"Leading from the front" Topic

We'd been having an interesting discussion of the battalion commander role in a game. My opinion was he mostly remained in the HQ coordinating all of his companies but there are historical exceptions you can include in a scenario:

In military terminology, a higher-ranking commander (such as a Battalion Commander, typically a Lieutenant Colonel) physically positioning themselves with a tiny frontline element like a squad or platoon is known as "leading from the front." While doctrine usually keeps battalion commanders at a tactical command post to manage hundreds of men, critical crises in World War II often forced these officers to attach themselves to isolated platoons to prevent total disaster.

Historical accounts detail instances where high-ranking commanders directly embedded themselves with small units to turn the tide of battle:

Lieutenant Colonel William J. O'Brien (Saipan, 1944) During the brutal Battle of Saipan, Lieutenant Colonel William J. O'Brien, commander of the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry Regiment, repeatedly bypassed safe command posts to attach himself directly to the absolute front lines.

The Crisis: On June 20, 1944, a frontline assault stalled, and American tanks were unknowingly firing on their own men. O'Brien ran through intense sniper fire directly into the open, physically ran up to the tanks, and pounded on the hulls to correct their fire.

The Action: On July 7, his battalion was completely overrun by a massive Japanese banzai charge. Rather than retreating to safety, O'Brien embedded himself with a small pocket of isolated infantrymen. Even after being severely wounded, he refused evacuation, grabbed a pistol in each hand, and personally fought alongside his remaining men until his position was ultimately overrun. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby (Gela, Sicily, 1943)The legendary founder of the U.S. Army Rangers, "Darby's Rangers," was famous for entirely ignoring the typical distance required of a battalion commander.

The Crisis: During the amphibious landings at Gela, Sicily, the 1st Ranger Battalion came under a sudden, massive counterattack by Italian infantry supported by heavy German Tiger tanks. The lightweight Rangers lacked heavy anti-tank weapons and were on the verge of being pushed back into the sea.

The Action: Lieutenant Colonel Darby did not manage the defense from the rear. He attached himself directly to a forward platoon that was being squeezed by an advancing tank. Spotting an abandoned 37mm anti-tank gun, Darby—along with a handful of nearby Rangers—physically ran out into the open under direct machine-gun fire, loaded the piece himself, and acted as the gunner. He personally blasted the advancing tanks at point-blank range, rallying the surrounding infantrymen to hold their ground and saving the beachhead from collapsing.

Major Matt Urban (Normandy, 1944)Though a Major and the eventual commander of the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, Matt Urban's actions in France earned him the title of the "Ghost of Normandy" and the Medal of Honor.

The Crisis: On July 25, 1944, near St. Lô, France, Urban's battalion was utterly pinned down by heavy German artillery and anti-tank fire. Two of his forward American tanks had been destroyed, and a third was sitting driverless and exposed, terrified infantry squads refusing to move forward.

The Action: Despite hobbling on a cane due to a severe leg wound suffered just days prior, Urban broke from his command element and crawled directly up to a pinned-down platoon. Realizing the men were paralyzed with fear, he exposed himself to a torrent of enemy fire, rushed to the driverless tank, climbed aboard, and manned the exposed .50-caliber machine gun. From this highly visible position, he began systematically destroying German nests, single-handedly motivating the forward squads to break their paralysis and launch a victorious assault.

Major John L. Williams Jr. (Hürtgen Forest, 1944) During the horrific battle for Bergstein and Castle Hill in the Hürtgen Forest, Major Williams, commander of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, found his units splintered, bleeding out, and facing absolute chaos.

The Crisis: German artillery and the elite 272nd Volksgrenadier Division had pinned down the Rangers. Communications were failing, and the forward push was dissolving into scattered, terrified pockets of men.

