"The Perilous Options in the Strait of Hormuz" Topic

What happens next will determine how deep the United States goes into another Middle East war.

Proceedings Magazine: link

More than a dangerous option… it sounds like a suicidal one…

Armand

Seems like the same as the other article in Proceedings. So this the US Navy ESTABLISHMENT saying they don't want to operate in the Persian Gulf in three similar editorials.

1. Oped: Seizing Iranian Offshore Islands: High Risk, Low Payoff
The ground operations the United States is considering carry significant tactical and operational risks and major strategic flaws.

2. Oped:The Perilous Options in the Strait of Hormuz
What happens next will determine how deep the United States goes into another Middle East war.

3. Oped: The Battle of Gallipoli's Sobering Lessons for the Strait of Hormuz
Gallipoli is the most classic case of expeditionary littoral warfare gone wrong.

4. Oped: Coercion, Catalysis, and the Iran Campaign
A preliminary analysis of the ongoing war with Iran. [a cautionary about strategic outcomes]

One such editorial is providinga counter view, FOUR is the Naval Establishment talking.

I respect the caution in thsee Proceedings pieces warning against any island seizures in the Persian Gulf. They rightly flag real tactical risks, like exposed positions, Iranian coastal reach, and the challenges of sustaining MEU or airborne forces in a contested environment. Dismissing geography in the missile/drone age is foolish – but geography goes both ways.

The four-op-ed pattern risks tilting too far toward strategic paralysis, essentially arguing for leaving Iranian "unsinkable missile platforms" like Abu Musa, the Tunbs, and Larak untouched while hoping standoff pressure alone suffices.

This underestimates how controlling even the smaller chokepoint islands could incrementally degrade Iran's "toll booth" strategy without requiring a full-scale invasion or prolonged U.S. garrison duty. Key points the analyses undervalue:

1. Differentiated feasibility: Smaller, sparsely populated outposts (Abu Musa, Larak) differ sharply from larger targets like Kharg or Qeshm. Seizing the former enables forward radar, air defense, and observation posts directly in the narrowest shipping lanes—turning Iranian assets into allied ones and complicating coastal harassment of commercial traffic.

2. Significant Iranian attrition has already been achieved: U.S. and Israeli strikes have heavily degraded launch infrastructure, with ballistic missile and drone capabilities down dramatically (launch rates reduced 70-90% in many assessments). While thousands of cheaper one-way drones remain and coastal systems persist, the volume and coordination of threats are attrited—not "unattrited" as some risk models implicitly assume. This creates a window where island seizures become more viable with air/naval suppression.

3. Gulf States support is real and actionable: The UAE has explicitly pushed for forceful reopening of the Strait and expressed willingness to assist in operations, including occupying disputed islands like Abu Musa (which it has long claimed). Handover to Arab League or Emirati forces after initial clearance is not fantasy, it's aligned with their interests in restoring energy flows and countering Iranian dominance. This reduces long-term U.S. footprint far better than pure inaction.

4. Strategic payoff in a grinding conflict: This isn't about one decisive blow forcing Tehran to surrender. It's about momentum in a protracted campaign where standoff strikes have plateaued. Partial control of the island arc could enable safer low-volume convoys, reassure Gulf allies, raise economic pressure on Iran's regime, and deny Tehran easy leverage. "High risk, low payoff" overlooks how owning key dirt still shapes control of the water—especially when leaving these positions untouched cedes initiative to a defender using asymmetric tools.

Sustainment, escalation, and casualties remain legitimate concerns, as do the broader Gallipoli-style warnings in companion pieces. No one advocates reckless entanglement. But framing limited littoral options as obvious folly risks reinforcing a default to inaction at a moment when Iran's maritime leverage continues disrupting global shipping and energy markets. Geography and coalition realities still matter. Sometimes calculated risks on the margin shift the balance more effectively than waiting for perfect conditions that may never arrive.

