"Pflugk-Harttung vs Hofschröer" Topic

The lengthy thread "The Waterloo Model" seems to have drawn to a close following the Editor's revelation that two posters who had supported the views of Peter Hofschröer – "Gneithardt" [Gneisenau's first name] supposedly from Iraq and "Lu Ny" ["Loony"!] supposedly from China – were actually Hofschröer himself, sitting in Austria. However, there are a couple of unanswered questions from that thread that I would like to deal with in this new thread, since they have nothing to do with the Waterloo model itself.

These questions have to do with the publications of Dr. Julius von Pflugk-Harttung, a Prussian historian and archivist in the Prussian Military Archives prior to World War I, who wrote a series of unbiased and thoroughly researched books and articles on the Waterloo campaign. In my article "Back to the Sources: General Zieten's Message to the Duke of Wellington on 15 June 1815" published in First Empire #82 (available on their website through this link: PDF link and this is the best version to use because an error they made in numbering footnotes in the published version has been corrected here), I wrote that Peter Hofschröer had repeatedly misstated the conclusions of Pflugk-Harttung concerning the arrival time of General Zieten's message to the Duke of Wellington containing the news of the French attack on the Prussians on 15 June 1815, and I provided detailed sources and quotations for this allegation. After this subject came up in the Waterloo Model thread,
"Arteis" asked on 22 April to see a comparison of quotations from Hofschröer and Pflugk-Harttung so that he could understand what the controversy is all about. On 29 April Dave Watkins, editor of First Empire magazine, provided links to my article and to a PDF file containing the 1903 journal article by Pflugk-Harttung on Zieten's communication with Wellington on 15 June 1815 (this file is mistakenly labelled "excerpts" when it is in fact the complete article. You can download it here: link John Cook then asked for a translation of key portions, and this is understandable, since not everyone reads German or is comfortable with the old Fraktur style of prewar German printing, so I am answering all of these requests by providing quotations from Hofschröer and translations of relevant paragraphs from Pflugk-Harttung, along with the original German in case anyone wants to check my translations.

On page 334 of 1815: The Waterloo Campaign, vol. 2: The German Victory, Hofschröer wrote, "Pflugk-Harttung conducted a more detailed examination of the issue in his Vorgeschichte der Schlacht bei Belle-Alliance – Wellington, published in 1903. Pflugk-Harttung examined all the available evidence and tried to make sense of conflicting accounts. He concluded that Wellington received Zieten's message by 9 a.m., but did not react until confirmation of its contents was received from elsewhere." Hofschröer's source note for this statement is not particularly helpful, since it cites "pages 44-79" of Pflugk-Harttung's book, making it hard for his readers to verify his assertion. There is obviously not enough space here for me to translate all of these pages, but this is not necessary, since only page 50 of this portion of the book deals with Zieten's message to Wellington. Here are the relevant quotes.

After reporting on Zieten's 8:15 a.m. message to Field Marshal Blücher in Namur, which contained the words "I have informed the Duke of Wellington of all this" ["Den Herzog Welllington habe ich hiervon benachrichtigt"] Pflugk-Harttung wrote [page 50], "In this letter Zieten thus states clearly that he has informed Wellington about the French attack. As we will explain elsewhere, this dispatch departed Charleroi between 8 and 9 a.m. but the English commander only received it late in the afternoon around 6 p.m." Pflugk-Harttung's footnote to this sentence: "See my essay, 'The Prussian Reporting to Wellington Prior to the Battle of Ligny', in the Historisches Jahrbuch 1902 [note: actually was 1903]." [Original German text: "In diesem Briefe erklärt Zieten also ausdrücklich, daß er Wellington von dem Angriffe der Franzosen benachrichtigt habe. Wie wir an einem andern Orte darthun werden, ist diese Depesche zwischen 8 und 9 Uhr von Charleroi abgegangen, der englische Feldherr hat sie aber erst am Spätnachmittage gegen 6 Uhr erhalten." Footnote: "Vergl. Meine Abhandlung: Die preußische Berichterstattung an Wellington vor der Schlacht von Ligny, im Historischen Jahrbuche 1902." Pflugk-Harttung goes on to say a bit later on page 50, "Wellington received the first report of the events [the French attack on the Prussians] not from the Prussians but from the Prince of Orange." [Original German text: "Die erste Nachricht von den Ereignisse erhielt Wellington nicht durch die Preußen, sondern durch den Prinzen von Oranien."]

Pflugk-Harttung's book refers his readers to his more detailed article on Zeiten's reporting to Wellington, and if we look at this article we see that on page 55 Pflugk-Harttung wrote, "After all this it can be taken as certain that Wellington received no report from Zieten during the morning, and that the only one to reach him was the one that was sent by the Prussian general between 8 and 9 a.m. but only arrived in the afternoon between 7 and 7 p.m." ["Nach alledem darf als sicher angenommen werden, daß Wellington des morgens keinen Bericht von Zieten erhalten hat, daß ihm nur derjenige zuging, den der preußische General morgens zwischen 8 und 9 Uhr absandte, der aber erst nachmittages zwischen 6 und 7 Uhr eintraf."] Pflugk-Harttung repeated this conclusion on page 57: "On the morning of the 15th Zieten sent just one dispatch to Wellington or Müffling, which left Charleroi between 8 and 9 a.m. and arrived in Brussels between 6 and 7 p.m." ["Zieten hat am morgen des 15. nur eine Depesche an Wellington (Müffling) gesandt, welche zwischen 8 und 9 Uhr von Charleroi abging und zwischen 6 und 7 Uhr in Brüssel eintraf."] These conclusions led Pflugk-Harttung to write on page 61 of his article, "All in all the Prussian reporting to the English commander was inadequate, hardly corresponding to the threatening situation." ["Alles in allem war die preußische Berichterstattung an den englischen Feldherrn eine geringe, der Bedrohlichkeit der Sachlage kaum entsprechende."]

