"Is German firepower too high?" Topic

Many WW2 rules give German infantry extra firepower to reflect the MG34/42. In Rapid Fire Reloaded, for example, German companies get an additional fire dice.

This is understandable.The MG42 had a very high rate of fire and was the core of the German squad. However, this came with a trade-off: riflemen were often tasked with carrying ammunition and supporting the gun, reducing their own individual fire output.

By contrast, British and US squads, built around the Bren gun and M1918 BAR, had less intense automatic fire but more evenly distributed firepower and arguably greater resilience.

Different rules handle this in different ways:

Rapid Fire Reloaded: flat German fire bonus (simple, but unconditional)
Chain of Command: German squads heavily MG-centric; loss of MG is critical
Bolt Action: LMGs fairly homogenised—national differences less pronounced
Flames of War: German MG teams strong, but balanced via points/morale
O Group: abstracts firepower at a higher level, differences less granular

Do rules overstate the German advantage by focusing on MG output while ignoring the manpower cost and dependency on the gun? Do our rules capture the trade-off or just the headline rate of fire?

Interesting point, but the tales of troops pinned own by these weapons are legion so they really should be pretty scary. It might be an idea in games like CoC to reduce the number of fire dice for each crew member lost, instead of just when down to the gunner himself. This could be argued to represent the loss of ammo-carriage and a tendency to use what they have left more sparingly?

The German LMGs were a real game changer.
What is often important is that the MG 34/42 can put down a lot of bullets when a target is visible for a short time.
Superb bit of kit.

martin

interesting point, but the tales of troops pinned own by these weapons are legion so they really should be pretty scary. It might be an idea in games like CoC to reduce the number of fire dice for each crew member lost, instead of just when down to the gunner himself. This could be argued to represent the loss of ammo-carriage and a tendency to use what they have left more sparingly?,

There is a well-know book by a British Officer in NWE 1944-45 who is very dismissive of the German Infantry defensive skills. (18 Platoon, Sydney Jarry. link ) and their over-reliance on the MG 34/42.

Interesting replies – especially mkenny's.

Does this reflect a wider tendency in WW2 gaming to emphasise German strengths, sometimes at the expense of their limitations?

The MG34/42 was undoubtedly formidable—but was an MG-centric squad always as effective in practice as it appears in our rules?

This smacks of Napoleonic rules, naming no name, that give the French a +2 for being French, and the British a +1 for being British.

Hugo Boss has a lot to answer for.

#mckenny – I have Jary's 18 Platoon, and you're right he makes excellent use of infiltration tactics and is rarely (I don't recall ever) caught in relatively open terrain by these weapons. There are many other accounts where the weight of fire laid down does bring everything to a stop and I am inclined to to believe those as well, as it is the perception of the troops under fire that matters most. Also, in the 44/45 timeframe many German troops were of much poorer quality than those in most games, and they wouldn't feel comfortable when the enemy got as close as the distance that some games start from.
Bottom line, it's a game and we can all change the rules to make them work how we like.

Iirc in RF reloaded, the introductory scenerio has German Panzergrenadiers, who all have two LMGs per section, so some sort of firepower bonus warranted.

There is a reason that after WW2, all NATO armies adopted GMPGs however, while Germans just went on using MG42s.

In game terms though, I usually base any firepower bonus on actual weaponry, so US armoured infantry and British carrier platoons get a FP bonus too. Particularly depends on level of game course.

In my home-baked rules I rated the firepower of squad weapons by how many rounds they could fire without reloading:

Germans MGs 50 (one belt), rifes 5.
British MGs 30, rifles 5 (or 10 on the first firing)
U.S. BARs 20, rifles 8

But then there is the question of how many of the men are actually firing, which would necessitate individual morale checks; possible in a small game, but a real bother if more than 1 or 2 squads on a side.

Note also that the German firepower is almost all coming from one point (the MG), whereas U.S. firepower is more spread out in origan (but can be concentrated on the same target). British somewhere in between.

Also, the BAR, and to some extent the Bren, can be fired while moving, whereas the German MG can't really.

Also the German MG and (I think) the Bren requires a second man to feed ammo to the MG and so is not firing himself, which is not true of the BAR.

Finally, there is the fact that the British had fewer riflemen per squad.

I can't disagree with anyone.

