"For sixty years, American nuclear strategy and corresponding arguments over missile defense have been organized around a choice: counterforce or countervalue? Will our nuclear armed adversaries target our nuclear and strategic weapons enterprise, or will it target what it thinks we value more — cities, population, and industrial capacity? And conversely, what choice will we make regarding their target set? While it is a bit of an over-generalization, hawks on each side favored counterforce. Non-hawks and doves favored countervalue, or more precisely, the threat of countervalue retaliation as the foundation of deterrence. Entire careers were built on this debate. Treaties were negotiated around it. The intellectual architecture of the nuclear age rests on the assumption that these are two different things. They may have been in the 1950s, but are not now. The failure to recognize this may be the most dangerous strategic blind spot in American defense policy today.
The counterforce/countervalue distinction made sense in the world that created it. In the early 1960s, when Thomas Schelling was writing Arms and Influence and Herman Kahn was publishing On Thermonuclear War, the American nuclear enterprise was geographically separable from the American population. Minuteman missiles sat in silos scattered across the empty plains of Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota. Strategic Air Command bombers operated from bases in rural Kansas and Nebraska. The targets that mattered militarily and the populations that mattered morally occupied different zip codes. Our Soviet adversaries could, in theory, design a strike against one that spared the other. Similarly, we could have designed a limited missile defense to defend those nuclear sites or their command and control, while leaving countervalue targets vulnerable, thus not adversely impacting strategic deterrence. Yes, this is exactly what the Soviets did with their dense missile defense of Moscow. That theoretical separability between counterforce and countervalue target sets was the premise on which deterrence theory and supporting ideas on escalation were originally built. The premise is no longer true.
Consider what has happened to the American defense industrial base and the nuclear and strategic weapons enterprise over the past half-century. The facilities that design, build, maintain, and command the nuclear deterrent have become deeply embedded in civilian population centers — not by accident, but by the economic logic of defense industrialization. Workers need housing. Housing creates towns. Towns create economies. Economies attract more workers. Over decades, the military installations, and the civilian communities around them fused into single, inseparable entities…"
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Armand