"U.S. Navy’s 2026 Shipbuilding Plan" Topic

"Over the past year, the United States Navy has continually demonstrated across multiple theaters and mission sets why it is the world's premier maritime force. Whether delivering continuous, devastating striking power at an unrelenting pace from virtually every type of platform in the Fleet in Operation Epic Fury, enabling the rapid insertion, decisive action, and safe recovery of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Operation Absolute Resolve, delivering long range precision strike in Operation Midnight Hammer, or sustaining high tempo carrier strike operations against Houthi targets in Operation Rough Rider, our Fleet has operated with unmatched reach and skill. At home, during Operation Southern Spear, Navy and Coast Guard forces surged to disrupt illicit trafficking and safeguard our southern approaches. No other Navy or combined force can match the mobility, endurance, and expeditionary capability that the Navy and Marine Corps delivers. Whether off foreign shores, across the Middle East, beneath the Arctic ice, throughout the vast Pacific, or elsewhere around the world, our Navy delivers ready combat power in hours or days, not weeks or months, and continues to underwrite America's global security and the Joint Force's ability to fight and win.

No other Navy, joint or combined force in the world can offer the same level of mobility and expeditionary capabilities that enabled this mission success. No matter the scenario, our Navy's differentiated value is the sovereign mobile capability we provide to our Nation and Joint Force to be in any hemisphere, fully capable, ready for any contingency, in a matter of days.

The Department of the Navy currently operates 291 battle force ships, while the Navy requirement by law is 355. Over the past two decades, the shipbuilding budget has doubled, yet we have no more ships now than in 2003. This is a persistent problem and one that is not just industrial. It is structural and the result of how we buy, how we plan, and how we manage risk in Navy acquisition.

The Navy's acquisition system grew administratively, but eroded operationally. Requirements expanded during execution, mature designs were modified and evolved by the Navy, and cost estimates and construction schedules were overly optimistic. As a result, schedules slipped, costs compounded, and the American taxpayer absorbed the bill while Sailors, Marines, and the Department of the Navy's readiness are left materially impacted. The Government Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service, and our own internal reviews have identified these issues repeatedly for more than three decades. Those lessons learned are the foundation of this plan. Carrying forward what works and correcting what does not. This also means taking a full lifecycle view from initial procurement through sustainment and reforming acquisition practices that have historically deferred cost and readiness risk into the out-years.

President Trump's Executive Order No. 14269, "Restoring America's Maritime Dominance," and the subsequent Maritime Action Plan, combined with the reform of defense acquisition practices, have been a long overdue catalyst for reindustrialization. This has driven a shift away from legacy approaches and toward stewardship, accountability, and disciplined follow-through. Investments in naval shipbuilding will be smart, deliberate, and distributed across the United States with opportunities for participation by maritime allies. We are creating economies of scale.

Recently implemented wage increases funded by the U.S. Government at Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding have resulted in both companies achieving their required hiring rate for CY25 and a reduction in attrition rates of 2–5%. We expect industry to do the same and make needed infrastructure investments, pay fair wages and invest in the skilled workforce that is necessary to protect our national sovereignty while eschewing Stock Buybacks and Dividends as directed in Executive Order No. 14372 "Prioritizing the Warfighter in Defense Contracting."

The Fleet of the Future is a high-low mix of platforms. It must also be a buildable and sustainable combination of platforms that are maintained to end of their service life. High-end platforms remain essential, but they must be complemented by systems that can be produced at volume and adapted in real time. That includes a range of unmanned systems operating everywhere from the seabed to space, fully integrated with current force structure. The highlow mix is how we increase new market entrants and competition within the industrial base.

Today, roughly 10% of shipbuilding work is performed at distributed sites. Our goal is 50%. New hulls will prioritize modular, digital designs that enable distributed shipbuilding across multiple yards and suppliers. Modular construction expands production capacity, reduces bottlenecks, and accelerates delivery by leveraging industrial capability across the country, not just at a handful of legacy shipyards. It also provides flexibility to ensure we are not locking capability into a single hull, but building systems that can evolve, integrate, and expand across the Fleet…"

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By the way…

US Navy plans to buy 15 Trump-Class Battleships

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Armand

"Restoring America's Maritime Dominance"? Shipbuilding is more like it. The last time any naval force exerted such dominance as we do now, Victoria was the Queen of England.

