"How Reagan Won the Cold War" Topic

[Ah..inflation theory.. If true, the same must be said about Harry, Ike, Jack, Lyndon, Dick, Jimmy, Jerry and Ron. If false, than the credit to Reagan is correct.]

Are you trying logic again, Snowman? Didn't we establish a LONG time ago that you just couldn't do it?

[Giving RR sole credit]

These same Bushtards who want to give Reagan sole credit for forty years of work … are the same droolers who claim that Clinton wasn't really responsible for balancing the budget and a decent economy.

Y'all are trying to apply logic to the views of RRR members. It just doesn't work.

Before someone jumps on me about that … I _do_ give Reagan credit for continuing the policies which we knew would eventually cause the Soviet Union to crumble. It was a waiting game. Time ran out for the USSR on Reagan's watch. He should get as much credit for that as every President since WW2.

I wouldn't give Truman thru Johnson any credit for the demise of the Soviet Union. They were in charge as the Iron Curtain was formed, the Red Scare, Domino Theory etc. In other words they propagated the Cold War.

I think Nixon should get some credit for at least beginning a dialoge w/the soviets. Followed by Carter and Reagan. Yes Reagan gets most of the credit because it happened on his watch and primarily because when he was first elected most folks thought he was going to start a war. Everyone was so relieved that the soviet union fell apart without a war, they gave ol' Ronnie the credit.

And if you don't want to give Ronnie the credit for the demise of the Soviet Union, just think what could have happened had Dubya been in charge at the time? I think Mr. Reagan did a damn fine job, considering what subsequent office holders have done.

I hope, James, you aren't talking aout me, as I have said repreatedly the Reagan shared the credit with a number of others.

These same Bushtards who want to give Reagan sole credit for forty years of work … are the same droolers who claim that Clinton wasn't really responsible for balancing the budget and a decent economy.
1. What year was the budget balanced? Didn't he say he was going to balance first it in 12 years, 11 years, 9 year, 7 years etc with the countdown.
2. What exactly did he do except "work as hard as he could" and could not give a tax break to the American people.
3. Or raise taxes. Which he actually did. And that was the last time the Democrats were a majority.in Congress.
4. Or the Internet pyramid scheme bubble. Internet businesses counting free ads on other web sites as revenue which in turn advertised on the next site and so on. Its like you and I giving each other the same dollar bill a million times and each claiming we had made $1 USD million. And sell dupes our stock.

doc mcb 02 Dec 2005 5:13 a.m. PST

Nobody at the time that I recall imagined that the USSR might come tumbling down. You all can believe that it just happened, would have happened regardless of whether we had a Reagan or a Carter as president, but I'm not buying it.

*NJH: While an undergrad 70-74, I penned a short paper postulating the demise of the USSR within a generation. My premise was that the sheer weight of the bureaucracy necessary to maintain the USSR would cause a social/political infrastructure implosion. I did not address economic or military failures. My paper was a bit tongue in cheek, but I really felt the 120 official languages and the many serious ethnic differences in the USSR would create too many problems for the bureaucratic veneer of the USSR. I envisioned a USSR being pulled in too many different directions at the same time.

That's why I also think the USA should declare English the Official Language, to prevent the bureaucratic nightmare that became the USSR.

"You all can believe that it just happened, would have happened regardless of whether we had a Reagan or a Carter as president, but I'm not buying it."

So you are saying that without RR the USSR would still be with us? That's a very big call.

"Nobody at the time that I recall imagined that the USSR might come tumbling down."

From "The Conduct of War 1789 – 1961" by Maj Gen JFC Fuller (c) 1961:

(On Kruschchev)"It was not that he…contemplated abandonment of Marxism – but the advances in technology were forcing them to liberalisze the existing tyrany by giving more freedom to the Russian peoples.

By mid-century,…industrialisation in Russia had brought into being a middle class of scientists, technicians and manager, stimulated by the prospects of higher salaries…These new rich form and administrative and technological plutocracy, and inevitably act as fugelmen to the rising generation of educated Russian youth…

(These youth)…trained to think in terms of Marxism, they are beginning to think in terms of their own pockets.

What does this point to? Not a revolt against Communism, which in a police state is virtually impossible, but to a revulsion against organised poverty.

…academians, professors and teachers are beginning to express doubts about the alleged scientific dogmas of Marxism. (other examples)

(But) Are these people not Communists? Of course. Just as the Victorians were all Christians…and they apply the principles of Marxism to their own lives to just the same extent as the Victorians applied the princliples of the Sermon on the Mount to theirs.

Should these appreciations be correct, then it is apparent that technology is transfroming revolutionary Marxism into bourgeois revival…"
pages 329 – 331.

Fuller went on to endorse the existing Western Policy of on the one hand containment and on the other engagement.

