can tell. But please do correct me if I err.

I think your perhaps "notes" failed you just a little bit, I am very sorry to say. But, at least we now have the actual text before us, and can see its level of support for your assertions and decide each one for ourselves what to think of your conjectures.

With my admiration for and again my thanks to our colleague,

- Evan

"Veränderungen der Aufstellung unter feindlichem Feuer mit einer Hälfte de Batterie nach der andern ausführen, so dass sie sich wechselweise während der Bewegung unterstützen. Dieses leidet dann eine Ausnahme, wenn ein kräftiger Anfall der feindlichen Front ausgiebiger ist.

Im Gefechte mit an Zahl überlegeuer feindlicher Artillerie, sobald sich diese gut eingeschossen hat, mit einem Theile der Batterie in eine Aufstellung seitwärts abziehen, von dieser dann den andern Batterietheil während seiner Bewegung dahin decken; jedoch nur, wenn ein solches Verlassen der früheren Aufstellung für den Zweck ohne Eintrag ist.

Oft gewinnt man, auf 700 Schritte wirksam beschossen, durch ein näheres Anfahren auf 500 Schritte gegen die Wirkung einer Artillerie, welche wie die französische auf 700 Schritte Metallschussweite eingerichtet ist, weil letztere nach häufiger Erfahrung auf nähere Weiten unsicherer richtet.

Gegen übermächtiges Feuer sein Geschütz in Verschanzungen von dem Platformen herab hinter die Brustwehre stellen, wenigstens einen Theil der ganzen Zahl, bis die Sturmkolonnen auf 600 Schritte angerückt sind, um diese dann lebhaft beschiessen zu können. Ohne dieser Vorsicht sind unsere Stücke früher undienstbar, als sie am kräftigsten gegen die Erstürmung zu wirken vermögen.

Die Munitionsfuhrwerke nach aller Thunlichkeit durch deckende Gegenstäande dem feindlichen Feuer entziehen. Es ist fast immer hinreichend, für zwei Geschütze gleichen Kalibers Einen Karren im Feuer bei sich zu haben; die übrigen werden abgesondet geführt, weniger augesetzt. In geschlossene Schanzen nimmt man nur mehrere Patronenverschläge, nie ganze Fuhrwerke, nöch weniger bespannte hinein. Auch in verschanzten Stellungen versäumt man nie, für die Protzen und Karren der Reservebatterien Schulterwehren vorzurichten."

Handbuch fur k.k. osterreichische Artillerie-Offiziere.
Josepeh Freiherrn v. Smola
(Karl Frhr. v. Smola & Joseph Frhr. v. Smola)
Wien 1939
Pages 184-185

My opinions , for what they are worth ….

-Cannonballs float
I think this question has been finally killed off : they dont float, they fall

-Gribeauval was an engineer and not an artilleryman.
OR
-Gribeauval was incompetent.
Dave is way off base here, as the categories really didnt exist in 1750 as they did in 1810. And the career of Gribeauval was clearly that of an artillery officer. Overall, a silly question or a jejeune and unscholarly epithet and not historical analysis of any sort.

-That the Austrian casting methods were up to date in the 1750s.
I see very little reason to doubt this, if one thinks in a general sense of "up to date" as of the 1750's, as opposed to "up to date" as per Silicon Valley.

-That the Gribeauval field pieces were too heavy.
Maybe subject to analysis. Not enough data to form a conclusion yet.

-That Austrian field pieces were superior to those of Gribeauval.
Maybe subject to analysis. Not nearly enough data to form a conclusion yet. May end up being a judgement call, a matter of opinion or conclusion as opposed to a clear an unequivical analytic result.

-That any of the Gribeauval or AN XI field pieces were copies of the Lichtenstein tubes.
Barring identical prints, they are not "copies". However, any beneficial feature evident in the Lichtenstein designs should, on balance, be present in the Gribeauval designs (as the Lichtenstein designs were known to the French and convergent development might easily lead to similar results anyway). So, no "insult" to the French if the proposition is true in whole or part. Overall, a dull question either way.