And we cannot "fix" the integrity of the corporations and the government, who have been running this cash cow. In another case of one man rule, the steel was on order the moment the Trumps were announced. No Congress needed for bothersome appropriations debates. But due to the tariffs, nobody is sure how to find enough to get them started. Except from overseas. Firing the Navy Secretary was the "fix" for this problem. I assume this is now up to Hesgeth.

The USN will dump this plan in a heartbeat once Trump is no longer in power, IMO. From a results point of view, I believe it could force us to curtail the submarine program. Which would be a huge mistake,IMO. Given the design input the POTUS has claimed, these ships could be running on coal. A "T" on the funnels? Time for more subsidies!

Tortorella +

Thanks

Armand

U.S. Navy Repositions Zumwalt-Class Destroyers as Hypersonic Vanguard for Future BBGN Battleship Fleet

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Sinking Ships in the South China Sea

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Armand

Apparently the "Zumwalts" went from too much gun to none. I wonder how much rebuilding/nefarious contracting this will entail.

The LCS program required a massive combined effort in chaotic bureaucracy to reach the level of fame where it now stands

The Constellation class frigate program was a bit of a nightmare too. The proposed replacement FF(X) program looks to me to be underarmed compared to its contemporaries – I would be good money that it is eventually cancelled or significantly changed with associated significant cost increases and over runs.

The Arleigh Burke Program by contrast has been a huge success compared to these other programs. They are not cheap, but at least you know what you are getting. I can see an Arleigh Burke Flight IV with an improved power plant and energy directed weapons being more likely than large numbers of the FF(X).

I also vote for the Arleigh Burke variants idea. We are less likely to be bamboozled. Again. They are tough ships, expensive but they would involve far less design costs with their proven quality.

Carriers: Not Dead Yet, and Unquestionably not Unloved

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Davie Defense Finalizes $3.5 USD Billion U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Security Cutter Deal

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Armand

When you think you can replace effective industry by paperpushers and pretend the paying of millions of state bureaucrats creates more wealth than when you had an industry, one day you find out that you cannot built much and certainly never be able to replay a "arsenal of the demcocracy" game as in 1942.
Too late.

Nuclear-Powered Trump Class Battleships Will Reverse One Of The Navy's "Largest Mistakes": Navy Boss

"The U.S. Navy's near-total abandonment of surface combatants with nuclear propulsion after the end of the Cold War is "one of the largest mistakes" it's ever made, according to the service's top officer. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle made this remark today while voicing support for the recently announced decision that the future Trump class battleships will be nuclear-powered. He also explicitly highlighted challenges the Navy has faced when it comes to fueling conventionally-powered ships taking part in operations against Iran, something TWZ recently reported on in detail.

Adm. Caudle, as well as Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao and Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Eric Smith, testified before members of the House Armed Services Committee today. The focus of the hearing was on the Department of the Navy's 2027 Fiscal Year budget request. The Navy disclosed that it had decided the Trump class warships will feature nuclear propulsion in its latest long-term shipbuilding plan, which was released on Monday…"

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Armand

America Stopped Building Ships. Now It Can't Build a Navy.

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Armand

U.S. Navy Orders and Tests Armed TSUNAMI Uncrewed Surface Vessels for SOUTHCOM Maritime Missions.

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Armand

Love the Brunswick boats. This one can double as a bass boat with a fool
-proof fish finder. Actually, it really is a leisure boat doubling as a naval vessel. Very clever. Who says we can't build our own ships?

Modular Construction Key to Battleship Effort, Navy Official Says

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Armand

Drones, LCSs, etc. in the Persian Gulf …

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The US Navy Needs a Strategic Industrial Plan to Realize the Golden Fleet

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Armand

The U.S. Navy Is Going To Shrink — At The Same Moment China's Navy Is The Largest On Earth

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Armand

Why the Navy says it wants 15 battleships

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Armand

About The New Trump-Class Battleship

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Armand

The new TC battleship article was a good read.