I'd argue the naval community should debate these trade-offs openly rather than coalescing around excessive restraint.

Given the dangers in any military activity, pessimists can seem like prophets.

There's also little risk in being a pessimist…

Looks to me like Pete needs to fire some more admirals.

SBm +1

There's also little risk in being a pessimist…

That is the reality. And I'd think the Pentagon knows the risk, and knows how to mitigate it. None the less Amphib/Airborne ops are inherently dangerous. We know this if for nothing the lessons from history.

And again continuing strikes on the island as well as a possible naval blockade. Could be work as well …

Threatening the Strait is Iran's only play. They are not giving it up. IMHO, we will have to eliminate that threat, and amphibious assaults/raids are probably the only way to be sure. Well, except for the other way to be sure, but don't think we plan that one.

Yes, that is all they have. And it is clear … the threat has to be eliminated. And the US/IDF know how to do that. It won't be pretty, in won't be clean, but we can mitigate our losses, to close to 0 … But in the end the deadly threat of Iran's islamist should be mitigated, i.e. removed from the board.

I believe the issue is not can the US act as regards the islands but how fast can they finish. There is no popular support for even the perception of an open ended commitment and I believe no political appetite for a lingering conflict.

US military bases in Gulf 'useless' after Iranian strikes, experts say

link

Armand

I believe no political appetite for a lingering conflict.

No there isn't … but the facts remain … Iran is still a threat. Not as much as it used to be. But none the less as long as they believe they can control the Strait they will play that card.

US military bases in Gulf 'useless' after Iranian strikes, experts say

Whoever said that should no longer be considered an "expert"…

In a forum that's about warfare, a discussion on sea denial versus sea control might be useful. I just popped a few questions into Google AI – and I haven't checked the answers but maybe it's a useful starting point. The first question was to discuss sea control vs denial in the straits – answer:

In the Strait of Hormuz, the tension between sea control and sea denial defines the strategic environment. While major naval powers like the United States seek sea control to ensure the free flow of commerce, Iran employs sea denial—and increasingly "de facto control"—to leverage its geography as a strategic deterrent.

Sea Control: Ensuring Freedom of Movement

Sea control is the ability to dominate a maritime area to ensure freedom of movement for one's own military and commercial traffic while denying it to an enemy.
CliffsNotes

Primary Objective: Maintaining global energy security and protecting the approximately 20% of the world's oil supply that transits the Strait.

Tactics and Capabilities: Employs carrier task groups, anti-submarine warfare, and airborne surveillance to protect transit corridors.

Challenges: Reestablishing sea control in this narrow chokepoint (only 33-40 km wide) is notoriously difficult due to the proximity of the Iranian shore and the presence of thousands of naval mines.

Sea Denial: Asymmetric Disruption

Sea denial focuses on preventing an adversary from using a maritime space without necessarily controlling that space oneself.

Primary Objective: To make the Strait prohibitively dangerous for foreign navies and commercial tankers, thereby gaining diplomatic and economic leverage.

Iranian Strategy: Iran uses an asymmetric "guerrilla warfare" strategy involving:

Anti-Ship Missiles: Mobile truck-mounted batteries hidden in coastal hills and mountains.

Naval Mines: A reported inventory of roughly 6,000 mines used to disrupt and slow movement.

Fast-Attack Craft: Small, hard-to-detect boats that can swarm larger vessels.

Drones: Use of Shahed-136 and other unmanned systems to target vessels.

Current Dynamic: De Facto Control and selective Blockades
As of April 2026, the traditional binary of control versus denial has shifted toward a state of de facto Iranian control despite U.S. conventional superiority.

Selective Blockade: Iran has implemented a selective blockade, allowing friendly vessels to pass while requiring others to coordinate directly with its armed forces.

Transit Tolls: In a shift from pure denial to governance, Iran has begun demanding transit fees (e.g., $1 USD/barrel) for ships crossing the Strait.