How the MG42 was deployed made a big difference. Tripod mounted with a telescopic sight was much different than firing from a bipod. The tripod had a feature where the recoil distributed a larger beaten zone range wise. It was set up higher so less protection for the gunner but in that configuration it could be used more effectively for longer range suppression/area denial.

The MG42 used flashless powder (different than smokeless) and was very hard to spot over 200 yards when firing.

I have seen pictures of Germans firing an MG (hard to tell if it was a 34 or 42) from the waist with a drum but I'm sure at short range.

Here is my opinion:
Medium to long range firefights where both sides had cover rarely came to a conclusion without maneuvering or combined arms.

Catching a foot unit that is line ahead and well dispersed means the gunner can expect to effectively engage 1-2 targets with a 2 second burst before everyone hits the deck which will take 1-2 seconds at most. I detest games where an MG opens up on a squad and the defending player sits idle as each individual unit is targeted. He can't hit the deck because it's not his turn or fails a die roll.

Tactics matter:
With two MGs against an assaulting enemy you can keep one gun silent and the other one waits to perform the FPF at close on an unsuspecting part of the attackers.

The Germans would have one MG firing tracers purposely over the head of the defenders giving them a false sense of security and expose themselves. The second MG opens up on them without tracers.

An MG42 is most likely not going to fire a 5+ second burst because it would be uncontrollable and a waste of ammo.

Another trick was to have a mortar unit nearby and zero in on a choke point the advancing enemy would have to go through. When they get to that spot the MG opens up, they all hit the deck. The mortar team, hearing the MG, starts a mortar barrage on the pinned down infantry.

You use full cyclic rate on specific occasions. Normally in the initiation of an ambush, good target of exposed troops in the open (as Martin stated) and for FPF. In an extended firefight to keep the enemy suppressed, rifles fire 5-6 rounds a minute. German gunners were trained to fire 3-7 round bursts changing the barrel after 150-200 rounds carrying 3-4 extra barrels taking 3-7 seconds to change one. So if a team has 5 barrels how long could they shoot for? I guess that depends on how many rounds a minute are fired. That's the big tradeoff for firepower. I think a high cyclic rate is a negative in a medium/long range extended firefight.

One advantage the MG42 had was the noise and fear it created. If only one squad was shot at most likely the entire platoon would hit the deck.

The squad leader should be prepared to have someone bring up additional ammo once the shooting starts. Game wise, if the player take 1-2 guys from the squad for ammo runs you don't have to worry about running low. Tradeoffs.

You may not want to stick around more than 5 minutes before the enemy pulls up with a tank or artillery barrage. That's why defenders had alternate defensive positions to fall back on.

The Marines used the "Barking BAR" tactic. They would each take turns firing a short burst thus keeping the barrels cooler even if they could not change them. If needed, they could all open fire at the same time but for suppressive fire it would be a waste. Tradeoffs and different tactics again.

In an extended firefight, we were trained for each team to fire into a designated area (even if you could not clearly ID a target) with the squad leader making sure we had coverage and the correct rate of fire. That's why Squad Leaders and officers do not generally take part in a fire fight. If the enemy fire increased the Squad Leader would have us increase our rate of fire. You gain the initiative using superior firepower.

After the war, the Germans said the US troops did not cover the entire front and they could pull back and move into an area not under fire.

In Saving Private Ryan (or was it Band of Brothers) the unit was in a tree line and had to move across an open area to another tree line. They sent out two "Scouts" (basically new and expendable FNGs). The Germans on the other side had to decide to fire at the scouts and give away their position or wait. They fired and counterattacked and then the American Sherman's came to the rescue.

For me, that's how games should be played out. Not a static firepower dice fest. Effective tactics are fun, unless you are on the receiving end.

Wolfhag

I was taught that in a US Army infantry squad the machine-gun and BAR were to support the riflemen. Whereas a German squad the Riflemen supported the machine-gun

Well, there's no doubt that the German MGs could put a lot of bullets downrange. A late-war German infantry company had about half as many men as an American company, but it carried TWICE as much ammunition as the Americans in its basic load.

I should add, concerning my home-baked rules:

If you add up the numbers for the Germans and the Americans, it comes out remarkably even for 12-man squads (sections):
Germans 1 MG (50) plus 9 rifles (45) equals 95.
Americans 1 BAR (20) plus 10 rifles (80) equals 100.

