"Sgt York SPAA Vehicle" Topic

Is there any info available on the Sgt York. From what I remember, it was a dismal failure.

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These two articles should help. Good luck!

Thanks Saginaw. I remember watching a report on the York many years ago; I believe it was on 20/20 and reported by Sam Donaldson no less; which came to the conclusion that Ford won the contract simply because the parts for the vehicle would be manufactured in more key congressional districts than General Dynamics. The fact that the GD prototype's performance was vastly superior to Ford's had no bearing on the selection process.

I might add that Sgt Alvin York is probably spinning in his grave to this day!

I wonder what happened to those 50 production vehicles?

I think they were turned into hard targets

I had the pleasure of being the overall controller for the Opposing Force during the operational test of the SGT York at Fort Hunter-Liggett in 1985. The live OPFOR guys from CDEC ran the vehicles and smoke; the CCG controlled the Apaches and fixed-wing; the guys in the instrumentation center ran the simulated artillery, mines, etc. I got to watch all the "battles" from the hilltops, make sure everything was coordinated into the overall plan, and brief the dignitaries on the OPFOR side of the battle at the end of each mission day.

Then because the test went so well (!), I was selected to be the threat guy on the white team which reviewed the development and operational test data, the results of which (a foregone conclusion) went to Congress, and which then drove the next generation of tactical air defense (which never was completely fielded as intended).

So I had an eyeful.

My conclusions I've stated here before. The radar—from a USAF fighter—was a humdinger. It saw and displayed everything, including all the ground clutter. It was possible for the operator to sort out the real targets from the ground clutter, but by the time he'd done so, the SGT York itself was usually dead.

The gun was perfectly accurate, putting every round into the same spot in the sky. It didn't have sufficient dispersion to get that "golden BB" effect. If one round went off-target, every round was going off-target.

The chassis was proven and reliable. It simply wasn't fast enough to keep up with M1s and M2s, which would run off and leave it—to become a priority OPFOR target.

But the real thing that killed the SGT York was a false threat assessment (cooking the intel was not invented in *this* millenium!). The SGT York was designed to protect heavy task forces against HIND helicoopters which would have to run in close to deliver their ordnance.

However, literally weeks before the operational test, DIA came up with a new assessment that the Soviets had improved the HIND's rotor hub to allow them to be able to launch ATGMs from a hover at long range. They also predicted large numbers of HAVOC attack helicopters would be produced, with even greater capabilities.

So we ran the test missions against three different helicopter capabilities (all represented by US Apaches crewed by the crustiest instructors from the Aviation School—-dang, they knew their business). When they acted as HINDs running in close, they were usually wiped out by the SGT Yorks (as designed) and the Blue ground force whupped up on the OPFOR. When they acted as HINDs or HAVOCs sitting in the trellines, launching ATGMs from max range, they took out the SGT Yorks first (who couldn't pick them out of the fground clutter) and then proceeded to annihilate the Blue Force.

Of course, we found out in succeeding years that the DIA assessment was bogus: that the Soviets retrofitted very few HINDs to be more stable, and that since we had already bankrupted the Soviet Union, relatively few HAVOCs were ever produced. But the intel supported the desired conclusion: a reason to kill the DIVAAD program.

The real casualties were not the vehicles, but all the air defense officers at the AD school who had tied their reputations to the DIVAAD. A lot of careers effectively ended in May 1985. The air defense community was paranoid
for years after, and this had an effect on the very slow fielding of the next generation, and the absolute avoidance of practical ideas such as the camera-nose-mount, joystick flown, $4,000 USD missile to take out hovering helicopters: fly it to the target and ride it in—designed by a Fort Bliss civilian engineer, proved about 100% effective in tests, and buried like a pile of dog poo because it was a lot cheaper than the Brad/Stinger, Avenger, and other systems much more lucrative to defense contractors.

The whole thing was neither the intel community's nor the air defense community's finest hours. I'm not particularly proud of having helped to kill the system with bad intel. It was, however, an enlightening experience.