As for the vessel itself, it feels like a 21st-century version of the old battleship dream: impressive, intimidating and politically attractive. Think "Dreadnoughts" (my grand dad served, pre-war, on the HMS Dreadnought BTW.)

The problem is that modern warfare tends to punish large, expensive, highly visible targets. For the cost of one giant "battleship," you can often build several smaller ships and spread the risk.The article raises this point.

As a military proposal: interesting, but I'm unconvinced.

As a wargaming subject: fantastic. Nothing gets naval gamers excited quite like a giant flagship bristling with guns and missiles.

"World of Warships" look out!

The problem is that modern warfare tends to punish large, expensive, highly visible targets.

Like e.g. CVEs ? Big ships with today's high tech and that tech keeps getter better/higher almost monthly, etc. Has much better AAA systems than ever before. As well as many other high tech, etc. defensive/protective systems/measures, etc.

Plus many new very lethal offensive weapons on the new version of the BB/BC.

Who can actually threaten a new class of BC/BB ? China ? Maybe ? That would go the same for the current CVNs. The Chicoms are working on ways to take out a CVN. Can they do it ?

When was the last time a US CVN or BB/BC been hit and sunk ?

When was the last time the Chicom Navy see combat ?

The Russian Navy much of it at the bottom of the Black Sea. How much of it is actually combat/sea worthy ?

Based on their ground forces performance in Ukraine … The Russians at this time or even the not so near future seem to be a "paper bear". All the really have going for them is Nukes …

What is the combat readiness of those Russian WMDs, etc.

Or any WMDs ?

Never underestimate your enemy … but as we saw/see in Ukraine … Many overestimated the "paper bear". I know I did. Many were as I, surprised at the very poor performance of the Russian military by all their branches.

Just my take … FWIW …

The Chinese have commissioned at least two more Type 055 destroyers this year already, with maybe a dozen more building. Ten are operational. These are really more like cruisers at 12,000 tons, with similar functions or the capability of being converted to similar roles that the USN appears to want for these battleships. But they cost less and the Chinese, with their shipbuilding capacity, can certainly crank out a bunch more.

I think that's the key issue. A fleet of smaller, capable ships can be in several places at once, whereas one giant flagship can only be in one. In an age of long-range missiles, concentrating so much combat power in a single hull seems a questionable trade-off.

The problem is merely intensified by 15 TC battleships. Fifteen of them or 60 smaller destroyers?

No way we will build 15 of these. The 19th century is over. No Great White Fleet to project power. We need to rebuild our capacity to design and build warships with future needs in mind based on the balance of power.

In some ways, the Chinese are reminding us how to do it on these oversize destroyers. Their design came from a strategic and tactical vision to fulfill an objective in a war with the US. The battleships came from POTUS, as far as I know, and now have to be reverse engineered into appearing they were conceived by professionals and will be like nothing the world has ever seen, etc. If I am wrong about this, I would be happy to be corrected. But this looked like a vanity project at the first mention.

If we do not overhaul our manufacturing capacity and address procurement corruption and the Navy penchant for wanting ships that can do it all like the LCS class, we will be buying warships from Europe or Japan like a banana republic during the early days of the first dreadnought race.

Excuse the rant, I got carried away. But I have a bad feeling about the way the USN may be going lately.

I can see why the direction of travel feels concerning. The key question may be less "what size ship?" and more "what system is producing them, and how reliably does it connect strategy to design?"

the LCS class

Those LCS, IIRC, are being use as drone carriers …

The battleships

aFAIK These new BBs will have some tech like that has never been seen before in combination on one platform. IIRC, railguns, lasers, TLAMs, high-tech AAA, etc. And it may not have to be as big as the old BBs.

US' new 180-foot drone ship could launch hypersonic missiles, demo set for 2027

"Saronic and Castelion, two defense technology companies, have announced plans to combine an autonomous warship with a hypersonic strike weapon. They said this is the first attempt to put a hypersonic vehicle on an unmanned surface vessel.