-That the Austrian artillery system was superior to that of the French.
OR
-Austrian production measures were superior to the French methods.
OR
-That the Austrian artillery arm was superior to the French in 1789/1790 (if they were, why did Maria Theresa ask the French to furnish qualified artillerymen to be seconded to the Austrian artillery, as Gribeauval was, in 1756?).
I am not sure we could define "superior" in this context with enough rigor to even pose the question of which was "superior", let alone answer such a question. This looks like it is a matter of opinion, a conclusion. It does not appear to be a question that can be answered analytically with a clear result one way or the other.

:-)

- Evan

I cant help feeling a little bemused by this whole thread. Admittedly I am not of the intellectual class as many of the posters in this thread.

The question was "why was it that Senamont was so succesful" The first 3 or 4 replies seemed to be targeting on the question, then Dave replied and within a paragraph he seems to suggest that it didnt happen, it must have been Senamonts "fantasy" …… . 3 pages later after reading about ballistics, inventors, who hasnt read what book, miners and engineers; I am left wondering

Why was Senamounts "TACTICs" so succesful.

I am reasonably sure it happened, I am not interested in whether cannon balls float; I am more interested in what was happening on the battlefield than being impressed by the intellectual ego's on display.

Please when replying to a thread stick to the question or start your own so we can avoid it.

baztanz :

I am sorry to have offended you. It wont happen again.

- Evan

I do everything: I make my own, I use slottabases, I use washers or small bits of resin scenery. The bases must look good, a bad base can spoil a great mini.

It is a thread not a book it goes where it goes so baztanz keep posting all of you keep posting,

and not a ner der well on my expressive post on the question.

Lord Ghee

Baztanz,

I echo Evan's sentiments and I am very sorry you're unhappy over the thread. I also think the question was answered and information supplied to look up if anyone was interested.

From 9 June on this thread:

'Senarmont did the same thing at Ocana in Spain with his artillery. There, however, it was an economy of force measure and not the main attack as it was at Friedland.

Other battles where this tactic, or a variation of it, were used was Wagram, Landshut, Lutzen, Raab, Hanau, and Ligny, so it wasn't a one-time event.

It should be noted that at Friedland the infantry supported Senarmont's large battery, which was a reversal in roles. Further, the Russian Guard cavalry attempted a flank attack against Senarmont's artillery. The gunners shifted trails and gave the Russians two canister vollies. They were literally blown off the battlefield.

At Hanau allied cavalry actually reached Drouot's large battery, where the gunners fought them with musket and bayonet, rammer and handspike until the Grenadiers a Cheval arrived to defeat the allied remnants on the gun line.

There is an excellent book Grand Artilleurs by Girod de l'Ain which covers Eble, Senarmont, and Drouot. It has a very large amount of letters and after action reports in it and is very useful. Senarmont's gives his losses and his ammunition expenditure at Friedland.'

From 18 June on this thread:

'There are at least two primary sources for Senarmont's action at Friedland. One is his after action report, which is in Grand Artilleurs by Girod de l'Ain, and there is a copy of the other, which is the I Corps after action report, in the older La Sabretache. They are clearly done by different people.

Senarmont was indeed supported by infantry, which is a role reversal. Usually, artillery supported the infantry and cavalry, not the other way round.

Finally, you certainly can find the impetus or suggestion of Senarmont's new artillery tactics first used at Friedland in 1807. He took it one step further, using artillery to seize the tactical initiative and become a maneuver element which actually held ground. It would be repeated on other fields, such as Raab, Ocana, Ligby, Hanau, and Lutzen.'

I'll also have to echo Lord Ghee's sentiment. A thread does go where it goes and also there isn't anything such as 'thread ownership.' However, the point you made is valid.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'Thank you Kevin for the extra effort on civility'

Lord Ghee,

You're welcome and thanks for saying that. It is much appreciated.