Fuller was further sighted than I was. I did not predict the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but it was clear all through the 80s and (to visionaries like Fuller) as far back as the early 60s that the Soviet system contained the seeds of its own destruction.

Communism fell when a) not even communists believed it any more, b)the dictators in charge no longer had the stomach to use the level of brutal oppresion needed to sustain it, and c) the same dictatos realised they could peronally be better off by turning off Communism and stealing the whole-damn-sheebang for themselves as private property.

Reagan held the line. He kept up the pressure. I personally believe he was a good President in many ways, but the man that brought down the SU? Pull the other one.

[1. What year was the budget balanced? Didn't he say he was going to balance first it in 12 years, 11 years, 9 year, 7 years etc with the countdown.]

According to the Congressional Budget Office, the budget was balanced from FY1998 through FY2001. Please note that even through FY2001 fell within GWB's term … it was approved while Clinton was in office.

Go look here for hard numbers: link

[2. What exactly did he do except "work as hard as he could" and could not give a tax break to the American people. 3. Or raise taxes. Which he actually did. And that was the last time the Democrats were a majority.in Congress.]

He gave better: the beginning of the pay off of the national debt.

If you look at the table above, overall revenues in FY2001 were BELOW that of FY2000 … while the budget was still balanced and the national debt was being paid off.

So, anything further to say about this?

I liked Reagan as a person. I think he did wonders for the country's morale in his first term. But, if I could have had my way (and was require to have 12 years of Republican presidents) … I would pick 4 years of Reagan and 8 years of Bush41.

Pouring money into the military was a supply side economics scheme. Had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Not even the side effects had any net benefit for the U.S. geo-politically in reality except the economy did better than it otherwise would have as proven time and time again where military expenditure is concerned. However the chances of WWIII were increased during that time period.

Spectral nailed it. I'd add only one more thing:

Somehow the Republicans manage(d) to argue passionately against welfare programs for the poor as "government hand-outs" while also protesting that Christianity was their guiding principle.

But when it comes to using taxpayers' money to subsidize defense contractors, well, then that's PATRIOTISM!

It was gorby that ended the cold war with glasnost. R.R. had senile dementia bought on from the assasination attempt on him. Its all quite well documented. By the end of his run of president he was quite useless and definatly quite brain damaged.

Mobius-Clinton did balance the budget and even ran a surplus (albeit small).

John N- Clinton was there at the time, but his submitted budget was for a deficit of $200. USD The Republican Congress fought him all the way and did trim this down by $260 USD billion (remember shutting down the government?) so there was a $60 USD billion surplus.
Sadly it seems Congress can only cut when it is newly elected Republican and the administration is Democrat.

Not entirely true Mobius. Clinton outmaneuvered the republicans in the end, getting pretty much what he wanted. Let's not re-write history. The republicnas came away from the experience looking like they were savaged. Clinton came up smelling like roses.

Hi

All this perfect hindsight is confusing! Some seem to suggest that the socialist pardigm of the inevitable Hand of History was correct, and the soviets fell due to forces bigger than them.

Some argue that the "significant person" theory of history is correct. But some argue that the significant person cannot be a republican because they hate the "Rascally Republicans Right" of today.

Curiously, some, like sam, seem to argue that it cannot be Reagan because of the invisible hand of history, unless it is in praise of Gorby!

Oh, DJ, we have something in common! When I was asked in the 70s about this, I pointed out that I thought the SU was falling. Short version, they either had not the population claimed, or the economy claimed in that looking at a photo of moscow clearly showed a lack of the highway and rail that would be NECESSARY to support the supposed population an economy claimed. The response was "what do you know, you are an aircraft expert".

Grin.

R

I don't know if you noticed, Rocky, but I gave Reagan the same credit as every other president who mainted the policy to keep long-term pressure on the SU.

John N Holly 03 Dec 2005 1:23 p.m. PST

….. Clinton outmaneuvered the republicans in the end, getting pretty much what he wanted. Let's not re-write history. The republicnas came away from the experience looking like they were savaged. Clinton came up smelling like roses.

Reporter: Mr Speaker how were the private budget negotiations with the President?

Speaker: Hack-Spit-Spit! Left a bad taste in my mouth – next time I'm sending the Majority Whip.

Reporter: Mr President how were the private budget negotiations with the Speaker?

President: Well, I came away satisfied.

I've asked this before, but is there one person here who thinks that if Ronald Reagan had not become President in 1984, the USSR would still be with us in 2005?

Moonrock, if your comment about RR having senile dementia is indeed well documented, please show us that documentation. Otherwise I shall think it an absurd allegation.

Whattisitgoodfor, I'll play, but it isn't a game that anyone can win. These what ifs are fun but not connected to enough reality to be resolvable.

I would argue that if the president of the US from 1981 to 1989 had been a Jimmy Carter clone, then yes, the Soviet Uniuon might very well have lasted until now. Gorby was a factor, surely, but it took ana ctive push from the USA.