Castelion's Blackbeard hypersonic system will be launched from Saronic's Marauder medium unmanned surface vessel, with a demonstration at sea planned for 2027…"

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Armand

More types of drones for all environments should be expected … I say go for it …

SASC Wants Navy to Develop New DDG(X) Destroyer in Tandem with Trump Battleship

"Senate authorizers want the Navy to continue pursuing the next-generation destroyer, in addition to the new Trump-class battleship, USNI News has learned.

The Senate Armed Services Committee thinks the Navy must keep developing DDG(X) as planned to follow the Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyers, according to the explanatory report accompanying the panel's draft of the Fiscal Year 2027 defense policy bill.

The report language says the Navy needs DDG(X) so it has a platform to succeed the Flight I Arleigh Burke destroyers when they start leaving the fleet in the 2030s…"

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Armand

US' new 180-foot drone ship could launch hypersonic missiles, demo set for 2027

SASC Wants Navy to Develop New DDG(X) Destroyer in Tandem with Trump Battleship

Sounds like a good plan … as we saw in e.g. WWII. One has to have naval and air superiority to win on the land in almost every situation.

Sailor's fatal fall exposed drug ring aboard aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan

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Armand

America's Asian Allies Want Nuclear Submarines. Here's How To Build Them

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Armand

U.S. Navy's New Flight III Destroyer George M. Neal Sharpens America's Maritime Edge

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Armand

The US Navy is eyeing next-gen carrier-based drones. Here's what they might do.

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Armand

Rebuilding the Arsenal: A Realistic Path to Building a Larger, More Capable U.S. Fleet

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Armand

Excellent, Armand..every point is spot on. Everything we need is there except the leadership and vision to grasp it and get it started.

Because naval shipbuilding is a continuous cycle—where a ship is funded by one president, laid down by a second, and completed by a third—each administration contributed to the fleet in drastically different ways.

🚢 Total Fleet Growth: Obama Administration
If the metric is the physical addition of ships to the fleet, the Obama administration oversaw the largest volume of completions.
* Key Achievement: Delivered 73 battle force ships, stabilizing production rates for the Virginia-class submarines and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
* The Catch: Many of these ships were funded under the Bush administration, and the Obama era also saw the retirement of older vessels, keeping the active fleet size relatively flat overall. [1]

💰 Funding and Strategic Vision: Trump Administration
If the metric is shifting national strategy and flooding the Navy with financial resources, the Trump administration had the largest institutional impact.
* Key Achievement: Established the legal and strategic goal of a 355-ship Navy, drastically reversing years of defense spending caps. In his current term, he secured a historic $65.8 USD billion shipbuilding budget to fund the upcoming "Golden Fleet" initiative. [1]
* The Catch: Because shipbuilding timelines span a decade, the massive budget increases and new ship designs (like the planned nuclear battleships) will not result in physical fleet growth until the mid-2030s.[1]

⚙️ Modernization and Alliances: Biden Administration
If the metric is technological readiness and countering modern threats (like China), the Biden administration focused on high-tech capabilities over sheer hull numbers.
* Key Achievement: Brokered the historic AUKUS agreement to supply Australia with nuclear submarines, heavily subsidized the domestic submarine industrial base, and advanced the critical Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program. [1]
* The Catch: Fleet size numbers dropped slightly as the administration aggressively retired older, high-maintenance legacy ships (like early Littoral Combat Ships and Ticonderoga-class cruisers) to free up money for research and development. [1]

I am not big on comparing the number of ships with China's as a way to figure out who is the toughest kid on the block. The Chinese have more soldiers than we will ever have. Does that make them the best army?

China looks like it is starting to catch up with us, but it still has a ways to go. Any navy that dependent on oil for fuel is not able to project power as effectively. They will be changing this. The Chinese navy is still tied to home waters logistically and their oil supply line is long and difficult to secure.

But China is racing ahead of the U.S. on diversified energy sources. Their navy is still evolving.