Sincerely,
K

Thank you Kevin I very much appreciate that answer and I think it was more like the answer Hungarianhussar was seeking, I know it was from my own view.
I take your point about "thread ownership", however it beholds each of us to be respectful of the person starting the initial thread, and when the the thread has gone 3 pages, most of which only by a whisper smacks of a answer to the initial enquiry I feel the thread has been hijacked.
However now I have found out what I wanted to know I will leave this thread to very learned folk.

Regards to you
Barry

Barry,

I look forward to seeing more postings from you here. I am planning on writing an article on Senarmont, as well as on Berthier, for First Empire if I can get around to it this summer.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin keep us posted on your articles and where we may find them, I am extremely interested in that aspect of Napoleonics namely, personalities and the military aspect as opposed to the scientific.

Barry

Evan – What Smola is saying is that French guns are more accurate at 700 paces, whereas Austrian guns are more accurate at 500 paces, when the French ones become less accurate. What is the most accurate way to fire a gun? As level as possible to the point of first bounce – as you cannot control what happens after a bounce and level fire keeps most of the forward motion. If a ball flies flat, then how can it be more accurate at a greater distance?

You have shown that to reach the first bounce described, hte ball must be on an elevation of .25 deg, which is considerably less than the French or Austrian dispart (it is noun – see KGL Muller – meaning the angle between the breech and muzzle highest points). If the ball is on an elevation, then it cannot be flying flat, can it?

Gribeauval was a miner, if you read about his whole career. yes, until L's changes made the 6pdr and heavier light enough to be effective in the field, the main role of artilelrymen overall was siege work and this was G's world. However, not only that, but G was captain of a mining companyt and what did he do in Austria? No, MT did not bring him to advise on guns or tactics. G spent all his time mining and sapping – this info is on the Net in Wurzbach and is also in the Organ to the OMZ. The man spent no time with field artilelry and thus had no grasp of it. His only contribution to anything pre-1765 was building a garrison gun carriage, which required further testing and modification at Schweidnitz, and along with Prince Charles Lorraine, setting up the Austrian sappers. All thes eclaims about his 1762 report and being hea dof the Austrian artillery are the fantasies of people who copy secondary claims.

His guns are overweight. It is quite simple – there are always trade-offs in any mechanism and you are looking for the most efficient point, where MC=MR (in economic terms), best expressed here as the point at which marginal gain equals marginal cost. Kevin and others have simply gone for "Mine is bigger than yours". The American, Captain J. G. Benton, in A Course of Instruction in Ordnance and Gunnery … (New York, 1862), Fig. 31, shows that for a twelve-pound field gun an absolute velocity threshold was reached at a barrel length of about 25 calibers. Benton's data indicates, moreover, that extending the barrel length beyond 16 calibers resulted in a gain in muzzle velocity of only about 5½ per cent while extending it beyond 12 calibers yielded only about a 12 per cent gain.

Consequently, this demonstrates that 16 calibres is the efficient point, since any gain beyond that point is offset by weight effects (and no doubt cost). It was also unnecessary to have a thicker barrel since the Yr XI conclusively showed that the larger French charge could be accommodated in an L barrel.

Indeed, I have noticed that Kevin has some unfortunate habits, which I mentioned in relation to "Titans". First, we have the claims about reading books. I don't doubt that he owns Hennebert and Smola 2nd ed., but why then write a lot of rubbish about the 1762 report in his book, when Hennebert give sthe text in full, and mention Duffy/Tousard, when the correct info is in Smola. Either he cannot in fact read the material or has deliberately ignored what does not suit his claims. Indeed, we can see another unfortunate technique – editing! Twice he has made claims about NV72, which involve not quoting the second half of the sentence, and now, I see he does it with de Scheel. S does not say that G tested the Prussian and Austrian guns at Strassbourg (it is mostly this text in Kevin's own Appendix 1). he only says that G tested them. Certainly he took one Prussian fortification gun back to France and I presume he must have at least seen some Austrian guns when writing the 1762 report and he did observe some sieges early in the 7YW. Nowhere does S produce any evidence of actual testing and he is a secondary source on the matter.