One might observe the dictum that for a really crushing victory/defeat like Cannae, it takes both a genius commanding one side (Hannibal) and dunces commanding the other (what's their names the consuls).

I don't know if you noticed, Rocky, but I gave Reagan the same credit as every other president who mainted the policy to keep long-term pressure on the SU.

I noticed, James. But let me ask this: would you say Carter kept the same degree of pressure on the Soviets that earlier presidents had, or that RR applied later? Some pressure was built into our foreign policy, but containment as a strategy was in tatters after Vietnam, and I don't see Carter really pushing the Soviets very hard.

I still haven't seen a shred of evidence that Reagan "pushed" the Soviets any more than any other US president.

Reagan was like a guy who gets into a barfight with a drunk. The drunk swings and misses, then falls over, hits his head on the barstool, and is knocked out cold. Everybody around Reagan then begins praising him for the knockout.

[I would argue that if the president of the US from 1981 to 1989 had been a Jimmy Carter clone, then yes, the Soviet Uniuon might very well have lasted until now.]

If, if, if, didn't happen. So, not a factor.

[Gorby was a factor, surely]

A big factor. He represented a huge change in the Soviet Union.

[but it took ana ctive push from the USA.]

Yes, and that active push had been on the USSR since the end of WW2. To give more credit for the fall to Reagan than other Presidents devalues the previous work. And, that's just not right.

James wrote:If, if, if, didn't happen. So, not a factor.

Doc wrote: Whattisitgoodfor, I'll play, but it isn't a game that anyone can win. These what ifs are fun but not connected to enough reality to be resolvable.

James, how would you assess Carter as an effective/ineffective president, with particular emphasis on foreign policy vis a vis the USSR?

I would like to hear some analysis of extent and limitations of the USSR's trading block during the course of the Cold War. I believe that the inability of the SU to create a genuine consumer society was instramental in her demise.

Beyond the above context, I believe the whole notion of 'containment' was nothing but a ruse that succeeding US administrations used to assert american material interests upon other sovereign nations.

This is your point to prove, Doc, not mine. You're just digging yourself deeper at this point.

If you wish to post such an assessment, I'll address it. But, I'm not going to humor you any longer on this ridiculous assertion that RR was the prime reason that the SU fell.

I hear this is actually on the fiction bestseller list:

"How Reagan Won the Cold War (and other very short stories)."

"Doc wrote: Whattisitgoodfor, I'll play, but it isn't a game that anyone can win. These what ifs are fun but not connected to enough reality to be resolvable."

Maybe, maybe not. But you are the one claiming Reagan won the cold war. Saying we would still have the USSR if it wasn't for Reagan is just a re-casting of your statement – one designed to show how silly it is btw.

I repeat that the Cold War was a struggle between two political and economic systems. The better system won because it was the better system and was hence better able to meet the political and material needs of its citizens.

It wasn't Gorby, or Reagan, though they played their parts.

I remember watching the coverage of the Berlin Wall coming down. The most touching moment for me was watching an interview with an East German family.

They had walked to West Germany for the first time, and were eating a pineapple. The father was crying because it was so delicious and his family had never had one before.

Communism fell the moment those in power no longer had the heart to shoot a man to stop him getting a fresh pineapple for his family.

But you are the one claiming Reagan won the cold war.

Indeed, mcb has done a lot of re-stating his opinion that Reagan won the cold war. When I posted 4 specific problems of his argument, he ignored them. Evidence please. You're the one making the claim here. Show us what you have.

[Show us what you have.]

I suspect it will be long on opinion and short on facts.

Mr W I believe the comments were the USSR would have lasted longer. As far as now?, no one can say.
Each time the US and the USSR would go thru arms talks, and each time some programs were cancelled permitted those costs to be used elsewhere. So, if a more 'liberal' type had been US President it is doubtful a new round of VERY
costly systems etc would not have 'pushed' the USSR over the edge. Also to consider if the US congress had not been
a little 'to liberal' in the 70's&80's the collaspe of the USSR may have occured sooner.

"nobody, and I mean nobody, knew how bad it was."

Except those who actually went there and looked around. I was an exchange student in Leningrad in 1978, and I always wondered how the system survived. There were no consumer goods. Store shelves were bare. When curtain rods went on sale in Gostiny Dvor, the line wrapped around the upper floor, down the stairs, around the first floor, out the front door, around the block and down the street.

I remember being in the middle of a huge demonstration/protest in palace square on July 4, 1978 where the masses were chanting "Freedom for Our Country!" while the authorities tried to disburse the crowd with water cannons, unsuccessfully. This was bigger than any of anti-Vietnam war protests I saw growing up in Boulder, Colorado.

Anyone who studied the Soviet Union knew that the system was completely FUBARed.