The "Corridor" Alternative: Military analysts suggest a more practical goal for naval powers is not total dominance of the Gulf, but rather establishing defended transit corridors that are predictable enough for insurers to accept the risk.

Next question to AI was the type and quantify of assets needed for sea control. Answer:

As of April 2026, establishing sea control in the Strait of Hormuz is no longer a matter of simple naval presence but a high-intensity combat requirement. The tactical transition from "presence" to "control" requires a specific mixture of high-end surface combatants, specialized unmanned systems, and significant aerial suppression to counter Iran's current "de facto control" of the waterway.

1. Surface Combatant Requirements

Sea control in a high-threat "chokepoint" requires a defensive envelope that can withstand saturation attacks from drones, missiles, and small boats.

The Escort Ratio: Naval analysts suggest that a basic escort operation for a single convoy of 5–10 commercial vessels requires between 8 to 10 destroyers.

Asset Type: The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer remains the cornerstone due to its Aegis combat system, which can track and engage multiple simultaneous threats.

New "Boots on Maritime Ground": The U.S. Navy is accelerating the development of the Trump-class battleship (LSC) and new frigates to provide the "mass" necessary for sustained escort missions without depleting the main fleet.

2. Specialized Tactical Assets
Modern sea control in the Strait requires more than just large ships; it requires "depth" in specialized mission areas.

Mine Countermeasures (MCM): Iran has reportedly deployed Maham 3 and Maham 7 limpet mines throughout the main traffic lanes. Sea control cannot be established without dedicated minesweepers and uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) to clear these "danger zones".

Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs): To counter Iran's swarm tactics without risking manned hulls, the U.S. is deploying up to 100 medium-sized USVs to augment the surface force and provide "distributed lethality".

Aerial Suppression: Unlike open-ocean control, Hormuz requires persistent ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and rapid-strike aircraft to neutralize mobile coastal missile batteries hidden in Iran's mountainous terrain.

3. Quantitative "Total Force" Projections (FY 2026)
For global sea control, the U.S. Navy's current posture includes:

Carrier Strike Groups: 11 carriers available globally, though usually only 1–2 are dedicated to the Gulf at any time to provide the necessary air cover for the Strait.
Surface Fleet Capacity: A planned battle force of 287 ships in FY 2026, including 115 surface combatants.

The Munitions "Tax": A critical tactical requirement is the depth of interceptor magazines. U.S. forces are currently expending SM-2 and SM-6 missiles (costing $1 USDM–$2M each) to intercept drones costing a fraction of that, making "magazine depth" a primary tactical constraint.

4. Logistics and Support
Combat Logistics: At least 31 support and logistics ships are required to sustain a sea-control force that cannot easily enter local ports due to missile threats.
Search and Rescue (SAR): Dedicated Coast Guard or Navy assets must be on station to recover mariners from vessels damaged by mines or drones.

Last question was on seizing offshore islands. Answer:

As of April 2026, the strategy of seizing Iranian offshore islands—specifically the "arc defense" islands like Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—is being actively debated as a primary method to break Iran's "de facto control" over the Strait of Hormuz.

How Seizure Aids Sea Control

Seizing these islands would transform them from Iranian "stationary aircraft carriers" into forward operating bases for U.S. and allied forces.

Persistent Surveillance: Capturing islands like Abu Musa allows for the permanent deployment of radar and sensor arrays directly in the middle of the Gulf, providing near-perfect visibility of all maritime traffic and Iranian military movements.

Defended Transit Corridors: These islands sit directly adjacent to the main shipping and tanker channels. Occupying them would allow for the creation of a "safe zone" or defended corridor where naval forces can offer immediate protection to commercial vessels.

Bargaining Leverage: Holding strategic territory like the Tunbs—claimed by the UAE—serves as a significant political "chip" to pressure Tehran into reopening the Strait to all international shipping.

How Seizure Hinders Sea Denial

Sea denial in the Strait relies on Iran's ability to operate small, lethal assets from hardened forward positions.