In both cases I'm talking about ordinary infantry. German panzergrenadier squads had two LMGs but therefore 2 fewer rifles. U.S. armored infantry squads had Browning LMGs instead of BARs, and thus 1 fewer riflemen. The U.S. LMG had the advantage of a tripod, while the Germn MGs (the squad LMG version) only had bipods. The U.S. Browning LMG had about half the rate of fire of a MG34.

In other words, it's complicated.

In other words, it's complicated.

Here are some reasons:
An air cooled machine gun is not going to fire at full cyclic rate for 1+ minute without a malfunction or the barrel melting. Water cooled guns can.

Unless triggering or responding to an ambush, the squad leader determines the rate of fire in a sustained firefight based on the objective or enemy return fire.

While the BAR is not considered a sustained fire weapon (no barrel change) with multiple guns alternating fire to keep the barrel cool they can simulate a sustained fire MG.

Not every member of a unit is shooting 100% of the time. Some may be reloading, relocating, first aid, etc.

Once shot at, you'll immediately seek cover. At ground level your Situational Awareness is severely hampered and you may not be able to see who was shooting at you unless you break cover.

Gaining fire superiority, not causing causalities is the immediate goal in a fire fight. That's when rate of fire is most valuable.

Noise causes psychological suppression. That's where the MG42 is more effective.

Fire superiority is achieved when the enemy return fire stops. At that point the squad leader uses sustained fire to keep their heads down. If return fire increases the squad leader orders an increase.

If neither side can achieve firepower superiority the engagement for last for quite awhile without a result or until one side pulls back, runs low on ammo or starts getting hit by indirect or direct fire.

The M1 Garand was capable of firing 40-50 rounds/minute but max sustained rate was 16-24 aimed fire.

Bolt Action rifles could achieve 20+ rounds/minute but sustained rate was 5-10 rounds. British rifleman were trained to do 15-20 rounds per minute, some could achieve higher rates aimed fire.

The US M1919 MG was a crew served weapon in the Company Weapons Platoon and attached to Rifle Platoons as needed for sustained suppressive fire while the teams maneuvered. It's sustained ROF was 40-60 rounds/minute to keep the barrel cool because it did not have a quick change barrel like the MG42. It had more crew than the MG42 and a hand cart to make it easier to carry the gun and more ammo. For short term FPF, the gunner might fire as quickly as possible for 1-2 minutes and risk burning out the barrel to stop the unit from being overrun.

The bipod MG42 was designed to inflict maximum causalities in seconds with psychological shock so was great in an ambush. The M1919 could take 10-15 seconds to set up and be ineffective in the initial stage.

These are generalities as sustained rates could be lower.

Fire & Maneuver: This is the main idea of suppression and why I think the US had a distinct advantage in the attack. The M1919 provides a base of suppressive fire allowing the entire 13 man squad to F&M with two 4 man teams providing semiautomatic fire while one advances taking turns firing and advancing.

A German squad needs the MG42 to remain static so only 6-7 rifleman can F&M with only bolt action rifles (unless a SMG unit). It lacks the tactical flexibility of the US.

F&M without an M1919: Here the squad leader can group the three BARs as a base of fire alternating firing giving the same firepower as an M1919. Now you have three 3 man maneuver elements with M1s. Also just have all three teams doing F&M with all using semiautomatic fire for suppression.

US Weapons Platoon: They normally had 2-3 60mm mortars which could assist in the attack being close enough for direct observation of the objective to support F&M. Medium and heavy mortars are too exposed to operate at the FEBA.

While the MG42 is an excellent weapon and the Germans do have some good tactics. I think the US TO&E and combined arms weapons give better tactical flexibility and coordination in the attack.

Static defense: The US would replace the M1919 for water cooled Browning's which could put out 250+ rounds per minute accurately (on a tripod) for minutes at a time. The MG42 would be much less effective with multiple barrel changes and difficulty controlling the fire with the bipod.

It's complicated and not just about firepower or comparing one weapon to another. If and how you want to reflect this in a game is up to you.

Wolfhag

I'm pretty sure that, officially at least, the ordinary U.S. infantry squad only had one BAR. In the ETO at least. Armored infantry none (officially).

@Wolfhag You seem to be comparing US company assets vs German platoon assets. The German company also had a weapons platoon with 2 tripod mounted MG42's with the heavy barrel for sustained fire. They also had spare tripods , so in defence could convert the squad MG's to tripod mounted. I conversed with an ex Bundeswehr MG3 gunner about how the gun was used. He confirmed it could be fired from the hip. Also they were trained in fire and manoeuvre. The gun doesn't remain static in the attack. You mention F&M at the squad level for the US. It is my understanding that all armies abandoned F&M at the squad level. It simply wasn't feasible with large conscript armies.

