In a war with unclear objectives, fought over a chokepoint that cannot be securely controlled, the most rational contribution some allies can make is restraint. Not every conflict needs more ships—sometimes it needs fewer participants and at least a few actors still capable of thinking about how to end the war.
Sending ships rather assumes that this is a war with clear objectives and a definable end state. That's not true at all. What exactly is the US aim? Keeping the Strait of Hormuz open? For how long, and against what level of disruption? "Victory" seems rather loosely defined.
The Strait itself is the key problem. It looks like something navies ought to be able to secure but in practice it's the opposite. It's narrow, congested, and sits right on Iran's doorstep. You don't need to close it outright to win—you just need to make shipping too risky or too expensive. Mines, drones, occasional missile strikes, even just the threat of them, and traffic dries up. That's not a problem you solve with escorts; it's a problem you inherit indefinitely. It's telling that whilst Trump was calling for Allies to escort tankers through the narrows, the US Navy was conspicuously not doing this. I think some wise American admirals knew better.
And once you send ships, you're in the war whether you intended to be or not. Those ships become targets, incidents become escalations, and "defensive deployment" turns into convoy duty, then strikes, then full participation. We've seen that ladder before. It's very easy to climb and very hard to step off.
There's also the question of whose war aims these actually are. The US may be operating without a clearly articulated objective beyond pressure and deterrence, which has a habit of drifting into something much larger. Other countries joining in risk signing up to an open-ended commitment where they carry costs but have little control over strategy. When/if the US declares "victory" and disappears, the mess remains to be cleared up.
In that context, restraint isn't weakness, it's clarity. Not every situation is improved by adding more military actors, particularly in a theatre that is structurally resistant to control. Keeping forces out avoids turning a difficult regional conflict into a broader one, and preserves at least some actors who aren't directly involved in the fighting and can push for de-escalation when the moment comes. Europe may be able to talk to Iran when the US most definitely can't.Japan can broker peace when the Iranians don't believe Americans. New Zealand can send envoys when American envoys would not be safe.
Sometimes the most positive contribution you can make to a war is not to join it.
*"When You Say Nothing at All" with apologies to Ronan Keating
YouTube link