I am seeing reports of the new Battleship cost estimated at $23.4 USD Billion for the first unit. With the average cost of around $19 USD Billion each for 15 of them.
Compared to an Arleigh Burke cost of around $2.5 USDBillion each, the plan just doesn't seem to make much sense.
There is a balance between concentration of systems on one hull versus diversification of systems across multiple hulls. I don't think that the sweet spot is too far away from the Arleigh Burke design – maybe adding some capable frigates to the fleet might be a better, more cost effective way to go.

US Navy reclassifying Virginia Class Submarines to refelct increased attack capabilities.

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Armand

+1 Martyn. Too many functions/missions in one ship is a mistake for a number of reasons. I find it hard to believe that serious naval officers think these BBs are a good idea.

Trump's instincts with the Trump class BB weren't wrong – the US is too carrier-centric and we now must deal with drone and ASM saturation threats, and as air defenses continue to improve making crewed airstrikes less effective. Given the limitations of US ship building, with atrophied capacity and more big shipbuilding yards available, the BB-X and BB-XN were not unreasonable solutions -- delay building the next several CVNs and build BBNs instead.

But the cost now at $25 USD Billion -- too much cost for not enough payoff. Here's some planning ideas to address this that I developed with Grok.

Revised US Naval Buildup Plan: Distributed Magazine Depth and Industrial Recovery

Core pillars: (1) Militarized Panamax ships for fast throw weight, (2) Constellation-derived medium combatants, (3) Full TRAM at-sea VLS replenishment, and (4) Dedicated revitalization of US shipbuilding capacity. No large battleship class.

1. Militarized Panamax Ships – Fast Throw Weight

Purpose: Deliver large volumes of missiles and defensive capacity in the near term with minimal demand on constrained naval yards.

• Purchase 25 to 40 used or recent Panamax (or suitable Feedermax/Panamax-sized) container ships on the commercial market. Prioritize US-flag or easily reflaggable hulls.
• Convert primarily in commercial and second-tier US yards (with limited allied support for non-sensitive modules).
• Install containerized or modular VLS (Mk 70-style or equivalent) for 40 to 96 or more cells per ship, focused on strike and air-defense missiles.
• Add organic anti-drone defenses: containerized high-energy lasers, EW suites, guns with programmable ammunition, short-range interceptors, and decoys.
• Apply minor radar-signature reductions (angled panels, smoothed edges, RAM coatings, reduced clutter) while retaining the basic commercial hull form.
• Integrate basic networking for remote or offboard control by Aegis ships or carriers, plus compatibility features for underway replenishment.
• Use small Navy or hybrid crews.
• Timeline: First ships ready in 12 to 24 months; full initial tranche within 3 to 4 years.
• Rough cost: $100 USD to $180 USD million per ship. Total program approximately $3 USD to $6 USD billion.
• Role: High-volume, dispersible magazines for saturation fires and layered drone and missile defense. Operate under the protection of higher-end combatants.

2. Constellation-Derived Medium Combatant

Purpose: Provide a more survivable, purpose-built medium hull that can be produced relatively quickly by updating an existing advanced design.

• Restart and revise the Constellation-class (FFG-62) design as the baseline for a new medium combatant class (target 6,000 to 8,000 tons).
• Key updates for the arsenal and defensive role:
• Expand or make more flexible the VLS capacity (baseline was 32 cells; aim for 48 to 64 or more, or hybrid fixed plus containerized).
• Strengthen organic anti-drone and close-in defenses (lasers, EW, enhanced CIWS or guns).
• Improve modularity, producibility, and cost control to correct original program shortcomings (design instability, schedule, and cost growth).
• Ensure full compatibility with TRAM at-sea reload.
• Retain multi-mission capability while emphasizing magazine depth and defensive contribution to task groups.
• Leverage existing design data, engineering, supplier base, and partial construction experience at Fincantieri Marinette (and expand to additional yards).
• Procurement goal: 20 to 40 ships over 10 to 15 years. First revised ships targeted for delivery in the early 2030s, with earlier low-rate production if design updates are prioritized.
• Role: Survivable distributed combatants that carry substantial VLS, provide strong local air and drone defense, and serve as controllers or escorts for Panamax magazines and unmanned systems.

3. Full Implementation of TRAM (At-Sea VLS Replenishment)

Purpose: Keep ships in the fight after high-tempo missile expenditure.