Neutralizing the "Arch Defense": The seven key islands (Abu Musa, the Tunbs, Hengam, Qeshm, Larak, and Hormuz) form a defensive curve that currently channels all shipping into narrow, predictable "kill zones." Removing Iranian forces from these nodes collapses this defensive geometry.

Denial of Launch Sites: These islands are currently used as staging grounds for IRGC fast-attack boats, naval mines, and drones (like the Shahed-136). Seizing them removes these assets' "front-line" launch points, forcing Iran to operate from the mainland where transit times are longer and detection is easier.

Dismantling the "Toll Booth": Iran has recently used Larak Island to enforce an illegal toll-collection regime. Occupying Larak would physically dismantle the infrastructure used to board and inspect vessels for fee extraction.

Strategic Risks and "The Trap"

Despite the tactical benefits, many analysts warn that seizing these islands could be a "trap".

Extreme Vulnerability: Occupying forces would be within range of shore-based Iranian ballistic missiles and cruise missiles from the mainland. Holding the islands would require a sizable force (est. 1,800 to 2,000 troops) who would be highly exposed to constant bombardment.

Escalation: Iran has threatened to retaliate by mining the entire Persian Gulf and targeting desalination plants and civilian energy infrastructure in neighboring Gulf states if its islands are invaded.

"
"We're now starting the process of clearing out the Strait of Hormuz as a favor to Countries all over the World, including China, Japan, South Korea, France, Germany, and many others," Trump stated."

..

"Axios, citing a US official, reported that several US Navy ships crossed the Strait of Hormuz. According to the report, the move was not coordinated with the Iranian Navy and was the first time US Navy ships made such a move since the start of the war."

…

"According to the Wall Street Journal, three US officials confirmed that two US Navy guided-missile destroyers passed through the strait without issue in what was described as a "freedom-of-navigation mission.""

..
"Minutes later, a senior Iranian military official denied the reported crossing of US vessels on Iranian government-owned state television." 😏

Subject: US 'clearing out' Strait of Hormuz after Iran threatens to attack ships | The Jerusalem Post


link

"50 minutes ago
No issues reported as two US Navy destroyers crossed Hormuz – WSJ

Two US Navy guided-missile destroyers passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Saturday, The Wall Street Journal reported citing three US officials, confirming an earlier report by Axios.

"No issues were reported, and the move was described as a freedom-of-navigation mission," the report said, adding that the vessels were not escorting commercial ships."

Is it a favor to countries all over the world? Yes, but it's also in US interests. US oil self-sufficiency is only one part of a complex issue. But, I will allow any politician a degree of 'political framing' – that's the way it is. Again, Google AI on the impact on the US including negotiations with Iran:

The "oil self-sufficiency" argument is increasingly criticized as of April 2026 for ignoring the non-oil commodities trapped in the Gulf and the strategic necessity of deterrence. While the U.S. may produce its own fuel, it remains highly vulnerable to the secondary economic shocks of a closed Strait.

1. Beyond Oil: The Global "Food and Tech" Chokehold
The Strait is a critical artery for more than just energy. Its closure has triggered shortages in unglamorous but essential industrial inputs that the U.S. cannot easily replace:

Fertilizers (Food Security): The Gulf region accounts for 30% of global fertilizer trade. Specifically, it provides 46% of the world's urea and 30% of its ammonia. Prices for urea have jumped 50% since the closure began five weeks ago.

Helium (High-Tech): Qatar produces nearly one-third of the world's helium. This is essential for semiconductor manufacturing and cooling the superconducting magnets in MRI scanners.

Aluminum: The region produces roughly 9% of global primary aluminum. Disruption here affects U.S. construction, aerospace, and renewable energy industries.

Sulfur: Nearly half of the world's seaborne sulfur trade passes through the Strait. It is a key input for sulfuric acid, which is used to process metals for EV batteries and maintain industrial production of munitions.

