"The factors that impact Combat Efficiency" Topic

I'm sure we all have our own opinion on this one so here's my list in order of importance. Feel free to come up with your own.

1 How well fed I am
2 How much sleep I've had
3 How reliable my equipment is
4 How much trust I have in my fellow crew/squad members
5 What the weather is
6 How much fuel/ammunition I've got
7 How much trust I've got in my chain of command
8 My appreciation of the enemy's capabilities

When the shooting starts it's how good is my training and how well I'm "motivated" by leadership. Warriors don't care about anything else.

Wolfhag

Wolfhag, so when the shooting starts you don't care if you have 30 rounds or 300 rounds? Everyone cares about supply and resupply(food, ammo, medical, fuel, etc.)

Only "warriors" I ever saw were on Battlestar Galactica. But I did sometimes see and read soldiers who called themselves "warriors" when they were trying to justify not obeying orders and regulations.

But I'd add training and experience to Mark's list, and specify training and experience pertinent to the situation. There are many sad stories about trained and even veteran soldiers caught in a fight of some different sort.

As for "order of importance" I don't think there is one in the abstract. A bad night's sleep and marching before breakfast is workable: 48 hours without rest and starving is not. You can say something similar about every item on the list. Everything has a "no problem" level, a "workable" level and a "catastrophic fail" level. (If you want to see "catastrophic fail" on "appreciation of enemy capabilities" read about the first tank attacks on good units who had never even heard of such things.)

Good question – at least from some examples I can think of rest and food are pretty important – for example, at Shiloh if the Confederates had not spent time looting Sherman and Prentiss' camps Prentiss probably would not have able to get his troops north

How tired I am. Cold, wet and haven't slept any appreciable length of time in the last x number of days wears on anyone. All the training and motivation in the world cannot fully overcome exhaustion.

inspired by a good cause?

"Inspiration" may get you to the battlefield, but once the sh-- starts flying, you only know the next thing you do--or choose not to do--can get you killed.

It's loyalty to your friends and the belief they will not abandon you that can keep you in the decision making process about what to do next.

Faith in the effectiveness of one's one weapon(s) counts for a lot, as well. The man with the Brown Bess will beat every time the man with the AK-47 who doesn't know how to use it, or thinks it's not going to work when he needs it to.

TVAG

I agree with Robert. Training, experience and leadership are the bedrock of a unit, all the rest are logistics and situation problems that are, at least theoretically, fixable. Historical examples of "wrong" experience reducing a units' effectiveness are common- 7DIV (Oz) going from the Western Desert (WD) and Syria to New Guinea, or the 7th ARMD DIV (UK) going from the WD to Normandy.

inspired by a good cause?

That's a leadership issue, Bill. It's up to the leadership to convince the troops that what they're doing has a purpose and motivate them to succeed. If the leadership can't do that (eg the last years of the Vietnamese War) then the morale issues spring up- fraggings, crime, high casualty rates, loss of effectiveness.

Surprise. I am not sure I have ever seen "warriors" in action, but I have seen "veteran" professionals act poorly when faced with a situation that they did not expect to see. They often recovered rapidly, but that initial short, sharp, shock certainly reduced their overall performance. Training and sheer guts went a long way in allowing them to quuickly recover any degradation.

Sorry if I sounded a little obtuse. Everything Mark said is valid.

As far as order of importance, I'd expect it depends on the mission and your time and resources.

When the shooting starts there is no point is worrying about anything but you and your buddies survival. If you plan correctly, there may be nothing to worry about.

Recovery from a bad situation can come down to leadership and training for immediate action without having to be ordered. Also, loyalty to your mates.

Like some said, leadership is about the care and well being of the troops. It also comes down to to planning, there are various ways leaders are trained. If you are stuck with a unit that is untrained, good luck.

Overview of the Five Paragraph Order (SMEAC). This is something you can use when generating a scenario.

The Five Paragraph Order, commonly known as SMEAC, is a structured method used by military units to organize and communicate operational plans. It is utilized by various branches, including the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, to ensure clarity and effectiveness in mission execution.