Of course the CIA screwed it up, but keep in mind the CIA is a GOVERNMENT PROGRAM, so this should not come as a surprise.

Reagan gets the credit for giving this system the final push into its long deserved grave. Perhaps this is not saying much. But we can be sure that Jimmy Carter would have screwed it up — he probably would have sent the Russians aid to prop up their failing system…

He really deserves the credit for ending the threat of global thermoneuclear war. Who would have ever thunk that cold-warrior Ronald Reagan could have ever struck a deal with Communist appratchik Gorbachov…

Zarquon, I agree.

Perhaps a sports analogy will help folks understand what I am saying and not saying:

"With two outs and his team down 5 to 3 in the bottom of the ninth, Joe Smith hit a home run, driving in runners on first and second and winning the game."

That is common usage. We all understand that the earlier runs counted as much, and that the batters who hit them in fact contributed as much as Joe did. We also understand that the opposing pitcher who threw the ball that Joe hit out of the park helped "win" the game — for the other side. Nevertheless, we also understand what we mean in saying that Joe "won the game."

Sigh. Your silly analogy demonstrates just how far away you are from providing a sound argument for what, exactly, Reagan did to "win the cold war".

First, commonly, it would be more accurate to say that Smith "scored the winnign runs" rather than "won the game".

But, to stay with the analogy…

Second, what are the "winning runs" scored by Reagan? What situations were the US and USSR in? What precisely did Reagan do to "drive in those runs"? Can you rule out that it was an "error" on the part of the USSR and those runs were "unearned"? Can you show that all the events in the game weren't much more important than Reagan's one swing of the bat?

In short, your analogy does nothing to help you. Once again, you merely state your opinion. Frankly, I think that's all you have.

The twin pillars of the effort to bring about the economic collapse of the USSR were an accelerated defense buildup—propelled by the expectation that the Soviets could not keep pace—and a determined effort to deny Moscow access to advanced Western technology.

To exhaust the Soviet economy, the Reagan administration tightened technology export controls, launched SDI, funded Afghan resisters, and induced the Saudis to keep oil prices low.

I don't quite know what specifics you are asking for. The above seems specific enough to me. If you are saying the Soviet economy was already weak, well duh, that was the fundamental assumption underlying RR's strategy.

[Jimmy Carter would have screwed it up — he probably would have sent the Russians aid to prop up their failing system…]

Except that he did the opposite. He cut off all grain, agricultural equipment, and fertilizer sales to the USSR after their invasion of Afghanistan. That cost Carter a lot of votes in the midwest and the South. Would George Bush have done it?

Zarquon: [He (Reagan) really deserves the credit for ending the threat of global thermoneuclear war.]

Doc mcb: [the effort to bring about the economic collapse of the USSR were an accelerated defense buildup—propelled by the expectation that the Soviets could not keep pace]

Think about that for a second; your whole scenario makes no sense. Reagan builds hundreds of new nukes, thus (allegedly) forcing the Soviets to build even more… and thus *reduces* the threat of nuclear war?

Nuh-uh.

Would either of you guys like to explain how "forcing" the Soviets to ramp-up and modernize their nuclear arsenals, just in time for the collapse of their civilization, has made the world a safer place?

The twin pillars of the effort to bring about the economic collapse of the USSR were an accelerated defense buildup—propelled by the expectation that the Soviets could not keep pace—and a determined effort to deny Moscow access to advanced Western technology.

Yet by most accounts, Soviet military spending had leveled off and indeed started to fall during Reagan's terms in office (see, e.g. the various articles by Christopher Wilkinson of NATO's Economics Directorate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, writing in the NATO Review). The Soviets weren't even trying to match us or keep up. Given this, what exactly did Reagan contribute here?

Considering that SDI wasn't "launched" nor was it taken seriously by anyone inside or outside the US, what did this have to do with the demise of the USSR?

If you want to claim the price of oil had anything to do with it, show how the economy of the USSR was wrecked by Reagan's efforts here (assuming you can first link the low price of oil in the 1980s with Reagan).

Why would funding Afghan resiters like Osama bin Ladin speed the demise of the USSR? Did the Afgan invasion cause the colapse? It's probable that it contributed, but you need to demonstrate how and why.

Finally, if you want to argue that increased controls on access to technology mattered, you first need to show that the technology was required for the USSR to continue. Then you need to show that the controls did in fact restrict access to said technology.

Really, all these expectations are pretty basic requirements of logic. I'm not sure why you're confused. If you're to make your case that something caused something else, you need evidence that the two are at least correlated, that other potential causes can be ruled out, and that the relationship isn't spurious.

Care to finally admit that all you have is your opinion?

No, mlicari, and it's only your opinion that all I have is an opinion.

Thank you for your gentle instruction in logic.

I googled Reagan technology Sovets and found this. It is an interesting read, I think. Maybe even mlicari will read it, as it is in answer to his question. In any case, I apologize to those who are offended by posting a long piece. But it does address an objection that has been raised. And it does put Reagan policy in context of other administrations.