• Accelerate the Transferrable Reload At-sea Method (TRAM) and related systems to fleet-wide operational status.
• Complete remaining testing, reliability improvements, and higher-throughput variants.
• Equip all VLS-capable surface combatants (including new Constellation-derived ships) and key logistics ships (T-AKE and adapted vessels).
• Develop procedures and training for reloading both purpose-built combatants and militarized Panamax ships.
• Expand supporting ammunition logistics capacity.
• Target: Routine, concurrent underway VLS reload capability (alongside fuel and stores) by 2028 to 2030.
• Outcome: Combatants and arsenal ships no longer forced to leave station once magazines are empty.

4. Dedicated Shipbuilding Infrastructure and Capacity Revitalization

Purpose: Overcome drydock shortages, workforce deficits, and overall industrial decline so the above programs and future construction can be sustained domestically.This is a multi-year national program.

• Expand and modernize drydocks and construction positions at public and private yards, including new or enlarged facilities sized for medium combatants and modular work.
• Aggressively grow the skilled workforce through training pipelines, apprenticeships, wage support, and retention incentives focused on critical trades.
• Promote distributed modular construction so second-tier and commercial yards can produce sections and smaller complete hulls, raising the share of non-legacy-yard work.
• Secure domestic and trusted-allied supply chains for steel, propulsion, and key components.
• Use long-term multi-year contracting, tax incentives, and public-private partnerships to stabilize demand and encourage yard investment.
• Limited, time-bound bridge use of allied (Japanese or South Korean) module capacity under strict controls while US capacity expands.
• Scale: Sustained multi-billion-dollar annual investment treated as strategic national infrastructure.

Phased Execution

• Years 1 to 2: Launch Panamax acquisition and conversion; accelerate TRAM fielding and training; stand up the infrastructure task force and begin major yard investments; initiate Constellation design updates and producibility fixes.
• Years 3 to 5: Deliver initial militarized Panamax ships; achieve initial operational TRAM capability; start low-rate production of revised Constellation-derived combatants; break ground on key drydock and workforce expansions.
• Years 6 to 15: Scale both Panamax conversions as needed and Constellation-derived production; mature the distributed industrial network; fully integrate the new magazine, defensive, and sustainment layers into fleet operations and doctrine.

Expected Results

• Rapid increase in missile throw weight and defensive capacity via Panamax conversions.
• A more capable and survivable medium combatant line derived from existing Constellation investment.
• Sustained high-tempo operations enabled by at-sea VLS replenishment.
• Gradual restoration of US shipbuilding capacity to support higher output without relying on foreign construction of complete warships.
• A distributed, resilient force structure that avoids the cost and concentration risks of large battleships while addressing the core problems of magazine depth, drone threats, and industrial weakness.

Possible BBN role in addition to core strategy – BBN-Centered Non-Carrier Surface Action Groups

A limited 1-to-1 swap of four future Ford-class aircraft carriers (the later ships not yet under construction) for four Trump-class guided-missile battleships (BBNs) would create powerful new non-carrier Surface Action Groups while remaining roughly budget-neutral and producing only a modest, temporary reduction in overall carrier readiness.Under current independent cost estimates, four future CVNs represent a procurement envelope of roughly 64 to 80 billion dollars. Four BBNs, using the higher CBO figures of approximately 23.4 billion dollars for the lead ship and 18 billion dollars for follow-ons, fall in a comparable 77 to 80 billion dollar range. The exchange therefore does not require a major net increase in the long-term shipbuilding top line.The resulting force structure change would be as follows:

• Each new BBN would serve as the core of a dedicated Surface Action Group.
• A typical non-carrier SAG could consist of one BBN plus three to five escorts drawn from existing or new Arleigh Burke destroyers, Constellation-derived medium combatants, and militarized Panamax magazine ships.

This combination delivers:

• Concentrated VLS magazine depth (128-plus cells on the BBN alone, plus the escorts' cells) for sustained saturation strike and air-defense fires.
• Organic high-capacity power for directed-energy anti-drone weapons and advanced sensors.
• A resilient command node less dependent on vulnerable carrier aviation in high-threat environments.
• Compatibility with TRAM at-sea VLS replenishment so the group can remain on station longer.