The Action: Williams moved directly out of his command post and physically pushed up the hill to attach himself to the foremost assault elements. Amidst a hail of exploding trees and mortar shells, he went from squad to squad, personally directing the fire of individual machine-gun teams, reorganizing shattered platoons on the fly, and physically leading the charge that ultimately seized the heavily fortified Castle Hill.

United States Marine Corps: The Commander: Lieutenant Colonel David M. Shoup

The Unit: 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines (and remnants of other stranded units)The Battle: Battle of Tarawa (1943)The Crisis: The amphibious assault on Betio Island was collapsing. Low tides forced Marine landing craft to ground out on the coral reefs, thousands of yards from shore. Marines trying to wade in were cut to pieces by Japanese machine guns. The few who made it to the beach were pinned behind a four-foot sea wall, paralyzed, leaderless, and lacking communications.

The Action: Lieutenant Colonel Shoup, the commander of the landing forces, shattered his knee with shrapnel the moment he hit the pier. Ignoring the crippling injury, he waded through waist-deep water under direct enemy fire to reach the sea wall. Finding the assault entirely stalled, Shoup did not try to manage the chaos from a radio bunker. He attached himself directly to a ragged line of pinned-down rifle squads. Hobbling on his mangled leg, he personally led a desperate, small-unit charge across the exposed, blistering airfield to seize a pivotal Japanese bunker complex. His physical presence at the absolute tip of the spear single-handedly kept the beachhead from being pushed back into the ocean, earning him the Medal of Honor.

German Wehrmacht / Waffen-SSThe Commander: SS-Sturmbannführer (Major) Kurt "Panzer" Meyer

The Unit: Reconnaissance Battalion, Leibstandarte Division

The Battle: The Battle of Klisura Pass, Greece (1941)

The Crisis: German forces were tasked with forcing open the heavily fortified Klisura Pass, which was stubbornly defended by Greek forces holding the high ground. Meyer's reconnaissance battalion was pinned down in a narrow, rocky ravine. The lead platoon was taking devastating machine-gun and mortar fire from above and flatly refused to leave their cover to charge up the open slope.

The Action: German doctrine relied heavily on Führung von vorne (leadership from the front). Meyer ran up the ravine and threw himself into a ditch next to the pinned-down platoon leader. Seeing that verbal commands were failing to move the terrified soldiers, Meyer pulled a live stick grenade, unscrewed the cap, lit the fuse, and flung it directly behind his own men in the ditch. He yelled that they could either die there by his grenade or run forward toward the enemy. Startled into action, the squad leaped from the ditch. Meyer sprinted at the absolute front of the line with them, personally clearing the Greek trenches with a submachine gun and successfully unlocking the entire mountain pass.3.

British Army, The Commander: Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones

The Unit: 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 Para)

The Battle: Battle of Goose Green (1982) (Note: While this occurred post-WWII, it remains the ultimate modern textbook example of British doctrine in action)The Crisis: During the assault on Darwin Hill, 2 Para was completely pinned down in open, gorse-covered terrain by heavily entrenched Argentine forces firing from interlocking machine-gun bunkers. The British advance had ground to a total halt, ammunition was running low, and the battalion was in danger of being systematically wiped out in the open daylight.

The Action: Lieutenant Colonel Jones became furious that his forward company was stuck. He left his tactical headquarters, ran forward through intense enemy fire, and attached himself directly to a stranded platoon. Realizing that a frontal assault was the only way to break the paralysis, Jones drew his submachine gun and personally charged up a steep gully toward a dominant Argentine machine-gun nest, screaming for the nearby paratroopers to follow him. He was fatally shot during the charge, but his suicidal bravery galvanized the platoon and surrounding squads. They immediately surged forward, overran the trenches, and won the battle. Jones was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.(An iconic WWII equivalent was Lieutenant Colonel Victor Buller Turner at the Battle of El Alamein in 1942, who attached himself to an isolated anti-tank platoon, loaded the guns himself while wounded, and destroyed dozens of German tanks).