Duping the Soviets
The Farewell Dossier
Gus W. Weiss

————————————————————————————————————————

We communists have to string along with the capitalists for a while. We need their credits, their agriculture, and their technology. But we are going to continue massive military programs and by the middle 1980s we will be in a position to return to a much more aggressive foreign policy designed to gain the upper hand in our relationship with the West.
Leonid Brezhnev. Remarks in 1971 to the Politburo at the beginning of détente.

During the Cold War, and especially in the 1970s, Soviet intelligence carried out a substantial and successful clandestine effort to obtain technical and scientific knowledge from the West. This effort was suspected by a few US Government officials but not documented until 1981, when French intelligence obtained the services of Col. Vladimir I. Vetrov, "Farewell," who photographed and supplied 4,000 KGB documents on the program. In the summer of 1981, President Mitterrand told President Reagan of the source, and, when the material was supplied, it led to a potent counterintelligence response by CIA and the NATO intelligence services.

President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger conceived of détente as the search for ways of easing chronic strains in US-Soviet relations. They sought to engage the USSR in arrangements that would move the superpowers from confrontation to negotiation. Arms control, trade, and investment were the main substantive topics. The Soviets viewed détente as "peaceful coexistence" and as an avenue to improve their inefficient, if not beleaguered economy using improved political relations to obtain grain, foreign credits, and technology.(1) In pure science, the Soviets deserved their impressive reputation, and their space program demonstrated originality and accomplishment in rocket engineering—but they lacked production know-how necessary for long-term competition with the United States. Soviet managers had difficulty in translating laboratory results to products, quality control was poor, and plants were badly organized. Cost accounting, even in the defense sector, was hopelessly inadequate. In computers and microelectronics, the Soviets trailed Western standards by more than a decade.

Soviet S&T Espionage
The leadership recognized these shortcomings. To address the lag in technology, Soviet authorities in 1970 reconstituted and invigorated the USSR's intelligence collection for science and technology. The Council of Ministers and the Central Committee established a new unit, Directorate T of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, to plumb the R&D programs of Western economies. The State Committee on Science and Technology and the Military-Industrial Commission were to provide Directorate T and its operating arm, called Line X, with collection requirements. Military Intelligence (GRU), the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and the State Committee for External Relations completed the list of participants. The bulk of collection was to be done by the KGB and the GRU, with extensive support from the East European intelligence services. A formidable apparatus was set up for scientific espionage; the scale of this structure testified to its importance. The coming of détente provided access for Line X and opened new avenues for exploitation. Soviet intelligence took full advantage.

In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration had no comprehensive policy for economic relations with the USSR. The sale of strategic goods to Communist countries was governed by the Coordinating Committee of NATO (COCOM), which administered an Alliance-agreed list of products and data embargoed for sale. Nixon's policy worked within this system, and, for the export of products exceeding the approved list, special exceptions were necessary. And, in a new set of commercial and scientific arrangements, the United States and the USSR set up joint technical commissions to assess prospects for cooperation. Topics included agriculture, nuclear energy, computers, and the environment.As Kissinger noted:

Over time, trade and investment may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system, invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political relationship.(2)
Beginning in 1972, delegations of Soviet specialists came to the United States to visit firms and laboratories associated with their commissions. Line X, ever alert, populated these delegations with its own people: in an agricultural delegation of 100 about one-third were known or suspected intelligence officers. On a visit to Boeing, a Soviet guest applied adhesive to his shoes to obtain metal samples. In another episode, the ranking scientists and managers of the Soviet computer and electronics industry obtained a visa for the specific purpose of visiting the Uranus Liquid Crystal Watch Company of Mineola, Long Island (a firm not among the Fortune 500). Three days before the delegation's arrival, they requested an expansion of the itinerary to include nearly all US computer and semiconductor firms. This maneuver was done to observe (that is, collect) the latest technology, and it was executed at the last minute so that the Defense Department would not have time to object. It was legal—Line X had studied our regulations and turned them to its advantage.

To acquire the latest aircraft technology, the Soviets in 1973 proposed purchasing 50 Lockheed transports if the firm, then in financial difficulty, would build and equip a modern "aircraft city" in the USSR. A similar proposition was put to Boeing (it besieges the imagination to ponder Brezhnev appearing from the cabin of an Aeroflot 747). Line X practiced the venerable capitalist technique of playing off competitors, and, from this bidding, the Soviets sought to gain technical data for use at home. On a less lofty technical plane, in 1972 the Soviets surreptitiously bought 25 percent of the US grain harvest, using phone intercepts of the grain dealers' network to listen to both sides of the market. The purchase led to higher grain prices for consumers, and taxpayers provided for a 25-percent-a bushel export subsidy. Those of us observing these arabesques began to question the USSR's total commitment to the spirit of détente.

