"Korean War Outbreak: A Study in Unpreparedness" Topic

"The outbreak of the Korean War is a classic example of an army facing battle totally unprepared. Numerous histories of the Korean War have been written and many historians have discussed the outbreak of the Korean War. A point they nearly all agree upon is that the combined forces south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea were unprepared for what turned out to be a long and extremely grueling war. That is, war, and most certainly not "police action," as it has sometimes been referred to, raised catastrophic havoc with soldiers on the ground during the initial stages of the action that devastated the Korean Peninsula and Korean people.

Although this theory is contested by some because of the early and dramatic success of the US and combined UN forces after the landing at Inchon, it is generally agreed by experts that we were unprepared for the Korean hostilities in 1950 as they unfolded at the outbreak of the war. It has been a common mantra often coined to justify military budget increases that we were a "Hollow Force " and classically unprepared to face the rudimentary, even outmoded, and ill equipped force that we faced in the North Korean aggressors. This was after we had victoriously emerged from W.W.II as the undisputed number one power in the world. In a very real sense, after the Japanese capitulated with an unconditional surrender on the battleship Missouri, the Pacific became undoubtedly an "American Lake." Why after such a hard fought but overwhelming victory in 1945, and undisputed power in the Pacific and East Asian theater, were we so unprepared to face a foreign enemy only 5 years later?…"

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Armand

Let's not forget that the Secretary of State released a list of countries that the United States would defend against Communist Aggression, and that South Korea was not included in that list.
Possibly because the division was supposed to be temporary. Also because the "government" in the South was notoriously corrupt.

MacArthur, our proconsul in Japan, had a long history of being totally unprepared, and this was just another example. His occupying troops were very unprepared and lacked proper training. Whose fault? Rot starts at the top. And our men suffered from that.

While the writer is generally correct about the Army's unpreparedness at the time, he is missing some vital elements from his thesis:

1. While he hints at this in the early paragraphs, he underestimates the US military chiefs belief in air and atomic power. During this time, there was a significant trend within senior leadership that the Army/USMC should be severely reduced as they wouldn't be needed to do anything more than hold ground….after the air bombardments and atomic attacks. The US military was buying into the idea that war would be won by airpower and the threat or use of atomic weapons. The idea of MAD did not exist yet, nor the idea that atomic/soon to be nuclear war was suicidal. Many military chiefs believed they could win a war using atomic weapons. The Army leadership was so worried about losing relevance, they developed the pentomic division to hopefully sway civilian leaders to the need to retain a large Army.

2. That being said, the statement "MacArthur wasn't ready" is significantly misleading, as this unreadiness was reflected Army wide, and the "social scientists" aspect of training should not be stressed as much as the writer implies. That may have been a factor in the poor performance of TF Smith, but overwhelmingly the belief in the atomic battlefield was far more influential.

3. However, it is correct that the US did not plan on defending Korea or even thought much about it. Stalin, who was the deciding factor in the North's decision to invade (they effectively waited for his permission), was fed the same information, not just by spies, but by public pronouncements by US political leaders. Stalin and the Soviet leadership were actually shocked by the US response as they were just as afraid of another round of "world war" as many in the West.

4. But….we can thank the Kennan telegram and its profound influence on US government thinking during the prior 5 years for the US' swift about face. The NK invasion triggered panic and "proof" of a world wide communist conspiracy to seize power and that it was in motion. The massive build up, and subsequent large expenditures over the next 20 years for defense, spy agencies and overseas meddling was a direct result of the NK invasion-and it led to the US' blunder into Vietnam…

Maggot +1

MacArthur was asleep at the wheel in the Philippines.
He was caught napping as proconsul of Japan. He couldn't demand that the occupying troops keep up their training?
And the Chinese caught him with his pants down at the Yalu.

Other than that…

The facts really don't support your argument; you're giving Mac agency that he really didn't have, regardless of his prima donna status (I'm not a Mac fan, either).