Soviet Red Army, The Commander: Major Guards Captain Dmitry Loza

The Unit: 1st Tank Battalion, 46th Guards Tank Brigade

The Battle: Vienna Offensive (1945)

The Crisis: As Soviet forces pushed into the heart of Vienna, Austria, Loza's tank battalion (equipped with American Lend-Lease Sherman tanks) was ordered to seize the central railway station. Navigating narrow city streets, the lead Soviet platoon was ambushed by heavy German armor, including a Panzer IV and a hidden Panther tank. The street was blocked by burning vehicles, and the remaining Soviet infantry squads were pinned down inside the rubble of nearby buildings, unable to advance or retreat.

The Action: Under intense pressure from Soviet high command to maintain momentum, Captain Loza chose not to direct the battle from the rear of the column. He physically dismounted his command vehicle, sprinted through sniper fire, and climbed into the turret of the foremost, exposed Sherman tank belonging to a junior lieutenant's platoon. Taking direct control of the platoon's movement, Loza used his tank to physically ram a path through the debris. He personally directed point-blank fire to neutralize the German anti-tank nests, rallying the scattered infantry squads to move room-by-room through the buildings alongside his tanks. His frontline intervention successfully cleared the sector and allowed the entire brigade to pour into the center of the city.

Survival rates leading from the front:

The survival rate for World War II combat commanders who chose to "lead from the front" was staggeringly low, with casualty rates for front-line infantry field officers frequently exceeding 40% to 50% during intense campaigns.

While the average overall military casualty rate for a nation like the U.S. was quite low—fewer than 9 out of 1,000 service members were killed in action—the statistics completely flipped for frontline infantry commanders. When a Battalion Commander (typically a Lieutenant Colonel or Major) stepped out of a command post to imbed with a platoon or squad, they entered the most lethal zone on the battlefield.

General Field Officer Casualty Rates. While junior officers (Lieutenants) had a notorious "turnover" rate due to leading raw platoon charges, higher-ranking commanders faced brutal math when they chose to fight forward:

The 40%+ Rule: In standard U.S. and British infantry units, the attrition rate for Captains and Majors in direct combat roles was roughly 40% to 45% (including killed, wounded, or captured).

The Replacement Crisis: By late 1944 and 1945, the Allies experienced an acute shortage of Battalion Commanders (Lt. Colonels). In the European Theater, the high mortality rate meant that field officers were constantly being promoted, wounded, killed, or replaced. German Wehrmacht Attrition (Führung von vorne)Because the German doctrine of Auftragstaktik mandated that commanders lead from the absolute front to witness the battle firsthand, their leadership suffered catastrophic losses.

General Officers: German doctrine was so aggressive that the Wehrmacht lost an average of one division commander killed-in-action every three weeks, and a corps commander every three months.

Battalion Level: At the lower regimental and battalion levels, commanders had a survival rate that mirrored their frontline infantrymen. In heavy attrition environments like the Eastern Front or Normandy, a German infantry battalion commander had a life expectancy often measured in a matter of weeks if their unit was actively engaged.

Red Army Attrition: The Soviet military operated under immense political and tactical pressure. For a Soviet commander, failing an objective could mean execution or being sent to a penal battalion, making "leading from the front" a matter of survival against both the enemy and their own high command.

Severe Officer Losses: Millions of Soviet officers were killed during the war. In 1941 alone, entire echelons of battalion, regimental, and division commanders were completely wiped out or captured in massive encirclements while trying to personally break out with their men.

Snipers: German, Japanese, and Allied snipers were trained specifically to spot and assassinate high-value targets. A commander carrying a radio, gesturing orders, or looking at a map stood out instantly.

Artillery and Mortars: Battalion commanders moving forward often had to cross open "no man's land" to reach pinned-down squads. They were highly exposed to pre-ranged enemy mortar brackets.

