Seems like the same as the other article in Proceedings. So this the US Navy ESTABLISHMENT saying they don't want to operate in the Persian Gulf in three similar editorials.
1. Oped: Seizing Iranian Offshore Islands: High Risk, Low Payoff
The ground operations the United States is considering carry significant tactical and operational risks and major strategic flaws.
2. Oped:The Perilous Options in the Strait of Hormuz
What happens next will determine how deep the United States goes into another Middle East war.
3. Oped: The Battle of Gallipoli's Sobering Lessons for the Strait of Hormuz
Gallipoli is the most classic case of expeditionary littoral warfare gone wrong.
4. Oped: Coercion, Catalysis, and the Iran Campaign
A preliminary analysis of the ongoing war with Iran. [a cautionary about strategic outcomes]
One such editorial is providinga counter view, FOUR is the Naval Establishment talking.
I respect the caution in thsee Proceedings pieces warning against any island seizures in the Persian Gulf. They rightly flag real tactical risks, like exposed positions, Iranian coastal reach, and the challenges of sustaining MEU or airborne forces in a contested environment. Dismissing geography in the missile/drone age is foolish – but geography goes both ways.
The four-op-ed pattern risks tilting too far toward strategic paralysis, essentially arguing for leaving Iranian "unsinkable missile platforms" like Abu Musa, the Tunbs, and Larak untouched while hoping standoff pressure alone suffices.
This underestimates how controlling even the smaller chokepoint islands could incrementally degrade Iran's "toll booth" strategy without requiring a full-scale invasion or prolonged U.S. garrison duty. Key points the analyses undervalue:
1. Differentiated feasibility: Smaller, sparsely populated outposts (Abu Musa, Larak) differ sharply from larger targets like Kharg or Qeshm. Seizing the former enables forward radar, air defense, and observation posts directly in the narrowest shipping lanes—turning Iranian assets into allied ones and complicating coastal harassment of commercial traffic.
2. Significant Iranian attrition has already been achieved: U.S. and Israeli strikes have heavily degraded launch infrastructure, with ballistic missile and drone capabilities down dramatically (launch rates reduced 70-90% in many assessments). While thousands of cheaper one-way drones remain and coastal systems persist, the volume and coordination of threats are attrited—not "unattrited" as some risk models implicitly assume. This creates a window where island seizures become more viable with air/naval suppression.
3. Gulf States support is real and actionable: The UAE has explicitly pushed for forceful reopening of the Strait and expressed willingness to assist in operations, including occupying disputed islands like Abu Musa (which it has long claimed). Handover to Arab League or Emirati forces after initial clearance is not fantasy, it's aligned with their interests in restoring energy flows and countering Iranian dominance. This reduces long-term U.S. footprint far better than pure inaction.
4. Strategic payoff in a grinding conflict: This isn't about one decisive blow forcing Tehran to surrender. It's about momentum in a protracted campaign where standoff strikes have plateaued. Partial control of the island arc could enable safer low-volume convoys, reassure Gulf allies, raise economic pressure on Iran's regime, and deny Tehran easy leverage. "High risk, low payoff" overlooks how owning key dirt still shapes control of the water—especially when leaving these positions untouched cedes initiative to a defender using asymmetric tools.
Sustainment, escalation, and casualties remain legitimate concerns, as do the broader Gallipoli-style warnings in companion pieces. No one advocates reckless entanglement. But framing limited littoral options as obvious folly risks reinforcing a default to inaction at a moment when Iran's maritime leverage continues disrupting global shipping and energy markets. Geography and coalition realities still matter. Sometimes calculated risks on the margin shift the balance more effectively than waiting for perfect conditions that may never arrive.
I'd argue the naval community should debate these trade-offs openly rather than coalescing around excessive restraint.