Because only the later, still-unbuilt CVNs would be deferred or cancelled, the near-term carrier force (the existing Nimitz and early Ford-class ships already delivered or under construction) would remain essentially intact. The reduction in long-term carrier inventory would be gradual and limited to four hulls over several decades, producing only a slight and manageable dip in overall carrier readiness and availability. Existing carriers and their air wings would continue to cover the majority of traditional power-projection and surge requirements.Industrial impact would also remain limited. The same large-hull, nuclear-qualified yards and drydocks already committed to carrier work would simply shift a portion of their future workload to the BBN program rather than expanding total nuclear-surface demand. Parallel investments in TRAM, medium combatants, Panamax conversions, and shipyard capacity revitalization would continue unchanged.In summary, exchanging four future CVNs for four BBNs offers a roughly budget-neutral path to field four high-capacity, surface-centric SAGs. These groups would provide independent, high-volume missile and defensive firepower without carriers, while the overall carrier force experiences only a modest, long-term reduction in numbers and readiness.

This topic is probably lights years away from Trump's personal areas of expertise. Even if there is an environment where no one wants to tell him that this idea may not be that great, or he disagrees, it still may not get going. It's not that it's a crazy idea, it's just being reverse engineered to Trump's vague idea of something like the Great White Fleet.

We need destroyers, especially with all the activity the Navy has been engaged in around the world under Trump. China's new large destroyer class is a threat and they can build them faster than the US. We need to do something now. There is not going to be a golden fleet or dome…we are spending ourselves into trouble even as taxes are cut. I do not think any surface fleet can project power anywhere in the world more effectively than a carrier based fleet can. Now we will reverse the hard won experience of WW2 where large surface units finally took a back seat to aviation?

SB,

I agree with the premise that currently the USN is a little too carrier centric.

While the Panamax idea is not one I support (there is an interesting article in the latest SITREP report by the Admiralty Triology Group on Chinese armed container ships that discusses many of the problems), the idea of a military grade arsenal ship with VLS banks relying on the sensors of other fleet combatants is a very interesting idea – and along the same broad concept.

On the Constellation class. I am broadly in agreement. I would probably not choose the Constellation or the FFGX, but rather the FREMM. To minimize costs I would go with the current FREMM variant – trying to change all the specifications is where this went wrong. But a modern, low cost combat frigate is what is needed.
I would also look at a Flight IV Arleigh Burke while developing the next gen of destroyer. The key is going to be a low cost drone missile killing option to limit the usage of high cost SM2/SM3/SM6s
The usage of the lower cost ESSM to replace some of the SM2s was a game changer. Not only due to the cost, but also the ability to fit four rather than one missile into each VLS cell.

The TRAM at sea is something that should be progressed.

Expanding ship building capacity is going to be essential.

Still not on board with the battleship concept. Even before knowing the price, it I was more in favor of multiple platforms.

@ Tortorella

Now we will reverse the hard won experience of WW2 where large surface units finally took a back seat to aviation?

The aircraft carrier did not replace the battleship because battleships suddenly became "bad ships." They remained extraordinarily powerful, but advances in technology fundamentally changed the balance between offense, defense, range, and reconnaissance. Naval strategy evolved accordingly. I believe we may be witnessing another such transition today as precision-guided missiles, autonomous systems, drone swarms, and long-range sensors increasingly reshape maritime warfare.

This isn't an argument against the aircraft carrier. The CVN remains the world's premier power-projection platform and will continue to be indispensable for many missions. The question is whether future procurement should continue to emphasize carriers to the same degree, or whether some investment should shift toward the capabilities that recent conflicts have shown are becoming equally critical: distributed missile magazines, sustained high-volume fires, at-sea VLS replenishment (TRAM), additional submarines, dedicated anti-drone defenses, and rebuilding America's shipbuilding industrial base.

