"Stop Fearing a Strong Russia. Start Fearing a Dying One." Topic

He was the head of a mobilization center in Rostov-on-Don. Rumor has it he knew he would be arrested for corruption… He likely wanted to avoid being stripped of his military rank and having his property confiscated. He took care of his family…

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There will be no investigation because the accused has died.

Here we see another major difference between the free world and theocracies like Russia's… in the free world, death doesn't absolve criminals of their crimes, and the investigation continues… if corruption is proven, their assets are confiscated, and they are demoted… in Russia, it's better to jump out of a window and everyone's friends… nothing ever happened. At least in the past, they had the decency to offer them a loaded gun and leave them alone to die with more dignity.

Armand

Tango, what are you talking about? What's going on with the Epstein case? This "free world" makes me feel nauseous)))

Russia Day 2026: The Hollow Sovereignty

Quite interesting to read all of it…

"…For decades, the Kremlin told its citizens that sport was the ultimate bridge — the arena where even warring nations could shake hands. That bridge has not been burned. It has been deleted from the map. This is how systemic isolation is constructed: not in a single dramatic decree, but centimeter by centimeter. First the brands depart — we will make our own. Then the scientists disappear from conferences. Then the musicians cancel their tours. Then the clubs vanish from the tournament draws. At some point, a person looks around and finds himself surrounded by walls he did not personally build — but inside which he must now live. The fan who had no interest in politics yesterday has had something more fundamental taken from him: the feeling that he is part of a larger, functional world.

The blank bracket is far from the only empty space on Russia Day 2026. The annual concert on Red Square — a fixture of the national holiday since 2003, survived through wars, economic crises, and a global pandemic — has been canceled for the first time in twenty-three years. The event was quietly relocated to a small indoor venue in eastern Moscow. Most announced performers failed to appear. State broadcaster Rossiya 1 had planned to televise a "grand holiday concert" live from the cobblestones outside the Kremlin. Instead, those historic cobblestones will sit empty.

The Kremlin offered no official reason. None was needed. The same week, Ukrainian drones struck critical infrastructure in Tolyatti, Nizhnekamsk, and Simferopol. The Russia Day concert joins a growing list of marquee events quietly retired this year: the MAKS aviation show — Russia's premier showcase of military aerospace power — was canceled for the third consecutive year. The Victory Day parade on May 9 featured no tanks or heavy armored vehicles for the first time since 2008. The Kremlin cited a "terrorist threat" from Ukraine each time…"

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Armand

Tango, Russia is in its fifth year of war. Surely that's reason enough to simplify the celebrations? In our city, for example, last year, at the request of the spectators, we cancelled the fireworks display on City Day and asked that the money saved be donated to a fund to help wounded soldiers. Isn't that natural?

The Russian team competed under the Russian flag at the 2026 European Gymnastics Championships in Varna. The Russian anthem was played in honor of the winners.

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Tango – the new "Berlin Wall" erected by the West will be destroyed)))

Your chosen war…the only sympathy in the world comes from yourselves…

Armand

No, we were forced into this war.

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Ukraine's Drone Campaign Is More Than a Military Operation — It's a Political Strategy

"Ukraine fired hundreds of drones at St. Petersburg last week — the second attack on the city and its surrounding region in less than seven days. According to press reports, the strikes targeted oil depots and refineries across the Krasnodar region in southern Russia, following an earlier attack on an oil terminal and naval base near St. Petersburg — launched just miles from where Vladimir Putin was hosting Russia's International Economic Forum, the Kremlin's answer to Davos. On Friday, Putin told the assembled audience he had rejected Ukrainian President Zelensky's request for a direct meeting.

The juxtaposition was not accidental. It was the point.

