"UK Forces and Automatic Firepower" Topic

Put quite simply, I do not understand the comparative lack of tripod-mounted, belt-fed machineguns in the UK WW2 TO&E.

First some quick generic numbers:

Looking at *paper* TO&E of

U.S. Infantry Division

Rifle companies in division: 27
M1917 heavy MG platoons: 18
M1919 "light" MG platoons: 14*

Total of 32 for 27 companies, for a ratio of 1.2

German Infantry Division (I know, AS IF there was a standard…)

Rifle companies in division: 27
MG34/42 tripod "heavy" MG platoons: 14**

Total of 14 for 27 companies, for a ratio of .5

UK Infantry Division

Rifle companies in division: 36
Vickers tripod "heavy" MG platoons: 12

Total of 12 for 36 companies, for a ration of .33

* most commonly assigned as 27 2-gun sections in rifle company's weapons platoon, so this is the 4-gun platoon equivalent.

** actually 9 platoons but each with 6 guns each instead of the 4 of the others.
================================

Obviously my numbers above are relatively "hogwashy" – us Yanks put MGs, usually .50cals, on everything that could possibly move, and plenty of things that didn't. The Germans had the first real GPMG and could tripod it or not as needed and so really what's the difference between the squad or company weapons. Plus the Germans had about a million different TO&Es so the idea of a standard is kind of a joke.

But not only did the Brits seemingly not have any Vickers organic to brigades or companies, their companies didn't even have a true heavy weapons platoon. Sure, a few 2" mortars and Brens attached to the HQ, but everyone else had the equivalent, in addition to the HW platoon for the company.

AND the Brits unshipped all the .50cals from the Lend-Lease stuff that came with them and warehoused them. No extra MG FP from halftracks or the like. Yes, they had oodles of Universal/Bren carriers, but those are still Bren guns, not Vickers (right?)

So I think the ratios are a useful place to ask my question from: Why that gap – and IMO it's a BIG gap – between the LMGs of the sections and the relatively few Vickers?

Secondary question: were the MG platoons of the MG Battalion assigned relatively permanently to brigades or battalions, or were they truly kept as a divisional asset?

Thanks!!

-dale

The 1941 -42 Infantry Division had 48 Vickers MMG's in the MG Battalion.
The 1943 – 45 Infantry Division had 36 Vickers MMG's in the MG Battalion.
This is from link

Doctrinal differences.

Brits prized marksmanship and had miserly ammunition scales – this suited their usual job of policing an empire. They were also the first fully-mechanised army, and enjoyed good radio provision. The radios could call in masses of artillery at formation level, and mortars at local level.

The Germans appear to have built their infantry squads around their MGs – probably enjoying crew-served weapons dynamics. They needed them too – lower quantities of artillery.

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There is a battle essay by Col Lionel Wigram – he describes the fighting in Sicily and talks about grouping the platoons brens together to shoot-in the attack, which took place using bayonets and grenades. He also notes that it was rare to hear brens and mgs firing at the same time.

This essary is an example belt-fed mgs being countered by magazine-fed light mgs.

The pre-war British Infantry Division, as outlined in 1936 or so, anticipated the new Infantry Brigade would have three inf (Rifle) Bns, each with 36 LMGs across its 16 Rifle Pls, and one Inf (MG) Bn with 36 MMGs and 16 towed 2-pr atk guns.

Early experience with the Bren showed it provided much better firepower than might have been expected; it was initially thought the MMGs would provide assault fire and the Brens would be utilised in defensive situations. Also the major expansion in Inf formations seen at the end of the 1930s put the requirement of three MG Bns per Div into sharp relief. The end result for the BEF in 1940 was that the MG Bns became Corps/GHQ units, that would be allotted to Divs as required (also the establishment of Atk Regts by the RA meant the 2-prs went to those units, allowing D Coy in each MG Bn to become an MMG unit).

Experience in 1940/41 did not indicate, at least not that I've seen mentioned anywhere, that the centralisation of MMGs in a dedicated Bn in any way prohibited the Inf Bns. MMG Pls or Coys could be allocated to Bdes and Bns for set piece assaults and Inf bns also had their own LMG reserve in the shape of the Carrier Pl.