US Computer Export Policy
In late 1973, President Nixon asked his Council on International Economic Policy to determine which computers and associated production technology might be prudently sold to Communist countries. This study was necessary because détente implied the expansion of commercial opportunities with Eastern Europe and the USSR; a new and more liberal set of COCOM rules was required to fit these prospects, however illusory they may have been. Data processing was the most important product requiring review. I was put in charge of the project, and I was also made responsible for the broader problem of technology transfer. The computer study was the first review of technology policy within détente; it sought to assess the economic gain to the United States from computer sales set against the national security risk from those sales.

Not surprisingly, the study concluded that the USSR was short of computers and the means to pay for substantial computer imports. Our analysis presumed that the Soviets intended to use their foreign exchange to best advantage by purchasing the most powerful computers, those that also held the most national security risk (large computers were used for nuclear weapons calculations and cryptography). The report concluded that the export potential for American data processing to the USSR was small and the risk great if the more powerful computers were allowed for sale. The study recommended raising moderately the power of machines allowed for COCOM release, while at the same time restricting the sale of technology. Export of the largest computers was to be prohibited. In National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 247, 14 March 1974, U. S. Policy on the Export of Computers to Communist Countries, President Nixon approved these recommendations, and they became the new export guidelines. As a result, the Soviets were excluded from importing significantly powerful Western computers, détente notwithstanding.

If the Soviets were to reach comparability with the United States in computers, their engineers would on their own now have to create designs and produce equipment. Line X would have to use its espionage resources to supplement what could be developed at home. NSDM 247 eliminated the West as an open source available to the Soviets, but Western intelligence was unaware of the collection apparatus the Soviets had deployed to obtain the technology.

Strong Suspicions and Skepticism
In the early 1970s, there were no US intelligence collection requirements for technology transfer and scientific espionage, and few, if any, reporting sources. But, by observing the behavior of Soviet delegations visiting US plants and by keeping in mind the clever 1972 grain purchase, a few government officials began to suspect that a master plan was in place to obtain our know-how. Direct evidence was nonexistent—only anecdotal clues were at hand. In their intelligence history, the Soviets could point to the success of the atom bomb spies, and they also had to their credit collection against industrial technology in Germany during the 1920s. After World War II, the Soviets copied the American B-29 and the Rolls-Royce Nene jet engine (the copy powered the MiG-15). Two former members of the Rosenberg network had set up the modern Soviet microelectronics industry. Soviet intelligence was professional at ferreting out science and technology and had the results to prove it. The Soviets were adept at copying foreign designs. In the style of Sherlock Holmes, the clues could almost speak for themselves: the USSR was behind in important technologies, their intelligence was accomplished at collection, and détente had opened a path.

Those suspicious of a Great Game in technology espionage found that the US Government was not 221 B Baker Street—we could make little headway in persuading officials in charge of intelligence requirements that the United States was facing a significant threat. We received discouraging responses to our pleas for help: "No evidence" of a grand design; "not usual Soviet practice;" "no requirements and no interest;" "no sources." It seemed to have escaped these authorities that having no evidence does not mean it is not true. The system defied movement.

A few alert colleagues were dispersed among the executive departments. In one episode, the Department of Commerce discovered a Line X effort to obtain an embargoed computer through a dummy corporation set up for this one transaction;officials intercepted the shipping container and substituted sandbags. (A note was enclosed, but it would not be politically correct to quote it.) In 1975, the Apollo-Soyuz spacecraft docking was used to gain intelligence access to the US space program. This project was conceived by the Nixon administration as part of détente, and President Ford had no choice but to continue the effort. To the consternation of NASA, a few weeks before the launch counterintelligence suspected that one of the Cosmonauts was a KGB officer who had been collecting away over the course of the project.

Presidential Interest
President Carter was the first chief executive to take an interest in technology loss. During his administration, CIA had begun to report the diversion of computers from the West into the Soviet defense complex, and he wanted details. In response, the Agency assigned staff to this endeavor and produced a more complete picture of technology loss than had been available since the start of Directorate T. Carter also ordered the first comprehensive study of technology transfer, Presidential Review Memorandum 31, a document that only distantly addressed the threat from clandestine collection. It was largely a missed opportunity, but Carter responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by instituting sanctions, canceling several computer sales, and stopping equipment destined for the Kama River truck plant.

President Reagan came to office intent on reversing what he saw as the "window of vulnerability" favoring the Soviets in strategic weapons. He also believed that the USSR's economy did not work and that the Soviet system was on the way to collapse. His intuition led him to believe the Cold War could be won. Joining Reagan's NSC staff were those of us who thought similarly and entertained the idea that economic pressure would have some effect. The NSC staff sought to fashion policies to take advantage of the USSR's low productivity, its lag in technology, oppressive defense burden, and inefficient economic structure. Reagan was the first president for whom this line of thought would have been even remotely acceptable.