In several Notes published in 2004 in the Journal for the Society for Army Historical Research (see my article for the specific references) Hofschröer rejected statements by John Hussey and Gary Cousins – supported by direct quotations from Pflugk-Harttung – that the Prussian historian had not agreed with 19th-century Prussian claims that Wellington received Zieten's message at 9 a.m. Hofschröer claimed that Hussey and Cousins had "overlooked a substantial part of Julius von Pflugk-Harttung's article." Hofschröer offered pages 42 and 44 of Pflugk-Harttung's article to support the allegation that Pflugk-Harttung's conclusion was the same as Hofschröer's (that Wellington received Zieten's message at 9 a.m. on 15 June 1815 but refused to act on it) On page 34 of my First Empire article, however, I showed that these pages contained simply a list of all the conflicting evidence that needed to be examined, plus an initial hypothesis that a letter by Wellington written on the evening of 15 June "seems" to give significant confirmation to the 9 a.m. arrival time alleged by Prussian General Grolman in 1819, a hypothesis rejected by Pflugk-Harttung after examining all of the available evidence, thus leading to the conclusions already stated above (from pages 55, 57 and 61 of Pflugk-Harttung's article). It should come as no surprise to readers of this Message Board that Pflugk-Harttung's conclusions are found at the end of his article, not at the beginning as argued by Hofschröer.

I hope this helps show what that particular controversy was all about. I felt it was important to show the true conclusions of Pflugk-Harttung because I admire his writings on Waterloo very much and consider them very important because he had access to the Prussian Military Archives that were destroyed during World War II. I also give him great credit for his courage in conducting a completely objective review of all of the evidence on the subject of Zieten's reporting to Wellington and rejecting previous Prussian accusations against Wellington (repeated more recently by Hofschröer) even though Pflugk-Harttung was writing at a time of great Anglo-German tension prior to World War I.

Sorry, I made a typo in the link to my article in First Empire. The correct link is: PDF link

Next time I will use the Preview button! The corrected link is for the Pflugk-Harttung article, not my First Empire article, whose link works fine.

Greg,

Very well done and I'm glad to see you posting here. I do hope you are well and will keep posting as your work is most gratifying to see.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Greg,
Interesting indeed.
''I wrote that Peter Hofschröer had repeatedly misstated the conclusions of Pflugk-Harttung concerning the arrival time of General Zieten's message to the Duke of Wellington containing the news of the French attack on the Prussians on 15 June 1815''.

In your opinion, is there any way Hofshroer's greatly 'misstated' conclusion could have been a genuine misunderstanding, or perhaps a mistake made by inadequate or rushed reseach?

Greg,

Thanks again for pointing out Hofschroer's mischievious misreading of Pflugk-Harttung to the general public. I used to enjoy Peter's work, as a long-overdue 'corrective' to the "Wellington-single-handedly-saved-the-World-from-the-Evil-Empire" British school of Napoleonic history. However, Greg, your objectively presented evidence 'outs' Hofschroer as a highly subjective 'journalist' with a clear personal agenda, rather than meriting our consideration as a serious 'academic' thinker worthy of the title. I'll take substance over 'flash' anytime—look forward to your next article, Greg.

Cacadore asked if Hofschröer's misstatement of Pflugk-Harttung's conclusions was an honest mistake or something else. If he had only made this "mistake" once, I would be willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. But the fact that he kept repeating it, even after critics quoted Pflugk-Harttung's conclusions to show that they were exactly the opposite of what Hofschröer had claimed, shows that this was not due to his misunderstanding of what he had read in German (and his ability in German is too good for that, anyway) but must have been deliberate. And as my article shows, the same sort of "mistake" occurred with other key evidence, like the quote from Zieten's "journal" that turns out to be from the grossly exaggerated and inaccurate Zieten autobiography written 24 years after the battle.

This indeed is enlightening to hear, I remember all the back and forth arguments for and against Peter in the First Empire magazines. Now after reading this I will not so easily trust this man as a historian.

I feel now his whole intention to write his 2 volume books on the Waterloo Campaign was more so to destroy a reputation of a General (Wellington) than to give us the truth.

Thanks for the translation Greg, very much appreciated.

Regards
Shane

Shane,
'feel now his whole intention to write his 2 volume books on the Waterloo Campaign was more so to destroy a reputation of a General (Wellington) than to give us the truth.'

Any idea why he wanted to do it?

no clue whatsoever…

you tell me

Controvesy sells.

S.

Cacadores,
In spite of the fact that there is a continual flood of Waterloo books published each year, most do little more than pick over the same ground.
If you want to sell your Waterloo book & make a reputation, you have to be controversial. Hamilton-Williams went down this path with his (unsubstantiated) attack on Siborne.
It would appear that this is the path Hoffie has trodden.
It's hard to give him the benefit of the doubt as he won't argue cogently but when challenged, simply spews allegations of insanity to his critics.
It is hard to reconcile his behaviour with academic rigour.
I believe other authors have gone down this track too though hopefully not so willfully. There was a 'revision' of the Consular Guard's efforts at Marengo a few years ago.

'There was a 'revision' of the Consular Guard's efforts at Marengo a few years ago'

Hi Donald,

And that sparked a lot of research which effectively and succinctly figured out what that small unit actually did and pretty much laid that tempest in a teapot to rest. Evan did outstanding work on that case, though it took a couple of years.

Sincerely,
Kevin

I've going to do some supposition here … I freely admit I don't know a huge amount about this battle other than reading a few modern books on the subject, and am no historian. I look forward to responses from those who have studied the battle more than me.

One of Wellington's comments that I believe has become quite contentious is the one about the Prussian advance only becoming effective at 7.00pm, when in fact the Prussians had been engaged an awful lot earlier than that. Some people feel that Wellington was minimising the Prussian involvement for his own advantage.

As I understand it, most of the first few hours of Prusssian involvement were around Plancenoit, which was behind Napoleon's lines, and very distant from Wellington. Yes, he would've seen and heard a battle going on over there. But by all accounts, that battle was very to-and-fro, and even a few hours later when Napoleon's guard counter-attacked, the Prussians were right back where they had started from. In other words, yes, they were involved, but the advance was not yet effective.

However, in the evening you have the Prussians finally building up enough to take Plancenoit for good, thus advancing. And the Prussians are now emerging onto the Allied Army's left flank at Smohain, which you could say is the first point at which their advance becomes directly effective to Wellington and his army.