Components of SMEAC

S – Situation: Details about the current environment, including enemy and friendly forces, ROE, minefields, terrain, and civilian considerations.

M – Mission: Clearly states the objective, including who is involved, what needs to be accomplished, where, when, and why. Who will relieve you.

E – Execution: Outlines how the mission will be carried out, detailing specific tasks like fire support and responsibilities.

A – Administration/Logistics: Identifies necessary resources (ammo, fuel, food, medical), support/QRF, and logistics/resupply, CASEVAC, EPOW, required for mission success.

C – Command/Signal: Specifies the command structure, including key leaders and communication methods.

It does not state orders of importance.

A good friend of mine (Marine) was a Spec Ops Team Leader in Bakhmut, Ukraine for almost 2 years. He said his job was "Daddy" because it involved getting the safehouse, paying the bills, vehicle, food, booze & cigarettes, supplies and filing paperwork to get him team paid. He said he used a variation of the above with his ATL handling much of the details.

Regarding orders of importance on a trench assault mission it was mostly about ammo and grenades. He carried 14x loaded 5.56 mags for his FN and a pouch for the empty mags to reload later. Plus 6-8 grenades and loose ammo stored wherever he could fit it. Someone would bring up the rear with additional ammo.

The plan was normally they take the trench or tree line and a Ukie unit relieves them to defend it.

You made sure your medpak was easily accessible and maybe bring two. If you get hit and don't have one don't expect someone to give you theirs. Some guys would have their tourniquets already on.

He had a medic on his team that had been fighting in various locations around the world for the last 10 years that ensured loadouts and trained his guys. The US training and medical supplies was inadequate.

One other agreement the team (all combat vet Westerners before coming to Ukraine) had. If they were in a tight situation where you were not wounded and could not keep up they'd make sure you had one grenade and they'd leave you behind.

It did happen once in July when running 2k through a heavy artillery bombardment getting ambushed after a successful raid when a guy got heat stroke. Fortunately, he made it back later. No, they don't leave the wounded behind.

One last thing. If his unit was given a mission he thought was suicidal, wrong or not for their skillset he could turn it down with no repercussions. If he had any problems with Ukie command he could call Gen. Budanov, the GUR commander.

Technically, they were not in the Ukie command structure. I'd classify them as Veteran, Irregular Light Infantry with high morale.

Wolfhag

Interesting, Wolfhag. There's so many similarities, yet so many differences. We also use/d SMEAC, but slightly differently. Our Mission is a one sentence statement of intent, eg "6PL shall occupy and hold the boozer.", said twice. All the rest you mention, "..what needs to be accomplished, where, when, and why. Who will relieve you." is detailed during the Execution part. The Poms do/did it slightly differently again, but I can't remember how. (It was two OGroups given 40-odd years ago, ~1979, and all I can remember is feeling the orders were a "bit different".)

"inspired by a good cause?"

With Dal (pretty much) and TVAG on this. A good cause may get someone to enlist--and not to desert when the rations are short and the pay is in worthless paper. But belief in the cause will not keep men in ranks while people on either side of them are falling down bleeding and dying. There seems to be no substitute for intense training to accomplish that. (OK, a sergeant behind you with a half-pike probably helps.)

I don't think it's a matter of leadership convincing them of the cause, either. Plenty of men fighting and dying well in bad causes. And as the old draft board joke ran "they can't make you fight, but they can give you a weapon and a uniform and put you where the fighting is and let you use your own judgment." David Drake did a year (1970) with the 11th ACR in Vietnam and Cambodia, and wrote later that no one believed in the cause: they fought well because they were well trained and believed in the regiment.