To say he was asleep at the wheel in the Philippines; well…that applies to every Western colonial officer in 1940…British, Dutch, American, French. None thought the Japanese could do what they did (and neither did most Japanese officers). Your assumption is that somehow Mac should have been more prescient than all those others? I'm actually reinforcing your argument that he was no where near the "god of war" some historians make him out to be.

Caught napping as proconsul of Japan? Again, the facts (and they are well documented facts) I pointed out above speak to a institutional pathos re. the use of ground forces in future wars…The belief in atomic supremacy (even after the Soviets exploded their own bomb in '49) was pervasive and not until after the Korean war did we see an explosion in spending for the Army. Keep in mind the US was still not globalist "world cop" yet and the idea of returning to a small pre-war Army just like after every other American war still held true in much government thought. It took the Korean war to change all that.

Pants down at the Yalu? I might have to agree with you there, although I've not studied the background enough to know for sure (my MA is in Cold War diplomatic, not military, history:^)). There seems to have been some indication of the Chinese build up, but keep in mind the US was still fighting the Korean war on a shoestring. Despite Mac's insistence on taking the war to China, Truman was really not interested in pushing the war any further than needed…the beginning stages of American overseas failures for the next 80 years…the undeclared, politically led, forever wars.

What was the status of US forces in Europe at the same time? Were the troops in Germany as under supplied and under manned as the forces in Asia? Was the rot traceable to MacArthur in Tokyo or did it track to Washington? My guess is that both were guilty. MacArthur did not have the men or supplies to be more prepared, even if he had wanted to try. He could have at least tried to do more with what he had, so I suppose that is my answer.

… the beginning stages of American overseas failures for the next 80 years…the undeclared, politically led, forever wars.

UNDECLARED is the key word, in my opinion.
Why Congress or all of the following presidents did not see fit to involve Congress in one of its most important functions is totally beyond my comprehension.
How many American dead in Korea? Vietnam? The "War on Terror"?
I won't mention foreign civilians, because who really gives a damn about them anyway?

RJ,
yes, the US Army Occupation Forces in Germany were woefully undermanned (although they did have the lion's share of the heavy equipment still in service) and completely unprepared for conflict. I cannot stress enough that prior to and even during much of the Korean War there were still thoughts about bringing most of them home and demob the majority of the ground forces.

The historical facts lean exceedingly towards the Korean War being THE "moment" that solidified the Cold War- it "proved" the Kennan telegram. The rise of McCarthy and the Red Menace are tied into this reaction as well-especially as we found out it was American spies who gave the Russians atomic secrets. Had Korea never happened, the critical overreactions on both sides of the Atlantic are up in the air; maybe it still goes on, but with less bloodshed over the next 80 years..who knows..

The end of the Korean War saw a significant shift in thinking about Europe and Western defense….keep in mind WW2 was only 9 years over and suddenly the US oversaw the creation of a new German Army (as well as the JSDF being created at roughly the same time). Let's think about that: 50+ million dead less than a decade before and the VERY SAME veterans that the Allies fought are now back in the game.

The Bundeswehr was "sworn in" in 1954, overwhelmingly with ex-WW2 German Army officers and NCOs. The Heer very quickly became the premier conscript Army in Europe. Within just a few years, it alone (not counting the German Navy and AIr Force) numbered almost 500K active forces (compared to current German numbers of less than 80K active in the Heer). German military industry was also among the first to recover, with the Heer's active forces almost exclusively armed by German companies by the mid 60's.

For the United States, the draft continues (remember Elvis Presley?) for another 20 years. For the first time in its history, the US begins to maintain a massive military industrial complex during "peacetime," its like is unseen in human history for its size and influence and we live with that to this day. Why the pivot to the MIddle East after the Soviet Union's fall? That complex needed a new boogie man to keep going..(Eisenhower was right!)

Thanks

Armand