My personal view is that Wellington might have being totally literal in his comment. Yes, the Prussians were heavily engaged much earlier, but their advance only became effective TOO HIM at about 7.00 …

Er … that last line should read "TO HIM" …

Kevin, as we both know, the originator of the Guard at Marengo theory was very reluctant to acknowledge any primary sources that challenged his thesis. And there were some compelling ones.
To be fair, he had some late sources that seemed to substantiate his views but I don't believe it was a strong case. I can live with 'The Guard was trashed' theory being a possibility but a remote one.
There was supposed to be a proper book to follow up the Osprey but I haven't heard anything about it for some years now. Have you?

Interesting….you talk about the Consular Guard at Marango. Can you enlighten me about this and what you guys mean ?

I once read that the Consular guard got their kicked at Marango but it seems there was more to it ?

Please elaborate…

Regards
Shane

Wonder if any of this lot are going to show their faces:
link

Hope not: ''Generally, a battle is an instance of combat…Battles are most often fought during wars….''

Great stuff!

Regarding the Consular Guard infantry at Marengo:

The thesis being referred to contended that the Consular Guard infantry was destroyed at Marengo, losing 400 prisoners and having only 100 survivors including the unit's colors. This is referenced in an 1822 Austrian military publication by Mras. The thesis is that the Guard infantry was taken in the rear by Austrian cavalry while in line and in a firefight with Austrian infantry, overrun and destroyed.

The traditional accounts have the Guard infantry suffering heavy casualties, about 270 out of 800 and then withdrawing under fire back to the French lines. Supposedly they were in square and withdrew intact. There is an eyewitness account by an enlisted Grenadier a Cheval, Joseph Petit, which supports this.

Coignet in his memoirs states that the Guard infantry came up behind them and furnished them with a resupply of ammunition. Their fight supposedly came after that.

All the other work I have seen done on this supports two things. First, that the 800 strength of the Guard was probably not present in their outnumbered fight with the Austrians. Soules was present commanding probably 500, the other 300 being the ones who brought ammunition up to Coignet's unit.

Those under Soules command got in the firefight with Frimont's troops and lost heavily, the number of 270 for casualties seems accurate and were incurred by the 500 under Soules command. Whether or not they were in square or line seems to me to be irrelevant. The 200-odd remaining pulled back to the French lines still as an organized unit, and were not destroyed. The fight probably lasted about thirty minutes.

They were probably joined by Tortel's battalion and were reformed for the French counterattack that happened after Desaix's arrival. For that, the Guard infantry with both Soules and Tortel present, might have been commanded by General Stabenrath, who was a general staff officer who is mentioned in some French primary accounts as commanding them in the counterattack. Dupont, Berthier, and Monnier in their after action reports all mention the Guard infantry participating in the counterattack, which they couldn't have done if they had been destroyed by Frimont.

Interestingly, Coignet mentions a battalion of a French line demibrigade (the 43d I think, but I am not sure) being taken in the rear by Austrian dragoons and taken. That's interesting and I find the likelihood of that happening twice in almost the exact circumstances in the same action almost nil.

I have seen no substantiated evidence that the Guard infantry lost 400 men as prisoners. It's a thesis, and an interesting one, but unlikely.

There were quite a few decorations for valor for the Guard at Marengo, both Soules and Tortel being on the list. I highly doubt that Napoleon is going to decorate two battalion commanders for losing their command, half as prisoners.

Melas does not mention any of it in his after action report.

I have most of the discussions of this by the participants which is, to say the least, more than interesting.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Very interesting indeed, the report I read is the one you cite from an Austrian source then. When I first read it years ago I was devastated to think the Consular Guards first battle was such an annihilation.

But I also bought and read, "Marengo and Hohenlinden", by James R. Arnold which gives a very good description of the battle.

You are right Gandalf, this is a very interesting little part of history that is shrouded in controversy.

Regards
Shane

Well, shes right for a few years anyway. Based on recent posts, at least invest in a locked cabinet for spray paint an minis; but eventually they will be able to roll dice and with three odds are one will be a gamer. One will be OK but think dad's a geek. And the third one: try not to think about that right now.

Well, I didn't post that one, and I wonder if I can find what I did post.

Sincerely,
Kevin

The discussions about Waterloo or Marengo will never end, no doubt about it. New findings, new interpretations, different opinions. Nothing new in military history.

'Those under Soules command got in the firefight with Frimont's troops and lost heavily, the number of 270 for casualties seems accurate and were incurred by the 500 under Soules command. Whether or not they were in square or line seems to me to be irrelevant. The 200-odd remaining pulled back to the French lines still as an organized unit, and were not destroyed. The fight probably lasted about thirty minutes.'

Over 50% casualties in 30 minutes certainly sounds like a disaster to me. This doesn't seem very far from the version in the Osprey book, except that you have the entire effect from Austrian fire? Good shooting if so.

The difference is that Soules' battalion was not destroyed and a large part of it was not captured by the Austrians. Further, it was still a viable unit in that it participated in the French counterattack that swept the field. And that its strength in the thirty minute fight was probably only 500 and was not rejoined by the 300 or so under Tortel until the counterattack. Those are pretty large differences.

My conclusions are based on the research and arguments of Evan Pawley, who did a lot of work and presented it on one of the Napoleonic forums. His research was well-done and presented, and was the best recitation of probably what happened in the Guard infantry's action at Marengo.

It should also be remembered that the Guard infantry were thrown into the fire because the French were losing. That it lost heavily isn't a 'disaster' but quite understandable, and probably expected, as the odds were somewhat long to begin with. The French were retreating and trying to break off the action to reorganize. Sacrificing units in that situation is quite understandable. That the battalion did as well as it did, holding up the Austrians for thirty minutes is commendable. And no one is disputing the fact that they were being overwhelmed and had to join the general retreat.

It should also be noted that this was the Consular Guard infantry's first action as a unit. It was made up of veternas, but I wouldn't consider it the elite of the French army (and the 9th legere would probably agree with that assessment).

It took the appointment of a colonel named Dorsenne to straighten out the Grenadiers a Pied. He was a handsome, many-times wounded officer from the line who was brought in to make the veterans into both a reliable combat unit and a show unit. He instilled discipline, was highly respected, actually revered, by the grenadiers, the toughest of them shaking in his shoes when confronted by Dorsenne.