However, Kevin has omitted a key point on hte same page of de S: "Nay it is even probable that he would have reduced them to 16 (calibres) witha view to gaining still farther advantages in facility of movement, which ought to be a great object in field artillery, but perhaps he thought it siufficient for the present to overcome prejudices thus far witha view of advancing still farther towards his object at a future day when experiments shall have succeeded in dissipating such obstinacy attached to the old ideas". Now I wonder why Kevin did not include that? The other point about this is that hte same proces happened with the Yr XI, which was originally produced at 16 calibres but then adjusted to 17 and hen 18 to placate "the old ideas". The G 8pdr was 50% heavier than an L gun and had the double position problem – that should tell you why it is overweight. The 6pdr barrel was only 60% heavier for a doubling of everything else – the 8pdr was 50% heavier for an increase of shot weight of 38.3% (33.3% x the 15% difference between Nuremburg and paris weights), plus the extra costs, heavier carriage, double position etc. That should also tell you where MC=MR.

Lord Ghee – Smola's battery at Neerwinden was a Cavalry battery with 6pdr guns and 7pdr howitzers. He supplemented hem with various calibres from 3 to 12 pdrs during the two days. More info on his battle is in the 1808 OMZ (officials reports from each side) and Zeissberg: Aldenhoven, Neerwinden und Lowen.

Lord Ghee wrote:
"If Senarmont's artillery tactics were so effective at Friedland (1807), why is it that they did not become universal ? In Answer : They where the universal Tactic.

In the Napolonic era the battery was still the largest tactical formation of the artillery. There were no batallions or even larger formations and no established command structure for larger formations. So most officers thought in terms of batteries, how to use them or parts of them most efficiently etc.; artillery was usually considered "only" a support arm in the combined-arms approach.

When at Friedland IIRC 36(?) guns were used under central command and became an "equal" or even the most important arm in battle this is very similar to situations reported for later wars (i.e. FPW 1870/71). Therfore I would call it innovative and not the universial tactic of the Napoleonic wars.

Ulenspiegel

No, while the numbers of guns involved was significant and reached its high point at Wagram with the Grande Batterie, it is just a question of relative sizes. Battles like Neerwinden, Wurzburg and Marengo featured about 30-40,000 on each side with batteries under central direction of about 12-18 guns. Thus Friedland would only have to have 80K per side to be the same size scaled up and don't forget that N had learned an important lesson from two Russian batteries of 60 guns at Eylau. In several aspects of the war, the French were undoubtedly doing the bigger version, but that is not an innovation – indeed, we can see from Friedland and Wagram, that the casualties make life difficult later, which was a key reason why other nations did not do these large scale actions in the first place.

Dave :

You are repeating yourself.

And, as requested, please open a new thread if you would care to discuss any of these points in greater detail.

==============================================

My Lord Ghee :

I cannot but in general agree with all your main points. And you do express them much better than I could !

:-)

- Evan

@Dave
But the larger batteries were usually position batteries. In contrast, the Friedland action fought by a large mobile artillery force, which requires better leadership.

Ulenspiegel

Evan – I would diagree. These points actually develop out of the same thing, be they Senarmont or guns. The mythology has come from the selective rewriting of secondary sources or reproduction of single source material without looking at other material.

Ulen – Here we are back on topic! I would not agree that these batteries were position batteries in every case – those 18/16 guns on each side at Marengo were deploying into position to support their respective infantry. Wurzburg was a 17 gun battery on a nice flat piece of ground, but designed to pound a French advance (you can still se the location). Neerwinden saw Smola pretty much on his own bar a cavalry escort – moving up to smash up a French column and halt its adavnce. Senarmont's men were manhandling the guns after they initially drew up in front of the 9e legere and others – that is easy to control, not least as an 1800 French manual prescribed this and it was normal use of the old battalion guns to have them advancing in front of infantry. The Russians in that case were mostly static, making x-coordination straightforward and don't forget that the key GA advantage was the coordination of large formations practised for 2 years in Boulogne. Maybe then the answer is that the French did not have enough survivors after 1807 to keep the x-coordination going?

