"Was the Hindenburg Line a failure?" Topic

On a different board (ultramodern warfare) somebody wrote:
"With expensive defensive systems, I am always reminded of the Maginot Line, the WW2 Atlantic Wall & the Hindenburg Line in WW1. Lots of money, time & effort expended for little return."

As far as I know the Siegfriedstellung/Hindenburg Line secured the western front for Germany from march 1917 till shortly before the war ended. So should it be considered a failure?

No of course it wasn't a failure, nor were other serious lines of fortifications. They can usually be breached eventually , but at what cost.

If you want more than a superficial summing up – a mere couple of sentences- consider the key irony.

The Hindenburg Line did its job too well in one sense:

It encouraged German leadership to believe defence alone could win.

This delayed political solutions and doubled down on a war Germany couldn't sustain.

When it finally broke in late 1918, it broke fast, because there was nothing left behind it.

In wargaming terms, it was a brilliantly designed defensive position that wins scenarios — but loses the campaign.

As well as what Ochoin said, you have to remember that the Hindenburg fortifications were designed when tanks were just coming into service, were unreliable and nobody knew how to make them work with infantry, especially, and the other arms. While some attempt was made to "tank proof" the fortifications, the work hadn't been done well enough to make a significant difference. By mid-1918 tanks had matured enough to be much more reliable, and tank-infantry-artillery cooperation had been refined. Air-ground support had also matured, though was still too dependent upon visual signalling (eg flares, panels and flags) to be more than moderately effective. German anti-tank measures had failed to keep pace, though some specialist rifles had been designed and issued, and artillery gunners had been trained in direct fire against slowly-moving targets.

In short, the fortifications were good 1915-16 designs that weren't nearly as effective as they needed to be in the changed battlefields of 1918.

Martin's right, too. Given enough time, men and munitions then any defensive position can be overcome – if you'll pay the cost.

Let's just ask ourselves how often these "expensive defensive systems" were actually attacked.
Errr… By intelligent High Command, that is. They certainly did the job when attacked by … less than competent High Command. They caused massive casualties, and could be held with minimal troops.

The person quoted in the OP seems an usually prescient and intelligent commentator. 87)

Forgetting casualties, if a defensive system is breached & the defenders then lose the war, it is a failure Quod erat demonstrandum.

It was better than the lines it replaced, but like all wars things move on and any defence will eventually be surpassed.

I was under the impression that the german defense doctrin in late WW1 was based on defense in depth and counterattack when the attacker lost cohesion due to casualties and disorganisation. And while the german inability to deal with surprising and massed tank assaults and the improvement in combined warfare abilities on the allied side put a lot of pressure on the defense lines, the inability to parry those attacks resulted from the huge losses in the german offensives in spring and summer 1918. The ability of the allies to constantly start new offensives exhausted the german army on a operational level. While this is surely a view from a german prospective, am I wrong in my reception?

You are quite right Dogtail.

The Hindenburg Line dud exactly what it was supposed to do,,allowed Germany to concentrate forces to defeat Russia and then shift forces West to defeat the Allies.

It was the ultimate failure of the 1918 offensive which lost the war for Germany , not any failures in the Hindenburg Line concept.

You're not wrong, and the views largely align.

Late-war German doctrine was based on defence in depth and counter-attack once the attacker lost cohesion. In 1917 this worked, and the Hindenburg Line functioned as intended—as a system to absorb attacks and restore the position with reserves.

The failure wasn't tactical but operational. The 1918 offensives gained ground but destroyed Germany's reserve structure. Once they failed to deliver a decision, the army no longer had the depth needed to make elastic defence work.

The Allies did. They could sustain tempo, launch repeated offensives, and rotate formations. Continuous pressure exhausted German units and made effective counter-attacks impossible.

So the Hindenburg Line didn't fail as a concept; it was rendered ineffective by the collapse of Germany's operational reserves after 1918. But whatever way you look at it; it failed to stop Germany's defeat.

the german defense doctrin in late WW1 was based on defense in depth and counterattack when the attacker lost cohesion

It goes back further than that, dogtail, to the Somme campaign at least. But the key in the defence in depth concept is having enough troops in depth to mount an effective counter attack. By 1918, as Ochoin alluded to, there weren't enough.

