"What Strategy Could Either Side Have Used ..." Topic

to Win the War in 1776?…

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Armand

Howe could have acted more like a CinC. Instead he acted like a Peace Commissioner who was acting more in sorrow than in anger.
He pursued Washington at a pace like he was hiking nature trails.
The British should have split his duties. One party to wage war against rebels, and a totally separate party for the diplomatic stuff.
The longer he let Washington hang in there, the better Washington grew.

The legendary proportions of Loyalists and Neutrals was never set in stone. It always fluctuated. Letting Washington off the hook so many times contributed to the swelling of Patriot support.

The Patriots could not have won in 1776. Staying viable was the only real way to win, and we stumbled into that strategy.

Well, just the premise of "strategy" in a pre-19th century state/military is dubious.

Armies and states rarely engaged in "strategic" level operations as we understand them today, so just the statement that a AWI leader had the ability or the knowledge to conduct operations at a strategic scale, particularly the size of the 13 colonies is a pretty weak argument to make.

I agree with the OFM. Lots of ways the Patriots could have lost, and absent Trenton-Princeton they nearly did. But no way they win until British resources of will and manpower begin to be stretched.

Maggot, would you agree that the invasion of Canada was a strategic operation? It failed, but came close to success, and had a clear strategic rationale.

Ira Gruber, who was my thesis director at Rice, wrote the book on the command of the Howe brothers. They were, as John points out, trying to be both peace commissioners and also military commanders. Obviously it didn't work, but it was by no means clear at the time that such was not the best approach when dealing with rebels with whom you want eventually to reconcile. And a lot of New Yorkers and New Jerseyites did take the oath to the king. It came close to working except for Trenton-Princeton.

Howe Brothers and the American Revolution (The Norton library) Hardcover – January 1, 1975
by Ira D. Gruber (Author)
4.3 4.3 out of 5 stars (7)
See all formats and editions
By focusing on the Howe brothers, their political connections, their relationships with the British ministry, their attitude toward the Revolution, and their military activities in America, Gruber answers the frequently asked question of why the British failed to end the American Revolution in its early years. This book supersedes earlier studies because of its broader research and because it elucidates the complex personal interplay between Whitehall and its commanders.

A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

Btw, somewhere (not in this book I don't think) Gruber took the time to examine all the generals that the king had to choose from, and concluded that Howe and Clinton and Burgoyne and Cornwallis were probably the best available when factors like age and especially political connections to the opposition party are taken into account.

Maybe both yes and no. It's like saying that Cornwallis' Southern "Strategy" or Burgoyne's Northern "Strategy" was a unified British effort when they really were not.

Strategy implies that a unified effort across all fronts (military, political, economic), led by a centralized command to achieve a singular goal or set of goals, exists. I contend that never really existed in the AWI.
It's not that some in the British/Continental leadership didn't think in strategic terms, they most certainly did, but the operations to get there really don't gel as strategically/centrally planned. The invasion of Canada would have had strategic results, but I'd argue it was more opportunistic than part of a greater planned/coordinated strategy.

As you are well aware, there was not a "Supreme Headquarters, British Forces in America," nor "United Continental Forces Command;" there definitely was not a "war department" in either state, either. What did exist were loosely tied, very independent forces that occasionally talked with one other to sometimes achieve shared, or at least, closely aligned goals.

I colloquial terms: "hey Cornwallis, lead your tiny army into the south and do things, and if it works out, and I even find out about it, Ill do things in the north that might take pressure off you, or maybe not. Talk to you in three months, maybe." :^)).

Strategic thought, yes, strategic planning, no.

Okay, we are using different terminology. Integrating political and economic and military etc is GRAND strategy. The Brits certainly had that under Pitt. Harder to do when there is strong oppo at home. But surely we can speak of (and critique) LBJ's strategy -- GRAND strategy -- in VietNam. BAD grand strategy.

I am using "strategy' in a narrow military sense: how armies and fleets move before battle.