Coignet tells the story of Dorsenne calmly maintaining his postition in front of the formation at Essling ordering the troops to close ranks as men fell to Smola's overwhelming cannonade. Dorsenne was wounded there and kept his command.

Elzear Blaze believed Dorsenne to be without any nerves at all. He said that Dorsenne was the only man he ever saw who could keep his back to an enemy cannonade without flinching. Blaze himself said he tried it once, and couldn't keep from looking behind him to see if there was any inbound roundshot coming his way.

Whada ya mean NO GUNPOWDER? HYW armies had cannons, the Ottomans had cannons even in the 15th-century. The Greek and Roman get catapults don't they? A cannon is just another catapult. And you gotta let organ guns in. Just count them as mutiple crossbows. The Chinese get repeating crossbows why can I have organ guns? Man! This is so unfair!

Name withheld by request.

1. Composition of the Garde Consulaire a Pied at Marengo.

The Garde Consulaire was formed by decree of 3 janvier 1800 (13 nivôse an VIII). The Garde a pied was to be composed of some 1300 infantrymen, in 2 batallions of 6 compagnies each of grenadiers (under chefs des bataillons Soules and Tortel, respectively) and a company of chasseurs a pied.
The following were the sources for the gardes:
> The Garde du Corps législatif : nominally 1200 men in 12 companies, elected representatives of the Garde national sedentaire
> Garde du Directoire : 120 men in 2 companies, chosen from the army's veterans
> Guides : perhaps some 2 dozen or so guides a pied who had managed to return from Egypt
> New selectees from the army : « La garde des consuls sera recrutée parmi des hommes qui se seront distingués sur le champ de bataille. » It is unknown how many such selectees were incorporated into the Garde before Marengo. Several officer biographies indicate such a selection in early 1800, but the number of selected gardes that could have made the Marengo campaign appears to be very limited (perhaps to less than 50 men).
The company of chasseurs a pied (nominally about 100 chasseurs) was formed somewhat later than the grenadiers and, if present at Marengo, seems to have been fielded without a seperate command. The biographical sketch of Soules taken from his Legion d'Honneur service record (Fastes de la Légion d'Honneur – T2. p 173.) says that he commanded 500 grenadiers or chasseurs at Marengo.
Tortel is noted in a revue of 3 mai 1800 at Dijon as marching with a total of 305 members of the Garde a pied, including 3 captains.
The total given by most sources, including Berthier's order of battle, is 800 for the Garde a pied at Marengo.
It is thus tempting to conclude that Soules commanded a batallion of 6 companies, likely the soldiers most fit for active service, and that Tortel led a reduced or half batallion of 3 companies. The remaining gardes would have stayed in Paris, where the commander of the Garde a pied, chef de brigade Frère, seems to have remained. Interestingly, a unit of veterans de la Garde was formed shortly after Marengo, as those unfit for active service were removed from the ranks of the Garde Consulaire.
Thus the composition of the gardes at Marengo would have been, in the majority and perhaps up to 3/4 of the total, former members of the Garde du Corps législatif – elected (!) representatives of territorial "home defense" units !
Assuming such an organization meshes nicely with several incidents and reports of the battle itsself. We can see Tortel's command in the gardes who passed out a re-supply of ammunition to Coignet's regiment if we wsh ot credit the old gronard's memory, while Soules' batallion is deployed on the far right of the French positions. Also, we might make the conjecture that the appointment of adjudant général (equivalent rank to a chef de brigade) Léopold Stabenrath to lead the Garde a pied in the evening counter-attack indicates that the forces of Soules (by then reduced in numbers) and Tortel had been united.

The Garde a pied had a large musique – at least 55 members at the time of Marengo. How many, if any at all, of these made the campaign is unknown.

The artillery of the Garde included 4 pieces that were attached to Soules command on the far right. These would be served by 40-odd gunners and perhaps another 40-odd members of the very newly created (militarized) train de artillery.

Together with some 15-20 officers of the batallion, and perhaps some additional officiers "a la suite" from among the the rather large general staff of the garde, it is easy to see how Soules' command might be reported a totalling some 600, as is seen in some accounts of the action on the French extreme right.

2.Time of Arrival.
A recent chronology of the battle of Marengo (D. Hollins, "The Battle of Marengo" , Osprey, p. 72) have Bonaparte and the Garde Consulaire arrving on the battle field at about 3pm. This "late arrival" scenario, based on the availbale time, tends to to limit the role of Garde a pied (and Bonaparte) to something less (and less "heroic") then many previous accounts of the battle.
However, an earlier chronology has strong primary source support. Among others, Coignet, Soult, Marmont, Berthier and Eugene all clearly indicate an arrival time at or before mid-day.
Eugene : around midday "beginning to take an active part"
Coignet : just before noon , handing out cartridges, their view inspiring him
Berthier's morning map : shown at Poggia
Soult : [morning positions] "Les deux divisions du général Victor avec la brigade de cavalerie du général Kellermann reslè rent ainsi en position à Pedra-Bona et à Marengo. Le général Lannes forma en seconde ligne, à six cents toises en arrière, ses deux divisions et la brigade de cavalerie commandée par le général Champeaux. La garde des consuls et une brigade d'infanterie, commandée par le général Carra Saint-Cyr, étaient en réserve à la troisième ligne, et le général de cavalerie Rivaud fut détaché à Sale."
Now, in the nature of source criticism, these accounts can be dismissed as mistaken, or written later using published chronologies for guidance.
On the other hand, there is no – repeat no – primary source support for the later time of arrival of which I am aware. In fact, since according to Marmont for example, the sound of fighting was audible at the headquarters bivouac and at least two officers had reported the fighting from early in morning, it requires an assumption that Bonaparte sat unpresponsively through the morning to support the later chronology. This seems to me a counter-intuitive assumption, or one crafted to minimize the role of the First Consul.
The simpler assumtpion, that Bonaparte and/or the Garde moved to the battlefield by about mid-day, seems the simpler assumption and does not require that the several reports of his arrival at that time be dismissed.