2. Sea Control as Strategic Leverage
You are correct that establishing sea control is a primary tool for stripping Iran of its current diplomatic and economic leverage.

Dismantling the "Tehran Toll Booth": Iran has begun asserting de facto control by demanding "coordination" and illegal transit fees—rumored to be as high as $2 USD million per vessel. Persistent sea control would physically prevent the IRGC from enforcing this toll regime.

Deterrence of "Calibrated Disruption": Iran uses "calibrated disruption"—small-scale attacks and threats—to raise insurance premiums and force global concessions. Sea control provides the "kinetic answer" needed to reduce this uncertainty.

Breaking the List System: Iran currently uses a "passage list" to allow friendly nations through while blocking others. Only a superior naval force can compel the inclusion of all international shipping, restoring the principle of "innocent passage" under international law.

My view:
Any attempt to establish sea control or disrupt Iranian sea denial requires the US military for two reasons – (1) the command and control architecture into which other nations forces can integrate – that is reason enough, and (2) the number assets to sustain sea control requires the combined assets of US and its allies. All countries navies have been reduced too far – including the USN.

As far as what goes through, country percentages, etc. I covered early on in the conflict. 🙂

The U.S. falls way down around 25 on the list, with a tiny percentage of our oil. Hardest hit, our enemies and Asian countries.

The new MCM tech is said to be untested, I believe, and the mines also create an ongoing level of anxiety for everyone that adds to the pressure to clear the way. They have to be cleared. And IMO we are probably years away from a battleship class, if ever. Maybe someone will eventually ask if they are worth the expense.

We do not have available the numbers of escorts needed – I think the failure of the LCS program could be haunting us here, although the expectations for the number of missions they could fulfill was not realistic. Its not like we don't spend a lot of money – nobody spends more. And the next defense budget is already out of sight at this point. This need might have been less critical if we had worked with our former allies before attacking Iran. But at this point I am not sure we have any allies who would have supported the war.

Tort,

I doubt the hit on day one would have been successful, if we had worked with "our allies" beforehand. I don't trust most to hold secrets any longer.

The US removed for disposal the last 4 Avenger class minesweepers from the Persian Gulf a couple of months ago. Minesweeper configured LCS are the replacement. At one point there we two hanging about Singapore at the wars outbreak but I'm unsure how many are available and how effective the UUV technology is and whether it's had any significant testing.

"7 minutes ago
Tense US-IRGC naval standoff as destroyers pass Strait of Hormuz – WSJ

US Navy destroyers on Saturday transited the Strait of Hormuz for the first time during the war, triggering a tense radio confrontation with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy as high-level negotiations between Washington and Tehran were underway in Pakistan, the Wall Street Journal reported.

The report said IRGC naval forces — which have tightened control over shipping in the strait since the ceasefire and introduced tolls on vessels — challenged the US warships as they attempted passage.

"This is the last warning. This is the last warning," Iranian forces said over radio communications, according to audio from a nearby civilian vessel.

The US destroyer responded that it was transiting in accordance with international law and had no hostile intent.

"Passage in accordance with international law. No challenge is intended to you," the ship said.

US Central Command said the vessels operated in the Persian Gulf and left the area as planned without incident. It said the transit was intended to signal that Washington does not recognize Iranian control over the strait and to support efforts to restore commercial navigation."

OVI +1

shadoe +1 … some good information there …

How War with Iran Undermines Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

"The goals of the attacks on Iran are ambitious: to eliminate the Iranian threat, delegate Middle Eastern security to regional partners, and redirect strategic bandwidth to the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, the demonstration of sheer US military power could deter Beijing from taking action regarding its own ambitions for Taiwan. In short, the ultimate goal of the Iran attacks could be seen as part of a broader grand strategy so that the United States can ultimately focus on the Indo-Pacific and the China threat.