The "Magnet" Effect: A commander only attached themselves to a squad or platoon when that specific unit was already in deep trouble, meaning they were voluntarily walking directly into the highest-density enemy fire on the battlefield.

Wolfhag

Most excellent!
One would think reaching Major would greatly increase you chance of surviving.
Except maybe a Soviet major.

You know, none of these said "Col Smith was killed trying to do a lieutenant's job. Since word of his death didn't reach HQ until evening, the regiment was effectively leaderless." Or "General Doberman went forward to get a better feel for the situation and was cut off without a radio, leaving no one in charge." These things also happen, and must be taken into account. One more time--"the plural of annecdote is not data."

JmcCarroll, pretty sure by WW2 every level of command up from platoon leader was safer than the one under it. Wolfhag is talking about atypical behavior. Now, in the ACW, most dangerous position was brigade command. Every promotion until you commanded a division increased your odds of not coming home--not that being an ACW general was all that safe, mind you.

One more time--"the plural of annecdote is not data."

Wolfhag doesn't present raw data, but half is post is a few anecdotes. The other half is summary statstics.

I usually prefer to put the summary stats first, then follow with examples. But there is narrative power in providing the stories to set the mood, then the stats.

I am enheartened to hear robert piepenbrink asking for data. It's a fresh turn of events.

I personally would like citations for any of the stories above. Every one invites reading more. And I'm lazy. While no references were provided, there is enough information in both the stories and stats to research them on your own.

It's not like they're vague estimates of undefined populations.

I have no doubt that LTC Darby was a man of extraordinary courage, but I do wonder how much good it did shooting a 37mm AT gun at "heavy Tiger tanks"…

I did some follow up on LTC Darby. They were Italian and German tanks but not a Tiger. He and a Captain manned the abandoned 37mm gun firing at close range until ammo ran out and then attacked stalled tanks with hand and thermite grenades.

Regarding "no one in charge", don't units have an XO and other staff that can take over?

Wolfhag

Wolf,
Great stuff as usual. It is yet another command decision to make; deciding where you are needed most right now. The same could be said for a company commander. In a way it is harder for the company commander because he rarely had an XO to cover for him. ( Your blessed to have a good first sergeant.)
In the game I am developing that is a decision to make, hands on to one critical piece or back off and see the bigger picture.

Cheers

Joe

Regarding "no one in charge", don't units have an XO and other staff that can take over?

My thinking exactly Wolfhag.

Bill N +1.

Ah, optimism! Yes, I remember the bit from Major Dundee:

"Lieutenant, when I left this command, I gave you an order."

"No Sir. When you left, you gave me a command: from then on, I gave the orders."

But few officers have a Jim Hutton standing by, and even Charlton Heston didn't seem thrilled. The two classic cases I can think of are 1st British Airborne Division at Arnhem, and the Afrika Korps during Rommel's "Dash to the Wire." In both cases there was delay--how long does the Old Man have to be gone before someone takes over?--and a strong reluctance to make any sort of irrevocable decision. I do not say the commander should never go forward: I DO say that it carries risks, and citing only examples in which it worked out distorts matters and deceives the reader.

Do those of you who love command ratings have one handy for Staff without the CO?

Robert brings up a good point.

I DO say that it carries risks, and citing only examples in which it worked out distorts matters and deceives the reader.

I think I documented how historically dangerous it was with the attrition rate being 40%+. Sometimes it does work but the leader gets killed. Sometimes it fails and he gets killed.

In the US Marines we have a Team Leader, Squad Leader and Platoon Leader. Above that each rank is a "Commander". Leaders lead their men directly into combat, commanders command the leaders.

However, "Commanders" have the responsibility for accomplishing the mission and a real leader/commander, at any level, does not ask his men to do something he won't do.

If the officers and NCO's are all KIA/WIA the unit could be leaderless to the point the CO or XO need to take over and sort things out and get the effort moving. That's historical, how or if you want to simulate it is up to you.