There was much discussion on the introduction of Support Bns into the Divisional structure, planned from late 1942 but not instituted until into 1943. This did raise the question of whether each Inf bn should be given a Pl of MMGs, though there was no corresponding increase in manpower if this was done. That meant taking some personnel away from their original duties to man any MMGs issued to Bns, and also increased the transport requirements for guns, eqpt and ammunition.

In Italy, Inf Bns were given four MMGs each (which for some units was a holdover of coming from the UK in Divs that did not yet have Sp Bns). They did have to re-role pers to man them, and were already suffering from shortfalls in reinforcements.

The MG Bn did survive into the end of the 1940s, before the continual downsizing of the Army meant they could no longer be supported, so around 1949 the MMGs were permanently issued to Inf Bns, with six being added to the Carrier Pl, which shortly thereafter became the MG Pl.

It is different from the US approach, which (no honestly) does not make it flat out wrong. The Red Army kept an MG Bn in Rifle divs to supplement Rifle Regt HMGs until into 1942, before they had to cut back, and the German Army went on to introduce standalone MG Bns in the late war period.

Gary

To add to Garys comments, the British rifle battalions had 36 LMGs in the rifle companies and an extra 12 LMGs in the carrier platoon, for a total of 48 LMGs in the battalion (52 if you include the AAMG platoon). The carrier platoon also had another three 2" mortars so the battalion had six 2" mortars and six 3" ones.

What might be 'weapons platoons' in other countries armies were rolled into the support company and carrier platoon. The British battalion also had four rifle companies and not three, so they all end up broadly comparable.

The support battalion of Vickers mgs and 4.2" mortars would be parceled outas required.

…and enjoyed good radio provision. The radios could call in masses of artillery at formation level, and mortars at local level.

The radios were also useful for adjusting indirect MG fire, which the British/Commonwealth used extensively. The Vickers was a champion at this and could dominate a fair bit of geography with decent FOOs.

Both the Brits and Germans had excellent LMGs.
So the need for Heavy MGs would be less.
The Brit habit of pulling off the .50 cal, reduced the need for 2 different caliber machine gun ammo.

Also, worth remembering that, doctrinally, the US .50s were provided for air defence, not infantry fire support. No matter that US troops used them most of the time for the latter. So if one is comparing organisations, the .50" is a bit of a red herring.

Also, the Bren meant that British infantry sections had a far superior LMG compared to US squads. One can argue the virtues of the MG34/42 compared to the Bren, but the latter was probably the better weapon for infantry on the offensive in the second half of the war.

There may also have been an element of hangover from WW1. The Vickers in 1914 had been the machine-gun issued to the infantry battalion. As trench war developed, it was far to heavy to advance reliably with attacking infantry through the mud. The Lewis Gun was becoming widely available, so all the Vickers were withdrawn from infantry battalions, infantry platoons got a Lewis Gun section, and the Vickers went to the new Machine-Gun Corps where they excelled at mass, sometimes indirect, barrage fire to support the infantry battalions.

That was why the inter-war focus was on finding an LMG to replace the Lewis, culminating in the Bren. I had the privilege forty years ago of knowing a former Welsh Guards officer, who as a young soldier had taken part in the field trials of the Bren having just passed out from Depot a few weeks before…

Oh, and the Vickers could be mounted in the Universal Carrier with a capability for firing from the vehicle, though obviously dismounting and emplacing the weapon was the preferred solution.

On another note on British organisationi, the Motor Battalion (found in Armoured Brigade) in late war configuration contains two Vickers MG platoons (each of four guns, with Universal Carrier for transport) in the battalion support company (alongside twelve anti-tank guns).

Also the three motor companies of the battalion themselves were moderately well-stocked with firepower; according to TOE each had 22 Bren guns, eight PIATs, six 2" mortars and two 3" mortars.

Also, the Bren meant that British infantry sections had a far superior LMG compared to US squads.

On a 1:1 comparison, absolutely as the BAR is not a LMG. However, three fire teams in a squad each with a BAR gave more tactical flexibility for fire & maneuver and other tactics – that's my opinion. I'll start a new topic on this.

