"Over the past year, the United States Navy has continually demonstrated across multiple theaters and mission sets why it is the world's premier maritime force. Whether delivering continuous, devastating striking power at an unrelenting pace from virtually every type of platform in the Fleet in Operation Epic Fury, enabling the rapid insertion, decisive action, and safe recovery of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Operation Absolute Resolve, delivering long range precision strike in Operation Midnight Hammer, or sustaining high tempo carrier strike operations against Houthi targets in Operation Rough Rider, our Fleet has operated with unmatched reach and skill. At home, during Operation Southern Spear, Navy and Coast Guard forces surged to disrupt illicit trafficking and safeguard our southern approaches. No other Navy or combined force can match the mobility, endurance, and expeditionary capability that the Navy and Marine Corps delivers. Whether off foreign shores, across the Middle East, beneath the Arctic ice, throughout the vast Pacific, or elsewhere around the world, our Navy delivers ready combat power in hours or days, not weeks or months, and continues to underwrite America's global security and the Joint Force's ability to fight and win.
No other Navy, joint or combined force in the world can offer the same level of mobility and expeditionary capabilities that enabled this mission success. No matter the scenario, our Navy's differentiated value is the sovereign mobile capability we provide to our Nation and Joint Force to be in any hemisphere, fully capable, ready for any contingency, in a matter of days.
The Department of the Navy currently operates 291 battle force ships, while the Navy requirement by law is 355. Over the past two decades, the shipbuilding budget has doubled, yet we have no more ships now than in 2003. This is a persistent problem and one that is not just industrial. It is structural and the result of how we buy, how we plan, and how we manage risk in Navy acquisition.
The Navy's acquisition system grew administratively, but eroded operationally. Requirements expanded during execution, mature designs were modified and evolved by the Navy, and cost estimates and construction schedules were overly optimistic. As a result, schedules slipped, costs compounded, and the American taxpayer absorbed the bill while Sailors, Marines, and the Department of the Navy's readiness are left materially impacted. The Government Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service, and our own internal reviews have identified these issues repeatedly for more than three decades. Those lessons learned are the foundation of this plan. Carrying forward what works and correcting what does not. This also means taking a full lifecycle view from initial procurement through sustainment and reforming acquisition practices that have historically deferred cost and readiness risk into the out-years.
President Trump's Executive Order No. 14269, "Restoring America's Maritime Dominance," and the subsequent Maritime Action Plan, combined with the reform of defense acquisition practices, have been a long overdue catalyst for reindustrialization. This has driven a shift away from legacy approaches and toward stewardship, accountability, and disciplined follow-through. Investments in naval shipbuilding will be smart, deliberate, and distributed across the United States with opportunities for participation by maritime allies. We are creating economies of scale.
Recently implemented wage increases funded by the U.S. Government at Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding have resulted in both companies achieving their required hiring rate for CY25 and a reduction in attrition rates of 2–5%. We expect industry to do the same and make needed infrastructure investments, pay fair wages and invest in the skilled workforce that is necessary to protect our national sovereignty while eschewing Stock Buybacks and Dividends as directed in Executive Order No. 14372 "Prioritizing the Warfighter in Defense Contracting."
The Fleet of the Future is a high-low mix of platforms. It must also be a buildable and sustainable combination of platforms that are maintained to end of their service life. High-end platforms remain essential, but they must be complemented by systems that can be produced at volume and adapted in real time. That includes a range of unmanned systems operating everywhere from the seabed to space, fully integrated with current force structure. The highlow mix is how we increase new market entrants and competition within the industrial base.
Today, roughly 10% of shipbuilding work is performed at distributed sites. Our goal is 50%. New hulls will prioritize modular, digital designs that enable distributed shipbuilding across multiple yards and suppliers. Modular construction expands production capacity, reduces bottlenecks, and accelerates delivery by leveraging industrial capability across the country, not just at a handful of legacy shipyards. It also provides flexibility to ensure we are not locking capability into a single hull, but building systems that can evolve, integrate, and expand across the Fleet…"
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By the way…
US Navy plans to buy 15 Trump-Class Battleships
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Armand
