I think that's a… creative interpretation but I don't think the "siege of Iran" analogy really holds water.
A more useful historical analogy may be the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45. Japan possessed overwhelming military superiority in many respects and initially expected that a series of crushing blows would force China to come to terms. Instead, it found itself drawn into a conflict vastly more difficult and protracted than anticipated.
The Japanese could win battles, seize territory and inflict enormous damage but none of that necessarily produced the political result they wanted. The Chinese government could retreat, absorb losses, continue fighting and make the Japanese pay for every additional step. What Japan had imagined as a campaign became a strategic quagmire.
Japan's experience in China is instructive precisely because it demonstrates how easily "we can defeat their forces" can become "we cannot make them stop fighting." The Japanese captured cities and repeatedly defeated Chinese armies, yet victory remained elusive and the war expanded rather than concluded.
So I'd be cautious about predicting a final "storming of the fortress". The more interesting question is whether the US can convert its enormous military superiority into a politically face-saving settlement—or whether it discovers that destroying things and defeating formations are two rather different things from actually ending a war.