3. Action before 3pm ?
If one allows the Garde a pied to have taken the field from mid-day, there then remains some 2-3 hours for them to act. Here is it easy to adduce numerous eye-witness acounts of their resisting Austrian cavalry – the number of charges variously given a 3 to 5. This "standard version" of Garde a pied at Marengo : the "block of granite". It appears in Victor, Berthier, Coignet, the contempory (and anti-Bonapartist) italian historian Botta, Soules service record, Soult, Eugene, Marmont, Petit and so on, ad infinitum.

In addition to the criticism that the were not yet on the battlefield, which was discussed above, there is a sceond critical point made : that there were no such Austrian cavalry available to (repeatedly) charge the Garde a pied. I have never seen exactly how this assertion is supported, if at all. For example, there is …
Brigade Johann Graf Nobili. 12 escadrons : 1873 hommes
…Dragoner-Regiment 3. Erzherzog Johann – 6 escadrons – Oberst Joseph Graf (de) Gavre (emigré, de Flandres) – rekrutierte aus Innerosterreich (Steiermark und Keurnten)
…Dragoner-Regiment 9. Fuerst Lichtenstein – 6 escadrons – Oberst Carl-Michael Marchese Belcredi (de Pavie) – ex-Stabs-Dragoner Regiment in Italien
These are said to have had trouble crossing the bridge to enter the battlefield proper …. which seems odd given that tehy had about 4-6 hours to make the crossing !

4. Sources for the "Destruction" of the Garde a pied.
The following have been variously claimed as "primary" or "based on primary" sources for the alleged destruction of the Garde a pied.
ITEM No. 1
Undated handwriiten notes which no longer exist but were reproduced in their regimental history (by which time they were named differently )
Pizzighelli, Cajetan. Geschichte des k.u.k. Husaren-Regimentes Wilhelm II. Koenig von Wurttemberg Nr.6.
1734-1896 / im Auftrage des Regimentscommandos zusammengestellt von Cajetan Pizzighelli. Rzeszow, Selbstverl. des Regimentes, 1897. viii, 853 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Clearly, the notes, if they existed at all, could have been written at any time up to 1896 and by anyone and for any reason. This is NOT a primary source.
ITEM No. 2
The description written by Mras in 1822/23, working at the Austrian archives (1823 edition of Osterreichische Milierische Zeitschrift). This version in reprinted in de Cugnac. It is clearly not itself a primary source, and there is no reason to believe it is based on anything other than the manuscripts discussed below.
ITEM No. 3
Stutterheim A and B
Two manuscripts, printed finally in about 1900, said to be the work of Major Joseph Stutterheim. He was on Melas' staff and is said to have gone forward against Lannes with Schellenberg's column. As noted below, he claims to have himself seen the "destruction" of the Garde a pied, and this may be so.
His first manuscript is of 1811 deposited at the Austrian achives. The second, it appears, was a cleaned up version of the first of about 1823. Unfortunately, it appears that Stuuterheim was rather , er, ah … dead (!) at this point, so the second or B version has a bit of a cloud on its claim to be a primary source.
Stutterheim A
"… A few minutes before this deciding moment the Guard infantry came marching on the road from Sale to the center. With these chosen men Bonaparte hoped if not to restore the battle to stop us for a while and to protect his other troops that were already on the verge of flight. In column with opened divisions the Guard marched across open field and had individual skirmishers accompany her march at a distance of some 60 paces. There could not have been a more desirable sight for our cavalry. Ott whom the Guard passed ordered Lobkowitz DR10 to blow rapel and to attack as soon as all were assembled. Alone there were circumstances – above all Oberst Fürst Taxis could not be found – such that Ott ordered Oberst-Lieutenant Graf Harrach to lead the charge against the Guard; after time-consuming preparations DR10 set into step, then into trot, finally into the gallop. The Consular Guard infantry seemed to be close to disaster when at a few musket shots from its skirmishers the whole DR10 turned about and ran away. Some French cavalry that had been observing this from a position behind the Guard pursued our dragoons. The situation for Ott's infantry seemed desperate as in midst of the coverless plains she had been deserted by her only cavalry. Alone the same as the Consular Guard had pursued its march without being scared by the Austrian cavalry deployed in line Spleny IR51 advanced now in midst the plains headlong against the French cavalry which like ours some moments before turned about after a few shots and ran away.
The same battalion[s] Spleny IR51 supported by a battalion of Fröhlich IR28 then advanced against the Consular Guard. The Guard formed up by divisions into a line. Then under a continuous artillery and small arms fire and although many men fell on both sides these two lines marched against each other with so much order and vigour that it was difficult to say who would triumph. Then suddenly while behind the Guard the whole French army was on the retreat a swarm of Imperial cavalry came galloped from Marengo fell into its rear and let only a few escape. Also their 4 guns fell into our hands. Although the French hide this incident and try to highlight the prior deeds of the Guard, Major Stutterheim has seen this whole incident which by any means does not dishonour the Guard; and a short time after the battle he received from several Guard officers the confession that but 100 of them returned who were increased to 500 only by those returning from Austrian captivity."

Stutterheim B :
" … when one discovered in a depression the march of a small column with big red plumes, the characteristic of the guard, which moved through a field of high standing corn to prolong the line of General Lannes. When FML Ott discovered this he hurried to order Lobkowitz DR10 to mount an attack against this column. Alone the forming up of the DR10 was delayed and a volley from the guard threw disorder in its ranks. French cavalry from the center tried to take advantage of the withdrawal of DR10 when a battalion of Spleny IR51 left the deploying Austrian column stormed headlong against this French cavalry which surprised and dispersed by the musket fire also turned back and took to its heels.
After these cavalry combats had ended without any result General Gottesheim was charged to attack with the other battalions of Spleny IR51 and one of Fröhlich IR28 the Guard infantry that strove to cover the right flank of the French army. Attack and defense changed here in peleton fire and whole volleys like on parade ground. …
[…..description of the taking of Marengo farm …]
… Near Marengo the rolling musket fire had already decreased and drawn to the Austrian left wing where Gottesheim was still fighting the Guard and Vogelsang Carra Saint-Cyr when a few squadrons of Nauendorf HR8 [Note : more likely this was Dragoon Regiment No. 1] and Bussy Jager Regiment [emigre French] came on, gallopped from the main road and fell into the rear of the Guard. This attack decided and ended all fighting. Many of the Guard were sabered down, the bigger part, and the four guns surrendered. The French totally conceal this incident in their reports and hardly mention their guard that defended itself with so much glory in midst of the plains. The author witnessed this whole incident and summons all who have been present with the Consular Guard at Marengo if they could dispute this account."