These attacks tell me two things — one operational, one strategic. Together they suggest that Ukraine has developed a level of political-military sophistication that deserves serious attention in Washington and every allied capital…"

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Ukraine launches ‘TrophyLab' platform to share captured Russian weapons with allies

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Armand

Why Russia Should Be Worried About Britain's £400,000.00 GBP Missile Programme for Ukraine

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Armand

The Real Reason Russia's Strongest War Supporters Stopped Believing in Victory

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Armand

Russians Miffed Over Broken Alaska Promises

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Armand

Tango, Russians are unhappy with Putin's indecisiveness))) And the US refusal to fulfill its obligations must be met with reciprocal aid to Iran, the same kind the US is providing to Ukraine and the European anti-Russian coalition… For starters, we could sell technology to improve Iranian drones—I think the Iranians will master this quickly.

Iran is a living dead… it poses no threat to the West except for the Strait of Hormuz. If the US ever truly decides to safeguard it, the Iranians will only be able to fish in the Caspian Sea.

Russia's allies are improving… Iran is subjected to the will of the US and Israel, continuing to lose leaders and military and civilian equipment. Venezuela is lost… Syria is lost. Afrika Korps is lost. Cuba is mired in its own filth. Nicaragua is nonexistent. North Korea is isolated as always, beating war drums that no one hears. And China… as always… playing its own game… it's only allied with China; when it no longer needs to extract anything from you, it will discard you.

Armand

Yes, I know. Trump has defeated Iran more than three dozen times already.
I wonder how many times he will conquer Greenland?)))

Recapping the situation…

The biggest weakening of Russia from the war with Ukraine is the severe, long-term degradation of its strategic position, centered on economic depletion, military erosion, and geopolitical isolation. Rather than a single failure, experts point to the systemic exhaustion of the country's core national power reserves.

Liquid assets in Russia's sovereign wealth/national reserve funds dropped drastically from over 6% of GDP at the start of the war to under 2%, forcing direct sales of gold reserves to cover mounting deficits

Continuous drone and missile strikes target domestic oil refineries and shipping routes, cutting fuel output and crushing long-term hydrocarbon export revenue forcing Russia to import oil

Russia has suffered staggering personnel losses—numbering well over a million total casualties or hundreds of thousands killed and severely wounded—draining an entire generation of military readiness

Traditional post-Soviet dominance has frayed as neighbors and regional partners distance themselves from Moscow.

Permanent severance of economic and security ties with Europe has turned Russia into a secondary economic actor heavily reliant on isolated or asymmetric partnerships

Endgame: Russia's war economy hits its limits

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Central Bank and Finance Ministry Warn Putin of War's Impact on Economy

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Not bad for an effective and short "Special Military Operation," huh?

Armand

Yes, and Putin thought it would be over in a matter of weeks.

Why a Weaker Russia Keeps Fighting

"…Not everyone in the Russian establishment wants to continue the war, let alone escalate it. Among the country's elite, one can now find voices calling for genuine negotiations. ln May, for example, Russia's flagship foreign affairs journal published an article by Vasily Kashin, a prominent, pragmatic but nationalistic military analyst, that made the case for freezing the conflict. Russia, Kashin argued, could not achieve more on the battlefield in the short to medium term, and the costs of prolonged war were starting to outstrip strategic benefits. Given the journal's prominence, Kashin's article was almost certainly previewed and green-lighted by officials in the Kremlin, likely as a way of giving voice to the pragmatists in the Russian security establishment. Likewise, on June 30, the CEO of Russia's largest bank (and a longtime Putin lieutenant) suggested that it was time to wrap up the conflict. "I don't think there is a single person in the country who has any concerns other than the swiftest conclusion of the hostilities," he said.

But this option is currently of no interest to Putin. Although he tolerates cautious calls for peace and sometimes sends signals that he is interested in a settlement, too, Putin's actions suggest that he is not ready to crawl out of the hole he is now in. In fact, he seems to want to keep digging. As long as Putin is convinced that he has an advantage over Ukraine with the destructiveness of his ballistic missiles and that Ukraine is vulnerable because of its lack of interceptors, he is likely to keep trying to wear Ukraine down—no matter the damage to his country. He views uncoordinated calls from Americans and Europeans for talks or for a cease-fire as a ploy to buy Ukraine more time. "We know that the West continues to pursue Russia's strategic defeat," he said in the June 28 interview. "Why are they calling for a cease-fire and peace negotiations? . . . If Ukraine is, as they claim, capturing more and more territory . . . then Western leaders simply need to wait. Russia's strategic defeat would, it would seem, come about of its own accord."