Contrary to popular myth the Germans did not defeat the Russians and then march everyone west. The bulk of the infantry were retained in the east, to make sure that the food supplying areas and new borders were secured. Germany couldn't withstand another "turnip winter" and, despite transportation difficulties in getting the food to Germany, that food was vital. They were also there to make sure the Russian White and/or Red factions didn't decide to "liberate" the conquered territories they'd ceded to Germany at Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918). However, the bulk of the artillery and engineers were sent west, some being available for the Michael offensive in March (21 March).

It was the ultimate failure of the 1918 offensive which lost the war for Germany

I disagree, Martin. Michael and Georgette severely damaged Germany's ability to attack, and culled their numbers across the front. But it was the surrenders of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria that forced Germany to admit defeat. They just didn't have the numbers to hold their borders in the south and south east, while the release of the troops on the Italian, Greek and African fronts meant they had immediate and close threats those borders.

As it was many in Germany refused to believe they'd lost the war and blamed politicians for betraying Germany, creating the situation where the carpet muncher could rise to power.

PS I forgot to add that the introduction of the US troops in force was also a big factor, and are probably why Germany surrendered in November 1918, instead of trying to hold out into 1919, as many of the generals and government wanted to do. I don't know what miracles they were expecting, and it reminds me of to the failure to grasp reality that prevailed in 1944-45.

I thought the prospect of US troops arriving in big numbers was the reason Germany went on the offensive in Spring 1918.
Ludendorff ask for an ending of the war as the German Army was surrendering in huge numbers, and he feared that the army would not be able to secure Germany against civil uprising. The black friday of the german army on the 8th of august had shown that a collapse of the army was possible.

I thought the prospect of US troops arriving in big numbers was the reason Germany went on the offensive in Spring 1918.

Agreed. That's one message that is the same across the different books I've read. The Germans needed a quick fix, for the reasons you gave and also for the threat of an uprising if Germany had to endure another "turnip winter". It backfired badly, which is the biggest danger of desperation plays.

The capture of western Poland, Ukraine, etc produced the food, but the damage done to the transportation corridors- in particular railways and canals- meant getting enough food out was going to be a problem. Plus they couldn't trust the Russians to keep to the treaty if they stripped too many troops for the Western Front.

No it did it's job

The Hindenburg Line was already an admission of failure. It was only a small piece of the entire Western Front defensive system. It was needed, however, because the defence-in-depth in the Somme area was failing and the French were regaining territory in the Verdun area. There were huge debates before the decision was taken because the political implications were clear. Once work got underway, it was a massive drain on resources. Ultimately the line was not fully completed.

Defence-in-depth was well known to the Germans before the line was built. At the time work got underway, there was a lot of debate going on around the concepts of elastic defence and the empty battlefield. These concepts had limited impact on the design. Indeed the work of von Lossberg in formulating these concepts was never fully accepted.

The primary purpose of the line was to shorten the defensive front and free up more divisions. Desultory attacks were made when the Allies reached the line during early 1917. The scorched earth tactics and the limited Allied logistic resources in this sector meant that no serious attacks were made until the Battle of Cambrai in late 1917. The line was still incomplete in this sector when the British attacked. They broke through the line but could not break out.

Attacks were made elsewhere throughout most of 1917. The Hindenburg Line was largely ignored with the attacks in Chemin des Dames, Amiens and Ypres areas. The latter was particularly important because the British, Dominion and French forces were able to systematically progress uphill until Passchendaele was reached. The defensive strategy of von Lossberg failed. German military leadership realised that they had to take the initiative in early 1918 because American forces were flooding into France, with more to come.

By the time the Hindenburg Line was targeted again, the logistics support was so good that British, American and French forces under Foch could maintain almost continuous pressure on the German lines with a rolling series of assaults. The Hindenburg Line was broken in several places, along with breaks into other lines elsewhere on the front, such as the St Mihiel Salient for example.

Robert

A good summary, Robert.

Thanks Robert — that's a fair and well-argued summary.

I think the Hindenburg Line made sense as a response to an already deteriorating situation but could never compensate for the broader operational and strategic problems Germany faced by 1918. Once Allied logistics, coordination, and pressure reached that level, the outcome was effectively decided regardless of the defensive system in place.

An interesting discussion and some good points raised all round.