Occasionally, one hears of Ho Chi Minh following Washington's strategy of holding out until the enemy gets tired and gives up.
An ex-TMPer vehemently disagreed with that, but he's gone now. So I guess it's okay to bring it up.

I've read that Amherst was offered command of British troops in the AWI, but he turned it down. Vehemently! (There's that word again…)
He disapproved of British policy and may have been in the wrong Party. Never discount British Party politics either.

Yes, grand strategy, but I'd even argue that the more "local" strategy (lets just say what the British or Continental armies did exclusively in the colonies) is even stretching the term of strategic planning. As I alluded to above, what really happened was loose coordination as opposed to theater strategy. The actions of most British generals was only marginally connected to a greater British plan to subdue the colonies. Lets be honest, there actually was no overarching British strategy to win:
1. The initial stages of the war were just attempts to smash the Continental Army in the field (and those first few battles were classic and superbly performed examples of 18th century military science and British tactical prowess-particularly Long Island), with no global plan to otherwise subdue the rest of the states-just beat Washington and everything would be fine.
2. The northern "strategy" pretty much failed to account for the other half of the colonies just as the southern did the same.
3. The multiple small British forces operating in all theaters at any one time were only vaguely, and in many cases, not at all operating on a cohesive grand plan to destroy the Continental forces, and also subjugate the rebellious non-fighting citizens.

Washington himself only loosely coordinated forces north and south (and sometimes west). Those forces often operated on their own initiative to deal with more localized problems without any real central input from the CinC himself….again, if at all. The Yorktown campaign and the small campaigns leading up to it were the closest the Continental armies acted in a truly cohesive manner.

Just my opinion on the matter, and you know, opinions and all that :^)).

Agree with above. Howe could have moved faster in advancing on New York and then attacking. After that he would have more time to have aggressively gone after Washington to destroy his army. Still, I am not sure Americans would have given up after that.

Interesting that the King can offer command and a General can just turn it down. I guess that is similar to the Union Army in the ACW. Imagine Eisenhower telling Marshall, nope don't want it.

It was a dumpster fire from beginning to end. A tragedy that could have been avoided.

Otoh, I very much like John Shy's exposition if the three phases of British strategy. 1774-75 police action; 1776-1778 European style war against a conventional opponent; 1779-83 counter-revolutionary efforts using the Loyalists and trying to form a militia. The third time they got it more-or-less right but simply ran out of men and time.

I agree the rebels win by just not losing.

I may have been incorrect regarding Amherst being offered command.
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He actually didn't oppose the war. He merely insisted on needing at least 75,000 troops.
Gee. Sounds like Vietnam.

Great thread and I agree with the main theme, the Americans won by no losing

Another factor to consider was what if the French had acted more in their own national interest rather than just trying to poke the British in the eye? At one point about 90% of the patriot's gunpowder and essentially all their Navy were French – the big debts the French ran up likely didn't help the Ancien Regime's survival – so suppose the Hessian garrison had been a little more alert that Christmas season and Washington's crossing of the Delaware had gone south – which given that the victory at Trenton was as I understand it a big part of the French thinking "let's back these guys" could have been a pretty negative thing for the patriot cause

As for Canada being a close call for the Yankees, I doubt that.
Consider this:
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Consider that New England was rabidly anti-Papist. They considered granting religious freedom to Catholics in Quebec one of the "Intolerable Acts". Personally, and I've told this story before, my namesake was a nemesis of Archbishop Briand, even getting excommunicated.
Canada was almost the American experience in reverse. We tried to invade, met with little popular support (sounds familiar? 🙄) and were expelled as soon as the ice cleared up on the St Lawrence.

It was successful only to the extent of generating wargaming scenarios.

I shall refrain from drawing Ultramodern parallels. 🙄

In hind sight of course the Brits could have flooded the zone. Shock & Awe.

I am glad they didn't because I would not want to be calling my potato chips crisps! :)