The C&C infantry rules I'm working on allow the teams and squads to function as the player desires if they are not under fire and react (Immediate Action Drill as trained) when fired on. After that the leaders take over.

To advance under fire the team/squad needs to pass an Aggressiveness Check. If they fail (simulates pinned down) the player can try again later or if he has a leader attached he can add the leaders value to the roll for them to "pass" the check and advance.

If the leadership modifier does not motivate the unit the player can have the leader attempt to do it himself, that's historical. How you want to implement it is up to you.

However, in an outward display of leadership and motivation exposes him to the enemy and the leader must take a causality check and can be killed. So poorly trained units can perform if with the leaders help. Veterans will not need leadership motivation as often. Leaders lead, commanders command as they say.

So how would you rate a platoon leadership rating if they had a brand new 1st LT but a seasoned combat veteran E6 Platoon Sergeant who the LT relies on for decision making? Even an inexperienced new 2nd LT can get up in front of his men and lead which he is expected to do.

I think it was Patton who made a remark to a unit that they need to get more LTs shot as an example to the men that officers won't ask you to do something you won't.

I read an account on Okinawa a unit needed to assault a Jap position moving over open ground and the officers and NCOs were KIA or WIA. The Major came down, explained the situation that they would try again and he's the first guy out. He did, they followed and took the position and the Major was KIA. That's leadership.

Another memorable one is Grenada when the Army Airborne unit dropped right on the runway and became pinned down. Finally, a lower enlisted guy stood up and basically yelled "screw this s---" and charged the enemy and everyone else, including officers, followed. I think he survived.

If you read the US MOH awardees you'll find a large % of lower enlisted, many in their very first combat. Almost all of the Marines in the newly formed 4,5 6 divisions invading Iwo Jima that were E4 and below and 2nd LTs it was their first enemy action. However, most of the E5 and above were combat veterans.

Wolfhag

There can be little doubt that individual bravery can very much influence the overall result of an engagement. As stated above, that presumes success and ideally survival. Both make a big difference to getting a VC or not, in British and Commonwealth Forces, and you had better have a officer to witness it. The opinion of ORs counts for nothing.

Col H Jones at Goose Green was much criticised at the time and since, but only in hushed tones, as he was inspiring and incredibly brave (and the UK govt was desperate for some sign of success to avoid calls for cease-fire), but possibly irresponsible. I am afraid that the traditional (and often told) tale of the paras immediately charging to avenge him is not true. It took some hours for his 2ic Keeble to organise another attack, and even that was stalled. The evac helicopter summoned for Jones was shot down and the pilot killed. Tragic outcome all around.

On exercises in BAOR the Brigadier/ Brigade Commander frequently went off in his Tac Panzer get as far forwards as possible, I even drove it on one exercise. On Telic One Commander 7 Armoured Bde used to pop off to the front lines in his TAC panzer to command the battle,

Tally Ho!

This is making me ask the question if the Battalion CO is in the front, how much does that degrade their command ability?

The Command Element (Battalion Headquarters)
The actual command group overseeing the battalion typically consisted of four to six officers:

Battalion Commander: Lieutenant Colonel (CO)
Executive Officer (XO): Major (second-in-command)
S-1: Captain or Lieutenant (Personnel/Administration)
S-2: Captain or Lieutenant (Intelligence)
S-3: Major or Captain (Operations and Training)Note:
S-4 (Logistics) was often added, depending on whether it was a regular infantry unit or elite units like the U.S. Rangers.

The S1-S4 officers may have had previous combat commands.

Couldn't the staff handle the details while the CO is at the front/main point of effort?

Could it shorten or increase command delays?

Would it have a positive impact on morale?

If the CO is KIA is the XO taking over going to be better or worse than the CO?

Should you be giving the CO a rating or a rating for the entire HQ?