Training lends to confidence in yourself and those around you and lends itself to the discipline in getting things done
Awareness of your surrounding is impacted by how much sleep we've had and your decision making ability
Condition of ourselves and our equipment .. if we keep our body and equipment in good shape it'll probably last longer than you think.
Understand the mission… when everything goes to h*ll in a handbasket, as it normally does when the first round comes in, knowing what to do and having the ability to do it because of the reasons above

Hi, Mark. In the rules I have been working on over the past 20 years ("Cohesion- It's the Name of the Game"), I have each unit roll up how it will perform in today's battle. They roll for Training and Experience of the men; Training and Experience of the unit leadership then "How long have these men been serving under these leaders?" The value becomes the Cohesion value of the unit. This can be modified by the scenario designer/Game Master by the the situations you outlined:
1 How well fed I am
2 How much sleep I've had
3 How reliable my equipment is
4 How much trust I have in my fellow crew/squad members
5 What the weather is
6 How much fuel/ammunition I've got
7 How much trust I've got in my chain of command
8 My appreciation of the enemy's capabilities

I would add some possible mods for the terrain today's battle they will face. I'd modify the starting CV by +/- "1 or 2" depending upon the circumstances that will affect (a) unit in today's game. Once determined, that will be the starting unit value. That CV can go up and down depending upon how well the unit leadership deals with cohesion loss. In practice, the game plays quicker than I can describe. "I" feel that game designers tend to lump unit's capabilities into general groupings (like Green, Veteran, Elite, etc.) which ign0re's vital factors for each unit as individuals. If no two men are the same then how can you always have two (or more) units rated the same? Just my .02 cents worth. I think you are on to what is important in game rules.

Well there's the proof of the dementia, missed [relevant] training didn't I. Number 3 for me because as someone observed above if you're exhausted you're done for, end of; although I agree the order is arbitrary because any one of these can degrade your CE if it becomes a big enough problem.

So the follow up question is:-
If we are writing rules for stand alone games [as opposed to campaign rules] can we, should we try and model this in and if so how. @Dye4minis has started the ball rolling, any other thoughts.

Limited ammo, limited fuel, variable morale (decided by GM or die roll). Do you want to account for breakdowns due to lack of maintenance/spare parts? Degrade fire factors due to exhaustion. You can add random bad decisions due to exhaustion.

As always, how we reflect things depends on level and maybe period. As an example, ammo supply for a unit should generally be reduced fire effect. At skirmish/RPG level--or for off-board artillery--sometimes you can count the rounds.

I tend to think lack of food and sleep should best be reflected in army breakpoint, or the reaction roll when you hit breakpoint. (Cowpens seems to me the classic example of good troops pushed far too hard and breaking as a result. Fed and rested, they'd have retired instead of becoming prisoners.) Training and experience should mostly be a matter of unit morale and of permitted unit actions--as in no, you can't order your Marlburian or SYW grenadiers to break into a skirmish line. Trust is morale, and "appreciation of enemy equipment" may be. Weather is usually visibiity and movement rates.

The tricky one is reliability of equipment. Reliability of equipment might mean my jeep can't get up some steep hill. It might mean my 37mm gun won't penetrate enemy armor. It might mean almost my entire Tiger II battalion breaks down before it gets to the battlefield. I'm still waiting for the rules set in which you "buy" your point-based WW2 army--then roll to see which tanks actually show up. We'd see a lot more Pzkw IV's and Stug III's on German troop rosters.

During the post Vietnam Division Restructuring tests of the 1970s, our Cavalry Squadron conducted a test to quantify irrational loss due to lack of sleep. The goal was to function for 48 hours without sleep. All firing, foot and vehicles, scores started dropping after 20 hours. Ability to travel and conduct missions also deteriorated. Due to safety concerns the test was halted at 32 hours.

By the way we were given laminated notebooks with the Five paragraph warning order and the Operational Recon report outline.

Mark asks: "If we are writing rules for stand alone games [as opposed to campaign rules] can we, should we try and model this in and if so how. @Dye4minis has started the ball rolling, any other thoughts."

In my experience, most games are based upon today's scenarios and very few make any attempt to link them into a greater campaign. I see no reason why gamemasters/scenario designers could not inject circumstances from previous gaming sessions (or just on the spur of the moment) before today's gaming session. The sky is the limit as to what can be injected into the scenario as long as the results are clear before the game begins, to all. Of course, it could be even more of a challenge if one side remains unaware of some weakness on the other side until discovered during the days gameplay.

Dye4minis +1

Most scenarios have scenario specific rules in them, Mark, so adding rules wouldn't be unusual. The big question is how to do it. Dye4minis "CV" system looks easily workable. Perhaps discussing it with your gaming group could bring up a few ideas as well?