Allen

Oh, yeah, the main point of the response to Treadhead3006: every component of the DIVAAD was outstanding in itself, if perhaps a poor choice for the system as it was now being expected to perform. But kluging them all together created a system that could have met its original design criteria, but had no chance against the raised expectations against which it was finally tested.

Allen

Treadhead, I rememnber watching that report on '20/20', especially seeing the tests where the M247 was directed to "kill" two flying drones; it missed them both, miserably. The only "saving grace" of that day was to fly them both into the M247's kill stream.

Allen, I'm sure you remember that report that was published in 1985 that overestimated (an understatement) Soviet land, sea, air, and ballistic missile power. That's what was great about the old Soviet Union; more excuse for weapons spending (not that I'm against spending what you should in undermining and eventually defeating your enemy).

The "20/20" report was evidence of the superb, consistent accuracy of the 40mm gun, and the absolute hoplessness of hitting anything with it, if it wasn't properly boresighted or it had slipped off.

As we were primarily in the business (in our little office at Fort Leavenworth, producing the FM 100-2 series and checking the CTC OPFORs) of getting unclassified threat information out to the troops, we LOVED the annual editions of "Soviet Military Power". DIA would leak (oh sorry, that's "declassify"; we don't "leak", do we?) selected juicy bits about new Soviet systems to keep up the anxiety level and defense spending high, just as you say.

I have mine all packed away so that when my kids are older, and we're getting ready to start a war in 2018 or 2020, I can show them why they should have a great deal of confidence in what they're being told…

Allen

Allen my main question is this. Was the reason why the DOD awarded Ford the contract, as 20/20 alleged, simply pork barrel spending? Or was there another reason?

I wasn't privy to the politics; by the time I was invloved in it, the GD protoyped had already been removed from consideration. A good survey of that subject and the possible reason for backing the Ford prototype is in an article in this publication:

PDF link

Allen

Interesting. A friend of mine was involved on that project from the civillian side. He always had good things to say about though. So I wondered what had actually happened.

One thing we are starting to learn is that sometimes you have to throw contracts at defense companies to keep themn going – otherwise they close down and then when you need them…..

There used ot be lots of those educational/keep them working contracts, but not anymore.

I also heard about the "new" test for the Sgt York. The way it was explained to me was that they designed a test that it couldn't pass (b/c it wasn't designed for it). I didn't realize that the new test was based on "real" evidence.

Too bad they didn't wait until it was qualified before they assigned York's name to it. :)

When I worked at Pt Mugu in the late 80s there was at least one of these parked behind the big anechoic chamber. I'd guess they eventually became targets.

I believe that the Ford Aerospace and Communications Corporation design was chosen over the General Dynamics system because the congressmen in the districts where the main and subsystems were to be produced were able to leverage more votes than those of the GD system.

One of the main reasons(read: excuses) given to justify the choice was a preference for an "American" system over the GD system, which was essentially a Gepard in a new can. The FACC design required new licensing agreements to produce the 40mm/L70 Bofors guns, feed system, and ammunition so it was very little more "American" if at all.

The Westinghouse APG-66 radar systems' shortcomings were software related and were already in the process of being overcome. The USAF were already addressing the problem of ground clutter as an aspect of the rethinking of the F-16s' role as light fighter to that of a fighter-bomber.

That test that 20/20 showed of the two high-subsonic drones being command detonated after the York failed to hit it were part of a process needed in all weapons development of the era. ALL hit-to-kill target drones are destroyed after a failed engagement, as there is no provision to land them. In the case in question, a high speed crossing engagement at close range is the most difficult undertaking for any air defense system, whether land bound or airborne. The major problem in that situation was the program's team management, succumbing to pressure to report success, trying to pass it off as a successful engagement.

In reality, it was a successful engagement in that it showed that the slew rate was not adequate for the task, and that the traverse gearing was not robust enough for the massive turret. By the time the inertia was overcome, the guns were already behind the targets and could not catch up before the drones left the engagement range fan.