Wolfhag

I thought there was only 1 BAR per section (squad)?

There was for the US Army, USMC progressed through 1, 2 and finally 3 per Squad. Probably best to see the new topic when it's started.

Another interesting British Army organisation is the para battalion, which had two mortar platoons (four 3" mortars each), one of which could substitute its mortars with Vickers MGs instead.

A few more idle thoughts, having looked back at my piece on the MG Battalion WE in 21 Army Group.

There was a distinct desire in 1942 to move to a new Support Bn organisation that was largely predicated on 4.2-in mortars and 20-mm LAA guns. The drafts for the early version of the WEs are sadly lost but available summaries show they were based on these two weapons. For the Inf Bde Sp Coy on the 1942 plan there were three 20-mm Pls (four guns each) and three 4.2-in Mrtr Pls (four mortars each), with no provision for MMGs. Two MG Bns, on the then standard four Coys of 12 MMGs each WE, were to be retained, while Armd, Mixed and Inf Divs would all receive one Sp Coy per Inf Bde. Div HQ level Sp Coys were effectively LAA units, with four Pls each of six 20-mm guns, plus Def and Emp Pls for Inf Div HQs.

That reorg was limited to Home Forces and did not necessarily come to pass (primarily I think due to constant issues with the 20-mm) and new WEs for the Support Bn were published in the summer of 1943. That gave the Bde Sp Gp three Coys, with 12 MMGs, 8x 4.2-in mortars and 16x 20-mm guns each. It came too late for the Inf Divs that went over for TORCH, so they took four MMGs in each Inf Bn with crews and transport to be taken from existing resources.

Commander-in-Chief of 21 Army Group did not like the Sp Bn concept and by early 1944 the units of this type in his command started to revert to MG Bns, with the standard 12 MMGs per MG Coy in three Coys and 16x 4.2-in mortars in the fourth. A letter from Feb 1944 noted that the change was driven by;

"the desirability of concentrating all the available support weapons in a division in order to obtain the necessary weight of fire power behind the attacking infantry…
Increasing air supremacy and the lack of a self destroying projectile for the 20 mm has rendered it unnecessary and undesirable to have to have 20 mm support for infantry in the fwd areas".

That first paragraph is important because it underlines the fact that the MG Bns, in old or revised format, were treated as being used as a Divisional asset, and not as an admin HQ with the MG Coys and Pls being routinely attached to Bdes/Bns. Anything from an MG Pl to an MG Coy could be used in support of an attack by a single Inf Bn, and likewise the 4.2-in mortars when they appeared.

There was an Infantry Commanders Conference in Nov 1945 that looked at the WEs used by Inf Bns and Bdes and the majority opinion was that the MG Bn in its final version (MMGs and 4.2s) had proven to be a satisfactory organisation. There was some support for Mixed Coys of MMGs and mortars. Re the Inf Bn, there was a desire to reduce the 'multiplicity' of weapons its personnel were expected to handle (LMGs, 2-in and 3-in mortars, 6-pr atk guns, PIATs) and no immediate wish to add MMGs to the mix. As mentioned above, it was around 1949 when it became impossible to justify distinct Inf units for MMGs and 42-n mortars, which had then to go to Inf Bns and the RA respectively.

Gary

Happy US Thanksgiving to all and a big Thank You for all the replies.

I tried to be very clear that I was addressing the gap – as perceived by me – at the company level regarding organic firepower. I will happily stipulate that in large part infantry TO&Es were built relatively similarly: everyone's infantry battalions had some AT assets, some 76mm – 82mm mortars, and accepting that MG battalion gun platoons attached, similar numbers of "heavy" MGs. (There is room for discussion about supporting light mortars here too, but the 2" doesn't come out near the top there either.)

But everyone but the UK also had organic HW platoons in addition to that at the company level. As pointed out, what the UK DID have was the carrier platoon carting around a ridiculous number of Brens :)

Do those close that gap I see? Someone above mentions the Bren being used to shoot in attacks. I know it was a great LMG, but was it THAT great?