A Defector in Place
Into the receptive climate of the Reagan administration came President Mitterrand, bearing news of Farewell—that is, Colonel Vetrov. In a private meeting associated with the July 1981 Ottawa economic summit, he told Reagan of the source and offered the intelligence to the United States. It was passed through Vice President Bush and then to CIA. The door had opened into Line X.

Vetrov was a 53-year-old engineer assigned to evaluate the intelligence collected by Directorate T, an ideal position for a defector in place. He had volunteered his services for ideological reasons. He supplied a list of Soviet organizations in scientific collection and summary reports from Directorate T on the goals, achievements, and unfilled objectives of the program. Farewell revealed the names of more than 200 Line X officers stationed in 10 KGB rezidents in the West, along with more than 100 leads to Line X recruitments.(3)

Upon receipt of the documents (the Farewell Dossier, as labeled by French Intelligence) CIA arranged for my access. Reading the material caused my worst nightmares to come true. Since 1970, Line X had obtained thousands of documents and sample products, in such quantity that it appeared that the Soviet military and civil sectors were in large measure running their research on that of the West, particularly the United States. Our science was supporting their national defense. Losses were in radar, computers, machine tools, and semiconductors. Line X had fulfilled two-thirds to three-fourths of its collection requirements—an impressive performance.

Interest in Technology Transfer
Overnight, technology transfer became a top priority, rising from the basement of Intelligence Community interest. CIA set up a Technology Transfer Intelligence Center, and the Pentagon created groups to assess damage and find ways to tighten technology controls. But careful study of Farewell's material suggested that more than just a few committees could come out of this wealth of intelligence. With the Farewell reporting, CIA had the Line X shopping list for still-needed technology, and with the list American intelligence might be able to control for its purposes at least part of Line X's collection, that is, turn the tables on the KGB and conduct economic warfare of our own.

I met with Director of Central Intelligence William Casey on an afternoon in January 1982. I proposed using the Farewell material to feed or play back the products sought by Line X, but these would come from our own sources and would have been ''improved," that is, designed so that on arrival in the Soviet Union they would appear genuine but would later fail. US intelligence would match Line X requirements supplied through Vetrov with our version of those items, ones that would hardly meet the expectations of that vast Soviet apparatus deployed to collect them.

If some double agent told the KGB the Americans were alert to Line X and were interfering with their collection by subverting, if not sabotaging, the effort, I believed the United States still could not lose. The Soviets, being a suspicious lot, would be likely to question and reject everything Line X collected. If so, this would be a rarity in the world of espionage, an operation that would succeed even if compromised. Casey liked the proposal.

A Deception Operation
As was later reported in Aviation Week and Space Technology, CIA and the Defense Department, in partnership with the FBI, set up a program to do just what we had discussed: modified products were devised and "made available" to Line X collection channels. The CIA project leader and his associates studied the Farewell material, examined export license applications and other intelligence, and contrived to introduce altered products into KGB collection. American industry helped in the preparation of items to be "marketed" to Line X. Contrived computer chips found their way into Soviet military equipment, flawed turbines were installed on a gas pipeline, and defective plans disrupted the output of chemical plants and a tractor factory. The Pentagon introduced misleading information pertinent to stealth aircraft, space defense, and tactical aircraft.(4) The Soviet Space Shuttle was a rejected NASA design.(5) When Casey told President Reagan of the undertaking, the latter was enthusiastic. In time, the project proved to be a model of interagency cooperation, with the FBI handling domestic requirements and CIA responsible for overseas operations. The program had great success, and it was never detected.

In a further use of the Farewell product, Casey sent the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to Europe to tell NATO governments and intelligence services of the Line X threat. These meetings led to the expulsion or compromise of about 200 Soviet intelligence officers and their sources, causing the collapse of Line X operations in Europe. Although some military intelligence officers avoided compromise, the heart of Soviet technology collection crumbled and would not recover. This mortal blow came just at the beginning of Reagan's defense buildup, his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the introduction of stealth aircraft into US forces.

National Security Directive
On 17 January 1983, to define his policy for political, military, and economic relations with the USSR, Reagan approved National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, U. S. Relations with the USSR, a document spelling out purposes, themes, and strategy for competing in the Cold War. It specified three policy elements: containment and reversal of Soviet expansionism, promotion of change in the internal system to reduce the power of the ruling elite, and engagement in negotiations and agreements that would enhance US interests. In economic policy, NSDD 75 highlighted the need to control technology; Farewell's reports had moved those writing the Directive to put emphasis on preventing technology loss, and the President had agreed (so a KGB defector working for a foreign intelligence service put his stamp on a part of presidential policy). Later in 1983, Reagan proposed the SDI, which Gorbachev and the Soviet military took far more seriously than American commentators. SDI would, if deployed, place unacceptable economic and technical demands on the Soviet system. Even Reagan's 1983 "evil empire" speech had its economic effect, for immediately thereafter the Soviet military asked for a budget increase, this on top of already-bloated defense expenditures.