It is one thing to mass individual batteries and quite another to actually move those batteries in concert. Senarmont appears to have advanced his guns at Friedland and Ocana but then his guns were as I understand it 4lbrs. In addition as a corps artillery commander he was able to take the guns from the infantry because the corps was in reserve.

It was always understood, since the 7YW and most likely earlier, that you could blow a hole in an opponent's front by putting batteries together and as the quality of the French infantry declined Napoleon made arrangements for a reserve built around his guard. Thus we have the massed batteries at Wagram,Borodino,Lutzen etc. These batteries of massed gus were mostly immobile.

The Allied problem was one of the established nations. Because the nobility devalued artillery most officers were no higher than lieutenant colonel or colonel and because of this they did not have the authority the French artillery generals attached to the army and each corps had but even in the French army it was a no no to take supporting artillery from the infantry. Thus, it was almost impossible to form massed batteries. Though at the end of the era armies had so many guns that their mere deployment in support of the infantry was almost a massing.

good gaming

bob coggins

All armies in the late 18th and early 19th century operated with a reserve – this was precisely where the more mobile and also heavioer guns were usually found. The whole point was that they could then be moved from the reserve to the key point for the smash through or to reinforce its defence. For example with Zach's final column at Marengo, the infantry had theor battalion guns, but three Cavalry batteries were taken from the reserve and deployed north of the road to support the infantry deploying to the south.

The difference with corps was simply that instead of an army of 30K with an artillery director, you have huge armies with corps of 30K each and all that happens is the army org is moved down to an intervening level – there is nothing mystical about corps, as they were known as armies, columns, Abteilungen etc. and just represent a new new level at which the army is sub-managed. Hence you have an artillery chief with each corps.

Nobility ahs nothing to do with artillery promotions. While it appears that the French system laid more emphasis on officers, Austria took its best NCOs and made them the key commanders. however, the end result is the same – thes emen are expensive to train and have to have a lot of technical knowledge. They will not get above Colonel simply because to be a general means you have to command all arms and that is a waste of your skill – it is the same reason as modern companies rarely have technical people as CEO and chairman. The French simply relied on giving rank to some men to allow them to deal with other Generals – in Austria, the man's authority came from his position in the army command structure. Smola was only a Colonel at Aspern, but could direct the assembly and control of about 100 guns during Lannes' advance at Aspern.

However, you make valid points about the later battles – Wagram was the next big event after Friedland and we see no mobility there (32 of the guns came from the Army of Italy). While he did very well and as I said, I think there was a key element of practised lateral coordination, I do not believe that S was doing anything unusual.

Dave,

Thanks for the reply. I tend to agree with much of what you wrote. The French had a number of artillery schools. When cadets graduated they were assigned to the artillery where the vast majority remained and were promoted if they were competent. Promotions in the French artillery army were much faster than in those of other nations. Certainly Dickson would have been a general in the French army. Philosphically the French treated artillery officers as other officers whilst other nations tended to isolate them.

Senior French artillery officers were often considered for corps command, to my knowledge artillery officers in other armies were not. Not only this but because of their rank and their credibility within the army French generals assigned to massed batteries were capable of coordinating not only fire but targets, rates of fire and resupply from the train.

There is a great difference between forming a grand battery as a single unit and merely massing individual batteries. The difference in authority, training, ability and philosophy made French grand batteries something totally different from the massed batteries of the allies, who while they massed guns did not have the authrority, training or philosophical outlook to coordinate the fire of those guns. Guns had been massed since Marlborough.

What drives me crazy are rules that have a number of grand batteries creeping across the table without regard to not only what occurred but also what could have occurred given the command structure and the philosophy of the various nations' artillery – including the French.

To my understanding even in the Frnech army once grand batteries were formed (after Senarmont)they were not moved. From Wagram to Waterloo these grand batteries remained stationary.

good gaming

bob coggins

at waterloo the grand battery started on the left side of the road then was moved across the road later in the day

Lord Ghee

British left, Nap right need to find map get compass. . . .