No system is ever invincible. The goal is to influence the actions of the opponent. An attack helicopter that has been lit up by radar will behave completely differently than one that only has to fear being acquired by the Mk I eyeball and effectively only engaged by an antitank round. If forced to fly nap of earth along covered routes, attack helicopters becomes much more predictable and susceptible to flak traps and direct fire engagement, instead of choosing any approach they like with impunity.

With the cancellation of the Sgt York, we were left with the four Red Eye teams of our battalion's Combat Support Company; a system that generally could only be employed after the aircraft had overflown your unit, presumably rendering portions of the owning unit into flaming rubbish.

You could write a doctoral thesis on the demise of the Sgt York system. There was interference from the USAF who felt that the Army being able to defend itself interfered with it's own air defense mission, cost overruns for fictitious problems, obstruction attempts by General Dynamics (who had first dibs on the APG-66 radars for the F-16), and of course, the M1 MBT program's resistance to even the evaluation of the M1 hull for the DIVAADS. The end result put the sons and daughters of America at risk. You know, same as Rumsfeld and associates are doing today.

Ken

P.S. at least two of the 50 built M247's were employed by the US Navy to track missiles at their Mediterranean missile range(Crete, if memory serves).

Every US DOD contract award is based partially on politics. It is an unfortunate side effect of a government system where the representatives use the electors' money to bribe the electors to re-elect them. Seldom has the US govt bought a major weapon system simply because it was the best one tested. Neither the M1 tank nor the A10 Warthog were the best performing design; which congressional district they were built in played a major role in their selection. Soemtimes, a congressman's pet project is forced on the troops, even if there is no need for it. Any of you remember the Gamma Goat? Or the GOER? How many troops died when one of those rolled over? That thing was so dangerous, we were not allowed to use them except in war-time. But it was built in some senior congressman's district.

This is all fascinating to read, gentlemen, especially the accounts of those who were actually there to witness or be a part of the M247's short life.

In 20/20 hindsight (not the newsmagazine, mind you), would it be a good hunch that if it did reach operational status, it probably would've been cancelled when the Cold War was declared won?

A good movie to see about how these things happen is "The Pentagon Wars".

imdb.com/title/tt0144550

Its a comedy about the M-2 Bradley and how the military dose test on equipment and make modifications to them and then gets the equipment approved for issue.

I did my time on an M-3 and on an M-2 and it rings home.

Here are a few Quotes:

Major General Partridge: Just because the tests didn't turn out the way Colonel Burton thought they would, was no reason to suspect there was anything devious going on.

Madame Chairwoman: I ask you General, filling the fuel tanks with WATER before a test to check the combustibility of those tanks, that wasn't devious?

Major General Partridge: If the tanks had been filled with fuel, there's a good chance the vehicle would have exploded.

Congressman #1: Isn't that the point?

Major General Partridge: If the vehicle had exploded, we wouldn't be able to run additional tests!

Allen -

Very thorough and interesting post! I've been out to Bliss to work with the ADA guys on some projects and I heard pretty much the same from them when I asked.

That was a case where it may have ultimately been an example of a good project cut for some good reasons, that somehow got morphed into an example of "rampant" Pentagon mis-spending. It's pretty amazing that the name "Sgt. York" still conjures up images of $500 USD hammers.

Ahh, I miss the 80s. :D

As a national radio host always says, "It's not your federal government in action, it's government INACTION".

Rings true.

Allen;
The guy out at Bliss, if I am correct he did a little work for Raytheon, and designed and built the FOG-M missile system for about 4 grand and with off the shelf components, and it got buried like you said.
My gunner worked on the Sgt. York Program at Aberdeen and the stories he told me were hilarious, and sad.
"Okay, let's build an ADA system that is supposed to be designed to keep up with M-1 Tanks…"
"Errr…we put it on an M-1 Chassis?"
"No you idiot! We slap it on an old M-48…"
My original suggestion was to take the entire ADA system, turret, radar, guns and all from the West German Flakpanzer Gepard and slap them on an M-1 hull and voila!…
But this was back in the 80's when it was "everything's gotta be AMERICAN, oh yeah…except for that German 120mm that the new M1's are coming out with…oh yeah…and the Belgian M-240 Machine Gun….oh yeah…and the Beretta 9mm pistols…

Btw Allen…I'd love to see some old copies of "Soviet Military Power" or an old gold cover FM-100-2-3…Mine went "poof" when I was moving.
Also…what ever happened to "Red Thrust Star?"