For the French :
From Soules' Legion d'Honneur records :
" …. Passé comme chef de bataillon dans les grenadiers à pied de la garde consulaire le 13 nivose an VIII,
Soulès suivit le premier Consul en Italie. Lors de la bataille de Marengo, où il commandait 500 grenadiers ou chasseurs à pied de la garde, il reçut l'ordre de se porter sur la droite de l'armée. Il n'y lut pas plutôt arrivé, qu'il eut à soutenir suecessivement cinq charges de la cavalerie ennemie , mais il les repoussa vigoureusement et lui fit essuyer de grandes pertes. Pendant cinq heures consécutives, il se maintint, dans cette position, malgré les efforts réitérés d'une colonne de 8,000 Autrichiens qui cherchait l'en débusquer, et il ne se retira que sur l'ordre formel du général en chef qui l'envoya protéger le mouvement rétrograde de l'armée, avec environ 200 hommes qui lui restaient. A six heures du soir, il reçu l'ordre de reprendre l'offensive, ce qu'il exécuta en dirigeant son attaque sur un corps de 3,000 hommes qui cherchait à tourner notre droite, et dont il coupa la retraite par l'habileté et l'audace de ses manœuvres. A la suite de cette mémorable journée, le premier Consul lui décerna un sabre dèhonneur ; l'arrêté du 17 thermidor an IX qui le lui confère est conçu en ces termes : «Bonaparte, [etc.], d'après le compte qui lui a été rendu de la conduite du citoyen Soulès, chef de bataillon dans la garde des consuls, qui, dans toutes les campagnes de l'armée d'Italie, où il servait dans le même grade, a constamment donné des preuves du plus grand courage, ainsi qu'a la bataille de Marengo, ou il commiandait le détachement de la garde des consuls, lui décerne, à titre de récompense nationale, un sabre d'honneur.»
Chef de brigade dans les chasseurs à pied de la garde le 15 frimaire an x, …."

Grenadier Petit, grenadiers a cheval, standing to the right of the main road :
"… charged three times by the cavalry, fusilladed by the infantry, they surrounded their colors, and their wounded in a hollow square, exhausted all their cartridges and with slow and regular steps, fell back and joined our astonished ranks."

5. Casualty Reports.
> Murat's report a few days later : 121 wounded & killed — one would think perhaps this is meant as "severely wounded and not re-joined the ranks"
> Petit : 25 (unwounded ?) prisoners returned the day after the battle
> Brossier (captain, engineering staff): 260 total casualties
> Lauriston : about 1/3 casualties (thus, similar to Brossier)

6. My Opinion.
Here is speculation, analysis, summary — call it what you will.
The garde a pied arrived on the field about mid-day.
500-600 men under Soules took position on the extreme French right.
Here they successfully resisted repeated cavalry charges, over some hours, likely adopting square from time to time. To deny this flies in the face of some dozen-odd primary accounts. All of these cannot be lying, mistaken, copying, propoganda, etc. Despite the well-deserved praise for this defense, it was no miracle – the ability of steady infantry to resisit unsupported and ill-co-ordinated cavalry assaults is well documented in the period (as are the deficiencies of Austrian cavalry doctrine).
In the later afternoon, they saw off a charge by Dr 10 in open column and then were finally caught, while in line in a firefight with 4 fresh enemy batallions supported by guns, and charged in the flanks and rear by 4 or more squadrons of light horse (DR 1 and Bussey Jagers) under Frimont.
Their defense, likely now very exposed as the remainder of the French had retreated, crumbled immediately or very quickly. Likely orders were sent about this time for them to retreat, but these were un-necessary / overtaken by events. Similarly, their likely quite depleted ammunition condition was neither a surpirse nor decisive. The key elements to the evetual success of the Austrians against the Garde was (i) more-or-less accidentally creating a viable combined arms attack and (ii) gross weight of numbers and (iii) the "morale fatique" of the defenders in an isolated position.
Of the 500-600 under Soules, some 200 retreated in something like good order, in something like hollow square around the colors, under Soules' direction. Another 100-odd likely just ran like stink !
There was no mass surrender, and few unwounded prisoners were taken. 4 attached guns were lost. No colors were lost. Stutterheim A is too "excited" on this topic – the tone of which is much reduced in Stutterheim B. Stutterheim A is the only source produced which could possibly be read as to imply a substantial surrender, and such is not explicitly stated even there.
Some 250-odd gardes were killed or wounded up to and including this "destruction" (a few additional casualties would have to be added for the evening counter-attack). Of these, about half were seriously wounded or killed.
The rallied members of Soules' command and the command of Tortel (total perhaps 500 men) were united for the evening counter-attack, under Stabenrath.
The "heroic" reputation for the Garde a pied was completely earned and merited for their performance at Marengo, especially so considering the actual composition of their ranks at the time (largely elected representatives from home defense national guard units). The lavish level of awards of armes de honneur to them was in to no way other than fully appropriate.
The inaction of the grenadiers a cheval is noteworthy. Bessieres is reported by Eugene as halting a charge by the chasseurs a cheval that had been requested/ordered by Lannes. One wonders if he was being similarly "careful" in his use of the grenadiers a cheval at the time of Frimont's charge.
The use of the word "destroyed" is at least problematic in this context. Clearly large losses were incurred by Soules' command while on the extreme right of the French disposition (upwards of 50%). But equally, they stayed in the battle to participate in the evening counterattack. Perhaps the motto of the Lauzun hussards applies : "Perit sed in armis".
The recent work of Mr. Hollins, while valuable in bringing the topic to discussion and in adducing the various "Austrian" sources for use by modern readers, to too livid and sensationalized, and in places over-values the quality of some sources while dismissing out-of-hand many contrary ones of equal or better value. One would look forward to a larger work by Mr. Hollins, as some of the weaknesses of his published work to date may have been forced upon him by the requirements of selling "booklets" to a wide audience.