I'm not very well-read on UK stuff compared to U.S. or Germans, or even the Red Army – were there complaints from the soldiers on the ground about not having enough suppressive fire available to them? Or was everything hunky-dory?

The Bren guns at infantry battallion level were not restricted to rifle companies and carrier platoon – also the anti-tank gun platoon had six of them (one per gun crew), and the battalion HQ company had a few stuck somewhere in the back of a truck (or lorry), in case they might be needed. By official TOE, there should be 63 Bren guns in a 1944 infantry battalion.

And the Bren guns were not restricted to the infantry battalions only – hundreds of them were spread across other elements of an infantry division. Probably the largest concentration of these was in the divisional recce regiment. I do not have details on the distribution over the other elements, though I recall RA regiments being issued with a decent number for self-defense.

Besides bipod or vehicular mount (e.g. on carrier), Bren gun could be also placed on tripod mount, which could also be converted into an AA mount. Use of tripod mount did not necessitate the removal of the bipod, and the Bren gun could be very easily removed from the tripod for ordinary use. However, the tripods did weight a bit (about the same as the gun itself), they were issued in limited numbers and were probably on their best in defensive situation, where they could be set to fire on "fixed lines" under limited visibility conditions.

Well in my experience, and I have looked at a few such documents, the Weapons Platoon at Company level, and distinctly different from the Battalion Heavy Weapons Company, was a pretty US centric feature, and even then not universally applied.

The German Inf Bn underwent a good half dozen reorgs from 1937 to 1945, all of which saw some reallocation of support weapons within its subunits. The KStN never officially authorised a Weapons Pl to the standard Rifle Coy, but vacillated between a pair of HMGs in the pre-war, then all HMGs and 8-cm mortars in the MG Coy from circa 1940 , then a pair of 8-cm mortars to Rifle Coys (though only when replaced by 12-cm mortars in the MG Coy during 1943), then back to a pair of HMGs in 1944 (with the 8-cm mortars concentrated back in the Hy Coy), while the Volks Grenadiers saw all HMGs back in Hy Coy with the 8-cm mortars, and the 12-cms kicked up to Regtl level.

The US model of a Wpns Pl in the Rifle Coy, then a Hy Wpns Coy in the Inf Bn, then a Cannon Coy in the Inf Regt is the most deliberate progression I can think of in terms of having both MG and HE fire support at each level of organisation. The use of not one but two distinct types of belt-fed MG (I'll likewise swerve .50-cals as they were for AA use, and using them against ground targets was at unit discretion) and the absence of sustained automatic fire capability (achieved via barrel change) in the Rifle Pls, did to an extent create the framework for three layers of fire support. For the British (and Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and South African Armies, and the Indian Army) to emulate it would have been difficult, as it meant either more LMGs outside the Rifle Pls, and a new midrange mortar, or moving the MMGs much further forward in org structure.

I would also note that the US Armored Inf and Parachute Inf did not conform to the standard Inf model, having no Coy level Wpns subunit, and devolving both M1919s and 60-mms out to the Rifle Pls. It was only the US Glider Inf that had a Wpns Pl in the Rifle Coys.

The USMC followed similar practice to the US Inf Regt until the 1944 reorganisation, then deleted the Hy Wpns Coy and incorporated both LMGs and HMGs in the Rifle Coys within a distinct platoon, and put the 60-mm and 81-mm mortars more directly under Coy and Bn commander control respectively.

As to whether the British Army emerged from the war thinking they were deficient in terms of firepower at subunit level, the various Standardization and commanders conferences held after the war do not support this. The Inf Bn WE introduced in early 1943 was judged to have proven sound and capable across campaigns in Italy and NWE, and formed the basis for the unit well into the 1950s. The key call was for more riflemen, not more MGs, to sustain Sec and Pls better. There was a recognition that a sustained fire weapon that was substantially lighter and so more mobile than the Vickers MMG was required, but not at the cost of capability.

The closest I think you can get to a 'Weapons' Pl for the British Inf Bn is in the perceived use of the Carrier Pl, with a Sec of three vehicles attached to a Rifle Coy in the Main Effort role, which added the equivalent of a fourth rifle Pl in terms of support weapons only; three LMGs, a 2-in mortar and a PIAT, but no extra riflemen.

