"Wars lost at home, not in field?" Topic

Watching the current Iran war, it raises an old question. We may be looking at a conflict where the decisive factor is not battlefield success or failure but whether the war retains support at home.

Early polling in the United States suggests this may already be an issue. A clear majority of Americans oppose military action against Iran, with limited support for any large-scale troop commitment and widespread concern about costs, casualties and unclear objectives. Even where there is some support for the aims, there appears to be much less confidence in the way the war is being conducted or explained.

That raises the broader historical pattern. There are a number of wars where defeat seems to have come less from battlefield collapse and more from loss of will at home.

Vietnam is the obvious case. Militarily, the United States was not decisively defeated in a conventional sense but public opinion turned sharply against the war, making continued involvement politically impossible. In Algeria, the French army largely succeeded tactically, yet deep political division, unrest, and even near-coup conditions in France itself forced a withdrawal. Russia in 1917 is perhaps the starkest example: the army still existed in the field, but economic collapse, war-weariness, and loss of faith in the regime led to revolution and an immediate exit from the war.

One can point to other, smaller or more recent cases where the same dynamic appears. Afghanistan and Iraq both saw long campaigns where initial military success gave way to declining public support over time. Even shorter episodes, such as Somalia in 1993, show how quickly domestic opinion can force disengagement once the perceived cost becomes unacceptable.The British in Ireland (1919–21) etc.

What seems to link these cases is not necessarily defeat on the battlefield but a breakdown in the relationship between the war and the society fighting it. Prolonged casualties, unclear or shifting objectives, political division, economic strain, and loss of confidence in leadership all play a role. Once the question "why are we still doing this?" becomes dominant, military success alone may not be enough to sustain the effort.

So the question is whether the Iran war is shaping up along similar lines, and more generally whether wars can still be "won" if they are lost politically at home. Is this mainly a feature of modern democratic societies or are there earlier examples where the same thing happened under very different political systems?

I'd be interested in further historical examples or counter-arguments but ideally keeping this grounded in evidence and comparison rather than present-day political point scoring.

Is this mainly a feature of modern democratic societies or are there earlier examples where the same thing happened under very different political systems?

English parliament in the 1420's onwards was not always too fond of funding the war fought by their king in France (where he claimed to have a right to the crown).

Regardless, the conflict continued until early 1450's.

Vietnam is the obvious case.

No. It is not.
The "expert" GUARANTEED that we would need, heck demanded, 750,000 troops to win. Plus, invade North Vietnam. Plus…
We "only" had 500,000 at the time.
Wiser heads … gave up.
Oh, by the way. We lost over 50,000 KIA, but with no Congressional declaration of war. Just saying…

I cannot remember the electoral plurality in the 1864 US Presidential election but had McClellan won, the ACW might well have ended differently.

OFM +1

McK +1

I'm still amazed anyone especially someone from outside the USA. Seeing what is going from biased media based more of personal hatred towards the POTUS, etc. When they are looking thru a straw to see things that are going on here … Ground 0 …

The term "useful dupes" came to mind …

In the present case there is the issue that a key policy pledge was "no foreign wars", so in part this was what people voted for. Either there needs to be convincing persuasion that the change of approach was essential or there is a risk that some people may think they didn't get what they voted for.

Remember for Sun Tzu the key factor was breaking the enemy's morale.

Good point— Sun Tzu knew what he was writing about.

His emphasis on breaking the enemy's will rather than simply destroying his forces fits this discussion rather well. What's interesting in the cases mentioned is that the same principle seems to apply internally as well as externally. In Vietnam, Algeria, and Russia in 1917, it wasn't just the enemy's morale that mattered, but the morale of the state and society prosecuting the war.

In that sense, one might argue these are examples of wars where the "centre of gravity" shifted to the home front. Once public support, political cohesion, and confidence in leadership eroded, the war effort became unsustainable regardless of the military situation in the field.

So perhaps the question is whether modern wars are increasingly decided by whose morale collapses first—the enemy's or your own.
I would think a fanatical religious opponent might have formidable will & be difficult to "break".

Imagine Vietnam War… without press…

Imagine Algeria War… without an intense international pressure, declining domestic support, and the unsustainable military/financial drain

Imagine Russia in 1917… without humillating loses, Economic Collapse & Food Shortage and poor leadership by the Tzar.

In Modern Wars the press It's more active than ever, and the economy doesn't seem to be a determining factor, unlike in the two previous examples.

IMHO, morality is definitely the key factor, and when combined with religious fanaticism, it's almost unstoppable.

If the local economy collapses… the people can only cling to the moral strength sustained by belief in God (or similar) and faith in the sustenance of their way of life.

Armand