- Evan Polley

P.S. I would like to thank the many many colleagues who have helped me to research this matrial. I hesitate to adduce their names, since Internet fora seem to breed conflict and ill-will and I do not wish to visit this upon those to whom I owe so much. Of course, all conclusions and opinions are mine alone.

P.P.S. for Kevin Kiley – "Blaze himself said he tried it once [ standing facing away from incoming cannonshot] , and couldn't keep from looking behind him to see if there was any inbound roundshot coming his way."
It was a standard "leadership skill" in the heavy cavary, as noted by Thirion and capitaine Claude Oriot who authored the "Lettre d'un cuirassier".

Dear Blancard, you are an amable guy, well done, add a few pictures and you have written a couple of Ospreys!

How strange the two most controversial topics have burst forth at the same time, must be that time of year.

Bravo Graf : excellent pseudonym decoding ! And thank you for your kind words.

Now, if you happen to know what happened to the painting of the g'al baron Blancard that once hung in his home, the chateau de Lisle near Allex, as late as about 1900, then I would be much obliged.

Or any other image of the g'al baron ?

Anyone ?

Merci a tous,

- Evan

Evan,

It's about time you returned-you have been greatly missed.

Sincerely,
Kevin

My Hollins & Hofschroer books are now going to a place of honour on a top shelf in my library where my Hamilton-Williams & Weider volumes live.
'Nuff said?

Kevin :
Actually, I am really only resting between travels – and home sick with what is NOT (with the blessing) cholera, just some nasty sw asian cold-type virus. They almost pulled me off the plane in Frankfort on the way back home !
But thank you very much for your kind words.

Donald :
I haven't studied the Hofschoer works, and havent even looked at the material on the Waterloo model. I must say that any passing interest in his treatment of the latter topic has been really cooled by the analysis and commentary I have read!
As to Mr. Hollins, I would not be so harsh, as we are really talking about the first instance of his version of Marengo, as published in a "booklet". I do think it is over-done and a bit livid (if not lurid) – but it adds to the material easily available to the general public some elements that other works lack. Let us hope instead that careful "peer review" of this initial offering strengthens and deepens the resulting definitive work by the same author that is still to be awaited.
What is wrong with Ben Weider ?? Are you implying that Napoleon was less than perfect as a statesman and general ? Oh dear, such heresy ! ;-)

A+

- Evan

Hello, Evan,
nice to 'see' you again.
There is, of course, some solid factual material in Hoffie's books but, as seems highly likely, the central tenent is flawed, then it needs handling with care.
You are probably correct about dave hollins but again, if his booklet's raison d'etre is coloured then any other reasonable work on Marengo rends it obsolete. Care to write it?
I think it's nice to have heroes but Mr Weider takes it a leetle too far, don'tcha think?
best wishes, donald

Donald :
Thank you.
I can only agree with your comments.
Part of the problem is a "writing history" issue. In each case ("Hoffie", Hollins and Mr. Weider), there was a substantial body of secondary sources that they see/saw as deficient or one-sided. Seeking to correct this imbalance, perhaps, caused an over-eager response in the other direction.
I know of VERY few modern authors who appeal to me as tied more to their sources than their theses. Some, like the late Paul Britten Austin and George Nafziger, specifically aim to reproduce original materials with only minimum comment. If I ever have the time to write anything, it would be in this genre.
Others do add more analysis than I would ever be capable of attempting, and yet have amazing fidelity in their treatment of source materials. For Mont-Saint-Jean, Bernard Coppens is very appealing to me and for Marengo, I hold my breath and hope that Bernhard Voykowitsch will find a publisher interested in his work.

A+

- Evan

?

If I remember correctly aren't Hollins & Hofschroer frends?

That's a strange coincident of Hollins & Hofschroer, Marengo and Waterloo.

No that's just me thinking out loud, sorry.

However, neither are mates of Hamilton-Williams…so that theory has rather short legs.

Oh well two out of three.

And I remember how much Hollins complained about Hamilton-Williams.

I think it was a friendship thing. Hoffie labelled some of hollins' critics "lunatics" as well as his own critics.
Kinda tag-team abuse….

Sounds the norm.

And of course Hollins wanted to take legal action on all of his "critics", me included.

Really? I deplore the American recourse to the legal system in order to sue all & sund….wait a minute. hollins is Welsh isn't he?

-And of course Hollins wanted to take legal action on all of his "critics"-

Curious. I have a vague memory of him threatening to sue some clueless jerk that gatecrashed the factual debate on Napoleonseries and accused him of fabricating his sources himself, or some such nonsense.

Threatening to ALL of all his critics, though? When did that happen?

Threatening to sue ALL of his critics, obviously…not merely menacing.

Joy!

The War has returned!

After the fragile Peace Of Amiens, the big guns of Generallisimos and Marshalettes (Tubes)Kevin, (Preussen)Peter, (KuK)Dave, (Sparks)Von P and varied aides de camp and ragged camp followers are at it again with a vengence.

Huzzah! and Hurrah!

(I just hope I don't get another solicitor's letter wanting me to take libellous sides)

BenjaminW1 :

Have you just labelled me a "varied aide de camp" or a "raggged camp follower" ?

I do not know how I could have expressed my comments with greater balance or deeper source citation, other than reproducing every texte mentioned in full in its original language. Further, I do not know how I could have been more polite and collegial in my expression of any disagreemnt with any author. Lastly, I do not know how I could more clearly label that which is my opinion or analysis – as opposed to primary source material.

Perhaps you would take the trouble to instruct me , so that I might do better in the future ?

- Evan

No mon frere, worry ye not.

Just my light hearted view of these genn'lmen (including yours truly) and their varied sallies and cutting out expeditions; throughout too many years and websites to remember…

(I still don't know how Sue, Grabbit and Runne got my home address though..)

There are always those that post civil, reasoned and evidenced arguments to the battle in question, esp about white bearskins and rotund Guaardsmen.

We, the great unwashed, know who to believe….

Felicitations
Benjamin

Greg – thanks for the translation.
I was thinking I had read the same but fifty pages of gothic script is a difficult task to plough through and ensure accuracy so I was loath to speak up.