Gary

Getting back to the original topic of calculating MG platoon ratios, it is worth keeping in mind that not all of the battalions and companies were in the front line. Common deployment for a triangular division, such as the British infantry division, would be to have two infantry brigades to the fore and one to the rear as a reserve. And those two brigades at the front would similarly deploy two battalions to the front and one to the rear as reserve. So out of the nine infantry battalions in the division, four are actually in the front line.

If the divisional commander assigns the divisional MG battalion to be evenly allocated to support those four battalions, each one will receive in support two Vickers MG platoons and one 4.2" mortar platoon (and there will still be one MG platoon left over). And that is if you split those units evenly across the front line.

BTW. For a unit with lots of MG firepower, the early Red Army had rifle battalion had a total of 36 DP LMGs (one per rifle squad) and 18 water-cooled Maxim MGs (2 per rifle company, plus 12 in a MG company).

Oh I agree that there were oodles of Brens at HQs, with AT units, etc. But again, everyone else did that too so that's really a wash. I'm not saying the UK battalions had no MG firepower, I'm wondering why they had so little officially TO&Ed at the battalion where "everyone else" *did* have some.

And from my (limited) reading the carrier platoons had lots of tasks, and not all of them included putting their Brens in the line for FP support.

So even with the MG BN attached out there's still some missing FP in there, IMO.

I need to read more on the artillery too. I've just started Moberg's "Gunfire: British Artillery in World War II" so that should help me with arty.

Thanks again guys. Always fun researching stuff for game design, right?

You might also want to view the mammoth work of the late Nigel Evans, who was a gunner himself.

britishartillery.co.uk

@Starfury Rider

Thanks! I will!

Raising this one from the dead a bit. I was yakking with a buddy on this topic and a question related to this topic occurred that I can't answer:

In WW2, how common was it for a Brit section to "acquire" unofficial weapons?

The lazy example I can think of is US squads permanently "acquiring" extra BARs or in the case of Airborne or Armored Infantry, adding one to their TOE before it became standardized.

Is that unique? A BAR would be easy – you already have the ammo and probably already have some spare parts lying around. Did Brit sections carry extra BRENs sometimes? Keep an odd Sten or 2 in Johnson's kit because that boy is huge and can pack the extra gear?

I am curious.

I think it was No.3 Commando that doubled their allocation of LMGs from four per Troop to eight, then by giving two to each Sub-section (equivalent of a Rifle Section) ahead of Normandy. That was though done before the landings. Trouble with doubling MGs of any type is that it doubles the ammunition requirements, and either increases the load of the riflemen or reduces the number to act as riflemen. Also needs a lot more spares than the unit is authorised to keep the extras working.

The main period of Commonwealth forces systematically acquiring foreign weapons was in the Western Desert, especially during and after Operation Compass, when vast quantities of Italian weaponry was captured. Perhaps not so much small arms, but mortars and light artillery were used widely, and the 6th and 9th Australian Divisions famously equipped their divisional cavalry with Italian tanks. The 20mm Breda was greatly prized as a light AA and AT gun, used by both RHA batteries and to up gun Marmon-Herrington armoured cars.

At the other end of the spectrum, George Macdonald Fraser famously confessed to throwing his hated Thompson into a river and replacing it with a casualty's Lee Enfield in Burma. The point being that a soldier might fire his weapon 1% of the time in the jungle but has to carry it 100% of the time… I suspect the same logic might apply in other environments; airborne forces or those engaged in street fighting might collect extra weapons, especially automatics, when fixed in place, but relinquish or ditch them once they start having to carry them long distances. The example of3 Cdo above matches that: extra LMGs for a beach assault, less attractive once you start advancing inland.

Excellent point!

And yet the Germans upped the ratio of machine-guns in a platoon as the war went on, and, as I think someone mentioned above (and I read in, I think, the Osprey on the US half Track), it was common for Armored Infantry to swap their tankers' jackets for BARs, which were not in their TOE.

Cheers,
John