If the objective was to free up capacity for the Indo-Pacific by entrusting Middle Eastern security to regional partners, the diplomatic architecture designed for precisely that purpose already existed. The Abraham Accords aimed to normalize relations between Israel and key Arab states and build a regional security framework that could function with diminished American involvement. While the 2023 Israel-Hamas war disrupted further diplomatic normalization, the security cooperation dimension of the accords remained broadly intact. The Iran campaign, paradoxically, has placed even that surviving architecture in jeopardy.

A deeper structural problem, however, undermines the post-Iran optimism. The principal variable binding Israel and Saudi Arabia together is the shared perception of an Iranian threat. No persuasive case has been made that this alignment would survive the removal of that precise threat. Removing a common enemy does not automatically produce durable peace; it can just as easily unleash suppressed rivalries. The expectation that Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other regional actors would seamlessly assume collective responsibility for Middle Eastern security without American underwriting requires a theory of regional cooperation that has no empirical precedent in the Middle East.

Iran had accumulated substantial quantities of near-weapons-grade uranium but had not entered the final weaponization stage. In fact, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated before the Senate Intelligence Committee that Iran had shown no effort to reconstitute its enrichment capabilities since Operation Midnight Hammer the previous year. This is a qualitatively different situation from the 1994 North Korean Yongbyon crisis, where Pyongyang was actively producing fissile material and had very likely already secured weapons-grade plutonium.

Another angle to the refocus on the Indo-Pacific argument is that a weakened Iran would disrupt China's energy supply, given that Iran exports 90 percent of its oil to China.

Yet China is 85 percent energy self-sufficient. Coal remains its primary energy source at over 51 percent of total consumption, and renewable energy surpassed oil in 2024 to become the country's second-largest source. Crude oil accounts for less than 20 percent of China's total energy consumption, meaning that Iranian oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz represents, by the Nomura financial services group's calculation, only about 6.6 percent of China's overall energy picture. Beijing has also built substantial insulation against precisely this scenario: as of early March, China held approximately 1.39 billion barrels of oil in strategic reserves, enough to cover 120 days of net crude imports. China's electric vehicle push has already displaced over one million barrels per day of implied oil demand, and that figure continues to grow.

China can replace lost Iranian volumes by increasing imports from Saudi Arabia, Russia, Brazil, and other suppliers, though at a higher cost that would squeeze margins for independent refineries in Shandong province that relied on discounted Iranian crude. The disruption is economically inconvenient for Beijing, but it is not strategically crippling.

Yet energy security is not what has defined US strategy toward Iran. One expectation from the Trump administration could be to neutralize the Middle Eastern threat before pivoting to Asia. But such a coercive reset was never part of the stated Asia-first playbook, and whether it is achievable remains deeply uncertain. The Iran campaign is a departure from, not an expression of, the strategic framework its architects publicly endorsed…"

link

Armand

Kharg Island: President Trump's Vicksburg Campaign

"In the long annals of military history, great captains have always understood a central truth: wars are rarely won by brute force alone, but by the relentless application of leverage against the enemy's decisive point of vulnerability. From the sunbaked plains of Gaugamela, where Alexander the Great shattered the Persian Empire by striking its center of gravity, to the muddy fields of Virginia in 1863, where General Grant turned the Mississippi River into a dagger aimed at the Confederacy's heart, the pattern repeats itself with iron consistency.

History does not repeat, but it does rhyme—and sometimes the rhyme is thunderous. Today, in the Persian Gulf in the spring of 2026, another such decisive point looms: the small, fortified speck of land known as Kharg Island. Like Vicksburg on the Mississippi, Kharg is not merely a piece of real estate. It is the economic and logistical linchpin of the enemy regime. Seize it, isolate it, and render it impotent, and the entire structure of Iranian resistance begins to unravel. Fail to do so, and the conflict risks becoming a protracted war of attrition that drains American blood, treasure, and political will.