Murph

Hey, Murph! Yep, the FOG-M: the acronym was eluding me. It was startlingly effective from the video footage we saw.

FORSCOM shut down the training detachment at Fort Hood which originally published the "RED THRUST Star" in '87 or '88 (?), and transferred the function with a suitable budget to the OPFOR brigade (177th AR BDE) at the NTC. While I was still on active duty, I had been a team chief and the detachment operations officer, and so had contributed to and published the bulletin while still a green-suiter. Trivia: Bill Gray (COL, Ret.), the author of "Age of Eagles" and the HMGS-East Webmaster, was a LT on my team when I arrived. I had the privilege of learning a whole lot about the Soviet Army from Bill and the team NCOs.

A cunning plan was developed (no names) to create a civilian position to continue to run the program out here at Fort Irwin, and miribile dictu, a certain civilian working on the FM 100-2 series happened to be the best qualified. I moved from Fort Leavenworth in late '89, and we continued the program and the quarterly bulletin until April '97.

I had been drafted as the NTC G-2 in '95, and kept the budget and the publishing capability, but we kept the pub nominally under the name of the OPFOR (now the 11th ACR) for the last two years. Then money got tight, and it was generally agreed that the publication wasn't really necessary any more, and conflicted with the official threat and OPFOR support materials which was TRADOC's mission to publish.

The Foreign Military Studies Office at Leavenworth has the last few issues, including the last one, available online; they're machine translations of the scans, so there are often typos:

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I have a complete set from the very, very beginning, and I suppose I ought to donate them to FMSO or CARL sometime, if they will make the older issues available too. It was turning into a manpower crunch to continue the project, when I hung up my spurs.

If I plan sometime to get up to Vegas for one of the historical events, I'll go by storage and dig out the stuff for you to peruse.

Allen

I remember the Sgt. York fiasco.. and I also remember our tank gunnery simulator, the UCOFT, was programmed with hovering and moving helicopter targets as well as tanks and BMP's so our TCs and gunners could train to take them out with .50 cal and tank main gun rounds. When we went to NTC and saw the Hind vismods, we'd volley fire a whole tank company team at them and usually get a MILES kill, so maybe it would have worked in real life, too. Thankfully I never had to try it!

In the late 80's and early 90's, We still had the Vulcan 20mm gatling gun turrets on M113 chassis and Stinger teams riding around in soft skin Hummers, but there was a definite need for a long time for a good close in armored self-propelled AA system that could keep up with the M1's and Bradleys.

Clay

Allen

And what you put out for those years at NTC was greatly appreciated by the troops.

I still have all the ones that my Scout Plt, and S-2 shop got through distribution. We got two each time and one always was mine.

Thanks.
SFC Robert Henry (retired)

Scout Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 1st Battalion 63rd Armor Regiment, 177th Armored Brigade, (32nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, 60th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, Opposing Forces), Fort Irwin, California from March 1989 – February 1990. As a Section Sergeant, Completing 13 force on force rotations.

Scout Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 1st Battalion 63rd Armor Regiment, 177th Armored Brigade, and the Scout Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, (32nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, 60th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, Opposing Forces) from March 1993 – June 1996. As a Section Sergeant, Platoon Sergeant and S-2 Intelligence Operations Sergeant Completing 39 force on force rotations.

Thanks, Bob. Blackhorse!

Allen

Only one comment/question. Why was an AAA weapon system named after an infantryman? Oh, that's right, there're no famous "Duck Hunters!"

Damn that's pretty low!

True.

But low.

One of the Sgt York DIVADs sits next to the Alvin York home north of Jamestown, TN. His home (and general store across the road) is worth the time, as it is staffed by York's family. I spoke with his son the day I was there. Just a sidebar…