Perhaps one of the clues to this happening is the vague reference like pp44-79, as well as the eagerness to have a sensation.
I know I have been guilty of skimming sources at speed making rough notes and then writing from memory with approximated references. Going back and checking more calmly I have found several times where the original actually said something quite different. For any point of detail I now have to consider writing out a footnote with an exact copy of the original as a reality check to avoid false memory faults. Even though this is a painful time consuming task of no joy whatever.

Research is a costly and time consuming process and credit to the people who have hunted out the errors, indeed it may seem more time went into that than the orginal works themselves.

It seems a fact of life that many French sources are online and a fair number translated to english, English originals are now often in cheap reprint, but the German only in rare original and occasionaly expensive limited edition reprint.

There are, however, very few books in English where we can read the German side of things.
One would wish cheap editions of English translations of the older German studies would be commercially viable. In the meantime it seems a case of learn German and hunt for tattered bargains or live with the knowledge that the books available in english whilst very informative in other ways have an element about their main sensations that needs to be considered when reading them.

G'day.

Disclaimer- Peter Hofschröer is a friend, has been my house guest and is someone whose work I admire. But not uncritically, as he well knows himself. So Gandalf, you may want to skip this and spare me the unwanted, futile and familiar lecture and pleas of injured innocence. Or we'll re-run the "Old Salt" thread from the NSF again, here, and you can explain that dirty laundry.

This thread reminds me of the old days on the original ( Fons' ) NSF. Same topics, many of the same allegations, same faux "I-was-once-a-fan-but-learned-the-error-of-my-ways" cheering and seemingly the same thrust- discredit Peter's work ( and as a bonus Hollins' ) by concentrating on one point from one book. I hope I'm wrong, but there is a deja vu feel to this thread.

( So why do I bother? I hate "lynch parties", that's why. )

Greg, you make a good case for Peter being wrong about P-H's conclusions. It's a good bit of work and I'm not being sarcastic when I say thanks for posting it. People make mistakes, deliberately or accidentally, and if they can be uncovered and examined so much the better.

It's not such a good case for it being deliberate, as there's a lot more to the matter than your short summary can show. The fact that Peter has continued to argue his interpretation suggests the matter isn't as cut and dried as you make it out to be.

Hopefully few will draw the erroneous conclusion that this point ( and a couple others uncovered on other boards ) mean that the only purpose for Peter's two-volume 1815 work was to discredit Wellington.

That was, of course, the purpose behind Wellington's Smallest Victory- and I haven't been convinced by the counter arguments that Peter's not at least partly right. But then I've read the un-editted manuscript and seen what was left out of the finished book, so I will claim an unfair advantage there.

By the way, are you a gamer or have you just come to this board to continue the debate from FE in another forum? Not that you can't do that, of course, but if so, why the need?

Don, I wouldn't be so quick to throw out either Peter or Hollins' books on the basis of a couple of posts here. But it's your decision to make.

Evan did some great work on Marengo, but I still don't think his work completely erases any case made by Dave's Osprey. Nor do I think we'll get a definitive answer on what happened, unless some unquestionable new evidence has/is turned up somewhere ( or heaven has re-runs of the battle on holographic TV ) . Personally I stopped following the Marengo Crusade a long time ago, but at the time I thought the anti-Hollins argument was just shading the pro-. And that's despite the frothing-at-the-mouth posts the two main protagonists brought to the feud ( it doesn't deserve to be called a debate ) .

I remember when Peter's first "controversial" book on the 100 Days was not yet published, but was still being attacked by some whom he'd asked to review the manuscript, such as the late Bob Elmer. Once published there was an immediate increase in the attack on his reputation, credentials, motives and veracity, led by the same characters that had attacked the unpublished manuscript. The attacks all concentrated on the "fact" that Peter was using that book to attack Wellington.

Why- because he dared examine Wellington's story of warning Blücher of the Prussians'faulty dispositions and he dared to examine the difference between the reported and actual troop locations on 15 and 16 June. In other words, because about 10% of the book looked at "100 Days Mythology" and questioned it.

The attack has since carried on, gaining impetus when Wellington's Smallest Victory was published. The usual tactic ( and I am not, at this stage, suggesting that this is what Greg is doing ) is to focus on one mistake/lie/distortion ( whatever you want to call it ) and use that to try to discredit the whole of Peter's work.

Over the 18 months after the publishing of book 1 I saw Peter turn from a person quite willing to discuss his book to a rather angry, sarcastic individual. Considering the attacks made on various sites and in the press, I'm not surprised. Of course things got worse when the "German Victory" got published and Peter dared suggest that Waterloo was not won on the playing fields of Eton.

The same happened when Hollins' booklet on Marengo came out. That feud, led by one Kevin Kiley ( aka Gandalf ) , has since spilled over to many boards, causing the original NSF and Max Sewell's NSF to fold and the rather stringent restrictions on posts on Bob Burham's NSF. It also damaged Dom Goh's Napwars Forum, infected THC and even made it here.

( Which begs the question, Kevin, why someone who has disparaged gaming/gamers on at least one occasion bothers to frequent a gaming board? )

So, 11ACR, considering the insults, accusations and attacks that have been aimed at those authors, I'm not surprised they returned fire. But don't exaggerate, Hollins ( of whom I am not a particular fan ) threatened a few specific individuals, not "all of his critics". Given that they would not stop the attacks, some of them quite personal, what was he to do? Threats of legal action seemed excessive ( and petulant ) to me as well. But I wasn't copping the he was, if i was I may have reacted similarly.

Anyway, if anyone is desperately interested in the topics of Marengo, Waterloo and the authors in question, I urge the undecided to go to the the NSF ( napoleon-series.org ) and have a read of all the archived threads on these subjects, before you accept the replies in this thread as accurate. ( If you have the patience. It may be better to avoid the subjects of Marengo and Waterloo all together- I try to. ) Make up your own mind on the subject by reading the old arguments ( they start in '96 or '97- that's how long this has all been going ) . I don't know Greg Pedlow and hope his motivation is merely that of correcting an error. But some respondents in this thread literally have a years-long history of attacking the work of both Hollins' and Hofschröer, so I wouldn't accept their uncorroborated word ( nor mine, for that matter ) on the subject.

Cheers ( and possibly good luck ) .

Dal.

Nice one Dal…

G'day, Ben.

Mate, do you get a 1999 deja vu feeling reading this thread?

Dal.