My noodlings do not replace the carrier, it rebalances the fleet. The carrier remains the centerpiece of naval power, but it could be well supported by more resilient Surface Action Groups, deeper missile inventories, and an industrial base capable of sustaining a prolonged high-intensity conflict.

So that's not a rejection of the carrier era, but an evolution of it in response to changing technology and the lessons of recent combat.

Yes, I got that SB and see your point, it is well made even though I don't entirely agree.

I would not use the word "bad" re battleships. It became immediately clear that battleships were extremely vulnerable to airpower, and the war confirmed that there were too many eggs in that basket. Not counting the stationary targets Billy Mitchell sank or the ships at Pearl. Prince of Wales and Repulse stood no chance, Bismarck, later Musashi and Yamato, both with massive weapons systems, armor and speed. Battleships became large anti aircraft batteries, main armaments for shore bombardment. Only in the night fighting in the Solomons and Suriago Strait did they briefly fulfill their original intent. Too much invested by everyone for the return.

Which does not make them worthless. But they cost way too much per vessel. It makes more sense to spread various systems and functions across a number of hills, hopefully lowering costs and risks. This is a core principle.

I don't like a large obvious target in the center of a task force with limited striking power and relatively short range, but this is a debatable opinion, as weapons systems are evolving so fast. It will take a long time to design and build them, costs willl skyrocket and I fear that Trumps burning desire to get the m to sea quickly so he can point to his name on the class will cause shortcuts. I am afraid we won't get our money's worth as we sail toward a financial Bermuda Triangle.

The next US destroyers can manage all kinds of tasks, cost less, more versatile, reduce risk. China's new destroyers displace 12,000 tons bigger than many WW2 cruisers. With their shipbuilding capacity they will pull ahead of us. I don't care about numbers of vessels as much as function and quality…can't have this. Destroyers can handle the duties that carriers cannot and we can keep building them. An amateur opinion, that's me.

Jet-Powered JDAM Production Is A Go For The U.S. Navy

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Armand

The BBGN Must Sail

"…There is one objection I find more credible than every cost complaint combined, and it is the one the ship's advocates tend to skate past: the weapons aren't fully built yet. A 600-kilowatt laser firing sustained, a railgun cycling every few seconds — that is the hardware carrying the heaviest load in this argument, and directed energy has spent twenty years overpromising and underdelivering. The field is a graveyard of programs that cleared every budget hurdle and then died on the physics. Just this year the Army abandoned its 300-kilowatt IFPC-HEL laser as a program of record, downshifting it to a single testbed, because the engineering would not close. If the version on dry land can't be made to work, why believe the one bolted to a warship will?

Because the problem that killed the land-based laser is the one problem a ship solves. A 300-kilowatt solid-state beam runs only about a third efficient: producing the beam draws about one megawatt, six or seven hundred kilowatts of that comes straight back off as waste heat. All of that heat has to leave the system in milliseconds, or the optics cook themselves blind. On land you reject that heat into the air through coolers and radiators, but air carries heat away far worse than water does. A warship floats practically in an infinite heat sink. It pulls cold seawater through the hull, runs it across titanium exchangers, and dumps the thermal load back into the sea, continuously, for as long as the reactor turns. The constraint that strangles a laser on a truck bed becomes, at sea, a plumbing problem with a known solution. With BBGN, the weapon finally gets the host its physics has always demanded.

So here is a falsifiable claim with a date on it, which is more than the people calling this ship a fantasy will give you. The Navy's stated plan funds a containerized 150-kilowatt laser across this year and next, targets a live demonstration for the summer of 2028, and specifies a beam-control system built to scale to 300–500 kilowatts. I will take the other side of "it'll never work": the 150-kilowatt class demonstrates a working intercept inside roughly that window, and the climb to the 300-kilowatt tier that actually defeats a saturation salvo proves to be a problem of power and cooling. The honest caveat here is that funding is where it could still die; a future Congress can zero the line for reasons that have nothing to do with whether the beam works. But appropriations risk and physics risk are different bets, and only the second one is mine to make. If the high-power laser dies at sea the way IFPC-HEL just died on land, the survivability case for this ship is genuinely wounded, and I would be wrong to bank on it…"

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Armand