At battalion level, from May 1944, the standard German infantry battalion was supposed to have another six tripod mounted MGs in the Heavy Company giving the battalion a total of 43 belt fed LMGs and 12 HMGs.

The US infantry battalion from June '44 added six belt fed LMGs to the Headquarters Company and six more BARs to every infantry company without, however, adding any more details to man them. The US Battalion total would then be 12 LMGs, 8 HMGs, 6 .50 MGs and 45 BARs.

The British pattern infantry battalion have 63 magazine fed LMGs. Heavier MGs were usually only found at a higher level.

Given the superiority of the US self-loading rifles I don't think the German battalion really has a firepower superiority over a US one.
Over the British battalion, yes, but depending on the scale it might be better if that was reflected in a firepower penalty to the Brits. That would probably encourage the British player to maximise his supporting assets, so not unhistorical.

I think higher German infantry effectiveness is just a statistical fact. The infantry platoon doesn't operate totally on it's own usually. US infantry had more artillery, tanks and machine gun support.
Rules that give German infantry equal support could be a problem.

"Given the superiority of the US self-loading rifles I don't think the German battalion really has a firepower superiority over a US one."

Operational research showed there was little difference between semi auto and bolt action rifles in terms of effectiveness.

Operational research showed there was little difference between semi auto and bolt action rifles in terms of effectiveness.

Not come across a report showing that before, do you have a reference?

It might be the case for certain types of engagement but I think it could be be mathematically provable that for other types of engagement, a rifle that could fire more than once every few seconds is better than one that can't.

Certainly the British army had been after an 'automatic' rifle for decades before they eventually got one.

Semi-auto rifles provide for follow-up shots without resetting the sight picture. They also allow for suppressing fire in a limited way.
Neither are things that are regularly needed in WW2 combat but the potential is still there.

When performing sustained suppressive fire some sources state one round fired every 8-10 seconds which would make the M1 and SMLE equal. The SMLE is slightly more accurate than the M1 as a bolt action is almost always more accurate then a semi.

SMLE vs M1 Garand

Large quantities of M1 Garand rifles were to be transferred to England. The first appropriation was made on March 27, 1941, and authorized transfer from current production and existing stocks by random requisition. After a second appropriation on October 28, 1941, a percentage allotment of current production was authorized. These transfers continued even after the declaration of war against Japan until a decision in March 1942 that all .30-cal. arms be allotted to the U.S. Army.

Transfers were officially terminated at the end of June 1942. In all, a total of 38,001 M1 Garand rifles were shipped to England under Lend-Lease. These were the "British Garands," which in recent years have become highly sought after by collectors.

Distinctive Marking of Non-Service Pattern Small Arms
British military procedure stipulated that non-standard arms of all types be marked in a readily visible, distinctive manner. The regulations that applied to the Garands were:

"Class I. Arms which do NOT fire .303-inch … British Service ammunition will be marked with a 2-inch band of RED paint. On this band will be stencilled in BLACK the calibre of the weapon." [capitals in the original]

"(I) Rifles, Class I 2-inch band round fore-end and front handguard between upper sling swivel and nosecap."

The "Mad Minute" was a pre-World War I training exercise where British soldiers were trained to fire 15 rounds accurately into a 12-inch target at 300 yards within one minute using the Lee-Enfield. While the actual rate of fire in combat varied, it demonstrated the rifle's potential for rapid fire in the hands of a skilled soldier.

Testing during WWII and the Korean War established the M1 Garand's practical rate of fire at 40 to 50 rounds per minute. A trained soldier could fire and reload an average of about 45 accurate shots per minute at medium ranges.

The British did not adopt the M1 Garand during WWII primarily because of wartime supply chain pressures, logistics, and the reliability of their existing standard-issue rifle. The Lee-Enfield was already well-entrenched as an exceptionally fast, rugged, and proven weapon.

The primary reasons the British stuck with the Lee-Enfield and rejected the Garand include:

Logistics and Ammunition: The Garand used the American .30-06 cartridge, while British infantry and support weapons (like the Bren gun and Vickers) were standardized for the rimmed .303 British round.