What period and level of operations are you looking at, Mark? I get the feeling it's modernish (1914+) and tactical/skirmish.

I'm still waiting for the rules set in which you "buy" your point-based WW2 army--then roll to see which tanks actually show up. We'd see a lot more Pzkw IV's and Stug III's on German troop rosters.

Yes, please. It would also increase the sweat level of those playing with British armour in the early Western Desert battles.

Timeportal, if I remember correctly Patton's comment in "War as I Knew it" was that at 40 hours, troops HAD to rest. Of course, it being an actual war, safety concerns may not have been a major factor. From personal experience, the falling off beginning at 20 hours sounds right. Most of my "how could I have been so stupid?" moments--many of them in the military--came when I was short on sleep and sometimes hungry in the bargain.

We will draw a discrete veil over the experience of the TOC officer who decided that, since it was only a three-day exercise, he'd just work through it without a relief. The CO ended that experiment on the second night.

Lots of good points here so thanks to all. A few I'd like to respond to: -

"I'm still waiting for the rules set in which you "buy" your point-based WW2 army--then roll to see which tanks actually show up". I remember suggesting this back in the 'WRG ancients rules all' days and nearly getting lynched for my pains.

"The sky is the limit as to what can be injected into the scenario as long as the results are clear before the game begins, to all. Of course, it could be even more of a challenge if one side remains unaware of some weakness on the other side until discovered during the days gameplay". I definitely favour option 2, in most scenarios I doubt the 'player' would have the overview information to predict his enemies status.

"What period and level of operations are you looking at, Mark? I get the feeling it's modernish (1914+) and tactical/skirmish". Sorry you lose lots of points for reconnaissance skills here; I'm primarily a divisional level Napoleonic player thus I [the player] see only a large fairly crude picture.

My own experience on exercise would corroborate the 20 hour drop off. I was used to working shifts and I think coped better than most with the 04:00 zombie stage, but I saw it all around me and I know it caught up with me at some point.

So taking up the hidden knowledge point does anyone have a good way of reflecting this without using an umpire. I can't see how you can hide a factor one player is going to add/subtract to their score. Any options would be welcomed.

As a result of this I've gone down the route of ignoring all these things [keeps it simple and playable] and just making the die role cover a wider scope of possibilities; typically I have 5 possible results with the 2 extreme ones at ~5% chance and the most common at ~65% chance [in other words a normal distribution divided by 1 and 2 standard deviations]. This works well as a playable option, but does leave me feeling I'm missing an opportunity in scenario setting.

Dal,
The one we were taught was BAMCIS Steps for Marine Planning

Below is an example of how BAMCIS might be applied to a marine-specific scenario, such as planning a Marine Protected Area (MPA) survey:

B – Begin Planning
Action: Receive the mission from higher command (e.g., "Survey the Channel Islands for potential MPA expansion").
Marine Task: Issue a Warning Order (WARNO) to your team, detailing the objective and timeline.

A – Arrange for Reconnaissance
Action: Determine what information is missing and how to get it.
Marine Task: Coordinate with Fisheries and Oceans Canada or local agencies for existing sonar data and nautical charts. Arrange transport (boats/divers).

M – Make Reconnaissance
Action: Physically or visually inspect the area of interest.
Marine Task: Conduct a preliminary site visit or use tools like SeaSketch to analyze real-time spatial data and confirm environmental conditions.

C – Complete the Plan
Action: Update the initial plan based on reconnaissance findings.
Marine Task: Finalize the survey route and diving schedules. Ensure the plan includes the Five Paragraph Order (SMEAC): Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration/Logistics, and Command/Signal.

I – Issue the Order
Action: Communicate the final plan to the team.
Marine Task: Gather the team around a terrain model or map of the coastline to brief them on their specific roles and safety protocols.

S – Supervise
Action: Ensure the plan is executed correctly and adjust as needed.
Marine Task: Monitor the survey progress from the command vessel. This is the most critical step to ensure mission success and personnel safety.

It's geared more for the squad level than SMEAC.

Wolfhag