"La Marine de la Révolution" Topic

La Marine de la Révolution
l'étrange victoire

The Revolutionary period is often perceived as a time of disaster for the French navy: seen as a purely technical instrument, it was deemed incompatible with the leveling principles of the Revolution. Yet, in this groundbreaking book, Olivier Aranda demonstrates that the Republic experimented with various naval strategies depending on the military context, revealing a clear interest in the maritime sphere. Facing an unfavorable balance of power against Great Britain and in the context of civil war, the Republic initially sought a decisive battle, which it intended to win using new weapons. Confronted with the failure of this initial approach, it adopted an indirect strategy of naval harassment, which placed the Revolutionary navy within a broader, particularly colonial, context. Success was ultimately achieved, despite maritime setbacks such as the Battle of Aboukir, as France emerged victorious from the war at the Peace of Amiens. While land victories were the primary drivers of this success, the navy's indirect strategy also fostered a strong desire for peace within the British nation, whose trade and coastlines were under constant attack from the French navy. Too often overlooked, the French Revolutionary Navy finally finds its rightful place in France's maritime history here, through a fresh perspective conveyed by a compelling narrative.

A thought-provoking work.
Sylvain Bonnet

a 350 pages book but Olivier Aranda's whole 769 pages thesis is on line here
PDF link

not reducing the naval war to a French-British vis-à-vis :

The British navy of the 1790s was a far more powerful adversary than the one Sartine and Castries had faced. Moreover, this was only one of the adversaries of the French navy. The fleets of the other members of the coalition are generally overlooked by historians in their analysis of the Revolutionary Wars. Some authors do not hesitate to present a table comparing the fleets of Great Britain against those of "France and its allies" in 1793 and 1795, without mentioning that Spain and the Dutch Republic fought alongside Great Britain against France between these two dates. Without going that far, most works, including those in French, tend to reduce the naval war to a Franco-British duel; however, the Republican navy had to fight the Spanish fleet for three full campaigns (1793, 1794, 1795). While the Spanish fleet did not arm all its ships, it nevertheless played a significant role, particularly in the Mediterranean. The United Provinces and Spain were not, moreover, England's only naval allies; one must also include Portugal, which sent a squadron of five ships of the line to join the British Channel Fleet in the summer of 1794; and Russia, whose influence in the Baltic Sea was expanding at France's expense, initially without sending large squadrons. While these actors are usually overlooked in the name of necessary simplification, one may well wonder whether this simplification is not merely a smokescreen for an Anglocentric view of the balance of power. The total number of ships of the line opposing France at the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars was therefore several hundred, compared to the Republic's 65 at the outbreak of war. This type of calculation, which poorly reflects the dynamics of the war, was nevertheless frequently used from 1796 onwards, when Spain and the Batavian Republic were at war alongside France. Spain's considerable influence shifted sides; However, as explained, this state, mired in crisis, never had the opportunity to arm a large proportion of its ships. From 1796 onward, Spain did not begin the construction of new ships of the line for more than half a century; Lourdes Odriozola Oyarbide does not hesitate to speak of "five years of inactivity" for the Basque shipyards, from 1795 to 1799. Like France, Spain suffered from the disruption to the Baltic shipping networks during these dates. As can be seen, the total number of ships of the line that could be armed by France, Spain, and the Batavian Republic never exceeded that of the British and their allies, contrary to what some calculations might suggest. Britain still had allies in the second half of the decade, notably the Russians, who from 1795 onwards committed no fewer than twelve ships of the line to the side of the Royal Navy, under Admiral Khanykov. These units carried out the bulk of the blockade of Texel from August 1795 until sometime in 1796 (and a Russian contingent remained after this date), since Duncan initially had only four British ships at his disposal. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Spencer, appreciated this contribution and constantly requested an increase.

One fact remains: the balance of power was considerably unfavorable to the French navy, a fact that historiography frequently, and sometimes deliberately, leaves somewhat vague (…)

The British cabinet intensified its requests for assistance from Russia, which sent twelve ships of the line to the North Sea during the summer of 1795. Great Britain was therefore far from isolated, since the Russian contribution balanced that of the Batavian Republic.
(…) By the summer of 1798, two Russian ships had rejoined Duncan, and this number continued to increase thereafter. Here again, this Russian contribution has generally been overlooked, particularly because the Battle of Camperdown took place during the few months when Duncan was not supported by ships of that nation, which contributed to its invisibility.

or a gap in the Historiography never seen before

This is particularly evident in the issue of the fight against the slave trade and slavery waged by the French navy during the Directory, a reality that has gone completely unnoticed by historiography(..)
The episode of this attack by an abolitionist power on a space theoretically intended for former slaves (…) After replenishing its supplies, the division left Sierra Leone and ravaged all English possessions as far as present-day Nigeria, and more specifically Calabar, which it reached in January 1795; it captured several dozen English and Portuguese slave ships. The slaves were set free ashore and the ships were systematically burned or sunk, after the most valuable goods had been seized
(…)
France's abolitionist stance in 1797 constituted the most salient element of the Republican colonial policy. The presence of free Black people on French ships continued to irritate the Spanish authorities, despite the alliance between the two countries. The governor of Puerto Rico, in particular, complained that the island's slaves suffered at the sight of Black French sailors, "well-dressed and puffed up with the title of citizen." But criticism of abolition was not confined to Spain: the Clichy right intensified its offensive during the early summer of 1797. During June 1797, Vaublanc and Villaret continued their lobbying, notably with Barras, for a large expedition to Saint-Domingue; a likely prelude to the re-establishment of slavery. Faced with this offensive, the Executive Directory continued to support Truguet's anti-slavery policy for some time longer. He paid particular attention to monitoring the fight against the slave trade waged by French light units in the Atlantic, as his correspondence attests. The station in French Guiana was particularly involved in this fight, due to the proximity of the Portuguese slave trade routes.
The Minister of the Navy, Truguet, expressed his satisfaction: "I was pleased to see that the 180 Black people captured on the Portuguese ship, the Aimable Demoiselle, were allowed to enjoy the benefits of freedom."
This example of liberation was not isolated: on November 7, 1796, the corvette Chevrette, sailing from Cayenne, captured an English brig from Benin, the Carolina, with 165 Black people on board. Eight days later, another English ship, the Tom, a three-masted copper-sheathed vessel from Liverpool, was captured.