Changing calibers would have created chaos for World War II supply lines. Industrial Capacity: British and Commonwealth factories were already tooled up to mass-produce the Lee-Enfield. Retooling entire industries in the middle of the war to build an American design was financially and logistically impossible.

Maintenance and Reliability: The British military tested the Garand and concluded it was more complex and less reliable in muddy, harsh battlefield conditions than the rugged Lee-Enfield.

Magazine Capacity and Reloading: The Lee-Enfield held 10 rounds and could be topped off mid-magazine. The Garand held 8 rounds, and its en bloc clip system made it difficult to reload partial clips or single rounds easily.

Doctrinal Differences: British infantry doctrine relied heavily on the light machine gun (the Bren) to establish fire superiority, using the rifle primarily as a supplementary tool. The high rate of fire offered by the semi-automatic Garand was therefore viewed as an unnecessary luxury compared to the Lee-Enfield. Although the Garand was a highly effective rifle, the British determined that its cost and weight did not justify disrupting their entire military logistics.

However, small numbers of M1 Garands were eventually issued to British forces via Lend-Lease, largely for specialized units operating alongside American troops.

Another comparison:
In terms of mechanical accuracy, both rifles are highly capable and comparable, consistently grouping within 3 to 4 MOA (Minutes of Angle) with standard military ammunition. However, their practical accuracy in combat differs due to their sights and action types.

Mechanical Accuracy & BallisticsM1 Garand: Fires the powerful .30-06 Springfield cartridge. It features a free-floating barrel setup that is highly conducive to consistent accuracy. In the hands of a marksman, it can easily maintain 2–3 MOA with match-grade ammo.

SMLE (Short Magazine Lee-Enfield): Fires the rimmed .303 British cartridge. The SMLE barrel is not free-floating (it makes contact with the fore-end wood stock and nose cap), which can sometimes cause stringing when the barrel heats up. However, its mechanical precision is still excellent, averaging around 3 MOA.

Sights (Practical Accuracy) M1 Garand: Generally considered to have the superior sighting system of World War II. It utilizes a fully adjustable, protected rear aperture (peep) sight and a front post. This creates a large sight radius and allows the shooter's eye to naturally center on the target, making fast, accurate hits much easier.

SMLE: Uses a rear U-notch or V-notch tangent sight placed relatively far forward on the barrel (depending on the variant) and a front blade. This configuration is slower to acquire and less precise than a modern aperture sight, hindering the rifle's practical accuracy for the average infantryman.

Rate of Fire & Follow-Up ShotsM1 Garand: Being a semi-automatic rifle, the M1 allows the shooter to keep their cheek on the stock and eye aligned on the target for every shot. You simply pull the trigger again, greatly increasing practical accuracy and speed during sustained fire.

SMLE: A bolt-action rifle. While it possesses an exceptionally smooth action—famous for allowing troops to pull off the "Mad Minute"—working the bolt inevitably forces the shooter to take their eyes off the target and re-acquire their sight picture between shots.

Summary: While the Enfield platform possessed excellent intrinsic potential (especially in dedicated sniper variants like the No. 4 Mk I (T)), the M1 Garand's semi-automatic action and aperture sights made it significantly easier to shoot accurately under the stress of combat.

I have a Korean War vintage M1 Garand and there is a way to top off the clip. In the slung prone position under ideal conditions I can put 60% of my shots in a human silhouette at 600 yards using surplus Greek Army ammo. It's very easy to track the vapor trail with a 10x spotting scope.

I'll answer Fred Cartwright May 7 question soon but I'll be starting a new discussion on it.

Wolfhag

My understanding fwiw. OR showed rifle fire was less than 5% as effective as expected compared to shooting range effectiveness. To put it another way. The average rifleman shot with so little effect that it didn't matter which rifle they carried.

Crew served weapons were much more effective.

Not come across a report showing that before, do you have a reference?

It comes from Bob Mackenzies site. He has an extensive essay on firepower. There are a number of reasons, but one of the biggest is that wartime shooting is very poor, like 20 x worse than peace time shooting.

Some accounts state it took 40-50,000 rounds of small arms fire of all types to create one causality in WWII and VN. I'm not going to dispute that. My questions would be how do you define effective and why this is so because it does not match AARs where one guy kills multiple enemies in a few minutes with a rifle or SMG.

Another example could be firing hundreds of rounds into a tree line after the enemy has pulled back.

