"Tackling the Mythology of the Arctic Convoys" Topic

"Winston Churchill, who during the Second World War served both as First Lord of the Admiralty as well as prime minister, famously remarked in his history of the war, ‘The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril'. With the desperate need to keep supply lines open for both armaments and food, it's hardly surprising that a convoy disaster, such as that of PQ-17 in July 1942, was considered to be ‘one of the most melancholy naval episodes in the whole of the war'.

The experience of the merchant sailors involved in the Arctic convoys is also widely viewed as one of the worst of all those involved in the Second World War at sea. Each journey was a battle against the elements: stormy seas, and extreme cold, with the added burden of waiting constantly for the sudden shock of a torpedo hitting a nearby ship, or worse still your own, and sentencing you to a perhaps mercifully quick death in the freezing waters. Part of the perceived horror comes from the lack of agency these men had in their own fates, forced simply to hold station in the convoys and await events. Typically the story is framed as one of defenceless merchant ships, constantly at the mercy of omnipotent U-boat ‘wolfpacks' hunting them down, while under the meagre protection of Royal Navy corvettes and other small escort vessels. These stories make for stirring reading and have an important place in the historiography of the war, but they do not necessarily reflect the real events.

Churchill was keen, in 1940 and 1941 to emphasize the threat to the UK for the benefit of public and political opinion in the United States. This was done in order to gain as much help as he could from his neutral trading partner across the Atlantic, and ultimately bring them into the war on the side of the Empire. Later, once the Arctic convoys began in the summer of 1941, Churchill was engaged in an equivalent propaganda campaign directed at Stalin and the Soviet Union: only by emphasising the effort and cost of the Arctic convoys could he counter the Russian leader's incessant calls for a second front on mainland Europe and more help to defeat Germany. The result of these efforts was to frame the convoys both as critical to the ability of the UK to continue the war against Germany, but also as a fight where the enemy held many of the strategic and tactical advantages. This framing was necessary to wartime politics but has also cast its shadow over the way the campaigns have been viewed in popular memory…"

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Armand

Great article, Tango!

I'll have to watch for more information on Swedish intercepts of German communications.

Grelber