Ukraine and its allies need to prepare for a long and bumpy road. Kyiv may be in the best position in the war since late 2022, but the Kremlin believes it will crush the will of Ukraine and its friends this winter. Russia may be struggling, but Putin has not exhausted his options. He still wants to fight for as long as possible."

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Armand

No Road Back to Putin, the Shakespearean Villain

"…there is no sign that Putin is inclined to negotiate with anyone, beyond occasional discussions with the US administration in the frustrated hope that he will be handed victory on a plate (Secretary of State Marco Rubio has made clear that this will not happen). Instead, he is still gambling on victory, and given his worldview, ideology, and the political system he has built, this should not be a surprise. For example, at the time of publication, Ukraine says Putin plans to mobilize another 500,000 men by the fall. Moreover, he is claiming even more territory while the General Staff consistently provides mendacious reports about the progress of Russian forces.

Beyond these facts, the calls for talks with Putin emanating from Europe have neither articulated who will speak to him on behalf of whom nor is there any coherent agenda for these discussions. Since inadequate preparation foredooms any negotiations, speaking to Putin on this basis is a non-starter if not a recipe for disaster. Such calls for talks reflect just how ill-prepared Western leaders are for such discussions.

Furthermore, the idea that Putin will accept a ceasefire as the result of such negotiations is also not founded on a realistic appreciation of the man or his policies. Four years of war have led to the virtually total militarization of the Russian state and economy, along with the intensification of repression to levels that recall late Stalinism."

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Armand

Taking LEO Off the Board: Russian Thinking About Anti-Satellite Warfare

"The Soviet Union and Russia have invested in anti-satellite weapons to ensure that their nuclear deterrent remains credible. For both the Soviet Union and Russia, the destruction of American satellites was (and is) viewed as part of the country's broader nuclear war plan and part of the opening salvo in a nuclear conflict with the United States. During Soviet times, these investments were aimed at developing conventional anti-satellite weapons to hold risk the relatively small number of U.S. early warning satellites. The Soviets paired these weapons with a large nuclear force, along with novel delivery system – Fractional Orbital Bombardment – to ensure that its deterrent could strike U.S. targets in ways that could evade nascent missile defense.

The return of U.S. missile defenses has spurred considerable Russian investments in similar novel delivery systems, designed to evade any current or future investment in missile defense. The U.S. investment in Golden Dome has also catalyzed investment by Russia in nuclear-armed options to hold at risk large satellite constellations, including those operated by private space operators, which military thinkers assume will be leveraged by the Department of Defense during any conflict for targeting and reconnaissance. The result is a serious investment and thinking about "taking low-earth-orbit" off the board in a nuclear conflict and the development and testing of nuclear armed satellites and upgraded orbital bombardment capabilities…"

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Russia's Newest Battlefield Weapon Is Aimed at Starlink

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Armand

After Putin

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Armand

Russia's Phantom Pains of the Soviet Empire as a Source of Systemic Threats to the West

"Russia's relations with post‑Soviet states shape the strategic environment across Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. After 2014, and especially after 2022, Moscow expanded its pressure toolkit: political statements about "historical territories," information campaigns, economic restrictions, military activity, and engagement with domestic political groups. These actions alter risk perceptions in neighboring states and create conditions for new crises.

The historical experience of the republics' incorporation into the USSR—and their subsequent departure from it—established a lasting sensitivity to questions of sovereignty. Contemporary Russian rhetoric amplifies this sensitivity, touching on issues of borders, identity, and political autonomy. As a result, states in the region view Russian policy as a factor capable of influencing both internal stability and foreign‑policy decision‑making.

This article applies a unified analytical framework to all regions. Each section examines, in sequence, the historical context, post‑1991 trajectory, security issues, economic ties, domestic political dynamics, information influence, and points of tension. This approach makes it possible to compare states and identify the elements that shape the strategic environment around Russia…"

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Armand