President Donald J. Trump, drawing on the same instincts that have defined his approach to negotiation and power projection, now stands at a moment that echoes Grant's crossing of the Mississippi. Bold maneuver, integrated joint operations, deception, and overwhelming pressure against a seemingly impregnable objective—these are the timeless principles that can once again deliver victory. This is not mere speculation. It is the clear lesson of military history applied to the hard realities of the 2026 Iranian conflict…"

link

Armand

Looks like the Straits are open … Iran fired a few missiles and drones resulting with little to no damage. US Army AH-64s & USN MH-60s sunk about 7 little boats …

The minor Iranian offensive actions demonstrate they have suffered heavy attrition.

And the conflict is not over … more to come … Iran's islamists are becoming an endangered species.

Syria Wants to Replace the Strait of Hormuz

"When Bashar al-Assad's regime collapsed in December 2024, Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa declared that he would embrace a "zero problems" foreign policy, in the hopes that would help break the country's isolation and solve some of its economic problems. The prospect of a stable Syria enticed at least $28 USD billion in investment deals from Middle Eastern countries in 2025, and even more has been secured so far in 2026.

The continuation of that trend amid the current war with Iran has amplified Syria's central geopolitical and economic pitch—that it can be a potentially transformational corridor for energy flows, commercial trade, and technological connectivity that links Asia to Europe through the heart of the Middle East. With the Strait of Hormuz still effectively closed and insecurity still high in the Red Sea, Syria is proposing to serve as a more direct land-based alternative…"

link

Armand

A small amount of ships are passing through the Straits of Hormuz. Some ships are trying to find another way.

The Houthis say they are going to block the Red Sea. And they fired on Israel.

Iran fired on Israel as well.

Hezbollah is still firing on Israel.

Isreal is striking Iran again. And still is shooting at Hezbollah.

The IDF's Iron Dome, etc. is intercepting many incoming missiles, etc.

Iran has violated the "ceasefire" firing many of their missiles, drones. And the IDF responded.

There appears to be Iran is not firing at Israel today … yet …

Hezbollah, an Iran proxy fires on Israel as they see fit.

Again, GEN Ret. Jack Kean, just said as I have said, and heard him say similar before.

Iran is buying time waiting on the midterms. As they see how some in Congress, the media, etc. is bent of forcing the US to stop the conflict with Iran, etc. Iran is betting on this.

Again as I have said those members of Congress, the media, anti-POTUS, anti-US, etc. who attack and fight the POTUS and his Admin at every turn. Are in effect supporting the islamists in Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, even the remnants of Hamas, etc.

There islamists in Congress, in many other governmental positions from local, state and Federal, in the media, in the universities, etc., etc. E.g. the mayor of NYC, as well as the NY Governor. You see similar in Minneapolis and Minnesota, etc., etc. Again, this demonstrates de facto support for Iran and its islamist allies.

Those in congress and the media want gas and food prices, etc. to stay high. And blame the WH, etc. for … well … everything …

But … again … if some are upset with higher prices, which are just temporary. So many more will be upset with Iran deploying and firing nuclear weapons. Which they still want to obtain.

They are no going to change … they never will change. Like so many islamists, e.g. Iran's theocratic leaders, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, Iraqi Shia militia, ISIS, the Taliban, etc., etc. they will die before they stop their jihad. Before they will question their archaic belief system …

So I know some academic, intellectuals, anti-POTUS, woke progressive, left, liberals, etc. here, there, and everywhere. Just don't understand … They just don't get it or refuse to see the reality. The only way to stop this islamic jihad terrorist movement/ideology, etc. is the termination with extreme lethal and deadly prejudice.

You cannot talk to them … no matter how long you try. The only thing they understand is brute, effective and efficient overwhelming force.

If anyone does not understand that … that is on you …

But the US and Israel cannot, will not any longer accept Iran and its proxies' terrorism, murder, destruction, etc.

Again, the average American who watches the evening legacy news literally has little to no idea of what really is at stake.

Short answer … bottom line … islamists with nukes cannot occur … period …

Nukes are a 0 – Sum game … a game no one save for those who want to die should ever play …