Two events beyond presidential control dovetailed with NSDD 75. The Federal Reserve's restrictive monetary policy of the early 1980s led to a fall in gold and primary product prices, sources of Soviet foreign exchange. And the discovery of Alaskan North Shore oil contributed to the 1986 fall in petroleum prices, cutting the revenues not only of OPEC but also of the USSR. Coincident events and deliberate government policy had the twin effects of adding to the burden on the Soviet system and of shifting the superpower competition to advanced technology, where the United States held a clear advantage.

Good-by to Farewell
About the time I met with Casey, Vetrov fell into a tragic episode with a woman and a fellow KGB officer in a Moscow park. In circumstances that are not clear, he stabbed and killed the officer and then stabbed but did not kill the woman. He was arrested, and, in the ensuing investigation, his espionage activities were discovered; he was executed in 1983. CIA had enough intelligence to institute protective countermeasures.

In 1985, the case took a bizarre turn when information on the Farewell Dossier surfaced in France. Mitterrand came to suspect that Vetrov had all along been a CIA plant set up to test him to see if the material would be handed over to the Americans or kept by the French. Acting on this mistaken belief, Mitterrand fired the chief of the French service, Yves Bonnet.(6)

An Important Contribution
In 1994, Gorbachev's science adviser, Roald Sagdeev, wrote that in computers and microelectronics—the keys to modern civil and military technology—the Soviets trailed Western standards by 15 years and that the most striking indication of their backwardness was the absence of a domestically made supercomputer. The Soviets considered a supercomputer a "strategic attribute," the lack of which was inexcusable for a superpower.(7) Line X did not acquire designs for such a machine, nor could Soviet computer scientists build one on their own—and NSDM 247 had stopped Western help. As for Farewell, his contribution led to the collapse of a crucial collection program at just the time the Soviet military needed it, and it resulted in a forceful and effective NATO effort to protect its technology. Along with the US defense buildup and an already floundering Soviet economy, the USSR could no longer compete, a conclusion reached by the Politburo in 1987.

When historians sort out the reasons for the end of the Cold War, perhaps Farewell will receive a footnote. It would be deserved.

Here's a money quote:

President Reagan came to office intent on reversing what he saw as the "window of vulnerability" favoring the Soviets in strategic weapons. He also believed that the USSR's economy did not work and that the Soviet system was on the way to collapse. His intuition led him to believe the Cold War could be won. Joining Reagan's NSC staff were those of us who thought similarly and entertained the idea that economic pressure would have some effect. The NSC staff sought to fashion policies to take advantage of the USSR's low productivity, its lag in technology, oppressive defense burden, and inefficient economic structure. Reagan was the first president for whom this line of thought would have been even remotely acceptable.

Interesting document, and a good refresher of my memory (however, in the future, something like that length should just be a link).

Regarding the info in the document, several things pop out at me. (btw, debating mcb is like talking to a newspaper).

1. Would detente have worked, as Kissinger anticipated, had it been continued? If so, Reagan's not that special.

2. What, if anything, did Reagan do regarding technology transfer that was so special. Even under Nixon's more diplomatic approach, there were limits on technology transfer.

3. That the soviets wanted our technology isn't news, nor does it help your case absent some analysis of your own as to why they needed it. Incedentally, the parts that played up the USSR's copying of foreign technology conveniently omits the fact that we ourselves really didn't have many original ideas in aeronautics for a long time. The Germans were the true aeronautic and rocketry revolutionaries of the 20th century.

4. Ok, so the USSR was duped a few times. I'm sure we were too. Were these dupes sufficient to bring down the USSR? Necessary? Necessary but not sufficient? Sufficient but not necessary? Or merely spurious?

5. Once again, the fact that there was "presidential interest" only establishes, well, interest. Maybe intent. But that's it. You, by skill and craft, will have to show how Reagan caused the demise of the USSR.

So, where's your logical argument? You've barfed up a lot of data (some of it not so good), but mostly opinion, on this topic. Time to put the pieces together and show us how Ronnie Ray-gun "wond the cold war".

Doc, please! My eyes!!!

You could just provide link. It would be much better.

Mr Doc Mcb, does not matter what you try and tell them, the left will never agree……

'never teach a pig to sing, it wastes your time and annoys the pig'

Snowy, I understand your point, amd sympathize. But do you know the story Herodotus tells about the convicted thief who told the king that, if he had a year, he could teach the king's horse to sing? Everybody said, That's impossible. And the thief said, yes, but I have a year, and who knows what might happen in that time? The king might die. I might die. The horse might die. And the horse might learn to sing.