On the range you have excellent conditions. In combat you may only be firing into a tree line or jungle with no target ID.

Would successfully suppressing an enemy position allowing your unit to maneuver be considered "effective" even if it caused no causalities?

My opinion is small arms fire suppresses the enemy to a greater or lesser degree but only causes causalities mainly when the enemy is mostly exposed and/or surprised at ranges up to 200m.

Small arms fire creates a firefight where the volume and noise of aimed fire can physically and/or psychologically determine who is winning. The losing side will seek cover more than shooting back showing a greater level of suppression and decreasing their firepower even if not taking a single causality. That's how I would consider effectiveness. Of course causalities would be great too.

Wolfhag

I suspect that the 40-50,000 rounds per casualty was made by dividing the number of casualties by the number of rounds expended. That would include training and testing rounds, suppressing fire and rounds shot at airplanes, rendering the number almost meaningless.

Yes, but again, how do you measure "effectiveness"? I'd say that there are different levels of effectiveness and it depends on the shooter and target. If the shooting accomplishes your objective it could said to be effective. Training, tactics and experience will influence it too.

How about artillery? How do you measure the effectiveness? If hundreds of rounds can impact and not cause a causality was it effective? It could be if it forces the defenders to withdraw from their positions and you occupy it. The same goes for AAA fire.

There is a N. Africa German (logistics?) report that in a battle it took 10-12 88mm rounds (does not stipulate if HE or AP was fired) to knock out one British tank. However, it does not explain how or why or how much was fired at infantry.

Wolfhag

Back in 2006 or so there were documentaries about helmand. You could watch footage of firefighter which lasted up to 7 hours with no casualties. These were often in the order of 100 metres engagement range.
Ross Kemp interviewed riflemen in one of these. He asked squaddies about their "score" they were mostly 1 with several 0. They explained there was one guy in their company had managed rather more. This roughly matched a pattern I've seen described in ww2 units. One or two guys in a company were particularly effective, most pretty much not. The modern interviewees were of course professionals so should be significantly higher performers than ww2 conscripts.

Their aar do not support one guy killing multiple enemies etc The footage doesn't support that either.

There is a N. Africa German (logistics?) report that in a battle it took 10-12 88mm rounds (does not stipulate if HE or AP was fired) to knock out one British tank. However, it does not explain how or why or how much was fired at infantry.

Its from the Jentz Panzertracts book 'The Dreaded Threat. a couple of Flak Units are examined. 1 in Russia and the others in N Afrika.
They had detailed ammo expenditure list for both AP and HE. The also listed the number of tanks/vehicles they claimed. Both in Russia and NA it averaged 10 AP rounds per tank claim at normal ranges and 20 at long range. There are also some expenditure rates about for Stugs in Russia and 12th SS in Normandy that show large amounts of AP shells were fired in relation to kills claimed. These expenditure rates are miles away from the range-firing tables Jentz uses in his Tiger books which were then used (by the majority of internet posters) as the normal accuracy rates to be expected in combat. German 88mm AA expenditure in 1944 was 3,000 rounds per claimed kill.
You will find lots of internet posts about the 'poor' accuracy of RP fired from aircraft at tanks but if you check field artillery in the same role the 'direct-hit' rate for both is about the same.
There are a few studies about showing how 'hit rates' in actual combat are significantly degraded from that obtained during target practise

It comes from Bob Mackenzies site. He has an extensive essay on firepower. There are a number of reasons, but one of the biggest is that wartime shooting is very poor, like 20 x worse than peace time shooting.

Link would be great. Yes shooting accuracy is much worse on the battlefield but it is when there are the best chances to hit – i.e. very close – that the advantages of the semi-automatic and automatic weapons become most obvious.

FWIW.
The British 8th Army in Italy in 1944 expended an average of roughly 9 million rounds of .303 per month and 1.1 million rounds of 25-pdr.
So roughly just 8 bullets fired for each shell fired.

Raimundo – link: link

Wolfhag

Raimundo – link: link

Wolfhag

Go that, superb book

I read it in the context that Jary and 18 Platoon achieved what they did despite their firepower inferiority.

"On 5th July three officers and 63 other ranks were required as reinforcements. Between 14th and 18th July a further twelve officers, of whom I was one, and 479 other ranks arrived and even then the battalion was still below its full strength .."

As requested Bob Mackenzie's web page.
link