Wolfhag

Ah, now you're getting closer to my point. It's not so much the actual risk to the officer--though surely whoever appointed him thought he was better than whoever will now have to take his place?--but two other things. (1) if the field marshal is commanding a battery of artillery, he is, to that extent, NOT commanding his corps or army. And (2) while there are procedures for replacing a dead commander, things get a lot hazier when you don't know what's happened to him. Is he one corpse in a pile of bodies? Or is he just pinned down somewhere where his radio doesn't work well? The staff officer who responds to developments by tossing the CO's plan may be in a very awkward position if the CO shows up again an hour later.

There is much to be said for staying far enough forward to be well aware of conditions, for leading by example, and even for doing a subordinate's job at some critical point. I'm saying that it also involves risks and penalties in mission accomplishment and not just the life of the commander.

For the record, Wolfhag, I've pulled duty in both battalion and brigade TOCs--14 years active, almost all of it on staff. Yes, of course routine will continue. But war is not a matter of routine. Chance and the enemy are always messing with plans, and while commanders known to be dead can be replaced, commanders NOT known to be dead are trickier--and a commander who insists on leading 2nd Platoon of Bravo Company while Charlie Company is in serious trouble is actually a little worse than having a dead CO.

A really interesting topic, with some xpert responses. As one whose only experience of conflict was years in an operating theatre environment, I am not qualified to comment further.

But I will say that Lord Uxbridge always confessed that the worst mistake he ever made was to join the heavy Cavalry charge early in the Battle of Waterloo. He freely admitted that he should have stayed back to co-ordinate support units and to ensure coverage once falling back. In the charge he was of no more use than a "cornet of Horse" (or some such phrase)

I'm thinking of Rommel, so far forward he was actually behind British lines while his chief of staff got to decide whether to pull back from Tobruk during Operation Crusader. I'm thinking of Roy Urquhart at Arnhem, so far forward he was out of touch for two days while his senior brigade commander and his chief of staff had to decide the relative importance of holding landing zones, reinforcing Arnhem and securing an alternate crossing point. These are not "routine" decisions. I'm also thinking of both Napoleon I and Marshal Bazaine siting cannon while in command of armies.

If you want to award a colonel or a general bonus points for "doing a sergeant-major's job" (Urquhart again) knock yourself out. Just don't tell youself the only downside is that he might get killed.

I have to side with Robert here. The staff SHOULD be competent to keep things running with "commanders intent". But things pop up all the time where a decision needs to be made and the staff either has to wait for an answer or guess.
I would go on vacation and a week later be surprised at my command and I had a very good XO.
The commander at the front can work but there is a risk.

Joe

Ps wolf, yes the commander should have a rating and the staff as a whole should have one. Possibly the XO as well. What I do in my games is send the XO up front. He has almost as much horsepower without the downside of loss of OODA. ( If he is good and you trust his judgement.)

Thanks guys.

But I will say that Lord Uxbridge always confessed that the worst mistake he ever made was to join the heavy Cavalry charge early in the Battle of Waterloo. He freely admitted that he should have stayed back to co-ordinate support units and to ensure coverage once falling back. In the charge he was of no more use than a "cornet of Horse" (or some such phrase)

Alexander the Great would have had no regrets.

It's definitely a historical risk-reward decision for the player.

The level I play is a up to reinforced company per side that historically took no more than an hour or so. I never really considered the Bn level HQ getting involved other than their intent which is outlined in the scenario description.

We could have an attached ANGLICO (Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company) officer to our platoon as an FO that could call for Bn level and above indirect fire.

In my scenarios I'd have a Bn level officer with the company at the start of the game.

I think regarding this let history be your guide and it leaves a lot of latitude for rule design and scenario generation.

Wolfhag

In effect mist games have the CO leading from the front, with the player being the CO and the units at the front.

Normal rules dont seem to do a good job, imo of reflecting unit actions, let alone how they are affected, or not by the presence of the CO or whether his absence from the CP affects the actions of the whole unit.